CASE OF STEEL AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
23 September 1998
The present judgment is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998. These reports are obtainable from the publisher Carl Heymanns Verlag KG (Luxemburger Straße 449, D-50939 Köln), who will also arrange for their distribution in association with the agents for certain countries as listed overleaf.
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Judgment delivered by a Chamber
United Kingdom – arrest and detention of protesters for breach of the peace – detention following refusal to be bound over (Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, section 115)
I. SCOPE OF CASE
Complaints under Articles 5 § 3, 6 § 2, 6 § 3 (b) and (c) and 13 of the Convention not pursued – complaint under Article 11 does not raise any separate issue.
Conclusion: not necessary to consider complaints (unanimously).
II. ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Arrests and initial detention of each applicant
Breach of the peace constitutes "offence" under Article 5 § 1 (c).
Expressions "lawful" and "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" stipulate full compliance with national law, consistency with purpose of Article 5 and that national law be formulated with sufficient precision to allow citizen reasonably to foresee consequences of actions – concept of breach of the peace and relevant legal rules formulated with sufficient precision to satisfy this requirement.
National courts which dealt with cases of first and second applicants satisfied that each had caused or been likely to cause breach of the peace – Court sees no reason to disagree – arrests and initial detention of first and second applicants complied with English law.
Protest of third, fourth and fifth applicants entirely peaceful – Court not satisfied that police justified in fearing breach of the peace – in the absence of national decision, Court finds arrests and detention of third, fourth and fifth applicants failed to comply with English law.
Conclusion: no violation in respect of arrest and initial detention of first applicant (seven votes to two); no violation in respect of arrest and initial detention of second applicant (unanimously); violation in respect of third, fourth and fifth applicants (unanimously).
B. Detention of first and second applicants following refusal to be bound over
Detention for refusing to comply with order to be bound over within scope of Article 5 § 1 (b) – national law formulated with sufficient precision – given context, binding-over orders sufficiently clear.
Conclusion: no violation (eight votes to one).
III. ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE CONVENTION
Not applicable in cases of first and second applicants since no breach of Article 5 § 1.
Third, fourth and fifth applicants could have brought civil action against police.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
IV. ARTICLE 6 § 3 (a) OF THE CONVENTION
Sufficient details given to first and second applicants in charge-sheets.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
V. ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
Protests, including those of the first and second applicants who physically impeded the activities of which they disapproved, constituted expressions of opinion within meaning of Article 10 – impugned measures therefore amounted to interferences with Article 10 rights.
B. "Prescribed by law"
This requirement similar to that under Article 5 § 1 that measures be "lawful" – in view of Court's findings under Article 5 § 1, measures taken against first and second applicants were prescribed by law, whereas those taken against third, fourth and fifth applicants were not.
C. Legitimate aim
Each applicant's arrest and initial detention pursued aims of preventing disorder and protecting rights of others.
Detention of first and second applicants for refusing to be bound over pursued, in addition, aim of maintaining authority of judiciary.
D. "Necessary in a democratic society"
Given dangers and risk of disorder inherent in first and second applicants' protest activities, actions of police in arresting and detaining them before bringing them to court not disproportionate – neither was their imprisonment following refusal to be bound over, given importance of deterrence and maintaining authority of judiciary.
Measures taken against third, fourth and fifth applicants disproportionate, since their protest entirely peaceful.
Conclusion: no violation in respect of first applicant (five votes to four); no violation in respect of second applicant (unanimously); violation in respect of third, fourth and fifth applicants (unanimously).
VI. ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Non-pecuniary damage: third, fourth and fifth applicants awarded compensation.
B. Costs and expenses: awarded to third, fourth and fifth applicants on equitable basis.
Conclusion: respondent State to pay specified sums to third, fourth and fifth applicants (unanimously).
COURT'S CASE-LAW REFERRED TO
26.4.1979, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1); 24.3.1988, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1); 19.12.1989, Brozicek v. Italy; 29.10.1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland; 25.8.1993, Chorherr v. Austria; 22.11.1995, S.W. v. the United Kingdom; 10.6.1996, Benham v. the United Kingdom; 23.4.1997, Stallinger and Kuso v. Austria; 25.6.1997, Halford v. the United Kingdom; 24.2.1998, Larissis and Others v. Greece; 9.6.1998, Incal v. Turkey
In the case of Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of Rules of Court A, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr R. Bernhardt, President,
Mr Thór Vilhjálmsson,
Mr F. Gölcüklü,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mrs E. Palm,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr T. Pantiru,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 22 May and 25 August 1998,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46). The object of the request was to obtain
a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles 5, 6, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr M. Eaton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent,
Mr R. Singh, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
Mr S. Bramley, Home Office,
Ms C. Stewart, Home Office, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mrs J. Liddy, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mr E. Fitzgerald QC, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr K. Starmer, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr M. Fords, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
Mr P. Leach, Legal Officer, Liberty, Solicitor.
The Court heard addresses by Mrs Liddy, Mr Fitzgerald and Mr Singh.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. First applicant
"That you did on Saturday 22 August 1992 at Wheeldale Beck in the Parish of Sefton behaved [sic] in a manner whereby a breach of the peace was occasioned. The complaint of PC 676 Dougall of North Yorkshire Police who applies for an order requiring that you enter into a recognizance with or without sureties to keep the peace. Pursuant to section 115 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 ["the 1980 Act" – see paragraphs 32–33 below]."
At 9.40 a.m. on 24 August 1992, she was further charged with using "threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress", contrary to section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 ("the 1986 Act" – see paragraph 30 below).
Ms Steel refused to be bound over, and was committed to prison for twenty-eight days.
B. Second applicant
"Arrested as a person whose conduct on 15 September 1993 at Cambridge Park, Wanstead, was likely to provoke a disturbance of the peace to be brought before a Justice of the Peace or Magistrate to be dealt with according to law."
She was kept in custody until 9.40 a.m. the following day (approximately seventeen hours' detention), on the grounds that if released she would cause a further breach of the peace.
C. Third, fourth and fifth applicants
"Breach of the peace, common law.
On 20 January 1994 at Queen Elizabeth Conference Centre, Victoria Street, London SW1, constituted or was likely to provoke a disturbance of the peace to be brought before a Justice of the Peace to be dealt with according to law.
Contrary to common law."
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Breach of the peace
"A comprehensive definition of the term 'breach of the peace' has very rarely been formulated…" (p. 426)
"We are emboldened to say that there is likely to be a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance." (p. 427)
"There is a breach of the peace whenever a person who is lawfully carrying out his work is unlawfully and physically prevented by another from doing it. He is entitled by law peacefully to go on with his work on his lawful occasions. If anyone unlawfully and physically obstructs the worker – by lying down or chaining himself to a rig or the like – he is guilty of a breach of the peace." (p. 471)
"The conduct in question does not itself have to be disorderly or a breach of the criminal law. It is sufficient if its natural consequence would, if persisted in, be to provoke others to violence, and so some actual danger to the peace is established." (p. 1392)
"… the court would surely not find a [breach of the peace] proved if any violence likely to have been provoked on the part of others would be not merely unlawful but wholly unreasonable – as of course, it would be if the defendant's conduct was not merely lawful but such as in no material way interfered with the other's rights. A fortiori, if the defendant was properly exercising his own basic rights, whether of assembly, demonstration or free speech." (p. 163)
2. Arrest for breach of the peace
B. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986
C. Binding over
A binding over order requires the person bound over to enter into a "recognizance", or undertaking secured by a sum of money fixed by the court, to keep the peace or be of good behaviour for a specified period of time. If he or she refuses to consent to the order, the court may commit him or her to prison, for up to six months in the case of an order made under the 1980 Act or for an unlimited period in respect of orders made under the 1361 Act or common law. If an order is made but breached within the specified time period, the person bound over forfeits the sum of the recognizance. A binding-over order is not a criminal conviction (R. v. London Quarter Sessions, ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner  1 King's Bench Reports 670).
1. Binding over under the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980
"(1) The power of a magistrates' court on the complaint of any person to adjudge any other person to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour towards the complainant shall be exercised by order on complaint.
(3) If any person ordered by a magistrates' court under subsection (1) above to enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour fails to comply with the order, the court may commit him to custody for a period not exceeding 6 months or until he sooner complies with the order."
95 Criminal Appeal Reports 215); and (2) unless the order is made, there is a real risk that the defendant will cause a further breach of the peace in the future.
"It is common ground that, although no criminal conviction results from finding such a complaint proved, the criminal standard of proof applies to the procedure."
2. Binding over at common law and under the Justices of the Peace Act 1361
4. The Law Commission's report on binding over
"We are satisfied that there are substantial objections of principle to the retention of binding over to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour. These objections are, in summary, that the conduct which can be the ground for a binding-over order is too vaguely defined; that binding-over orders when made are in terms which are too vague and are therefore potentially oppressive; that the power to imprison someone if he or she refuses to consent to be bound over is anomalous; that orders which restrain a subject's freedom can be made without the discharge of the criminal, or indeed any clearly defined, burden of proof; and that witnesses, complainants or even acquitted defendants can be bound over without adequate prior information of any charge or complaint against them." (Law Commission Report no. 222, § 6.27)
The Law Commission therefore recommended abolition of the power to bind over.
D. Immunity of magistrates from civil proceedings
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
breach of the peace did not have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. They also complained of violations of Articles 10 and 11, arising from the uncertainty inherent in the concept of breach of the peace and the power to bind over and the disproportionality of the restrictions on their freedom to protest. Finally, the first and second applicants alleged a violation of Article 13 in connection with their refusal to be bound over.
The full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced as an annex to this judgment.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
The applicants asked the Court to find violations of Articles 5 §§ 1 and 5, 6 § 3 (a), 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention, and to award them just satisfaction under Article 50.
AS TO THE LAW
I. SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
A. Arrests and initial detention of each applicant
1. Ground of detention under Article 5 § 1
Further or in the alternative, the Government submitted that these initial periods of detention had been permissible under Article 5 § 1 (b), since the obligation to keep the peace was specific and prescribed by law.
It will consider whether this suspicion was "reasonable" below, in connection with the issue of lawfulness (see paragraphs 58–64).
2. Lawfulness of the arrests and initial detention
At the hearing before the Court, in respect of the detention of the third, fourth and fifth applicants, the Government pointed out that if the police officers' belief that these applicants' actions had been likely to cause a breach of the peace had lacked objective justification, it would have been open to the applicants to challenge the legality of their arrests in the domestic courts. Since they had failed to take such proceedings, it had to be presumed that their arrests had been objectively justified.
First, they submitted that if, as appeared from the national case-law (see paragraph 27 above), an individual committed a breach of the peace when he or she behaved in a manner the natural consequence of which was that others would react violently, it was difficult to judge the extent to which one could engage in protest activity, in the presence of those who might be annoyed, without causing a breach of the peace. Secondly, the power to arrest whenever there were reasonable grounds for apprehending that a breach of the peace was about to take place granted too wide a discretion to the police. Thirdly, there had been conflicting decisions at Court of Appeal level as to the definition of breach of the peace (see paragraphs 25–26 above).
Accordingly, the Court considers that the relevant legal rules provided sufficient guidance and were formulated with the degree of precision required by the Convention (see, for example, the Larissis and Others v. Greece judgment of 24 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, p. 377, § 34).
(a) First and second applicants
The Court, having itself examined the evidence before it, finds no reason to doubt that the police were justified in fearing that these applicants' behaviour, if persisted in, might provoke others to violence. It follows that the arrests and initial detention of the first and second applicants complied with English law. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that these deprivations of liberty were arbitrary.
(b) Third, fourth and fifth applicants
For this reason, in the absence of any national decision on the question, the Court is not satisfied that their arrests and subsequent detention for seven hours complied with English law so as to be "lawful" within the meaning of Article 5 § 1.
B. Detention of the first and second applicants following their refusal to be bound over
1. Categorisation under Article 5 § 1
to a criminal conviction. Further or in the alternative, the detention fell under Article 5 § 1 (b), since the applicants were committed to prison as a result of their refusal to comply with the orders that they enter into recognizances to keep the peace.
The second applicant was similarly ordered by the Redbridge Magistrates' Court to agree to be bound over under section 115 of the 1980 Act to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for twelve months in the sum of GBP 100. When she refused to observe this order, she was committed to prison for seven days (see paragraph 18 above).
It will consider in connection with the issue of "lawfulness" (see paragraphs 74–78 below) whether the terms of the binding-over orders applied to these applicants were sufficiently clearly defined for the purposes of Article 5 § 1.
2. Lawfulness of the applicants' detention for refusing to be bound over
required the person bound over to avoid conduct involving violence or the threat of violence or unreasonably giving rise to a situation where there was a real risk that violence might occur. The magistrates had acted within the law in committing Ms Steel and Ms Lush to prison for refusing to be bound over.
In this connection, it recalls its finding (in paragraph 55 above) that the elements of breach of the peace were adequately defined by English law. Furthermore, it is clear, from the terms of section 115 of the 1980 Act and the relevant case-law (see paragraphs 31–33 above) that where magistrates are satisfied, on the basis of admissible evidence, that an individual has committed a breach of the peace and that there is a real risk that he or she will do so again, the accused may be required to enter into recognizances to keep the peace or be of good behaviour. Finally, it is also clear that, if the accused refuses to comply with such an order, he or she may be committed to prison for up to six months (ibid.).
The Court is, therefore, satisfied that the applicants could reasonably have foreseen that, if they acted in a manner the natural consequence of which would be to provoke others to violence, they might be ordered to be bound over to keep the peace, and if they refused so to be bound over, they might be committed to prison.
In this respect it notes that the orders were expressed in rather vague and general terms; the expression "to be of good behaviour" was particularly imprecise and offered little guidance to the person bound over as to the type of conduct which would amount to a breach of the order. However, in each
applicant's case the binding-over order was imposed after a finding that she had committed a breach of the peace. Having considered all the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that, given the context, it was sufficiently clear that the applicants were being requested to agree to refrain from causing further, similar, breaches of the peace during the ensuing twelve months.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 5 OF THE CONVENTION
"Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation."
In the alternative, they pointed out that if the applicants' arrests or detention had been contrary to English law, they could have brought civil proceedings against the police for false imprisonment.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 3 (a) OF THE CONVENTION
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
They argued that, since "breach of the peace" was a very general accusation, the precise behaviour of each applicant which formed the basis of the charge should have been specified.
It follows that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 3 (a).
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
B. "Prescribed by law"
Since the requirement under Article 10 § 2 that an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression be "prescribed by law" is similar to that under Article 5 § 1 that any deprivation of liberty be "lawful" (see paragraph 54 above), it follows that the arrests and detention of the first and
second applicants were "prescribed by law" under Article 10 § 2 but that those of the third, fourth and fifth applicants were not (see paragraph 64 above).
C. Legitimate aim
D. "Necessary in a democratic society"
First, they stated that, in the context of non-violent protest activity, arrest was too extreme a measure since it totally extinguished the possibility further to participate in the demonstration and since the threat of arrest had a "chilling" effect on the exercise of Article 10 rights. Secondly, they pointed out that they had each been detained for long periods of time when other less restrictive measures could have been used.
Finally, the first and second applicants argued that their freedom to protest would have been unreasonably restricted had they agreed to the vague and general terms of the binding-over orders and that they had been imprisoned for long periods of time as a result of their refusal to accept these restrictions.
Since different factors are relevant to each of the applicants, the Court will examine each case separately.
1. First applicant
Forty-four hours is undoubtedly a long period of detention in such a case. However, the Court recalls that Ms Steel's behaviour prior to her arrest had created a danger of serious physical injury to herself and others and had formed part of a protest against grouse shooting which risked culminating in disorder and violence. Particularly given the risk of an early resumption by her, if released, of her protest activities against field sports, and the possible consequences of this eventuality, both of which the police were best placed to assess, the Court does not consider that this detention was disproportionate.
It recalls its above finding that, in ordering Ms Steel to be bound over to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, the court was effectively requesting her to agree to refrain for a year from causing any further breach of the peace (see paragraph 76 above). Again, given the dangers inherent in her chosen form of protest and the public interest in deterring such conduct, the Court does not find that the imposition either of this order, or of the GBP 70 fine, was excessive in the circumstances.
paragraph 97 above and the above-mentioned Sunday Times (no. 1) judgment, p. 34, § 55), the Court does not find it disproportionate that the applicant was committed to prison, even for as long as twenty-eight days, for refusing to comply with the court's order.
2. Second applicant
3. Third, fourth and fifth applicants
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
- No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State."
VII. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
VIII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."
A. Non-pecuniary damage
B. Costs and expenses
C. Default interest
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
(a) that the respondent State is to pay to each of the third, fourth and fifth applicants, within three months, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, 500 (five hundred) pounds sterling;
(b) that the respondent State is to pay to the third, fourth and fifth applicants, within three months, in respect of legal costs and expenses, a total of 20,000 (twenty thousand) pounds sterling, less 46,747 (forty-six thousand seven hundred and forty-seven) French francs to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable on the date of delivery of the present judgment, together with any value-added tax which may be payable;
(c) that simple interest at an annual rate of 7.5% shall be payable on the above sums from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement;
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 September 1998.
Signed: Rudolf Bernhardt
Signed: Herbert Petzold
In accordance with Article 51 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 53 § 2 of Rules of Court A, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) joint partly dissenting opinion of Mr Thór Vilhjálmsson and Mrs Palm;
(b) joint partly dissenting opinion of Mr Valticos and Mr Makarczyk.
Initialled: R. B.
Initialled: H. P.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION
OF JUDGES THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON AND PALM
In paragraphs 105 and 107 of the judgment the majority of our colleagues conclude that neither the initial detention of the first applicant for forty-four hours after her arrest on 22 August 1992 nor her imprisonment for twenty-eight days because of her refusal to comply with the binding-over order were disproportionate in the particular circumstances of her case. Our assessment of the weight of the relevant arguments set out in paragraphs 102 to 107 of the judgment lead us to the conclusion that the periods of deprivation of liberty were disproportionately long and that there was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION
OF JUDGES VALTICOS AND MAKARCZYK
While we share the Chamber's opinion and conclusions on most of the points in the instant case, there is one with which we cannot associate ourselves.
This is the case of the first applicant, Ms Helen Steel, who during a protest against a grouse shoot caused an obstruction by walking in front of a member of the shoot in such a way as to prevent him from firing. She was then taken to a police vehicle and detained for forty-four hours, after which she was charged. The court imposed a fine of 70 pounds sterling and, under an Act of 1980, ordered her to agree to be bound over for twelve months. Ms Steel refused to agree to an undertaking she considered to be too vague and was committed to prison for twenty-eight days.
We cannot regard these measures as being compatible with the letter and spirit of the Convention. In the first place, the judge did not in this instance really act judicially, convicting someone on account of an offence she had committed, but, by seeking assurances from her that were drafted in very vague terms, and on pain of criminal penalties, he exercised a kind of "imperium" conferred on him by the Act, and in our view this type of order, which is not moreover regarded as a criminal penalty, goes beyond the concept of judicial decision to which the Convention refers.
That, of course, is debatable. What is not in any event debatable is that to detain for forty-four hours and then sentence to twenty-eight days' imprisonment a person who, albeit in an extreme manner, jumped up and down in front of a member of the shoot to prevent him from killing a feathered friend is so manifestly extreme, particularly in a country known for its fondness for animals, that it amounted, in our view, to a violation of the Convention.
For this reason, we voted against the majority on points 2 and 9 of the operative provisions and I (Judge Valticos) also voted against the majority on point 5.
Note 2 otes by the Registrar
. The case is numbered 67/1997/851/1058. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission. [Back] Note 3 . Rules of Court A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol. They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently. [Back] Note 4 . Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the registry. [Back]
Note 2 otes by the Registrar . The case is numbered 67/1997/851/1058. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission. [Back]
Note 3 . Rules of Court A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (1 October 1994) and thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol. They correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently. [Back]
Note 4 . Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the registry. [Back]