European Court of Human Rights

                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                       Application No. 25648/94
                       by Timothy ROBSON
                       against the United Kingdom

     The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   C.L. ROZAKIS, President
           Mrs.  J. LIDDY
           MM.   E. BUSUTTIL
                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                 A. WEITZEL
                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
                 B. MARXER
                 B. CONFORTI
                 N. BRATZA
                 I. BÉKÉS
                 E. KONSTANTINOV
                 G. RESS
                 A. PERENIC
                 C. BÎRSAN
                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 27 June 1994 by
Timothy ROBSON against the United Kingdom and registered on
14 November 1994 under file No. 25648/94;

     Having regard to:

-    the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
     the Commission;

-    the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
     22 November 1995 and the observations of the applicant in reply
     submitted on 13 February 1996;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a British citizen born in 1962 and resides in
Argyll, Scotland.

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

     The applicant was questioned by police on 4 and 5 April 1992 and
claims that he was, inter alia, assaulted and refused a solicitor
during questioning. The standard form filled in by the police and
entitled "Arrest-Rights of Accused" (submitted by the applicant to the
Commission) noted that the applicant was informed of his right to have
a solicitor present at 07.34 on 4 April 1992. The handwriting on the
form notes that the applicant's then solicitor and the duty solicitor
could not be contacted. At 15.50 on the same day it was again noted on
the form that the applicant's own solicitor could not be contacted and
that the duty solicitor "attends".

     The applicant, along with two others, was charged on indictment
with eight offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act")
and with two charges of reset. The applicant appeared before a court
on 6 and on 13 April 1992, on which latter date he was released on
bail.

     The applicant received legal aid from the Scottish Legal Aid
Board ("S.L.A.B.") for the preparation of his defence and for legal
representation at his trial.

     The applicant was represented at his trial in the High Court in
Scotland by a solicitor and by counsel. During the trial the
prosecution relied on certain statements made by the applicant during
his questioning by police. The defence argued, in the presence of the
jury, that certain of those statements were obtained through, inter
alia, assaults, intimidation and deprivation. The prosecution disputed
this and submitted that the statements had been fairly obtained. In his
summing up to the jury, the trial judge noted the submissions of the
defence and the prosecution in this respect and directed the jury that
before they could accept any such statements they must be satisfied of
three matters: that the statements were in fact made, that any such
statements were accurately recorded and that they were freely made and
obtained. The trial judge continued as follows:

     "Whether it was <fairly obtained> or not is something you have
     to decide and in reaching that decision you should be guided by
     the following principles. Fairness in relation to the
     admissibility of statements really involves both sides of the
     case. On the one hand, it is in the public interest that crimes
     should be investigated and those who commit them brought to
     justice. On the other hand, those who are suspected or accused
     must be fairly dealt with. Information from them must be obtained
     fairly and it must be freely given by them. There should be no
     threats, inducements or intimidation ... If you thought that the
     ... statement was unfairly obtained then you should exclude it
     from your consideration ...".

     On 5 April 1993 the jury found the applicant guilty on four of
the charges under the 1971 Act and on one of the charges of reset. The
judge sentenced the applicant to five terms of imprisonment to run
concurrently - two sentences of 5 years, one sentence of 2 years, one
sentence of 6 months and one sentence of 4 months. On the same day a
forfeiture order was made in relation to the applicant's mother's car
which the applicant had been using and in which certain quantities of
drugs had been found.

     On 8 April 1993 the applicant lodged an intimation of his
intention to appeal together with a note of appeal against conviction
and sentence. The grounds of appeal, outlined in the note of appeal,
simply challenged the severity of the sentence and noted that the
applicant wished to apply for an appeal against sentence or "possibly"
for a retrial on the charges of which he had been found guilty.

     On 4 May 1993 the transcript of the trial judge's summing up to
the jury was filed. On 20 August 1993 the report of the trial judge on
the trial was also filed pursuant to section 236A of the Criminal
procedure (Scotland) Act 1974. In that report, the trial judge
described the evidence against the applicant, the reasons for the
sentences given, including his consideration of mitigation offered on
the applicant's behalf, and as regards the applicant's request for a
retrial, stated that "during the trial no objections were made to the
admission of any evidence".

     While the legal aid the applicant received for his trial would
have covered legal advice in connection with his appeal including
obtaining the opinion of counsel as to the appeal's chances of success,
it did not cover legal representation for the appeal hearing and, for
this, the applicant made a further application for legal aid on 6 May
1993.

     On 25 November 1993 the applicant's solicitors wrote to the
S.L.A.B. requesting the granting of legal aid and advising that counsel
was indisposed but had advised orally that counsel was of the opinion
that the applicant's appeal was not stateable. That letter notified the
S.L.A.B. of the date of the forthcoming appeal which was 3 December
1993. On the same day the applicant's solicitor wrote to the applicant
indicating that counsel did not consider that he had any ground of
appeal whatsoever and that it was likely that he would have to
represent himself at the hearing of his appeal.

     On 3 December 1993 the S.L.A.B. refused to grant legal aid on the
basis that the S.L.A.B. did not consider that the applicant had shown
substantial grounds for making the appeal and that it was not
reasonable, in the circumstances of the case, that legal aid should be
made available to the applicant. The S.L.A.B. indicated that, while
they did not receive a written opinion from counsel in connection with
the prospects of an appeal, the applicant's solicitor had informed
S.L.A.B. that counsel had advised orally that the appeal was not
stateable.

     When the appeal came on for hearing, on 3 December 1993 the High
Court granted the applicant's solicitors and counsel leave to withdraw
from acting for the applicant. An adjournment of the appeal hearing was
also granted to a later date on the basis that on that date the
applicant would be in a position to represent himself. The High Court
also suggested that, if the applicant wished to continue his appeal,
he should lodge amended grounds of appeal.

     Pursuant to complaints made by the applicant against the police
who had interviewed him, the applicant was informed by letter dated
13 December 1993 that the Regional Prosecutor Fiscal did not intend
initiating criminal proceedings against any of the police officers
concerned.

     On 6 January 1994, when the appeal again came on for hearing, the
applicant obtained an adjournment for a month so that he could apply
again for legal aid. On 3 February 1994 the case was again continued
as the court had insufficient time to consider the appeal. The
applicant had no success in obtaining legal aid and on the 2 March 1994
he presented his appeal in person. The applicant indicated that he had
abandoned his appeal against conviction but that he wished to maintain
his appeal against sentence. Having heard the applicant and considered
the documents and information before it, the High Court refused the
applicant's appeal.

     On 28 June 1994 the Justiciary Office of the High Court confirmed
to the applicant that, in order to challenge the forfeiture of her car,
the applicant's mother should have made an application within a year
of the forfeiture order for the return of the car.

     On 1 December 1995 the applicant was released from prison.

Relevant domestic law and practice

1. Criminal trials - Solemn proceedings

     It is open to the defence to make formal objections to the
admissibility of evidence which objections require the judge to ask the
jury to withdraw, to hear counsel's submissions on the point in the
absence of the jury and to decide whether the evidence should be opened
to the jury or not. The cases where this occurs are concerned almost
exclusively with the admissibility in evidence of statements made to
the police.

2. Prior to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act")

(a)  Criminal appeals - Solemn proceedings

     In solemn proceedings in Scotland where the trial proceeds upon
an indictment before a judge sitting with a jury, a person convicted
of a criminal charge has an automatic right of appeal granted by
statute (section 228 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 -
"the 1975 Act"). No leave to appeal is therefore required.

     In an appeal, the appellant may ask the court to review an
alleged miscarriage of justice in the proceedings in which he was
convicted (section 228(2) of the 1975 Act). A miscarriage of justice
is not defined by statute but the term includes such matters as
misdirections by the trial judge, wrong decisions on the admissibility
of evidence and breaches of natural justice. The nature of the alleged
miscarriage of justice must be specified in the grounds of appeal which
must be lodged within eight weeks of the date when sentence is imposed
upon the appellant (section 233(1) and (2) of the 1975 Act). An
appellant may not, at the appeal hearing, found any aspect of his
appeal on a ground which is not contained in the notice of appeal
unless, exceptionally and on showing cause, he obtains the leave of the
court to do so (section 233(3) of the 1975 Act.

     Pursuant to section 236A of the 1975 Act the trial judge must,
as soon as is reasonably practicable after receiving a copy of the
notice of appeal, furnish a report in writing giving the trial judge's
opinion on the case generally and on the grounds contained in the
notice of appeal. Section 234 of the 1975 Act provides that the
appellant can opt to present his case in writing instead of orally.
However, in practice appellants present their case orally.

     While there is no statutory provision relating to the conduct of
the appeal hearing (other than defining the quorum of judges as being
three), the practice is that an appellant is afforded an opportunity
to make oral submissions at such a hearing in support of his appeal and
is also permitted to lodge other documents in support of the appeal.
It is also open to the judges at that hearing to ask questions, or to
put points to, the appellant. In addition, where an appellant refers
to a pre-prepared statement, the practice is for the court to ask the
appellant to present that statement orally or to provide copies of the
statement to the judges to read for themselves.

     The Crown is always represented by counsel (the Advocate Deputy)
at the hearing of criminal appeals. The duty of such counsel is to act
solely in the public interest and not to seek to uphold a wrongful
decision. Accordingly, they will only address the court if requested
to do so or if it is necessary to bring to the attention of the court
some matter relevant to the appeal, whether favourable or not to the
prosecution.

     The court may dismiss the appeal and affirm the verdict of the
trial court. In addition, the trial court verdict can be set aside
either by the appeal court either by quashing the conviction or by
substituting an amended verdict of guilty or by authorising a new
prosecution (section 254 of the 1975 Act).

(b)  Legal Aid for Criminal Appeals - Solemn proceedings

     Responsibility for the administration of legal aid in Scotland
is vested in the Scottish Legal Aid Board which is an independent body
whose members are appointed by the Secretary of State.

     Legal aid, which has been available for the trial, extends
normally to include consideration and advice (by a lawyer and by
counsel previously involved in the case) on the question of an appeal.
Where appropriate legal aid is also available to enable a solicitor to
draft and lodge the statutory intimation of intention to appeal and the
notice of appeal setting out the grounds of appeal.

     To extend legal aid beyond this point a further application to
the Legal Aid Board is required. This application will be granted on
fulfilling two conditions. In the first place, the appellant must be
financially eligible for legal aid. Secondly, the appellant must have
substantial grounds for making the appeal and it must be reasonable
that legal aid should be made available in the circumstances. In
deciding on these issues the Legal Aid Board will take into account,
inter alia, any opinion prepared by counsel as to the appeal's
prospects the success.

     If legal aid has been refused and the appellate court is of the
view that, prima facie, the appellant may have substantial grounds for
taking the appeal and that it is in the interests of justice that the
appellant should have assistance with the costs of legal representation
to argue these grounds, that court can adjourn the hearing and
recommend that the Legal Aid Board review their decision. This practice
was formalised by the circulation of a Practice Note to this effect in
1990 following the judgment of the Court in the Granger application
(Eur. Court H. R., Granger judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no.
174). Where such a recommendation is made, legal aid is automatically
granted (paragraph 6.12 of the Manual of Procedure of the Scottish
legal Aid Board).

3.   The 1995 Act - criminal appeals and legal aid for such appeals

     The 1995 Act, which applies to appeals from convictions handed
down on or after 26 September 1995, provides that an appellant must
apply for leave to appeal and such leave will be granted when the
appellant shows arguable grounds for appeal. In line with that new
appeals system, the 1995 Act also provides that legal aid will be
granted for an appeal where the applicant is financially eligible for
legal aid and where leave to appeal has been granted.

COMPLAINTS

1.   The applicant complains that he was wrongly convicted and, in
this respect, makes a number of complaints about irregularities
surrounding the proceedings against him.

     In the first place, the applicant complains about his treatment
by the police while he was questioned by them and that he was refused
a solicitor during that time.

     Secondly, he complains about the prosecution witnesses at his
trial, the failure to issue a fresh indictment sheet listing only the
matters in respect of which he was charged and about mistakes made
during his trial. He also complains that his solicitor had no interest
in his case or the trial, was in collusion with the Procurator Fiscal
and did not present the necessary defence evidence at trial. He further
complains that the trial judge's report to the appeal court was unfair,
untrue and inaccurate and that the appeal court relied on this report.

2.   The applicant complains about the forfeiture order made on
5 April 1993 by the trial court in relation to his mother's car and
alleges that the police have failed to return some of his property
which was in the car when it was seized.

3.   The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 3(c) of the
Convention that he was refused legal aid for his appeal claiming that
he was therefore obliged to present his own appeal and to drop his
appeal against conviction.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

     The application was introduced on 27 June 1994 and was registered
on 14 November 1994.

     On 6 September 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government, to request the Government to
submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's
complaints under Article 6 para. 3(c) of the Convention and to request
the applicant to provide further information in relation to his
allegation of a refusal of access to a solicitor during questioning by
police.

     The Government's observations were received on 22 November 1995
and those of the applicant were received on 13 February 1996.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that he was wrongly convicted and, in
this respect, he makes a number of allegations as to irregularities
surrounding the proceedings against him.

     At the outset the Commission would recall that, as regards the
judicial decisions in the case and in accordance with Article 19
(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance
of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In
particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
errors of law or fact on the part of domestic courts, except where it
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of
any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. The
Commission refers, on this point, to its established case-law (e.g. No.
12505/86, Dec. 11.10.88, D.R. 58 pp. 106, 110 with further references).


     The Commission has therefore considered the applicant's
allegations of irregularities in the proceedings against him and
considers that those allegations can be considered under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which Article, insofar as
relevant, provides as follows:

     "1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
     everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
     reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
     established by law..."

     In this respect, the Commission must consider whether the
proceedings as a whole were conducted in conformity with the provisions
of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see, for example, Can v.
Austria, Comm. Report 12.7.84, Eur. Court H.R. Series A no. 96) and has
concluded, in relation to the allegations of the applicant as regards
the proceedings against him, as follows.

(a) In the first place, the applicant complains about his treatment by
the police when he was questioned by them. In this latter respect, he
alleges that he was assaulted, threatened and tricked by the police
during his interviews with them, that he suffered during that detention
due to lack of sleep for several days, lack of food and lack of
medication for his migraines and that his interview tapes were tampered
with.

     The applicant also complains about his being refused a solicitor
when he was questioned by the police.

     As regards the applicant's allegations about his treatment by the
police when questioned, the Commission notes the following. The
applicant's counsel did raise such issues before the jury during his
trial (as a basis for challenging the evidentiary value of statements
made by the applicant during questioning by the police) and the
applicant also complained about such treatment to the police
authorities. However, the applicant does not appear to have submitted
any evidence whatsoever of any such treatment to the trial court or to
the police authorities and he has not done so before the Commission.

     In addition, the Commission finds it significant that there is
no evidence that any formal objection was made to the trial judge, as
to the admissibility of the statements made by the applicant when
questioned by police, on the basis of such treatment. It is also
noteworthy that the applicant has not commenced civil proceedings for
assault against those police officers. Furthermore, such treatment by
the police cannot be assumed from the applicant's allegations as
regards a refusal of access to a solicitor, particularly in view of the
findings of the Commission below as to the efforts made by the police
to contact certain solicitors.

     Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the applicant's
complaints, as regards his treatment by the police during questioning,
are unsubstantiated.

     As to the applicant's complaints about a refusal of access to a
solicitor when he was questioned by the police, the Commission finds
that the applicant was informed of his right to have a solicitor
present at 07.34 on 4 April 1992, that various attempts were made to
reach the applicant's solicitor together with a duty solicitor and that
those solicitors were, at least immediately, unavailable. The
Commission also finds that the form submitted by the applicant in this
respect admits of the possibility that the applicant was questioned for
a period of time without a solicitor being present and the Commission's
consideration below is based on this assumption.

     However, the Commission recalls that the right of access to a
lawyer can be subject to restrictions and the question to be considered
is whether any questioning of the applicant without his solicitor is
in conformity with the general principle of fairness laid down in
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see, for example, No. 11256/84,
Dec. 5.9.88, D.R. 57 p. 47 and No. 12391/86, Dec. 13.4. 89, D.R. 60
p. 182).

     Insofar as the applicant complains that the absence of his
solicitor, of itself, led to the proceedings being unfair, the
Commission considers that the period of time during which the applicant
was deprived of access to his solicitor was relatively short (being
4 and 5 April 1992 at the longest). Furthermore, it is not alleged that
the applicant's access to a solicitor was inhibited in any way after
5 April 1992 to the date of his trial in April 1993.

     Insofar as the applicant complains that his proceedings were
rendered unfair by the admission during his trial of statements made
to the police in the absence of his solicitor, the Commission again
notes that there is no evidence of any formal objection being made to
the trial judge against the admissibility of such statements, the
success of which objection would have meant that the statements would
not have been even opened to the jury.

     The defence did make certain submissions to the jury as to the
evidentiary value of certain of the applicant's statements in light of
the circumstances surrounding the applicant's questioning by the
police. However, the Commission notes the trial judge's detailed and
clear summing up to the jury in this respect. The trial judge noted the
prosecution and defence submissions as regards the circumstances
surrounding the making of those statements and clearly pointed out that
the jury must be satisfied that the relevant statements were in fact
made, that they were accurately recorded and that they were freely made
and obtained. He went on to clarify that if the jury were not so
satisfied, then the applicant's statements to the police could not form
part of the body of evidence against the applicant to be taken into
account by the jury. The Commission also recalls that the applicant
does not maintain that the jury were other than independent and
impartial.

     The Commission therefore concludes that, insofar as the applicant
has substantiated his complaint about the absence of a solicitor when
he was questioned, this complaint does not disclose a violation of the
Convention.

(b) The applicant also complains about the failure to issue a fresh
indictment sheet (separate to indictment sheets relating to his two co-
accused) listing only the matters in respect of which the applicant was
charged and about mistakes made during his trial. He further complains
about the prosecution witnesses and that the necessary defence evidence
was not produced at his trial. He also complains about his solicitor
(claiming that he had no interest in the applicant's trial and that he
was in collusion with the Procurator Fiscal) and about his counsel.
Finally, the applicant complains that the trial judge's report to the
appeal court was unfair, untrue and inaccurate and that the appeal
court relied on this report.

     In the first place, the Commission considers that the alleged
failure to issue a fresh indictment sheet listing the charges against
the applicant only, even if substantiated, does not disclose any
procedural prejudice to the applicant. Secondly, the Commission also
considers that the applicant's allegations of mistakes made during his
trial and about the trial judge's report to the appeal court are vague
and unsubstantiated.

     Thirdly and as regards the applicant's complaint about the non-
production of defence evidence during the trial and in relation to
prosecution witnesses, the Commission notes that the applicant was
represented by a solicitor and counsel during his trial and that his
counsel would have had the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses and to introduce evidence and call witnesses on behalf of the
defence during the trial.

     Fourthly and as regards the applicant's complaints about his
legal representatives, the Commission recalls that the State's
liability is engaged, in relation to the actions of lawyers in respect
of whom legal aid is granted, only to the extent that "effective
assistance" be provided to the person represented (Eur. Court H.R.,
Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, p. 18, para. 36).

     In the present case, the Commission does not consider that the
applicant has substantiated his allegation that his solicitor conspired
with the Procurator Fiscal or that his solicitor had no interest in the
defence of the charges. In addition, the Commission considers that an
examination of the file does not show that the applicant's legal
representation as regards his trial constituted ineffective assistance
within the meaning of the Artico judgment. The Commission finds
therefore that the State's liability is not engaged in relation to the
complaints relating to the applicant's legal representatives.

     Accordingly, the Commission considers that the complaints listed
above under (b) do not disclose a violation of the Convention.

     In light of the Commission's conclusions above, that the
applicant's submissions noted at (a) and (b) do not disclose a
violation of the Convention, the Commission considers the applicant's
complaint, as to the wrongfulness of his conviction, manifestly ill-
founded pursuant to Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant also complains about the forfeiture order made on
5 April 1993 by the trial court in relation to his mother's car which
he was in the habit of using and that the police have not returned
certain of his possessions which were in the car, to which items the
forfeiture order did not relate.

     However and insofar as the applicant can claim to be a victim of
a violation of the Convention in relation to the forfeiture order, the
Commission notes that the applicant's mother did not petition the court
for the return of the car, as she was entitled to do, within the time
allowed for such a petition or at all. Neither has the applicant taken
any action against the police for the return of his property.
Accordingly, this complaint is inadmissible on grounds of non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of
the Convention. An examination of the application reveals no reasons
why the applicant should be absolved from the requirement that domestic
remedies should be exhausted, the Commission considering that the
applicant's specific submission, that he fears arrest if he commences
any proceedings against the police to recover his property, is not
substantiated.

     The Commission therefore finds this complaint inadmissible
pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.

3.   The applicant further complains about the refusal of legal aid
for his appeal and he invokes Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the
Convention which, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

     "3.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
     minimum rights: ...

           c.  to defend himself in person or through legal assistance
           of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to
           pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
           interests of justice so require; ... "

     The Government request that the application be struck out insofar
as it relates to the applicant's complaint about the lack of legal aid
for the appeal hearing. They argue that it is no longer justified to
continue the examination of this complaint given the changes made to
the criminal appeals and criminal legal aid systems in Scotland by the
1995 Act, which Act was enacted following the Boner and Maxwell
judgments of the Court (Eur. Court H.R., Boner and Maxwell judgments
of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-B and 300-C). The applicant points
out that the provisions of the 1995 Act do not relate to him or to his
appeal in any way since his appeal had been determined prior to
26 September 1995.

     The Commission notes that the provisions of the 1995 Act apply
to appeals from convictions handed down on or after 26 September 1995
only and clearly do not benefit the applicant in any way as regards his
complaint under Article 6 para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention,
his legal aid application and appeal having been determined pursuant
to the 1975 Act (mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., Axen judgment of
8 December 1983, Series A no. 72, p. 11, para. 24). In such
circumstances, the Commission cannot accede to the Government's
request.

     As regards the substance of the complaint under Article 6
para. 3(c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, the applicant submits that
the refusal of legal aid meant that he felt he had to drop his appeal
against conviction and prevented the proper presentation of his appeal
against sentence and thereby led to his appeal hearing being unfair.
The Government has no observations on the substance of this complaint
in light of the Court judgments in the Boner and Maxwell cases (Eur.
Court H.R., Boner and Maxwell judgments,  loc. cit.).

     The Commission considers that this complaint of the applicant
raises issues of fact and law which are of such complexity that their
determination should depend on an examination of the merits. This
complaint cannot therefore be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the
     applicant's complaints about the refusal of legal aid for his
     appeal;

     DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the First Chamber         President of the First Chamber

     (M.F. BUQUICCHIO)                       (C.L. ROZAKIS)