AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application No. 28915/95 by S.P. against the United Kingdom The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 17 January 1997, the following members being present: Mrs. J. LIDDY, President MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ E. BUSUTTIL A. WEITZEL L. LOUCAIDES B. MARXER B. CONFORTI N. BRATZA I. BÉKÉS G. RESS A. PERENIC C. BÎRSAN K. HERNDL M. VILA AMIGÓ Mrs. M. HION Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the application introduced on 3 July 1994 by S. P. against the United Kingdom and registered on 12 October 1995 under file No. 28915/95; Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; Having deliberated; Decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant is a British citizen born in 1986. He brought domestic proceedings by his mother and next friend. He is represented before the Commission by his mother. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. A. The particular circumstances of the case The applicant is dyslexic. This means that, despite his high intelligence, he has difficulties with spelling, written mathematics, handwriting and that he has poor motor co-ordination. Further the applicant has a significant weakness in short term auditory sequential and visual memory and a weakness in laterality of knowledge. These learning difficulties have caused the applicant to have serious emotional, behavioural and social problems, including suicidal tendencies. The applicant had begun to read and write prior to commencing school. He commenced primary school in September 1991, shortly before his fifth birthday. The applicant's mother was concerned at her son's failure to progress at school, and she consequently requested that the Local Education Authority ("LEA") carry out an assessment (but not a statutory assessment under the Education Act 1981) of her son's educational abilities. In January 1992, when the applicant was aged 5 years 4 months, an LEA Educational Psychologist produced a report which stated that overall the applicant was in the top 15% of children for his age but that he had weaknesses in short term memory, reading, spelling and numbers which suggested some underachievement, taking into account his ability. The report concluded by observing: "It is my opinion that [S.P.] is an able boy whose cognitive skills are above average. It is important, therefore, that there is awareness of this ability as [S.P.] may not produce evidence to this effect on paper. The reasons for [S.P.'s] weak results in the basic skills may be due to emotional factors or they may be due to more specific difficulties ...". At Easter 1992 the applicant's mother removed her son from the initial primary school and placed him in another nearby school. At this school, likewise, the applicant failed to perform according to his abilities. The applicant's mother obtained a further report from the LEA in May 1993, carried out by the same Educational Psychologist. This report concluded that: "[S.P.] is performing at a level well above his age in both reading and in number. His spelling skills are also above his age but weaker than expected and taking into account his general level of ability ...[S.P.] does have one specific area of weakness, that of short term auditory memory, and this appears to have some effect on his progress in the area of spelling, and in his ability to attending class ...". In March 1993 the applicant's mother independently obtained a report on the applicant by a consultant in learning abilities and difficulties (Dr.C.). This report stated that the applicant was dyslexic and commented with regard to a statutory assessment: "[S.P.'s] difficulties are much above the standard where [the] County Council would consider making a multi-professional assessment under Section 5 of the 1981 Education Act, which might lead to a Statement, and if he was placed within the ordinary classroom of the local authority school, he would be unlikely to receive specialist teaching or in-class support." The report concluded that: "[S.P.] is a student of high intellectual ability, who shows a range of highly developed skills and learning, other skills at an average level, but has difficulties in fine motor control, and auditory short term memory. His reading, spelling, writing and numeracy skills are age appropriate, but below the level anticipated of a student of his age and high intellectual competence. He is therefore under-achieving to some extent in his basic skills development, and this will impair his work on his curriculum, and affect his attitude to school ...". The applicant remained at the school until September 1993 when his mother removed him and thereafter he attended an independent school. The applicant was removed from this school by his mother within a year, as she considered the school was failing to help her son appropriately and he commenced at a further independent school. In May 1994 the applicant's mother requested that the LEA carry out a statutory assessment of the applicant's special educational needs, pursuant to Section 9 of the Education Act. The LEA replied by letter stating: "Nationally about 20% of children may have some form of special educational need at some time. A formal assessment under the 1981 Act, however, is only applicable in a minority of cases - nationally around 2% of children where a child's needs are so severe or complex as to require the local education authority to determine and arrange for special educational provision for the child ... It is clear from Dr. C's report that [S.P.'s] difficulties are not such as to require a formal assessment under the 1981 Education Act. The authority will not therefore be complying with your request." Leave was granted to the applicant to challenge, by means of judicial review, the decision of the LEA not to make a statutory assessment of the applicant. However, the High Court, on 23 January 1995, upheld the decision of the LEA. In 1995 the applicant's latest school requested that the applicant be removed, as they were unable to supply the specialist teaching he required. The applicant's mother commenced home education and has provisionally obtained a place for the applicant at a specialist independent school, to commence in September 1997. The mother of the applicant independently obtained a report on the applicant by a further psychologist, dated 12 June 1995. The report dealt with the applicant's intellectual abilities, educational attainments, specific learning difficulties, personality, and social and behaviour adjustment. The report noted, inter alia, that the applicant's personality profile showed significant deviations from the norm, and noted a concern over suicidal thoughts and tendencies. The report concluded (inter alia) that: "In my opinion [S.P.] would benefit from a Statement of Special Educational Needs in order to afford him the necessary protection in law which should address both his learning difficulties and his emotional, social and behaviour problems." This report was sent to the LEA. In November 1995 the LEA agreed to make a statutory assessment of the applicant's special educational needs. B. The relevant domestic law Section 8 of the Education Act 1944 (the 1944 Act) creates a statutory duty on local authorities to provide suitable primary and secondary full-time education: "to afford for all pupils opportunities for education offering such variety of instruction and training as may be desirable in view of their different ages, abilities, and aptitudes ...". In particular local authorities must provide appropriate special education for disabled children. This duty was reinforced by the Education Act 1981 (the 1981 Act). The LEA's duties are enforceable pursuant to a parent's complaint or otherwise under sections 68 and 99 of the 1944 Act, by the Secretary of State for Education. He may seek an order of mandamus against a recalcitrant LEA. A subsidiary obligation is placed upon parents to secure suitable education for their children in accordance with their age, aptitude and ability. This latter obligation is ultimately enforceable through criminal proceedings (sections 36, 37, and 39 of the 1944 Act). Section 76 of the 1944 Act requires education authorities to have regard to parents' wishes, so far as is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction, and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure. Section 5(1) of the 1981 Act deals with a child for whom the LEA are responsible and who in their opinion has or probably has special educational needs of a kind which calls for them (as opposed to the school) to determine what special educational provision should be made to meet these needs. In such a case the LEA are required to make an assessment of the child's educational needs. Section 7(1) of the 1981 Act requires that if the LEA, having made an assessment under section 5, are of the opinion that they should be the ones to determine the special educational provision which should be made for the child, then they should make and maintain a statement of his special educational needs and section 7 (2) of the 1981 Act imposes upon the LEA the duty to arrange that the special educational provision is made for him. Section 9(1) of the 1981 Act provides that: "parents of a child for whom no Statement of Special Educational Needs is maintained by the local education authority may ask the authority to make an assessment of those needs. The authority must comply with that request unless it is in their opinion unreasonable." Special educational assessments are subject to periodic review. Parents may appeal against the LEA's statement to an appeal committee which may remit the case for further consideration by the LEA. Further appeal can be made against the LEA's decision to the Secretary of State for Education (there is no right of an oral or adversary hearing with this form of appeal). In the final instance judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision can be made, on the basis of irrationality, illegality or procedural impropriety. Likewise, judicial review can be sought of the LEA's decision not to comply with a parent's request for a statement of special education needs under section 9(1) of the 1981 Act. COMPLAINTS The applicant complains that he has been denied the right to an education, in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The applicant considers that teaching staff at each of the schools (including two state run schools and two independent schools) have failed to take account of his special needs. In particular the failure by teachers to address the applicant's problems with short term memory, have resulted in him being unable to derive a positive benefit from the education system. Further the neglect of the applicant's learning difficulties has contributed to the applicant's current behavioural, emotional and social problems. The applicant further complains about the refusal of the LEA to make a statutory assessment of him with regard to his special educational needs and the refusal of the High Court to overturn this decision by means of judicial review. The LEA refused the request from the applicant's mother for a statutory assessment of the applicant in May 1994. They maintained this refusal until November 1995, when an assessment was agreed to. THE LAW The applicant complains that the failure of the schools he has attended to recognise and assist him with his learning difficulties and the initial refusal of the LEA to assess him with regard to his special needs, amounts to a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2). Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) provides as follows: "No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any function which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions." The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has entered a reservation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2), which reads as follows: "... in view of certain provisions of the Education Acts in the United Kingdom, the principle affirmed in the second sentence of Article 2 (Art. 2) is accepted by the United Kingdom only in so far as it is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure." Article 64 (Art. 64) of the Convention provides as follows: "1. Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be permitted under this Article. 2. Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief statement of the law concerned." In the light of developments in the case-law of the Convention organs on Article 64 (Art. 64) of the Convention, questions may arise as to whether the reservation entered to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) is valid (see, in particular, Eur. Court HR, Belilos v. Switzerland judgment of 29 April 1988, Series A no. 132, pp. 25-28, paras. 52-59), and if it is valid, whether it is applicable to the present case which concerns largely provisions which entered into force subsequent to the making of the reservation (see Eur. Court HR, Fischer v. Austria judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A no. 312, pp. 18-20, paras. 37-41). The Commission is not, however, required to resolve these questions as the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) constitutes a whole that is dominated by its first sentence (Eur. Court HR, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen judgment of 7 December 1986, Series A no. 23). In the present case, there is no question of the applicant having been excluded from the educational facilities of the State. The applicant's mother voluntarily removed her son from two State schools and one private school as she did not consider he was receiving the extra help he required. She was requested to remove her son from a further private school as they were unable to meet the special teaching requirements of the applicant. The Commission recalls that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) is a right which: "by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals" (Eur. Court HR, Belgian Linguistic judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, pp. 30-32, paras. 3-5). Such regulation is permitted as long as the substance of the right to education is preserved. The Commission notes that the United Kingdom Government provides special education for disabled children either in normal mainstream schools with special departments, or in specialised segregated institutions (for cases on special education see No. 14135/88, Dec. 2.10.89, D.R. 62, p. 292 and No. 14688/89, Dec. 4.12.89, D.R. 64, p. 188). In keeping with current educational trends, section 2 of the Education Act 1981 provides that children with special educational needs should be educated in an ordinary school with other children of their own age, if that is compatible with the special education which the former require, the provision of efficient education for other children at the school and the efficient use of resources. The Commission recognises that there must be a wide measure of discretion left to the appropriate authorities as to how to make the best use possible of the resources available to them in the interests of disabled children generally. As regards the facts of the present case the LEA initially obtained, at the request of the applicant's mother, professional reports, albeit not statutory assessments, on the applicant. From these reports the LEA concluded that the applicant was of above average intelligence and his short term memory problems were not such as to require a formal statutory statement, which would have been the first step towards providing special teaching provisions for the applicant. To the contrary, it was the LEA's view that the applicant's needs could be sufficiently catered for in the classroom. In May 1994 the LEA refused to make a statutory assessment of the applicant. They made this decision on the basis of the then current independent psychologist's report (Dr. C.), which itself stated that the applicant was not exhibiting difficulties at a level which would normally lead to a statutory assessment. It appears from the facts that over a period of several years and four changes of school, the applicant's learning difficulties and associated behavioural, social and emotional problems magnified. When the LEA received a further report of 12 June 1995 from a different psychologist stating in unambiguous terms that a statutory assessment was required, they acceded to this request. The Commission considers that, in these circumstances the LEA cannot be criticised for initially refusing, in May 1994, to make a statutory assessment of the applicant, albeit with hindsight the applicant's mother was shown to be right in her concerns. The Commission in particular notes that in November 1995 having received a psychologist's report that recommended an assessment, the LEA agreed to undertake a statutory assessment of the applicant's special educational needs. With regard to criticisms made of the various teaching that the applicant has received in the four schools he has attended, it is not the Commission's task to assess the standard of teaching provided by schools. In these circumstances the Commission concludes that the applicant has not been denied his right to education and that the present case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 2, first sentence of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2). It follows that this application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously, DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE. M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY Secretary President to the First Chamber of the First Chamber