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WIERCIGROCH v. POLAND - 14580/02 [2006] ECHR 1032 (5 December 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/1032.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 1032
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF WIERCIGROCH v. POLAND
(Application
no. 14580/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5
December 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Wiercigroch v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L.
Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 November 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 14580/02) against the
Republic of Poland lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Polish national, Mr J. Wiercigroch (“the applicant”).
The
Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz, of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
On
9 February 2006 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Bestwina.
On
18 April 1991 an action was brought before the Bielsko-Biała
District Court in which certain claimants requested the determination
of title to land. The applicant was one of the defendants in the
proceedings. He requested the court to dismiss the action, claiming
that he had title to the disputed land.
On
an unknown date the court decided to adjourn a hearing until
information from the land and mortgage register could be provided.
At
a hearing of 27 October 1991 the court decided to conduct an on site
inspection.
On
18 October 1991 the applicant requested the exclusion of the judge
from the case. On 10 February 1992 the court refused the applicant’s
request.
On
11 May 1992 the applicant requested that the proceedings be stayed
pending the completion of criminal proceedings instituted against his
neighbours, who, according to the Government’s observations,
had been charged with the offence of “distortion”.
A
hearing fixed for 13 May 1992 was adjourned.
On
18 November 1992 the court refused to stay the proceedings.
On
28 May 1992 the applicant requested the judge’s exclusion from
the case. On 6 November 1992 the court rejected the applicant’s
request.
On
an unknown date the applicant requested the exclusion of all judges
on the bench from hearing the case. On 6 November 1992 the court
rejected the applicant’s request.
At
a hearing on 1 June 1993 the court ordered an expert opinion and an
on-site inspection. The inspection was conducted on 16 June 1993 and
the expert opinion was submitted on 20 December 1993.
At
a hearing on 22 March 1994 the court requested the expert to
supplement his opinion within a one-month time-limit.
The
next hearing was adjourned owing to the failure of the expert to
comply with the court order.
A
hearing fixed for 24 May 1994 was adjourned and the claimant was
ordered to submit further documentation.
On
31 August 1994 the court stayed the proceedings owing to the parties’
failure to comply with court orders.
On
an unknown date the claimant requested the court to resume the
proceedings. The court refused the claimant’s request as it had
been lodged outside the time-limit.
On
15 December 1994 the court ordered another expert opinion.
On 12
May 1995 the court decided to resume the proceedings and to conduct
another on-site inspection.
On
1 June 1995 the applicant applied to the court to have seven more
witnesses examined.
On
2 June 1995 an expert opinion was submitted.
At
a hearing on 4 October 1995 the parties were ordered to submit
further documentation.
On
10 October 1995 the Bielsko-Biała District Court gave a judgment
by which it found that one of the claimants was the owner of the land
in question. On 27 December 1995 the applicant appealed to the
Bielsko-Biała Regional Court. On 16 February 1996 he requested
the judge’s exclusion from the case. He also applied to the
court to have another five witnesses examined.
On
26 February 1996 the court rejected the applicant’s requests.
On
12 March 1996 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court quashed the
judgment of 10 October 1995 and referred the case back.
On
5 June 1996 a hearing was held before the Bielsko-Biała District
Court.
On
21 August 1996 the court conducted an on-site inspection.
On
22 August 1996 the proceedings were stayed as the claimant had died
and his successors had to be identified.
On
21 January 1997 another hearing was held.
Subsequently,
the applicant requested the court to exclude the judge from the case;
he also applied to the court to have additional witnesses examined.
On
17 February 1997 the court excluded the judge from the case.
Subsequent
hearings were scheduled for 6 May 1997 (adjourned owing to the
absence of all witnesses), 17 June 1996, 7 July 1997, 21 August
1997 (adjourned), 9 September 1997, 2 October 1997, 4 November
1997, 11 December 1997, 10 January 1998 and 10 February 1998.
On
24 February 1998 the Bielsko-Biała District Court gave a
judgment by which it granted property rights over the disputed land
to the claimant. On 8 April 1998 the applicant appealed.
On
11 August 1998 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court dismissed the
applicant’s appeal. On 23 September 1998 the applicant lodged a
cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. In his cassation appeal he
contested inter alia the impartiality of the judges who had
ruled on his case.
On
5 January 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s
cassation appeal. In particular, it did not find anything to suggest
a lack of impartiality on the part of the judges.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
On
17 September 2004 the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a
breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o
skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w
postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki)
(“the 2004 Act”) entered into force. It lays down various
legal means designed to counteract and/or redress the undue length of
judicial proceedings. A party to pending proceedings may ask for the
acceleration of those proceedings and/or just satisfaction for their
unreasonable length under section 2 read in conjunction with section
5(1) of the 2004 Act.
On
18 January 2005 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy)
adopted a resolution (no. III SPP 113/04) in which it ruled that
while the 2004 Law produced legal effects as from the date of its
date of entry into force (17 September 2004), its provisions
applied retroactively to all proceedings in which delays had occurred
before that date but only when they had not yet been remedied.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The
Government contested that argument.
The
proceedings began on 18 April 1991 and ended on 5 January 2001, thus
lasting 9 years, 8 months and 21 days. The period to be taken into
consideration began only on 1 May 1993 when the recognition by Poland
of the right of individual petition took effect. It thus lasted 7
years, 8 months and 8 days for three levels of jurisdiction.
However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed
after 1 May 1993, account must be taken of the state of proceedings
at the time.
A. Admissibility
The
Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted remedies
available under Polish law. They maintained that from 17 September
2004 when the 2004 Act had come into force, the applicant had the
possibility of lodging with the Polish civil courts a claim for
compensation for damage caused by the excessive length of proceedings
under Article 417 of the Civil Code, read together with section 16 of
the 2004 Act. They noted that the three-year limitation period for
the purposes of a compensation claim in tort based on the excessive
length of proceedings could run from a date later than the date on
which a final decision in such proceedings had been given.
The
applicant did not address the Government’s arguments.
The
Court notes that the arguments raised by the Government are the same
as those already examined and rejected by the Court in previous cases
against Poland (see Małasiewicz v. Poland, no.
22072/02, §§ 32-34, 14 October 2003; Ratajczyk
v. Poland (dec.), 11215/02, 31 May 2005; and Barszcz
v Poland, no. 71152/01, 30 May 2006) and the Government have
not submitted any new elements which would lead it to depart from its
previous findings.
The
Government further argued that the possibility of lodging a claim for
compensation for damage caused by the excessive length of proceedings
under Article 417 of the Civil Code had existed in Polish law even
before the entry into force of the 2004 Act, namely since the
judgment of the Constitutional Court of 4 December 2001.
The
applicant did not address the Government’s arguments.
The
Court notes that it has already examined whether after 18 December
2001 and prior to the entry into force of the Law of 17 June 2004 a
compensation claim in tort as provided for by Polish civil law was an
effective remedy in respect of complaints about the length of
proceedings. It held that no evidence of any judicial practice had
been provided to show that a claim for compensation based on Article
417 of the Civil Code had ever been successful before the domestic
courts (see Skawińska v. Poland (dec.), no.
42096/98, 4 March 2003, and Małasiewicz v. Poland, no.
22072/02, 14 October 2003). As the Government have failed to
submit any new arguments which would cast doubt on its conclusions in
those cases, the Court will abide by its previous findings.
It
follows that the Government’s plea of inadmissibility on the
ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
48. The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The
Government submitted that although the case had not been complex, the
establishment of the facts had been time consuming. The
Government emphasised that twenty eight witnesses had been examined
and two expert opinions had been submitted.
The applicant did not address this issue.
The
Government were of the opinion that the interests of the applicant
were of a purely pecuniary nature.
The
applicant did not address this issue.
The
Government observed that, as regards the conduct of the authorities,
the court had conducted comprehensive evidence proceedings.
The
applicant did not address the Government’s argument.
The
Government maintained that the applicant had contributed to the
length of the proceedings as he had not provided the court with
precise information and had lodged several requests for the exclusion
of judges from the case. In addition, the applicant had requested the
examination of new witnesses on many occasions. The Government
further noted that the claimant had also significantly contributed to
the length of the proceedings.
The
applicant did not address this issue.
57.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the
case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of
the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities
and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among
many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no.
30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII; Kusmierek v. Poland, no.
10675/02, judgment of 21 September 2004, § 62; and Zynger v.
Poland, no. 66096/01, judgment of 13 July 2004, § 45).
The
Court notes that the proceedings were not complex, as was admitted by
the Government. It further notes that although the applicant lodged
several requests for the exclusion of judges from the case and to
have additional witnesses examined, which inevitably contributed to
the length of proceedings, he did so in the exercise of his
procedural rights. Moreover, it is to be noted that on one occasion
his request for the exclusion of a judge was successful.
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender and other cases cited above).
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive
and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
The
applicant further complained that the length of the proceedings
complained of had infringed his right to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
The
Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above
and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
Having
regard to its finding under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph
60 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to
examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Zanghì v. Italy, judgment of
19 February 1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
(LACK OF IMPARTIALITY OF THE COURT)
The
applicant lastly complained that the courts dealing with his case had
not been impartial as they had favoured the other party.
The
Court notes that there is nothing in the case file that would suggest
that the judges deciding on the case lacked impartiality. The courts’
refusals to exclude judges from dealing with the case were not
arbitrary or unreasonable. The issue of the alleged lack of
impartiality on the part of judges was raised by the applicant in his
cassation appeal. In its judgment of 5 January 2001 the Supreme Court
thoroughly examined the applicant’s allegations and did not
find that there was a lack of impartiality on the part of any of the
judges.
It
follows that this complaint is inadmissible as being manifestly
ill founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must
be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 7 euros (EUR) per square metre of his land in
respect of pecuniary damage and claimed compensation in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, not specifying its amount and thus leaving this
matter to the Court’s discretion.
The Government contested the claim for pecuniary damage as being
exorbitant and manifestly ill-founded.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 1,800 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed EUR 5,064 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.
The Government did not express an opinion on the
matter.
The Court considers it reasonable to award the
applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, the sum of EUR 100
under this head.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the default
interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaints concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings and its impact on his peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that it is not necessary to examine separately the
applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention: (i) EUR 1,800
(one thousand eight hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, (ii) EUR 100 (one hundred euros) in respect of costs and
expenses, (iii) the above sums to be converted into Polish zlotys at
the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may
be chargeable;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 December 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President