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Cite as: [2005] ECHR 949

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SECOND SECTION

DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 6778/05
by MPP GOLUB
against Ukraine

The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 18 October 2005 as a Chamber composed of:

Mr J.-P. Costa, President,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström, judges,
and Mr S. Dollé, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 February 2005,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, MPP “Golub”, is a Ukrainian company that is registered in Ternopil. The company belongs to a private entrepreneur Mr Ivan Mikheyevich Golub, born in 1947 and residing in Ternopil.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

1. Proceedings with regard to the merits of the applicant’s complaints

Since August 1995 the applicant had been making plans for the construction of a building containing 30 apartments on 0,25 hectares of land situated in the village of Zhovtneve, in the Kamyanets-Podilsky District of the Khmelnytsky region. It alleged that it received all the necessary construction permits and concluded an agreement with the PMK-35 company (a private company; “PMK-35”) for construction of this building. On 4 October 1996 the Ternopil Regional Arbitration Court declared null and void the construction contract of 9 August 1995 concluded between the applicant and the PMK-35 (PMK-35 was later reorganised into the construction company “Kamyanets Ltd.”).

The applicant alleges that from November 1996 it was allegedly persecuted by the Ukrainian authorities for its attempt to construct the building. Allegedly as a result of this persecution, PMK-35 demolished the foundation of the building it was supposed to construct.

In 1996-2001 the applicant was a respondent and / or plaintiff in unsuccessful litigation before different courts about the building. It did not provide a full account of the litigation, and submitted that the only proceedings of which it complains were the proceedings initiated by it on 24 January 2002 before the Khmelnytsky Regional Commercial Court (case no. 6/661). These proceedings were instituted by the applicant against the PMK-35. However, on 14 February 2002 the Khmelnytsky Regional Commercial Court (“Khmelnytsky Court”), changed the respondent to the construction company “Kamyanets Ltd.” (hereinafter the “respondent”) as the successor of PMK-35. The applicant sought restitutio in integrum. In particular, it claimed that, as the respondent had demolished the building’s foundations constructed by PMK-35, it was obliged to rebuild it.

On 20 August 2002 the Khmelnytsky Court rejected the applicant’s claims as the events about which the applicant complained dated back to 1996. It therefore considered that they were lodged outside the three-year statutory time-limit for the introduction of civil claims, envisaged by Article 71 of the Civil Code.

On 19 November 2002 the L’viv Regional Commercial Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal as being unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 20 August 2002.

On 16 March 2003 the Higher Commercial Court quashed the aforementioned judgment of 20 August and the ruling of 19 November 2002 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the Khmelnytsky Court.

On 5 March 2003 the Khmelnytsky Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the applicant’s case. In the course of the new proceedings before the Khmelnytsky Court, the applicant asked the court to extend the three-year limitation period for lodging its claims against the respondent. It also requested the court to suspend or temporarily terminate the proceedings in its case in view of the criminal investigation pending against the respondent’s director. It lodged additional claims for compensation against the respondent. Initially, the applicant claimed that the damage amounted to UAH 21, 211.0.^¹ Later, it increased its claims to UAH 256,579.89^².

On 31 March, 15 April and 10 June 2003 the Khmelnytsky Court ordered the applicant to produce substantiation for the amounts it claimed in damages. It also required the applicant to pay the State tax (державне мито) for the introduction of its additional claims.

On 23 June 2003 the Khmelnytsky Court rejected all of the applicant’s motions and requests as unsubstantiated. As to the increase in the applicant’s claims, the Khmelnytsky Court stated that the applicant had failed to substantiate or pay the State tax on them. It further decided that the applicant’s claim should be rejected as it was lodged outside the statutory three-year limitation period (Article 71 of the Civil Code^³).

On 11 December 2003 the Zhytomyr Regional Commercial Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal as unsubstantiated, and upheld the judgment of 23 June 2003. In particular, it referred to Articles 71 and 80 of the Civil Code that envisaged a three-year limitation period for lodging claims for damages.

2. Proceedings related to the admission of the applicant’s appeal in cassation

The applicant appealed in cassation directly to the Higher Commercial Court (Вищий Господарський Суд України).

On 21 January 2004 the Higher Commercial Court rejected the cassation appeal as it should have been lodged through the first instance or appeal court which had considered the case and where the case file was. The court referred to Article 109 of the Code of Commercial Procedure.

On 4 February 2004 the applicant re-lodged its appeal in cassation.

On 10 March 2004 the Higher Commercial Court rejected the applicant’s cassation appeal as it was lodged outside the one-month time-limit allowed for the introduction of such appeals (Article 110 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). It also held that the incorrect introduction of the cassation appeal by the applicant does not suspend the one-month time-limit envisaged by Article 110 of the Code of Commercial Procedure. As a result, the cassation appeal was returned to the applicant.

On 5 April 2004 the applicant re-lodged its appeal in cassation for the third time. It also requested renewal of the time-limit for the introduction of the cassation appeal.

On 6 May 2004 the Higher Commercial Court rejected the applicant’s request to extend the time-limit as unsubstantiated. It also stated, inter alia, that the time-limit for lodging an appeal in cassation was 12 January 2004, but the applicant had lodged its appeal on 5 April 2004, i.e. out of time. Furthermore, the Higher Commercial Court reiterated that, under Article 110 of the Code of Commercial Procedure, the refusals of 21 January and 10 March 2004 to allow the applicant’s cassation appeal had no influence on the one-month time-limit for the introduction of an appeal with the Higher Commercial Court. Moreover, Article 109 of the Code of Commercial Procedure clearly states that cassation appeals with the Higher Commercial Court had to be addressed to it through the court of first instance or the court of appeal. As a result, the cassation appeal and the court fees were returned to the applicant.

On 2 June and 20 July 2004 the Higher Commercial Court informed the applicant, by letters, that its complaints about the partiality and lack of independence of the judges who rejected the applicant’s cassation appeals were unsubstantiated. They also informed the applicant that it could appeal in cassation against the rulings of the Higher Commercial Court to the Supreme Court.

On 31 May 2004 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against the ruling of 6 May 2004 of the Higher Commercial Court with the Supreme Court (Верховний Суд України).

On 16 September 2004 the Supreme Court refused to initiate cassation proceedings.

B. Relevant domestic law

1. Constitution of Ukraine, 28 June 1996

Article 125

“In Ukraine the system of courts of general jurisdiction is formed in accordance with the territorial principle and the principle of specialisation.

The Supreme Court of Ukraine is the highest judicial body in the system of courts of general jurisdiction.

The respective high courts are the highest judicial bodies of specialised courts.

Courts of appeal and local courts shall operate in accordance with the law.

The creation of extraordinary and special courts shall not be permitted.”

2. Law of Ukraine on the Judicial System of 21 June 2001

Section 47

The Supreme Court of Ukraine - the highest judicial body

“1. The Supreme Court of Ukraine is the highest judicial body within the system of courts of general jurisdiction...

2. The Supreme Court of Ukraine:

1) examines in cassation proceedings the decisions of courts of general jurisdiction in cases which, in accordance with procedural law, fall within its jurisdiction and / or re-examines all cases considered by courts of general jurisdiction...”

3. Code of Commercial Procedure (former Code of Arbitration Procedure) with changes and amendments as of 21 June 2001

Transitional Provisions

“1. This law shall become effective from the date of its publication, save for Article 81-1 [of the Code], which shall become effective from 28 June 2002.

...9. Decisions of the judicial divisions of the Higher Arbitration Court of Ukraine or of the Presidium of the Higher Arbitration Court of Ukraine¹ that were not challenged by way of supervisory review proceedings before this Law entered into force, as well as resolutions of the Plenary Higher Arbitration Court of Ukraine, shall be final but may be appealed against to the Supreme Court of Ukraine on the basis of and pursuant to the procedure prescribed by the Code of Commercial Procedure of Ukraine.”

Chapter XII

Review of the judicial decisions in the course of cassation proceedings

Article 109

The procedure for lodging an appeal in cassation (petition for appeal in cassation)

“The appeal in cassation (petition for appeal in cassation) shall be lodged with the Higher Commercial Court through the court of first instance or the commercial court of appeal, which gave a contested judgment or resolution.

The first instance or commercial court of appeal, that has adopted a contested judgment or resolution, shall transfer the appeal in cassation (petition for appeal in cassation) together with the case file to the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine within 5 days from the moment of its receipt.”

Article 110

Terms for lodging appeals in cassation

“Appeals in cassation (petition for appeal in cassation) shall be lodged within one month from the date of entry into force of the first instance court’s judgment or the resolution of the court of appeal.”

Chapter XII-2

Review of judicial decisions of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine by the Supreme Court of Ukraine

Article 111-14

The Right to appeal in cassation against the judicial decisions of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine

“The parties to a case as well as the Prosecutor General of Ukraine have the right to lodge with the Supreme Court of Ukraine a cassation appeal against the resolution [or ruling]^² of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine adopted following the review of a decision of a first instance commercial court, that has entered into force, or a resolution of the Commercial Court of Appeal [adopted as a result of its review].”

Article 111-15

The grounds for lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of Ukraine against a resolution [or ruling] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine

“The Supreme Court of Ukraine reviews cassation appeals lodged against the resolutions [or rulings] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine if they are lodged:

1) on the basis of the application by the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine of a law or normative act which contravenes the Constitution of Ukraine;

2) where a decision contravenes decisions of the Supreme Court of Ukraine or of a higher court of a different specialisation on the issue of the application of the norms of substantive law;

3) where the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine has applied the same provision of the law or any other normative act differently in a similar case;

3-1) due to the inconsistency of the resolutions [or rulings] with the international treaties of Ukraine approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

4) where an international judicial body whose jurisdiction is recognised by Ukraine finds that a resolution has violated the international obligations of Ukraine.”

Article 111-16

The procedure for lodging an appeal in cassation and of the cassation petition against the resolution (ruling) of the Higher Commercial Court

“The cassation appeal (petition) of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine against the resolution of the Higher Commercial Court shall be lodged within one month from the moment of its [the resolution’s] adoption.

In the event that the existence of the grounds for appeal in cassation after this period has ended, the Supreme Court shall be obliged to rule that it has jurisdiction over the cassation appeal (petition).

The cassation appeal (petition) of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine against the resolution of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine shall be lodged with the Supreme Court through the Higher Commercial Court.

The Higher Commercial Court shall transfer the cassation appeal (petition) together with the case file to the Supreme Court within ten days from the moment of its receipt.”

Article 111-17

The procedure for review in cassation of the resolutions [and rulings] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine

“Proceedings for a review in cassation of a resolution [or ruling] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine by the Supreme Court of Ukraine shall be initiated on the basis of a decision taken by at least one judge in the course of the hearing of the chamber in commercial cases composed of three judges and shall be considered within one month from the moment of arrival of the cassation appeal or petition.

The resolution or a ruling of the Higher Commercial Court shall be reviewed by the judges of the commercial cases chamber of the Supreme Court in the course of a hearing.

The resolution or a ruling of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine shall be reviewed in cassation on the basis of the rules for consideration of the case in the first-instance commercial court, save for procedural actions to establish and prove the actual circumstances of the case.”^¹

Article 111-18

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in the course of the cassation review of the resolutions of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine

“The Supreme Court of Ukraine, following consideration of the appeal in cassation by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine against a resolution [or ruling] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine, is entitled to:

1) leave the resolution [or ruling] unchanged and dismiss the appeal;

2) quash the resolution [or ruling] and remit the case to the first-instance court for further consideration or quash the ruling and remit the case for further consideration to the Higher Commercial Court;

3) quash the resolution [or ruling] and terminate the proceedings in the case.”

Article 111-19

The grounds for quashing the resolutions [or the rulings] of the Higher Commercial Court

“The resolutions [or rulings] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine shall be quashed if they contravene the Constitution of Ukraine, international treaties agreed as binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, or if the substantive law has been misapplied otherwise.”

Article 111-20

Resolutions of the Supreme Court

“... A resolution of the Supreme Court of Ukraine shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal.”

Article 111-21

The binding nature of the instructions adopted in the resolution of the Supreme Court

“... Resolutions of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, following a re-examination of the case on the basis of an appeal in cassation against the resolution [or ruling] of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine shall not include directions as to the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence, the superiority of one type of evidence over another, the norms of substantive law which shall be applicable or the kind of decision that shall be adopted as a result of the further consideration of the case.”

COMPLAINTS

The applicant company complains that the domestic courts misapplied domestic law when considering its case, thus denying it a fair hearing. In substance, it complains about the infringement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It also alleges that the courts erred in their assessment of the evidence and the establishment of the facts.

It further maintains that it was unfairly denied access to a court to have its claim considered, particularly access to the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine. The applicant submits that it did not appeal in cassation because the Higher Commercial Court and the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to accept its appeal in cassation. It further alleges that the judges of the commercial courts at all levels were partial and lacked independence. In particular, it alleges that the judges of the Zhytomyr Regional Commercial Court of Appeal and the Higher Commercial Court lacked impartiality and independence. It also alleges that some of the documents that proved its claims disappeared from the case file.

Finally, the applicant raised general complaints about the unlawful actions of the director of a private company “Kamyanets Ltd.” and various State authorities to whom it complained about its situation. It referred to Article 5 of the Convention.

THE LAW

A. The applicant’s complaints

The Court considers that there are two complaints that require further consideration and raise issues as to their admissibility under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Firstly, the applicant complains that it did not receive a fair hearing before the domestic courts. Secondly, it alleges that its appeal in cassation against the ruling of the Zhytomyr Regional Commercial Court of Appeal of 11 December 2003 lodged with the Higher Commercial Court was rejected unfairly. The applicant invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

The Court notes that, as to the merits of the applicant’s complaints, the applicant failed to lodge an appeal in cassation with the Higher Commercial Court and the Supreme Court of Ukraine, respectively, against the decisions of the first-instance court and the court of appeal in accordance with the requirements of the domestic law. It recalls that, according to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law.

It reiterates in this connection that this rule only requires normal recourse by an applicant to such remedies which are likely to be effective, sufficient and available. For a remedy to be effective, it must be, inter alia, capable of remedying the impugned state of affairs directly. Moreover, a remedy must exist with a sufficient degree of certainty to be regarded as effective (see, mutatis mutandis, Vorobyeva v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 27517/02, 17 December 2002; Arkhipov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 25660/02, 18 May 2004). The Court considers it necessary to clarify the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies in relation to commercial cases.

B. Remedies in Ukrainian law

The Court notes that a fourth level of jurisdiction was introduced into Ukrainian commercial procedure on 21 June 2001, with effect from 5 July 2001.^¹ According to the relevant provisions of the Code of Commercial Procedure, a cassation appeal to the Higher Commercial Court, similar to the one found in other member States of the Council of Europe, and a second (or repeated) cassation appeal to the Supreme Court are now available to the parties in a commercial case. Their exercise does not depend on the discretionary power of a State authority (compare and contrast, Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, no. 48553/99, §§ 74-77, ECHR 2002 VII).

As to a cassation appeal lodged with the Higher Commercial Court, the Court observes that it can be lodged within one month against the judgment of the first-instance court or the resolution or ruling of the court of appeal. An appeal in cassation does not require the leave of the Higher Commercial Court. However, the cassation appeal has to be lodged with the court that gave the judgment or decision complained of. That court has to decide on whether or not the cassation appeal complies with the requirements as to form and content specified in the Code of Commercial Procedure. The Higher Commercial Court delivers a ruling if it decides to assume jurisdiction over an appeal in cassation. The jurisdiction of the Higher Commercial Court extends to points of law only.

The Court also observes that, in accordance with the changes introduced to the Code of Commercial Procedure on 15 May 2003, the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court can be lodged only against a ruling or a resolution of the Higher Commercial Court within one month of the date of its adoption (Article 111-16 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). The Court is of the opinion therefore that the second (or repeated) cassation appeal is dependent upon whether the case was heard by the Higher Commercial Court. The second (or repeated) cassation appeal to the Supreme Court shall be lodged with the Higher Commercial Court. This appeal shall be transferred to the Supreme Court within ten days from the moment of its receipt by the Higher Commercial Court (Article 111-16 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). The chamber of three judges of the Supreme Court decides whether leave to appeal in cassation shall be granted. If one of the judges of the chamber considers that the cassation appeal is admissible, the appeal shall be transferred for consideration on its merits to the relevant chamber of the Supreme Court. The appeal in cassation is heard by judges from the Commercial Chamber of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the power to quash the decision of the Higher Commercial Court and to remit the case for reconsideration or to terminate the proceedings in the case. The resolution of the Supreme Court given upon the cassation appeal is final and not subject to appeal.

The Court further notes that decisions of the lower courts given after 5 July 2001, as in the applicant’s case, cannot be challenged in cassation indefinitely, but only within the time-limits laid down in the Code of Commercial Procedure. The new cassation procedures do not therefore undermine the principle of legal certainty, one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law, which requires, inter alia, that where a court has given a final ruling on a matter, that ruling should not be capable of being called into question (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999 VII).

C. The Court’s assessment

1. The applicant’s complaints as to the refusal to admit the appeal in cassation lodged by the applicant with the Higher Commercial Court

As to the question of access to court, the Court recalls that the procedural guarantees laid down in Article 6 secure to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal; in this way it embodies the “right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, pp. 13-18, §§ 28-36). However, the “right to a court”, of which the right of access is one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. However, these limitations must not restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired; lastly, such limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they do not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see, among other authorities, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, judgment of 19 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, p. 295, § 33).

Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant lodged a cassation appeal directly with the Higher Commercial Court. However, under Article 109 of the Code of Commercial Procedure, it should have been lodged with the first instance court or the court of appeal. The Higher Commercial Court rejected the applicant’s re-lodged appeals in cassation as they were lodged out of time. It further ruled that the applicant’s appeal in cassation lodged directly with the Higher Commercial Court did not interrupt this time-limit (Articles 109-110 of the Code of Commercial Procedure). The Court considers therefore that the refusal to consider the cassation appeal was based on law and discloses no element of arbitrariness.

The Court further considers that the regulations concerning the lodging of cassation appeals, as envisaged by Article 109 of the Code of Commercial Procedure, i.e. that the cassation appeal must be lodged within a one-month time-limit and through the first instance court or the court of appeal, where the case file is, undoubtedly serve the purpose of assuring a proper administration of justice. The parties concerned may reasonably expect those rules to be applied. Moreover, from the materials of the case-file it can be seen that the applicant was aware of this rule, but intentionally failed to abide by it, as it alleged a lack of impartiality and independence of the court of appeal judges. However, the Court considers that the applicant has failed to provide any evidence to support his allegations of the theft of documents from the case file by the judges of the Zhytomyr Regional Commercial Court of Appeal or their partial attitude towards the applicant. Moreover, it has not proved that the reasons for lodging its appeal directly with the Higher Commercial Court were sufficient and that its right of appeal in cassation would have been interfered with by the Zhytomyr Regional Commercial Court of Appeal.

In the light of these considerations, the Court finds that the applicant has not shown that the three rulings of the Higher Commercial Court of 21 January, 10 March and 6 May 2004 were arbitrary or unjustified in the circumstances of his case. An examination of this complaint does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

2. The merits of the applicant’s complaints (unfairness of the decisions rejecting the applicant’s claims for restitution)

It is to be noted that the applicant complained of the outcome of the proceedings before the Khmelnytsky Regional Commercial Court (judgment of 23 June 2003) and the Zhytomyr Regional Commercial Court of Appeal (ruling of 11 December 2003). It alleged, in particular, that the law had been misapplied by these courts and that evidence had been incorrectly assessed by them. It also challenged their interpretation of the Articles 71 and 80 of the Civil Code. The Court considers that these are matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Higher Commercial Court and they could have constituted grounds for seeking leave to appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court, after the case had been decided by the Higher Commercial Court.

For the Court, an appeal in cassation to the Higher Commercial Court and a second cassation appeal lodged with the Supreme Court against the resolutions of the Commercial Courts of Appeal may be considered effective remedies against lower court decisions taken after 5 July 2001 and against the rulings of the Higher Commercial Court from 15 May 2003 onwards. It would add that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular domestic remedy, which is not obviously futile, is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust it (see the Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no. 40, p. 18, § 37, and A.B. v. the Netherlands, no. 37328/97, 29 January 2002, § 72). Accordingly, the Court rejects the applicant’s reasons for not availing itself of the aforementioned remedies.

It follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

3. Remainder of the applicant’s complaints

As to the remainder of the applicant’s complaints raised, including those under Article 5 of the Convention, the Court finds that they are wholly unsubstantiated and should therefore be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

S. Dollé J.-P. Costa
Registrar President

1. EUR 3,804.

2. EUR 42,767.4.

3. Civil Code provisions are applicable to both the proceedings before the commercial and the civil courts of general jurisdiction.

1. After the judicial system reform in June 2001 all “arbitration” courts were renamed into “commercial” courts.

2. As amended on 15 May 2003 by the Law on the Introduction of Changes and Amendments to the Code of Commercial Procedure of Ukraine.

1. Article amended on 15 May 2003 by the Law on the Introduction of Changes and Amendments to the Code of Commercial Procedure of Ukraine.

1. This Law on the introduction of changes and amendments to the Code of Commercial Procedure had been published on four occasions in the following official printed media: 5 July 2001 (Holos Ukrayiny), 6 July 2001 (Ofitsijny Visnyk Ukrayiny), 10 July 2001 (Uryadovy Kurjer) and 7 September 2001 (Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrayiny).