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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> PHILIS v. GREECE (No. 2) - 19773/92 [1997] ECHR 34 (27 June 1997)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1997/34.html
Cite as: [1997] ECHR 34, (1998) 25 EHRR 417, [1998] 25 EHRR 417, 25 EHRR 417
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In the case of Philis v. Greece (no. 2) (1),
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of Rules of Court A (2), as a Chamber composed of
the following judges:
Mr R. Bernhardt, President,
Mr B. Walsh,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr L. Wildhaber,
Mr P. Jambrek,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr E. Levits,
Mr J. Casadevall,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney, Deputy
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 22 February and 29 May 1997,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
_______________
Notes by the Registrar
1. The case is numbered 65/1996/684/874. The first number is the
case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the
relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the
case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its
creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications
to the Commission.
2. Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the entry
into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and thereafter only
to cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9). They
correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as
amended several times subsequently.
_______________
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the Greek Government
("the Government") on 6 May 1996, within the three-month period laid
down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1,
art. 47). It originated in an application (no. 19773/92) against the
Hellenic Republic lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights
("the Commission") under Article 25 (art. 25) by a Greek national,
Mr Nicolas Philis, on 15 January 1992.
The Government's application referred to Articles 44 and 48 of
the Convention (art. 44, art. 48). Its object was to obtain a decision
as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the
respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he wished
to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyers who would
represent him (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr N. Valticos,
the elected judge of Greek nationality (Article 43 of the Convention)
(art. 43), and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the Court
(Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 10 June 1996, in the presence of the
Registrar, the President of the Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew by lot the
names of the other seven members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr B. Walsh,
Mrs E. Palm, Mr L. Wildhaber, Mr K. Jungwiert, Mr E. Levits and
Mr J. Casadevall, (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21
para. 5) (art. 43). Subsequently Mr P. Jambrek, substitute judge,
replaced Mr Gölcüklü, who was unable to take part in the further
consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Bernhardt,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government,
the applicant's lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the
organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant
to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received the
Government's and the applicant's memorials on 16 December 1996.
5. On 30 January 1997 the applicant was granted legal aid (Rule 4
of the Addendum to Rules of Court A). On 13 February 1997 he lodged
an additional claim for costs and expenses in respect of his
representation at the hearing before the Court.
6. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took
place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
18 February 1997. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr G. Kanellopoulos, Senior Adviser,
Legal Council of State, Delegate of the Agent,
Mr V. Kyriazopoulos, Legal Assistant,
Legal Council of State, Counsel;
(b) for the Commission
Mr C.L. Rozakis, Delegate;
(c) for the applicant
Mr P. Duffy, Barrister-at-Law,
Miss M. Demetriou, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
Mr S. Grosz, Solicitor,
Miss J. Sohrab, Advisers,
Mr N. Philis, Applicant.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Rozakis, Mr Duffy, Mr Philis and
Mr Kanellopoulos.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Circumstances of the case
7. Mr Philis, a Greek citizen born in 1937, lives in Athens, where,
at the material time, he was working as an engineer.
In 1987 Mr Philis had already filed a different application that
led the Court to find that the applicant's right of access to a court
had been violated (judgment of 27 August 1991, Series A no. 209).
A. The criminal proceedings
8. On 14 April 1986, during proceedings he had brought against
officials of the Autonomous Organisation for Labour Housing
(Aftonomos Organismos Ergatikis Katikias - "the AOEK"), the applicant
sent the Indictment Division of the Athens Court of Appeal
(Symvoulio Efeton) a pleading in which he argued that the procedure
followed by the relevant authorities in connection with the various
legal proceedings he had brought left no doubt that there was bias in
favour of the AOEK's officials, and that the delays in the proceedings
were plainly intended to ensure that the limitation period for the
offences would run out.
9. On 25 April 1986 the public prosecutor at the
Athens Court of Appeal (Isageleas Efeton) forwarded the pleading to the
public prosecutor at the Athens Criminal Court
(Isageleas Plimmeliodikon) and recommended that the applicant should
be charged with insulting the judiciary. On 30 April 1986 the
prosecutor at the Criminal Court ordered a preliminary investigation
(see paragraph 23 below).
10. On 9 October 1986 Mr Philis appeared before the
investigating judge. He denied the charges and informed the judge that
he intended to file a pleading by 15 October 1986. In the pleading,
which he filed on 14 October 1986, he applied for several witnesses to
be heard. Four witnesses were examined between 10 November and
20 November 1986. On 20 January 1987 the investigating judge sent the
file to the prosecutor.
11. On 20 March 1987 the prosecutor asked the investigating judge to
complete the file by ordering the applicant to send him a number of
court decisions mentioned in the pleading of 14 October 1986. On
11 June 1987 Mr Philis submitted those decisions, together with another
pleading. On 12 June 1987 the investigating judge forwarded these to
the prosecutor.
12. On 5 October 1987 the prosecutor charged the applicant with
insulting the judiciary and set the case down for trial on
12 October 1988 by the Athens Criminal Court sitting with three judges
(Trimeles Plimmeliodikio). On 13 September 1988 the applicant was
summoned to appear before that court on 12 October 1988. On
22 September 1988 he made an application under Article 322 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to be examined by an indictment division,
but this was refused by the prosecutor at the Court of Appeal on
30 September 1988.
13. On 12 October 1988 the Athens Criminal Court convicted Mr Philis
and sentenced him to five months' imprisonment, a penalty which was
converted into a fine of 400 drachmas per day. The applicant
immediately appealed, thereby causing execution of his sentence to be
stayed (see paragraph 24 below).
14. On 5 November 1990 the Athens Court of Appeal adjourned the case,
but on 25 October 1991 it allowed the appeal and quashed Mr Philis's
conviction.
15. The Court of Appeal's judgment and the record of the hearing were
finalised (katharographi) on 19 November 1991 and served on the
applicant on 28 November 1991. On 9 December 1991 the applicant
applied to the Court of Appeal to have them rectified and supplemented.
On 15 April 1992 the court ruled that the application was inadmissible
on the ground that it had not been made within twenty days of delivery
of the judgment on 25 October 1991.
16. Under Articles 473 and 506 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
prosecutor had a right of appeal on points of law against the
Court of Appeal's judgment, to be exercised within ten days of the
finalisation of that judgment. He did not, however, avail himself of
that right, with the result that the Court of Appeal's judgment became
final on 29 November 1991.
B. The disciplinary proceedings
17. On 2 August 1982 the AOEK complained to the
Greek Chamber of Technology (Techniko Epimelitirio Ellados - "the TEE")
of the various proceedings brought by Mr Philis against the AOEK and
some of its engineers. The chairman of the TEE's disciplinary board
then initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for
improper conduct. On 14 November 1983 the charges were drawn and a
rapporteur appointed. On 9 March 1984 the disciplinary board decided
to adjourn the case as the chairman of the AOEK, who had been called
to give evidence, had not appeared. On 20 November 1984 the
disciplinary board suspended the applicant from practising his
profession for ten months.
18. Mr Philis was notified of that decision on 7 June 1985. On
21 June 1985 he appealed to the TEE's Supreme Disciplinary Council
within the prescribed two weeks, thereby causing his suspension to be
stayed (see paragraph 28 below). On 14 April and 18 May 1992 he wrote
to the TEE requesting it to inform him of the outcome of his appeal.
On 22 May 1992 the TEE replied that the case was being considered by
one of the members of the Supreme Disciplinary Council acting as
rapporteur and that a hearing would be held when he had submitted his
report.
19. By a letter of 17 February 1993 the applicant was invited to
attend the Supreme Disciplinary Council hearing on 10 March 1993. On
5 March 1993 he challenged all the Council's members and asked for the
guarantees in Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6) to be respected at
the hearing.
20. On 10 March 1993 the Supreme Disciplinary Council rejected that
request. It allowed the appeal, however, and completely exonerated the
applicant.
21. On 2 April 1993 Mr Philis sought rectification of the decision
of 10 March 1993. On 26 April 1993 the Supreme Disciplinary Council
answered the points raised by the applicant in his request but did not
rectify its decision.
II. Relevant domestic law
A. The Code of Criminal Procedure
22. Under Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
criminal proceedings may be initiated of the authorities' own motion
following a report, a complaint or any other information indicating
that an offence may have been committed.
23. The public prosecutor is then required to order a preliminary
investigation or to commit the accused for trial directly, where this
is possible. If the complaint or report in question is without
foundation, the public prosecutor takes no further action (Article 43).
24. Where an appeal is lodged in accordance with the law and within
the prescribed time-limit, execution of the judgment against which it
has been brought is stayed (Articles 471 and 497).
25. Under Article 370, criminal proceedings end when the accused has
been found guilty or innocent.
B. Provisions governing disciplinary proceedings
26. Disciplinary proceedings in the Greek Chamber of Technology are
governed by the presidential decree of 27 November and
14 December 1926, as amended by Article 1 of
Legislative Decree no. 783/1970, and by Law no. 1486/1984.
27. Article 28 of the above-mentioned presidential decree provides
that, at first instance, disciplinary offences by members of the TEE
come under the jurisdiction of disciplinary boards.
28. Under Article 32 para. 1, an appeal lies against disciplinary
board decisions. Appeals must be lodged with the
Supreme Disciplinary Council within two weeks of notification of the
decision in question. The appeal has a suspensive effect.
29. Article 34 provides that disciplinary proceedings are separate
from other proceedings and are not stayed on account of
criminal proceedings. However, in exceptional circumstances, a
disciplinary board may stay disciplinary proceedings until
criminal proceedings have ended, while remaining free to give a
decision that differs from the criminal court's judgment. Where there
is a conviction in criminal proceedings, disciplinary proceedings that
have led to an acquittal or a reprimand will be reopened.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
30. In his application to the Commission of 15 January 1992
(no. 19773/92) Mr Philis complained of five different sets of civil,
criminal or disciplinary proceedings. He submitted that these
proceedings - some of which had been brought against him, others by
him - had entailed violations of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention
(art. 6, art. 8, art. 14) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
31. In decisions of 13 August 1994 and 24 May 1995 the Commission
declared admissible the complaints of a violation of Article 6
(art. 6) in that a reasonable time had been exceeded in two of the sets
of proceedings complained of, and declared the remainder of the
application inadmissible. In its report of 16 January 1996
(Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the unanimous opinion that there
had been a violation of that provision (art. 6) in both sets of
proceedings. The full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced
as an annex to this judgment (1).
_______________
Note by the Registrar
1. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed
version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-IV), but a copy of the Commission's report is obtainable
from the registry.
_______________
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
32. In their memorial the Government requested the Court to "reject
the entire appeal lodged by Mr Nicolas Philis".
33. The applicant in his memorial requested the Court to
"hold:
(1) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the
AOEK's officials, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) as regards the applicant's right to a court or to a
fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
(2) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the
AOEK's officials, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) [for failure to comply with] the 'reasonable time'
requirement;
(3) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the
applicant, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) [for failure to comply with] the 'reasonable time'
requirement;
(4) that, in the criminal proceedings instituted against the
applicant, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) [for failure to comply with] the 'rule of law' and [on
account of a] 'denial of justice';
(5) that, in the disciplinary proceedings, there has been a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) [for failure to comply
with] the 'reasonable time' requirement;
(6) that, in the disciplinary proceedings, there has been a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) [on account of a]
'denial of justice';
(7) that there has been a violation of Article 8 and of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 taken together and in conjunction with
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 8+P1-1+6-1);
(8) that there has been a violation of Article 13 (art. 13)".
AS TO THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 OF THE CONVENTION
(art. 6-1)
34. The applicant complained of the excessive length of the
criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 8-16 above) and the disciplinary
proceedings (see paragraphs 17-21 above) instituted against him. He
alleged a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1),
which provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ...
hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ..."
The Government disputed that submission, while the Commission
accepted it.
35. The Court reiterates at the outset that the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular
circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid
down in its case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and
the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities
(see, among many other authorities, the Kemmache v. France (nos. 1
and 2) judgment of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, p. 27,
para. 60). It is necessary among other things to take account of the
importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation
(see, for instance, the Phocas v. France judgment of 23 April 1996,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, p. 546, para. 71).
A. The reasonableness of the length of the
criminal proceedings
36. As the Court has been unable to ascertain when notice of the
investigation was first served on the applicant or when he was first
affected by it, it shares the Commission's view that the period to be
taken into consideration began on 9 October 1986, when Mr Philis first
appeared before the investigating judge (see paragraph 10 above); it
ended on 29 November 1991, when the Court of Appeal's decision quashing
his conviction became final (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). As the
latter date marked the end of the criminal proceedings
(see paragraph 25 above), the Court cannot accept the applicant's
submission that there had not yet been a ruling on the merits of the
charge because of the Court of Appeal's allegedly unlawful refusal to
rectify its judgment of 25 October 1991.
Consequently, the period to be taken into consideration under
this head lasted more than five years.
37. The applicant argued that his right to address a court freely had
been in issue, that the case had been simple and that his conduct had
not delayed the proceedings. The judicial authorities had been wholly
responsible for the excessive length of the proceedings.
38. The Commission pointed out that there had been a period of
inactivity imputable to the State from 12 October 1988, when the
applicant appealed against his conviction at first instance
(see paragraph 13 above), until 25 October 1991, when his conviction
was quashed by the Athens Court of Appeal (see paragraph 14 above).
It considered that the Government had not provided any satisfactory
explanation for the delay, since the Athens Court of Appeal's excessive
caseload was not a convincing argument.
39. The Government submitted that there had been no long adjournments
or delays at any of the three stages in the proceedings (during the
preliminary investigation, at first instance and on appeal). The
first two stages had each lasted approximately one year. With regard
to the third stage, the Government maintained that the
Athens Court of Appeal had had a backlog of cases and that there had
been no special feature of the case which justified giving it priority
as the applicant had not been in custody. Lastly, the adjournment on
5 November 1990 (see paragraph 14 above) had been due to organisational
difficulties for which the judicial authorities had not been
responsible.
40. The Court notes that the case was not particularly complex and
that the applicant was not in any way responsible for the length of the
proceedings. It also observes that Mr Philis was convicted at first
instance (see paragraph 13 above) and agrees with the Commission that
there was a period of inactivity of approximately three years between
the date of his appeal and the date on which his conviction was
quashed. Such a period may be considered reasonable only in
exceptional circumstances which the respondent State must account for.
In this connection, the Government pleaded the excessive caseload of
the Court of Appeal and organisational difficulties it had encountered.
However, as the Court has repeatedly held, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their
judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its
requirements, including the obligation to hear cases within a
reasonable time (see, as the most recent authority, the Süßmann
v. Germany judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1174,
para. 55).
41. Accordingly, and taking into account what was at stake for
Mr Philis in the proceedings, the Court cannot regard the period of
time that elapsed in the instant case as reasonable.
There has therefore been a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1) in this respect.
B. The reasonableness of the length of the disciplinary
proceedings
42. The applicant also maintained that the excessive length of the
disciplinary proceedings instituted against him had contravened
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). He argued that the case had concerned
only one simple point of law and that he had not in any way contributed
to the delays.
43. The Commission noted that there had been a period of inactivity
of more than seven years between the lodging of the appeal against the
penalty imposed at first instance (see paragraph 18 above) and the date
on which the Supreme Disciplinary Council ruled on the appeal
(see paragraph 20 above). It considered that Mr Philis could not be
held responsible for the delay and that the Government had not provided
any convincing explanation for it.
44. The Government argued that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) did not
apply in the instant case as the outcome of the proceedings was not
directly decisive for the applicant's civil right to practise his
profession. As the suspension from practising his profession for
ten months imposed by the disciplinary board (see paragraph 17 above)
had been stayed throughout the appeal proceedings and had then been
quashed by the Supreme Disciplinary Council (see paragraph 20 above),
Mr Philis had never been deprived of his rights.
In the alternative, the Government contended that in any event
the proceedings before 20 November 1985, when Greece's recognition of
the right of individual petition had taken effect, were outside the
Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis. Moreover, in the applicant's
interests, the Supreme Disciplinary Council had deferred its decision
until judgment had been given in the various civil and
criminal proceedings between him and the AOEK. As Mr Philis had never
tried to expedite the proceedings, he had tacitly agreed to the
deferment.
45. The Court does not accept the Government's submission.
Concerning the argument that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) does not
apply in the present case, the Court reiterates that it is clear from
its settled case-law that disciplinary proceedings in which, as in the
instant case, the right to continue to practise a profession is at
stake give rise to "contestations (disputes) over civil rights" within
the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (see, among other
authorities, the following judgments: König v. Germany, 28 June 1978,
Series A no. 27, pp. 29-32, paras. 87-95;
Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981,
Series A no. 43, pp. 19-23, paras. 41-51;
Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58,
pp. 14-16, paras. 25-29; and Diennet v. France, 26 September 1995,
Series A no. 325-A, p. 13, para. 27). It goes without saying that the
procedural guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) apply to all
litigants, not just those who have not won their case in the
national courts.
46. The Court agrees with the Commission that the period to be taken
into consideration began at the latest on 14 November 1983, when the
disciplinary charges against the applicant were drawn (see paragraph 17
above). Like the Commission, the Court acquired jurisdiction
ratione temporis when Greece's recognition of the right of individual
petition took effect on 20 November 1985. However, in order to assess
the reasonableness of the length of time which elapsed after that date,
regard must be had to the state of the case at the time (see, among
other authorities, the Foti and Others v. Italy judgment of
10 December 1982, Series A no. 56, pp. 18-19, para. 53, and the Zappia
v. Italy judgment of 26 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1412,
para. 22). The proceedings ended on 10 March 1993, when the
Supreme Disciplinary Council completely exonerated Mr Philis
(see paragraph 20 above). While the applicant argued that the
proceedings had not yet ended as the Supreme Disciplinary Council had
refused to rectify its decision (see paragraph 21 above), he failed to
show how the outcome of such a rectification could affect his right to
practise his profession.
The Court must accordingly rule on the reasonableness of
disciplinary proceedings which lasted more than nine years, seven of
which were within the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the
Convention institutions.
47. In that connection the Court notes, as did the Commission, that
there was a long period of inactivity between the lodging of
Mr Philis's appeal with the Supreme Disciplinary Council in June 1985
and the hearing in March 1993 (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above).
48. The Court observes that the Government did not dispute the
applicant's argument, which the Commission accepted, that the case was
not complex. As to the Government's submission that consideration of
the appeal had been deferred pending the outcome of other court
proceedings, the Court notes that the Supreme Disciplinary Council
never expressly ordered that deferment. Moreover, there was no binding
statutory obligation on it to defer its decision as disciplinary bodies
are free under Article 34 of the presidential decree of 27 November and
14 December 1926 (see paragraph 29 above) to give a decision that
differs from a conviction in criminal proceedings. Nor does it appear
from the case file before the Court that Mr Philis knew of the
deferment, still less that he agreed to it.
49. The Government maintained that the applicant had never tried to
expedite the appeal proceedings. But the duty to administer justice
expeditiously is incumbent in the first place on the relevant
authorities, especially in proceedings in which they have the power of
initiative and the power to ensure that progress is made. Besides, the
Government did not specify how Mr Philis, who strictly observed the
only time-limit imposed on him (see paragraph 18 above), could have
expedited consideration of his appeal.
50. As the Government did not provide any other explanation for the
Supreme Disciplinary Council's delay, the Court finds that a period of
more than seven years to consider a case acknowledged to be simple
fails to satisfy the "reasonable time" requirement in the Convention.
There has therefore been a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1) in this respect too.
C. The other complaints raised by the applicant
51. In his memorial Mr Philis requested the Court to consider some
additional complaints based on Articles 6 para. 1, 8 and 13 of the
Convention (art. 6-1, art. 8, art. 13) and on Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (see paragraph 33 above). As those complaints
were declared inadmissible by the Commission (see paragraph 31 above),
the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain them (see, among many other
authorities, the Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands judgment of
28 September 1995, Series A no. 327-A, p. 13, paras. 39-40).
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION (art. 50)
52. Under Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50),
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal
authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is
completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising
from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the said
Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party."
The applicant sought compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary
damage and reimbursement of legal costs incurred in the
domestic proceedings and before the Convention institutions.
A. Damage
53. Mr Philis claimed, firstly, one thousand million drachmas (GRD)
for his loss of earnings between 1986 and 1995. He accepted that the
proceedings in issue had not led to the suspension of his professional
activities, but maintained that while they lasted he had been deprived
of the legal protection necessary to practise his profession unimpeded.
54. The applicant further claimed GRD 4,679,553,400 for the loss
arising from the fact that actions to recover fees and for compensation
which he had instituted against the AOEK, the TEE and the Government
had remained in abeyance. The risk that further criminal and
disciplinary proceedings might be instituted against him had, he
alleged, deterred him from taking any steps to have a date set for
these actions.
55. Lastly, Mr Philis claimed GRD 20,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage
in respect of the long period during which he had lived in a state of
uncertainty.
56. The Government stated that judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights were binding in the Greek legal system and that redress
could be obtained in Greece for any injury imputable to the
public authorities. In any event, the applicant had not proved the
alleged damage or established any causal link with the alleged breach
of the Convention.
57. The Delegate of the Commission submitted that although Mr Philis
had perhaps sustained non-pecuniary damage, it was hard to establish
a link between the alleged pecuniary damage and the delays leading to
the finding of a violation.
58. The Court points out that in the present case the only issue to
be decided is whether there was a failure to comply with the
"reasonable time" requirement in two sets of proceedings, criminal and
disciplinary. Those were the only complaints declared admissible by
the Commission (see paragraph 31 above). Consequently, the applicant
cannot argue that he did not have the legal protection to which he was
entitled, and a fortiori cannot claim just satisfaction on that
account. As there is no causal link between the violations found and
the alleged damage, the Court cannot allow the claims in respect of
that damage.
It is therefore unnecessary to consider either whether the damage
alleged by Mr Philis was actually sustained or whether, as submitted
by the Government, he could obtain redress in the domestic courts.
59. As to non-pecuniary damage, the Court, making its assessment on
an equitable basis, awards the applicant GRD 1,500,000. In view of the
particular facts of the case, Mr Philis cannot now be expected to bring
new proceedings for compensation against the State.
B. Costs and expenses
60. The applicant sought reimbursement of the costs and fees incurred
in the domestic courts and before the Convention institutions, which
he assessed, in respect of his own work, at GRD 1,880,000 and
GRD 3,420,000 respectively. He also sought 14,245.50 pounds sterling
for fees and costs for the lawyers who represented him before the
Court, to which sum the applicable rate of value-added tax (VAT) was
to be added.
61. In the Government's submission, only necessary, reasonable costs
which Mr Philis could prove he had incurred could be considered. The
additional claim lodged on 13 February 1997 (see paragraph 5 above)
should be dismissed as being out of time.
62. The Court notes that it has considered the proceedings in issue
only in relation to the reasonableness of their length. Any
compensation must consequently reflect that fact.
With regard to the costs in respect of the domestic proceedings
for which the applicant is seeking reimbursement, the Court cannot see
how those were incurred to prevent the violations established by the
Court or to seek redress for them. It consequently dismisses this
claim in its entirety.
As to the amounts claimed in respect of the proceedings before
the Convention institutions, the Court finds, like the Delegate of the
Commission, that Mr Philis was assisted by lawyers only during the
hearing before the Court. Making its assessment on an equitable basis,
it awards him GRD 2,000,000 for costs and expenses, together with any
VAT that may be chargeable, less 17,750 French francs already paid by
way of legal aid.
C. Default interest
63. According to the information available to the Court, the
statutory rate of interest applicable in Greece at the date of adoption
of the present judgment is 6% per annum.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1) as regards the length of the
criminal proceedings brought against the applicant;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) as regards the length of the disciplinary proceedings
brought against the applicant by the Greek Chamber of Technology;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within
three months, 1,500,000 (one million five hundred thousand)
drachmas for non-pecuniary damage and
2,000,000 (two million) drachmas for costs and expenses, together
with any VAT that may be chargeable, less
17,750 (seventeen thousand seven hundred and fifty) French francs
already paid in legal aid, to be converted into drachmas at the
rate in force on the date on which the present judgment is
delivered;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 6% shall be payable
on those sums from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months
until settlement;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing
in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 27 June 1997.
Signed: Rudolf BERNHARDT
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar