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BARTIK v. RUSSIA - 55565/00 [2006] ECHR 1139 (21 December 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/1139.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 1139
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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF
BARTIK v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 55565/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21
December 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Bartik v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs F. Tulkens,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A.
Kovler,
Mrs E. Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev, judges,
and
Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 November 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application (no. 55565/00) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Arkadiy Mikhaylovich
Bartik (“the applicant”), on 23 February 2000.
The
applicant was represented before the Court by Mrs M. Voskobitova,
a lawyer with the International Protection Centre in Moscow. The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
The
applicant alleged, in particular, a violation of his right to leave
his own country.
By
decision of 16 September 2004, the Court declared the application
partly admissible.
The applicant and the Government each filed
observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided,
after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was
required (Rule 59 § 3 in fine).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1954 and at the material time lived in the
Moscow Region. He now lives in the United States of America.
In
1977 the applicant started working for a construction and design
agency “Raduga” (GMKB “Raduga”), a
State corporation that developed rocket and space devices. He signed
an undertaking not to disclose classified information.
On
16 May 1989 the applicant signed a new undertaking, the relevant part
of which reads as follows:
“I, [the applicant], undertake:
(a) not to disclose information containing
State and professional secrets that are entrusted to me or that I
learn by virtue of my service (work) duties...
...
(c) not to visit embassies, missions,
consulates or other representative offices of foreign States, and not
to contact – directly or through others – foreigners
without the consent of the management of the agency I work for or the
relevant Soviet authorities...
I have been informed of the prohibition on travel
abroad, except as permitted by relevant laws and regulations...”
On 31 January 1994 the applicant signed a new
undertaking which read as follows:
“I, [the applicant], on assuming my work duties at
the Raduga design agency, undertake:
(a) not to disclose information containing
State and professional secrets entrusted to me or coming to my
attention by virtue of my service (work) duties;
(b) to abide by the applicable requirements
laid down in the orders, instructions and regulations concerning the
secrecy of the studies conducted, of which I have taken cognisance;
(c) to notify the department of the
enterprise responsible for secrecy arrangements or the competent
authorities of any attempts by outsiders to obtain secret information
from me;
(d) to inform the human resources department
in a comprehensive and timely fashion of any change in my personal
circumstances. To inform the department responsible for secrecy
arrangements of any contacts with my relatives permanently living
abroad or planning to take up permanent residence abroad, or of any
non-professional contacts with foreigners.
In the event of my dismissal I undertake to abide
strictly by requirements (a) and (c) above...”
On
20 August 1996 the applicant resigned.
In
early 1997 the applicant's father, who lived in Germany, fell ill.
Wishing to visit his father, the applicant applied to the Passports
and Visas Service of the Department of the Interior of Dubna for a
travel passport, the identity document which entitles Russian
citizens to leave the country and travel abroad (zagranichnyi
pasport).
On
17 March 1997 the head of the Passports and Visas Service refused the
applicant's request. The entire text of the decision read as follows:
“As there exist grounds for a temporary
restriction on your right to leave the Russian Federation as set out
in section 15 of the Act on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving
the Russian Federation, your application for a travel passport has
been declined until 2001 further to a recommendation (zakluchenie)
by the Raduga design agency of 20 February 1997 (registration number
6/209/23324)”.
The
applicant contested the refusal before the Interagency commission for
the examination of Russian citizens' complaints in connection with
restrictions on their right to leave the Russian Federation
(Mezhvedomstvennaya komissiya po rassmotreniyu obrashcheniy
grazhdan RF v svyazi s ogranicheniyami ikh prava na vyezd iz RF –
“the Commission”). On 24 February 1998 the Commission
informed the applicant that it had unanimously upheld the imposition
of a five-year restriction. The letter did not indicate the reasons
for the decision.
The
applicant appealed against the decision of the Commission to the
Moscow City Court.
On
24 September 1999 the Moscow City Court gave judgment. It found that
on 22 April 1977, 16 May 1989 and 31 January 1994 the applicant had
signed undertakings not to disclose State secrets; the 1989
undertaking also contained a clause restricting the applicant's right
to leave the country. Having examined a report on the applicant's
knowledge of State secrets (zakluchenie ob osvedomlennosti v
gosudarstvennykh sekretakh) of 20 February 1997, drawn up by the
applicant's former employer and confirmed by the Aviation and Space
Industry Department and the State Secrets Protection Department of
the Ministry of Economy at the request of the Passports and Visas
Service, the court found as follows:
“According to the report... [the applicant] in his
work used workbooks bearing inventory nos. 5301 and 4447 that
contained extracts from top-secret documents (nos. ...). In respect
of some inventory numbers, requests were sent to the design
enterprises [in order] to verify whether the information contained
therein was still sensitive. However, no response was received.
Moreover, the court questioned a witness, Mr K., the deputy General
Director responsible for the regime and for security at the Raduga
agency, who confirmed that the information contained in the documents
that had been drawn up in the Raduga agency had retained its
top-secret classification and was still sensitive... As the witness
Mr K. clarified to the court, there are no grounds for changing the
secrecy classification of this information...”
On
these grounds the court determined that the restriction on the
applicant's right to leave the Russian Federation until 14 August
2001 was lawful and justified.
On
9 November 1999 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld
the City Court's judgment, finding that it had been properly
justified and reasoned.
The
restriction on the applicant's right to leave the country expired on
14 August 2001.
On
25 October 2001 the applicant was issued with a travel passport
and subsequently took up residence in the United States of America.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The USSR Act on the Procedure for Entering and
Leaving the USSR (USSR Law no. 2177-I of 20 May 1991 – “the
USSR Act”)
The USSR Act provided that USSR citizens could only
leave the country with a travel passport issued by a competent body
(section 1). A travel passport could be refused, in particular,
if the person had knowledge of State secrets or was subject to other
contractual obligations prohibiting his departure from the USSR
(section 7 § 1). An appeal lay against a refusal to a special
commission of the Cabinet of Ministers and from there to a court
(Section 8).
Pursuant to section 12, “restrictions
[concerning international travel] [were to be] brought to citizens'
attention by the management of enterprises, institutions,
organisations... on their enrolment for work or study... that
entailed access to State secrets. Before such access [could be]
authorised, a written employment contract [had to] be signed on a
voluntary basis...”
The
USSR Act remained in force until 19 August 1996 when it was replaced
by the Russian Act described below.
B. The Act on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving
the Russian Federation (Law no. 114-FZ of 15 August 1996 –
“the Russian Act”)
Section 2 provides that the right of a Russian citizen
to leave the Russian Federation may only be restricted on the grounds
of, and in accordance with, the procedure set out in the Act. Section
15 (1) provides that the right of a Russian national to leave the
Russian Federation may be temporarily restricted if he or she has had
access to especially important or top-secret information classified
as a State secret and has signed an employment contract providing for
a temporary restriction on his or her right to leave the Russian
Federation. In such cases the restriction is valid until the date set
out in the contract, but for no longer than five years from the date
the person last had access to especially important or top-secret
information. The Interagency Commission for the Protection of State
Secrets can extend this period up to a maximum of ten years.
C. The State Secrets Act (Law no. 5485-1 of 21 July
1993)
The granting of access to State secrets presupposes
the consent of the person concerned to partial and temporary
restrictions on his or her rights in accordance with section 24 of
the Act (section 21).
The
rights of persons who have been granted access to State secrets may
be restricted. The restrictions may affect their right to travel
abroad during the period stipulated in the work contract, their right
to disseminate information about the State secrets and their right to
respect for their private life (section 24).
III. RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE DOCUMENTS
The relevant part of Opinion no. 193 (1996) on
Russia's request for membership of the Council of Europe, adopted by
the Parliamentary Assembly on 25 January 1996 (7th Sitting), reads as
follows:
“10. The Parliamentary Assembly notes
that the Russian Federation shares fully its understanding and
interpretation of commitments entered into... and intends:
...
xv. to cease to restrict – with immediate effect
– international travel of persons aware of state secrets, with
the exception of those restrictions which are generally accepted in
Council of Europe member states...”
The
Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 4 to the Convention (ETS No. 46)
indicates that the Committee of Experts on Human Rights set up by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe endorsed the changes
bringing the text of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in conformity with
that of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, cited below (see, in particular, points 7 and 12 of
the Report).
IV. SITUATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES
The laws of the founding members of the Council of
Europe have not restricted the right of their nationals to go abroad
for private purposes since the inception of the organisation. The
Schengen Agreement, which was originally signed on 14 June 1985
by five States and has to date been implemented by fifteen States,
has removed border posts and checks in much of the Western part of
Europe and abolished any outstanding restrictions on international
travel.
Many other Contracting States, including, in
particular, the former Socialist countries, repealed restrictions on
international travel by persons having knowledge of “State
secrets”, a common legacy of the Socialist regime, during the
process of democratic transition (for example, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). At present certain
restrictions on persons who were aware of “State secrets”
but wish to go abroad have endured in only a few States that were
once part of the Soviet Union. Of those, two member States (Armenia
and Ukraine) provide for temporary restrictions on permanent
emigration – but not on international travel for private
purposes – by persons who had access to “State secrets”
and one member State (Azerbaijan) also restricts private
international travel by such individuals.
V. RELEVANT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), to which the Russian
Federation is a party, defines the right to freedom of movement in
the following terms:
“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a
State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to
any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the
present Covenant.”
General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement (Article
12), adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40 § 4
of the ICCPR on 2 November 1999 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9), reads as
follows:
“1. Liberty of movement is an indispensable
condition for the free development of a person...
2. The permissible limitations which may be imposed on
the rights protected under article 12 must not nullify the principle
of liberty of movement, and are governed by the requirement of
necessity provided for in article 12, paragraph 3, and by the need
for consistency with the other rights recognized in the Covenant.
...
8. Freedom to leave the territory of a State may not be
made dependent on any specific purpose or on the period of time the
individual chooses to stay outside the country. Thus travelling
abroad is covered, as well as departure for permanent emigration...
...
9... Since international travel usually requires
appropriate documents, in particular a passport, the right to leave a
country must include the right to obtain the necessary travel
documents. The issuing of passports is normally incumbent on the
State of nationality of the individual. The refusal by a State to
issue a passport or prolong its validity for a national residing
abroad may deprive this person of the right to leave the country of
residence and to travel elsewhere...
...
11. Article 12, paragraph 3, provides for exceptional
circumstances in which rights under paragraphs 1 and 2 may be
restricted...
...
14. Article 12, paragraph 3, clearly indicates that it
is not sufficient that the restrictions serve the permissible
purposes; they must also be necessary to protect them. Restrictive
measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they must
be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the
least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the
desired result; and they must be proportionate to the interest to be
protected.
...
16. States have often failed to show that the
application of their laws restricting the rights enshrined in article
12, paragraphs 1 and 2, are in conformity with all requirements
referred to in article 12, paragraph 3. The application of
restrictions in any individual case must be based on clear legal
grounds and meet the test of necessity and the requirements of
proportionality. These conditions would not be met, for example, if
an individual were prevented from leaving a country merely on the
ground that he or she is the holder of 'State secrets'...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL NO. 4
The
applicant complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of the Russian
authorities' refusal to issue him with a passport to travel abroad.
The relevant parts of that provision read as follows:
“2. Everyone shall be free to leave any
country, including his own.
3. No restrictions shall be placed on the
exercise of [this] right other than such as are in accordance with
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre
public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”
A. The applicant's status as a “victim” of
the alleged violation
The
Government submitted that “at present there [were] no legal
grounds to apply the Convention provisions” to the applicant's
situation, since he had taken up permanent residence in the USA.
In
so far as the Government's statement may be understood as a challenge
to the applicant's status as a “victim” of the alleged
violation, the Court reiterates that an applicant will only cease to
have standing as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 if the
national authorities have acknowledged the alleged violations either
expressly or in substance and then afforded redress (see Guisset
v. France, no. 33933/96, §§ 66-67, ECHR 2000-IX). A
decision or measure favourable to the applicant is in principle not
sufficient to deprive him of his status as a victim in the absence of
such acknowledgement and redress (see Constantinescu v. Romania,
no. 28871/95, § 40, ECHR 2000-VIII).
The Court observes that the applicant was issued with
a travel passport and became able to travel abroad only after expiry
of the full five year period during which he had been denied the
right to leave Russia on the ground of his past awareness of “State
secrets”. No domestic authority has acknowledged the alleged
violation of his right to leave his own country during that period
and the applicant has not received any compensation or other redress
for that restriction. The Court further notes that, in so far as the
alleged violation of the applicant's individual right was brought
about through the application of general legal provisions restricting
foreign travel by persons having knowledge of “State secrets”
(see paragraph 22 above), those provisions have remained in force to
this day.
In
these circumstances the applicant may still claim to be a “victim”
of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
B. Existence of an interference
The
applicant claimed that the Russian authorities' refusal to issue him
with an identity document for travelling abroad had interfered with
his right to leave his own country.
The
Court reiterates that in accordance with its established case-law,
the right of freedom of movement as guaranteed by paragraphs 1 and 2
of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 is intended to secure to any person a
right to liberty of movement within a territory and to leave that
territory, which implies a right to leave for such country of the
person's choice to which he may be admitted (see Napijalo
v. Croatia, no. 66485/01, § 68, 13 November
2003, with further references). It follows that liberty of movement
prohibits any measure liable to infringe that right or to restrict
the exercise thereof which does not satisfy the requirement of a
measure which can be considered as “necessary in a democratic
society” in the pursuit of the legitimate aims referred to in
the third paragraph of this Article (ibid.). In particular, a
measure by means of which an individual is denied the use of an
identity document which, had he so wished, would have permitted him
to leave the country, amounts to an interference within the meaning
of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see Napijalo, cited
above, §§ 69 and 73; Baumann v. France, no.
33592/96, § 62, ECHR 2001 V; and Timishev v. Russia
(dec.), nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, 30 March 2004). The United
Nations Human Rights Committee, examining the scope of Contracting
Parties' obligations under the identically worded Article 12 of the
ICCPR, also expressed the opinion that “the right to leave a
country must include the right to obtain the necessary travel
documents” (see point 9 of General Comment No. 27, paragraph 30
above).
Accordingly,
the Court finds that the applicant's right to leave his own country
was restricted in a manner amounting to an interference within the
meaning of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
C. Justification for the interference
1. The applicable test
The
Court has next to determine whether the interference complained about
was justified. It reiterates that Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No.
4, which guarantees the right to leave any country, including one's
own, must be read subject to the third paragraph of that Article,
which provides for certain restrictions that may be placed on the
exercise of that right in the interests of, inter alia,
national security or public safety. The Convention organs have
previously accepted that restrictions imposed following a failure to
comply with military service obligations (see Marangos v. Cyprus,
no. 31106/96, Commission decision of 20 May 1997), or restrictions on
the travel of a mentally ill person who had no arrangements for
appropriate care in the destination country (see Nordblad v.
Sweden, no. 19076/91, Commission decision of 13 October
1993), were permissible. The Court has dealt with the withdrawal of
travel documents and passports in applications concerning criminal
(or bankruptcy) proceedings against applicants or third parties (see,
for example, Luordo v. Italy, no. 32190/96,
ECHR 2003 IX). So far there has been no application to the
Convention institutions where a person was denied the right to travel
abroad on the sole ground of his or her knowledge of certain “State
secrets”. The applicable test is nonetheless similar: in order
to comply with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 such a restriction
must be “in accordance with the law”, pursue one or more
of the legitimate aims contemplated in paragraph 3 of the same
Article and be “necessary in a democratic society” (see
Raimondo v. Italy, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A no.
281-A, p. 19, § 39, and Napijalo, cited above, §
74).
2. Whether the restriction was “in accordance
with law”
The
applicant contended that the restriction that had been imposed was
not in accordance with the law because he had never signed a contract
of employment containing a restriction on his right to leave the
Russian Federation. The undertaking he had signed in 1994 did not
contain any such restriction.
The
Government indicated that in 1977, 1989 and 1994 the applicant had
signed undertakings not to disclose State secrets. The undertaking of
16 May 1989 also contained a clause restricting his ability to
travel abroad. The Russian Act of 15 August 1996 required agencies to
sign new employment contracts with employees having access to
sensitive information. That had not been done in the applicant's case
because the law had entered into force on 19 August 1996, that is to
say, a day before the applicant's employment ended.
The
Court notes that both the USSR and Russian Acts provided for
temporary restrictions on international travel of the persons who had
been granted access to “State secrets” (see paragraphs 19
and 22 above). A similar provision was included in the State Secrets
Act (see paragraph 23 above). The Court finds therefore that the
impugned restriction was imposed in accordance with law.
3. Whether the restriction pursued a legitimate aim
The
Government claimed that the restriction on the applicant's right to
travel abroad had been introduced in the interests of national
security and for the protection of the State's interests.
The
Court accepts that the interests of national security may be a
legitimate aim for an interference with the rights enunciated in
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
4. Whether the restriction was “necessary in a
democratic society”
The
applicant claimed that the domestic courts' approach had been
excessively formalistic and that they had relied excessively on
statements by his former employer, without analysing the necessity
for such a restriction in the light of his explanation that his
access to classified information had been virtually nil since 1989.
The
Government submitted that the applicant had worked as a team leader
in the Raduga agency. Until his resignation he had been in possession
of a “special briefcase”, a seal, a “special
notebook” and workbooks that had contained top-secret
information. On 14 August 1996 he had surrendered all these items to
the agency. That was the last date on which he had had access to
classified information. The restriction was of a temporary nature,
spanning over five years after that date.
The
Court reiterates that the test as to whether the impugned measure was
“necessary in a democratic society” involves showing that
the action taken was in pursuit of that legitimate aim, and that the
interference with the rights protected was no greater than was
necessary to achieve it. In other words, this requirement, commonly
referred to as the test of proportionality, demands that restrictive
measures should be appropriate to achieve their protective function
(compare with point 14 of the Human Rights Committee's General
Comment on Article 12 of the ICCPR, cited in paragraph 30 above).
The
Court notes at the outset that the applicant surrendered all
classified material to his employer on termination of his contract in
1996, that is, before he applied for the travel passport. The
applicant submitted that the purpose of his planned trip abroad had
been purely private and not related to his previous work, as he had
intended to visit his ailing father. This was not contested by the
respondent Government.
The
Court further observes that the Russian law on international travel
by persons with knowledge of State secrets imposed an unqualified
restriction on their right to leave Russia, whatever the purpose or
duration of their visit. Accordingly, the scope of review by the
Interagency Commission and the domestic courts was confined to
examination of the formal issue as to whether the information to
which the applicant had once had access in the Raduga design agency
was still sensitive. They did not consider whether the restriction on
the applicant's right to travel abroad for private purposes was still
necessary for achieving the legitimate aim it had been intended to
serve and whether a less restrictive measure could be applied.
The
Government did not indicate how the unqualified restriction on the
applicant's ability to travel abroad served the interests of national
security. The Court, for its part, considers that it is precisely the
link between the restrictive measure at issue and its purported
protective function that is missing. Historically, the purported
“protective function” of the impugned measure was to
prevent disclosure of classified information concerning “State
secrets”. At the time the restriction was conceived, the State
was able to control transmission of information to the outside world,
using a combination of restrictions on outgoing and incoming
correspondence, prohibition on international travel and emigration
and a ban on unsupervised contacts with foreigners within the
country. However, once the ban on personal contacts with foreigners
was removed and correspondence was no longer subject to censorship,
the necessity of restriction on international travel for private
purposes by persons aware of “State secrets” became less
obvious. In these circumstances, in so far as the ban on
international travel for private reasons purported to prevent the
applicant from communicating information to foreign nationals, in a
contemporary democratic society such a restriction fails to achieve
the protective function previously assigned to it. That view is
shared by the UN Human Rights Committee, which expressed the opinion,
in general terms, that “the test of necessity and the
requirement of proportionality... would not be met... if an
individual were prevented from leaving a country merely on the ground
that he or she is the holder of 'State secrets'” (see point 16
of General Comment no. 27, paragraph 30 above).
The
Parliamentary Assembly's Opinion on Russia's request for membership
of the Council of Europe indicates that the repeal of restrictions on
international travel for private purposes was regarded as a necessary
condition for membership of the Council of Europe, as the
organisation of States adhering to the principles of individual
freedom, political liberty and the rule of law (Preamble to the
Statute of the Council of Europe) (see paragraph 25 above). The
express mention in the Parliamentary Assembly's Opinion on Russia's
accession request of Russia's undertaking to cease restrictions on
international travel by persons with knowledge of State secrets
suggests that the Assembly did not consider the existence of such a
restriction compatible with membership of the Council of Europe.
Indeed, many Member States of the Council of Europe have never had a
comparable restriction in their legislation, whereas many others have
abolished it during the process of democratic reforms (see paragraphs
27 and 28 above). However, Russia's undertaking to abolish that
restriction has not been implemented and the relevant provisions of
domestic law have remained in force to date (see paragraphs 22 and 34
above).
Finally,
the Court observes that the restriction on the applicant's right to
leave his country was imposed for a considerable period of time, for
five years following the termination of his employment,
notwithstanding the fact that that restriction was not explicitly
mentioned in the 1994 undertaking (see paragraph 9 above). The impact
of that measure must have been particularly heavy on the applicant
because he had not been able to travel abroad since the beginning of
his employment in 1977, that is, for a total of twenty-four years.
Having
regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the
restriction on the applicant's right to leave his own country was not
“necessary in a democratic society”.
Accordingly,
there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of compensation for
non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested his claim.
The
Court accepts that the applicant suffered distress as the result of
an unjustified restriction on his ability to leave Russia. Making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant the
amount claimed, plus any tax that may be chargeable on it.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant claimed 210 US dollars (USD) in respect of costs in the
domestic proceedings and EUR 2,000 in respect of the proceedings
before the Court. The Government did not comment.
According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of
his costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these
have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. Having regard to these criteria and making a reduction on
the basis of its decision finding one of the applicant's complaints
inadmissible, the Court awards him EUR 1,600 in respect of costs in
the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings, plus any tax that may be
chargeable on this amount.
C. Default interest
The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention;
Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR
3,000 (three thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR
1,600 (one thousand six hundred euros) in respect of costs and
expenses;
(iii) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 December 2006,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
