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SKURSAK v. SLOVAKIA - 58708/00 [2006] ECHR 1030 (5 December 2006)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2006/1030.html
Cite as:
[2006] ECHR 1030
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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF SKURČÁK v. SLOVAKIA
(Application
no. 58708/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5
December 2006
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Skurčák v. Slovakia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza, President,
Mr J.
Casadevall,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L.
Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 14 November 2006,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
The
case originated in an application
(no. 58708/00) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Slovakian national, Mr Stanislav
Skurčák (“the applicant”), on 25 April 2000.
The
Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Poláčková.
On
24 November 2005 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The
applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Tvrdošín.
1. Bankruptcy proceedings against the applicant’s
former employer
On
27 June 1997 the applicant was dismissed from his job in a private
company due to its restructuring. The company failed to pay him his
salary and a severance payment.
On
31 May 1999 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court declared the
company bankrupt. On 28 July 1999 the applicant registered his claim
against the debtor in the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings.
On
18 October 2004 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court quashed the
declaration of bankruptcy as the debtor’s property was
insufficient to cover the claim.
2. Proceedings concerning the execution of a debt
In
July 1997 the applicant started working in a different company. He
was dismissed from his job on 28 February 1998 due to the
restructuring of the company.
In
1998 the applicant filed an action against the company claiming
arrears of salary and a severance payment. On 11 September 1998
the Banská Bystrica District Court granted the applicant’s
claim.
On
19 January 1999 the applicant filed a motion for execution of the
judgment. On 1 February 1999 the Banská Bystrica District
Court authorised an executions officer to execute its judgment.
On
26 March 1999 the executions officer informed the debtor company that
execution proceedings had been brought against it and that the sum
due would be transferred to the applicant from the debtor’s
bank account. On the same day the company’s representative
informed the executions officer that the company owned no property
and that its business activities had been stopped.
On
20 April 1999 the applicant concluded a contract with the executions
officer concerning the enforcement of the sum due. Article II of the
contract provided that the applicant did not have to pay any advance
on the costs of the execution to the executions officer.
On
2 November 1999 the executions officer issued an execution order
under which the debtor’s banks were to transfer the relevant
sum from the debtor’s account to the bank account of the
executions officer. On 9 November 1999 one of the banks replied
that the debtor’s deposit was insufficient for covering the
debt. On 12 November 1999 the other bank replied that the debtor’s
account had been closed.
On
20 July 2000 the applicant filed a petition with the Slovak Chamber
of Executions Officers in which he complained that the executions
officer had been inactive in enforcing his claim. In a letter of
23 October 2001 the Secretary to the Slovak Chamber of
Executions Officers informed the applicant that the executions
officer had acted in compliance with the law. The letter stated,
inter alia, that the executions officer had examined the
debtor’s financial situation, that he had filed an execution
order with the debtor’s banks, and that the sum in issue could
not be obtained as the banks had informed the executions officer that
the debtor did not own any property.
On
24 August 2000 the executions officer requested the applicant to pay
an advance on the costs of the execution failing which the officer
would ask the District Court to discontinue the execution
proceedings. In his reply of 11 September 2000 the applicant recalled
that, pursuant to the contract of 20 April 1999, he was not obliged
to pay any advance on costs.
On
25 October 2001 the executions officer requested the District Court
to discontinue the execution proceedings. On 8 February 2002 the
Banská Bystrica District Court discontinued the execution
proceedings on the ground that the applicant had failed to pay an
advance on the costs. The decision was served on the applicant’s
lawyer on 14 March 2002. It became final on 22 April 2002.
On
29 August 2002 the Registry of the Court asked the applicant for
information as to whether he had used the remedy under Article 127 of
the Constitution enacted with effect from 1 January 2002.
On
8 September 2002 the applicant replied that he had exhausted all
available remedies at the time when he had lodged his application in
2000. He maintained that he was not required to use the newly
introduced remedy as his case was pending before the Court. At the
same time, the applicant admitted that the original alleged violation
of his right resulting from delays in recovering the sums in question
still continued and that, in the meantime, new violations had
occurred as a result of the subsequent developments in his cases. He
referred, in particular, to his submissions to the Court of 12 May
2002.
On
5 February 2003 the Registry informed the applicant of the Court’s
decision in the case of Andrášik and Others
v. Slovakia (applications no. 57984/00, 60237/00, 60242/00,
60679/00, 60680/00, 68563/01, 60226/00) of 22 October 2002 according
to which in similar situations applicants should use the new remedy
under Article 127 of the Constitution to the extent that it was still
available to them. The applicant replied that he would try that
remedy.
3. Proceedings before the Constitutional Court
On
17 February 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court
that (i) the length of both the bankruptcy proceedings of 1999 and
the execution proceedings of 1999 was excessive, (ii) he had not
recovered the arrears of salary which his former employers owed him,
(iii) the executions officer had infringed the execution contract of
20 April 1999 and (iv) the Banská Bystrica District Court had
not examined the execution contract when it had decided to
discontinue the execution proceedings.
In
a letter of 27 February 2003 a judge of the Constitutional Court
informed the applicant that his motion could not be dealt with as it
met none of the formal requirements laid down in the Constitutional
Court Act for bringing proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
The letter further stated that plaintiffs had to appoint an advocate
to represent them in proceedings before the Constitutional Court and
that a complaint to the Constitutional Court had to be lodged within
a two-month time limit.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
For
recapitulation of the relevant domestic law and practice see Poláčik
v. Slovakia, no. 58707/00, §§ 32-43, 15 November 2005.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
The
applicant complained that the above bankruptcy and execution
proceedings had been unfair and that they had lasted an excessively
long time. He alleged a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
The Government contended that the applicant had not
exhausted domestic remedies as he had not sought redress by means of
a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, which had been
introduced with effect from 1 January 2002.
The applicant submitted that he was not required to
use the new constitutional remedy as he had lodged the application
prior to its enactment.
1. As regards the length and alleged unfairness of the
bankruptcy proceedings
The
bankruptcy proceedings were pending before the Banská Bystrica
Regional Court from 31 May 1999 to 18 October 2004. While it is
true that the applicant had no effective remedy at his disposal at
the moment of introduction of the application in 2000, such a remedy
was available in Slovakia with effect from 1 January 2002. The
Court’s Registry drew the applicant’s attention to that
remedy, and it has been the Court’s practice to require that
applicants in similar situations should use it (see, for example, the
Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia decision
referred to in paragraph 19 above).
As
the applicant did not file his complaint with the Constitutional
Court in accordance with the formal requirements (see paragraph 21
above), he has not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article
35 § 1 of the Convention.
It
follows that this part of the application must be rejected under
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2. As regard the alleged unfairness of the execution
proceedings
The
Court notes that this complaint relates to proceedings which ended by
a decision given on 8 February 2002. At that time it was open to the
applicant to complain about the alleged violation of his right to a
fair trial to the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 127 of the
Constitution, which took effect on 1 January 2002.
It
follows that this complaint must also be rejected under Article 35
§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies.
3. As regards the length of the execution proceedings
The
Government maintained that the applicant should have sought redress
by means of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution enacted
with effect from 1 January 2002. With reference to the practice of
the Constitutional Court, they argued that the applicant could have
obtained redress before the Constitutional Court if he had filed a
complaint within the statutory time-limit and in accordance with the
formal requirements. The Government disagreed with the Court’s
practice according to which applicants who had filed an application
concerning length of proceedings prior to 1 January 2002 were
required to use the new constitutional remedy only where the domestic
proceedings complained of were pending after 22 October 2002 when the
Court had adopted its decision in Andrášik and
Others v. Slovakia (see also Vujčík v. Slovakia,
no. 67036/01, §§ 50-51, 13 December 2005).
The
applicant disagreed with the Government’s arguments.
As
stated above, the decision to discontinue the execution proceedings
was given on 8 February 2002, and it became final on 22 April 2002.
The application was introduced on 25 April 2000. At that time it was
the Court’s general practice to assess whether domestic
remedies had been exhausted with reference to the date on which the
application had been lodged with it. The Court decided to make an
exception to this rule in respect of cases against Slovakia
concerning the length of proceedings which had been lodged with it
prior to 1 January 2002 in its Andrášik and Others
v. Slovakia decision adopted on 22 October 2002. At that
time a final decision had already been given in the execution
proceedings of which the applicant complains. The statutory two-month
time-limit prevented the applicant from using the constitutional
remedy in issue.
Given
these circumstances, the Court, in conformity with the position
previously taken, considers that the applicant was not required to
have recourse to the remedy in issue as regards his complaint about
the length of the execution proceedings. The Government’s
objection can therefore not be upheld
The
period under consideration lasted from 19 January 1999 to 8 February
2002, that is 3 years and 21 days.
The
Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that
this complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the
Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the
merits. The Court concludes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been
established.
B. Merits
The
Government admitted that the complaint about the length of the
execution proceedings was not manifestly ill-founded. They
considered, however, that the applicant had contributed to the length
of the proceedings by insisting that the execution be carried out
despite the fact that the debtor had had no property and by refusing
to pay an advance on the costs of the execution.
The
applicant maintained that his right to a hearing within a reasonable
time had been violated.
The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII). Special diligence is necessary in employment
disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992,
Series A no. 230 D, p. 39, § 17).
The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above). In particular, the facts
of the present case are, in substance, similar to those of Poláčik
v. Slovakia referred to in paragraph 22 above. In the Poláčik
judgment of 15 November 2005 the Court found that the length of
execution proceedings lasting 3 years less 17 days in similar
circumstances had been excessive.
Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the execution proceedings was
excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time”
requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
The
applicant complained that he had been unable to recover the sums
which his former employers owed him. He relied on Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
The
Court does not consider it necessary to determine whether or not the
applicant exhausted domestic remedies as, in any event, it finds no
appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account
of the conduct or outcome of the proceedings complained of (see also
the Poláčik v. Slovakia judgment referred to
above, §§ 64-65).
It
follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4
of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The
applicant claimed 204,611 Slovakian korunas in respect of pecuniary
damage alone. That amount comprised the sums which the former
employers owed to the applicant plus default interest.
The
Government contested the claim.
The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
As
the applicant submitted no claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
no award should be made in respect thereof.
B. Costs and expenses
The
applicant made no claim under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the execution proceedings admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention as a result of the length of the
execution proceedings;
Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 5 December 2006, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President