European Court of Human Rights

                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 18714/91
                      by David BRIND and Others
                      against the United Kingdom

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
9 May 1994 the following members being present:

           MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President
                 S. TRECHSEL
                 A. WEITZEL
                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
                 J.-C. SOYER
                 H.G. SCHERMERS
                 H. DANELIUS
                 F. MARTINEZ
           Mrs.  J. LIDDY
           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES
                 J.-C. GEUS
                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
                 G.B. REFFI
                 M.A. NOWICKI
                 I. CABRAL BARRETO
                 B. CONFORTI
                 N. BRATZA
                 I. BÉKÉS
                 J. MUCHA
                 D. SVÁBY

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 12 March 1991 by
David BRIND and Others against the United Kingdom and registered on
22 August 1991 under file No. 18714/91;

      Having regard to :

-     reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the
      Commission;

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
      12 July 1993 and the observations in reply submitted by the
      applicants on 25 November 1993;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The first six applicants are a television producer and five other
broadcast journalists, working as employed or independent television
and radio producers, editors or presenters.  The seventh applicant is
a clerk, who is bringing the application as the holder of a television
licence. A list of the seven applicants is set out in the annex.

      In the proceedings before the Commission the applicants are
represented by Messrs. Stephens Innocent, solicitors practising in
London.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

(a)   The particular circumstances of the case

      On 19 October 1988, the Secretary of State for the Home
Department issued two notices, one addressed to the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the other to the Independent
Broadcasting Authority (IBA), in the following terms:

"1. ... I hereby require [the BBC] [the IBA] to refrain at all times
from sending any broadcast matter which consists of or includes -

      any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview or
      discussion or otherwise, by a person who appears or is heard on
      the programme in which the matter is broadcast where -

      (a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to
      represent an organisation specified in paragraph 2 below, or

      (b) the words support or solicit or invite support for such an
      organisation,

      other than any matter specified in paragraph 3 below.

2.    The organisations referred to in paragraph 1 above are -

      (a) any organisation which is for the time being a proscribed
      organisation for the purposes of the Prevention of Terrorism
      (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 or the Northern Ireland
      (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978; and

      (b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence
      Association.

3.    The matter excluded from paragraph 1 above is any words spoken -

      (a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or

      (b) by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, European
      Parliamentary or local election pending that election."

      The Home Secretary explained the reasons for the measure in a
statement to Parliament on 19 October 1988:

      "For some time broadcast coverage of events in Northern Ireland
      has included the occasional appearance of representatives of
      para-military organisations and their political wings, who have
      used these opportunities as an attempt to justify their criminal
      activities. Such appearances have caused widespread offence to
      viewers and listeners throughout the United Kingdom, particularly
      just after a terrorist outrage. The terrorists themselves draw
      support and sustenance from access to radio and television - from
      addressing their views more directly to the population at large
      than is possible through the press. The Government have decided
      that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who
      use it to propagate terrorism. Accordingly, I have today issued
      to the chairmen of the BBC and the IBA a notice... The
      restrictions will not apply to the broadcast of proceedings in
      Parliament, and in order not to impair the obligation on the
      broadcasters to provide an impartial coverage of elections the
      notices will have a more limited effect during election
      periods... These restrictions follow very closely the lines of
      similar provisions which have been operating in the Republic of
      Ireland for some years... Broadcasters have a dangerous and
      unenviable task in reporting events in Northern Ireland. This
      step is no criticism of them. What concerns us is the use made
      of broadcasting facilities by supporters of terrorism. This is
      not a restriction on reporting. It is a restriction on direct
      appearances by those who use or support violence...".

      By way of an explanatory letter dated 24 October 1988 the Home
Office offered guidance to the BBC on the interpretation of the
notices. The letter, which was copied to the IBA, provided, inter alia,
as follows:

      "It was asked whether the notice applied only to direct
      statements by representatives of the organisations or their
      supporters or whether it applied also to reports of the words
      they had spoken.  We confirmed, as the Home Secretary has made
      clear in Parliament, that the correct interpretation (and that
      which was intended) is that it applies only to direct statements
      and not to reported speech, and that the person caught by the
      notice is the one whose words are reported and not the reporter
      or presenter who reports them.  Thus the notice permits the
      showing of a film or still picture of the initiator speaking the
      words together with a voice-over account of them, whether in
      paraphrase or verbatim.  We confirmed that programmes involving
      the reconstruction of actual events, where actors use the
      verbatim words which had been spoken in actuality, are similarly
      permitted.
      ...
      The BBC also asked whether a member of an organisation or one of
      its elected representatives could be considered as permanently
      representing that organisation so that all his words, whatever
      their character, were covered by the Notice.  We confirmed that
      the Home Office takes the view that this is too narrow an
      interpretation of the word "represents" in paragraph 1(a) of the
      text.  A member of an organisation cannot be held to represent
      that organisation in all his daily activities.  Whether at any
      particular instance he is representing the organisation concerned
      will depend upon the nature of the words spoken and the
      particular context.  Where he is speaking in a personal capacity
      or purely in his capacity as a member of an organisation which
      does not fall under the notice (for example, an elected Council),
      it follows, from that interpretation, that paragraph 1(a) will
      not apply.  Where it is clear, from the context and the words
      that he is speaking as a representative of an organisation
      falling under the notice, his words may not be broadcast
      directly, but (as mentioned above) can be reported.  (He may, of
      course, come within the scope of paragraph 1(b), if his words
      contain support for the organisation.)  Although there may be
      borderline occasions when this distinction will require a careful
      exercise of judgment, we believe that the great majority of
      broadcast material will fall clearly within one case or the
      other."

      On 2 November 1988 the Home Secretary's directions to the BBC and
the IBA were debated in the House of Commons, and approved by 243 votes
to 179.  The House of Lords, also after a debate, took note of the
directions on 8 December 1988.

      The applicants challenged the directions in judicial review
proceedings.  Their application was dismissed by the High Court on
26 May 1989, and their appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on
6 December 1989 and by the House of Lords on 7 February 1991.

      The House of Lords held that for lack of incorporation into
domestic law the Convention rights were incapable of being directly
enforced by the English courts. Applying the Convention either directly
or by reference to the principles developed in the Convention organs'
case-law would amount to a judicial usurpation of the legislative
function. Judicial review was confined to examining whether the Home
Secretary had acted unreasonably in issuing the directions. On this
question, Lord Bridge stated inter alia:

      "Most of the rights spelled out in terms in the Convention,
      including the right to freedom of expression, are less than
      absolute and must in some cases yield to the claims of competing
      public interests. Thus, Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention
      spells out and categorises the competing public interests by
      reference to which the right to freedom of expression may have
      to be curtailed. In exercising the power of judicial review we
      have neither the advantages nor the disadvantages of any
      comparable code to which we may refer or by which we are bound.
      But again, this surely does not mean that in deciding whether the
      Secretary of State, in the exercise of his discretion, could
      reasonably impose the restriction he has imposed on the
      broadcasting organisations, we are not perfectly entitled to
      start from the premise that any restriction of the right to
      freedom of expression requires to be justified and that nothing
      less than an important competing public interest will be
      sufficient to justify it. The primary judgment ... falls to be
      made by the Secretary of State to whom Parliament has entrusted
      the discretion. But we are entitled to exercise a secondary
      judgment by asking whether a reasonable Secretary of State, on
      the material before him, could reasonably make that primary
      judgment.

      Applying these principles to the circumstances of the case, ...
      I find it impossible to say that the Secretary of State exceeded
      the limits of his discretion. In any civilised and law-abiding
      society the defeat of the terrorist is a public interest of the
      first importance. ... The Secretary of State, for the reasons he
      made so clear in Parliament, decided that it was necessary to
      deny to the terrorist and his supporters the opportunity to speak
      directly to the public through the most influential of the media
      of communication and that this justified some interference with
      editorial freedom. I do not see how this judgment can be
      categorised as unreasonable. ..."

      The applicants had invited the Court to apply a test of
proportionality as developed by the European Court of Human Rights for
the purpose of interpreting Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention.
Rejecting this approach as being outside the scope of judicial review,
Lord Ackner said:

      "The European test of whether the "interference" complained of
      corresponds to a "pressing social need" ... must ultimately
      result in the question "Is the particular decision acceptable ?"
      And this must involve a review of the merits of the decision.
      Unless and until Parliament incorporates the Convention into
      domestic law, ... there appears to me to be at present no basis
      upon which the proportionality doctrine applied by the European
      Court can be followed by the courts of this country."

(b)   The relevant domestic law

      The notices made in the present case were authorised under powers
conferred on the Home Secretary in a "Licence and Agreement" of
2 April 1981 in respect of the BBC and under Section 29 of the
Broadcasting Act 1981 in respect of the IBA.

      The BBC is a public corporation governed by a Royal Charter which
defines its objects, powers and obligations, its constitution and the
sources and uses of its revenues. The Licence and Agreement prescribes
the terms and conditions of the corporation's operations.

      Clause 13 (4) of the Licence and Agreement reads as follows:

      "The Secretary of State may from time to time by notice in
      writing require the Corporation to refrain at any specified time
      or at all times from sending any matter or matters of any class
      specified in such notice; and the Secretary of State may at any
      time or times vary or revoke any such notice..."

      Section 29 (3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981 provides that:

      "... the Secretary of State may at any time by notice in writing
      require the Authority to refrain from broadcasting any matter or
      classes of matter specified in the notice; and it shall be the
      duty of the Authority to comply with the notice."

COMPLAINTS

      The applicants complain that as a result of the Home Secretary's
directions there was unjustified interference with their right to
receive and impart information and ideas. They invoke Article 10 of the
Convention.

      They submit that as a result of the directions they have suffered
direct and continuing interference with their right under Article 10
of the Convention to impart and receive information and ideas. By way
of illustration of the impact of the directions on their professional
work as broadcasters and of the "chilling effect" on coverage of issues
in Northern Ireland, they provide the following examples:

  -   an interview with Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein and later
      Member of Parliament for West Belfast, which was conducted in
      1982, can no longer be retransmitted;

  -   another interview with Gerry Adams MP conducted by the "World in
      Action" programme cannot be retransmitted, so that the
      half-truths, evasions and hypocrisy of those who excuse terrorist
      atrocities cannot be exposed;

  -   an interview with Ms McGuiness, a Sinn Fein local councillor,
      produced in the week following the Directive, which relates inter
      alia to her campaign over the closure of the local hospital was
      banned by the IBA in consequence of the directives;

  -   an interview with a Sinn Fein spokesman about the SDLP/Sinn Fein
      talks, conducted and transmitted by the BBC in September 1988,
      cannot be retransmitted;

  -   "phone-in" radio programmes require examination of callers'
      political views prior to permitting them access to the airwaves;

  -   historical programmes such as "Ireland - A Television History"
      and "The Troubles" have been refused repeat showings because they
      contain historical documentary footage of notable Irish leaders
      who were in the past members or supporters of the IRA or Sinn
      Fein;

  -   a record made by the Irish folk singing group "The Pogues" was
      banned from air play on radio stations by the IBA on the grounds
      that its lyrics were supportive of the IRA (by suggesting that
      six men convicted of an IRA bombing in Birmingham in 1973, and
      four men convicted of an IRA bombing in Guildford in 1974, were
      not guilty as charged) until the ban was lifted in March 1991
      when the convictions of the ten people were quashed on the
      grounds of miscarriage of justice.

      They further complain that, by limiting judicial review to a test
of unreasonableness, the courts denied them an effective remedy for
their Convention claim, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 12 March 1991 and registered
on 22 August 1991.

      On 31 August 1992 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government for observations on its
admissibility and merits.

      The Government submitted their observations on 12 July 1993,
after successive extensions of the time-limit in order to enable the
Government to consider video recordings which were finally submitted
by the applicants on 28 May 1993.  The applicants submitted their
observations, after two extensions of the time-limit, on
25 November 1993.

THE LAW

1.    The applicants allege a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the
Convention by virtue of the effect of the notices made by the Home
Secretary on 19 October 1988.

      Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides, so far as
relevant, as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This
      right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
      impart information and ideas without interference by public
      authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

      2.   The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
      duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
      conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
      and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
      national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
      the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
      or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
      others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
      confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
      the judiciary."

      The Government submit that the seventh applicant, who is not a
journalist but applies to the Commission as a member of the public who
has paid his television licence fee and who alleges restrictions on his
right "to receive.. information", cannot claim to be a "victim" of a
violation of the Convention within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25)
of the Convention.  The applicants point out that the seventh applicant
is adversely affected by the notices as he is unable to receive the
information on the basis of which he could otherwise assess and judge
the personalities and policies of Sinn Fein.

      The Commission is not required to determine this aspect of the
case, as it finds that the application is in any event manifestly
ill-founded in respect of all the applicants, for the reasons set out
below.

      The Government accept that, for the purposes of Article 10
(Art. 10) of the Convention, there has been an interference with the
right of the first to sixth applicants to freedom of expression, but
they point out that the extent of the interference is less than that
resulting from the restrictions applicable in Ireland when the
Commission decided Application No. 15404/89 (Dec. 16.4.91), and in any
event is mitigated by the fact that the notices do not limit the words
which can be spoken on radio and television, but merely require (for
statements falling within the ambit of the notices) an actor's voice
to be used.

      The applicants do not accept the Government's claim that the
extent of the interference is limited.  They point out that the penalty
for non-compliance with the notices - the loss of the right to
broadcast - is so enormous that broadcasters will always err on the
safe side, with the result that a substantial "chilling effect" is
brought about.  They also refer to academic research which indicates
that the notices have had a considerable effect on current affairs
coverage in Northern Ireland.

      The Commission recalls that freedom of the press affords the
public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of
the ideas and attitudes of political leaders, and freedom of political
debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society (Eur.
Court H.R., Oberschlick judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, p.
25, para. 58).  Whatever view may be formed of the politics of, for
example, Sinn Fein, it is the role of broadcasters and journalists,
such as the first to sixth applicants, subject to the restrictions
imported by the duties and responsibilities referred to in Article 10
para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention, to channel to the public
information about political movements and their leaders.  Article 10
(Art. 10) rights to convey information can be interfered with by
restrictions on the manner of conveying information, as well as on the
content of the information (Nos. 11553/85 and 11658/85, Dec. 9.3.87,
D.R. 51, p. 136, 144; Eur. Court H.R., Autronic judgment of
22 May 1990, Series A no. 178, p. 23, para. 47).

      The Commission notes that the notices have a real impact on the
way in which the first to sixth applicants undertake their journalistic
functions, and finds that each has been subjected to interference with
his or her rights under Article 10 (Art. 10).

      The interference entails a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of
the Convention if it does not fall within one of the exceptions
provided for in paragraph 2.  The Commission must therefore examine
whether the interference was "prescribed by law", whether it had an aim
or aims that is or are legitimate under Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2),
and whether it was "necessary in a democratic society" to achieve that
aim or those aims.

      The Government submit that the Licence and Agreement of 1981 in
the case of the BBC and the Broadcasting Act 1981 in the case of the
IBA provide the necessary regulatory background to the notices, and
that, when taken together with the explanatory letter from the Home
Office, the directions fall within the concept of "law" as defined by
the European Court of Human Rights in the Sunday Times case (Eur. Court
H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31,
para. 49).  The applicants consider that the directions contained in
the notices are so unclear that it cannot realistically be determined
what they cover.  In particular they point to the gloss put on the
directions by the Home Office explanatory letter of 24 October 1988,
namely that an elected individual may speak as an elected individual
but not, if a member of Sinn Fein, as a member of Sinn Fein.  They
consider that it is impossible to separate the statements of an
individual which are made in his capacity as an elected individual from
those made as a member of the party he was elected to represent, and
conclude that it cannot therefore be said that the notices contain
sufficient precision to enable individuals - journalists and
broadcasters in this case - to regulate their conduct.

      The Commission recalls that it has considered orders of a similar
nature to the present notices in the case of Purcell v. Ireland (No.
15404/89, Dec. 16.4.91, to be published in D.R. 70).  In that case the
Commission found that the broadcasting restrictions in Ireland were
"prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2
(Art. 10-2) of the Convention.  Although similar, the Commission finds
that the restrictions in the present case cannot be exactly equated
with those in the case of Purcell.  In particular, the orders in the
case of Purcell derived from an express statutory power to make orders
relating to matters "likely to promote, or incite to, crime or [which]
would tend to undermine the authority of the State".  Moreover, the
Irish provisions were brought into effect by a statutory instrument
which had to be laid before both Houses of the Irish parliament, and
could be annulled by either House (see p. 14 of the Commission's
decision).

      The Commission recalls that the European Court of Human Rights
has identified at least three requirements which flow from the phrase
"in accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2
(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.  The phrase "prescribed by law" in
Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) must be given the same interpretation
as the phrase "in accordance with the law" (Eur. Court H.R., Silver
judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 33, para. 85).  Thus a
norm must be formulated with sufficient precision; the phrase "in
accordance with the law", or the equivalent phrase "prescribed by law",
does not merely refer back to domestic law, but also relates to the
quality of the law, and a law conferring a discretion is not in itself
inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability provided that the
scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated
with sufficient clarity (Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March
1988, Series A no. 130, p. 30, para. 61 with further references).

      In the present case the Commission is faced with notices whose
authority derives from statutory sources in the case of the IBA and a
Licence and Agreement in the case of the BBC.  The Government and the
applicants agree that this difference is of no significance.  In any
event, notwithstanding the applicants' criticism of the state of
domestic law, the Commission notes that there is no contention in the
present case that the interference was not in accordance with domestic
law, as the House of Lords ultimately established.  As to whether the
"law" at issue in the present case has the required "quality", the
Commission notes that the authority to make notices is of a general,
blanket nature.  It sets no limits on the type of directions the
minister may give, and does not require the directions to be made for
any particular purpose.  The Commission must, however, look not only
to the source of the authority for the making of the directions, but
also to the directions themselves, as it is the directions which laid
down the restrictions which had, and have, to be complied with by
broadcasters.

      The Commission recalls that accessibility and foreseeability are
two of the requirements inherent in the phrase "prescribed by law" in
Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2) of the Convention (see, for example,
Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no.
30, p. 31, para. 49).  The accessibility of the directions is not in
question in the present case: the source of the authority for the
respective notices is generally available, and the notices made by the
Home Secretary were announced in Parliament, debated in Parliament, and
the subject of widespread comment in the press.  As to foreseeability,
even if the original notices contained areas of uncertainty, such as
the impact on elected individuals speaking on matters unrelated to
terrorism, the Commission finds that the subsequent clarification by
the Home Office to the broadcasting authorities rendered the extent of
the interference with the applicants' rights apparent to all concerned.

      Accordingly, the Commission finds that the interference was
"prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2
(Art. 10-2) of the Convention.

      The Commission must next consider whether the interference with
the applicants' rights pursued a "legitimate aim".  The Government
point to the address by the Home Secretary to the House of Commons on
19 October 1988, in which he referred to the restrictions as part of
the campaign against terrorism.  They recall that Lord Templeman in the
House of Lords also recognised this aim.  They see the aim of the
notices as principally the protection of "the interests of national
security" and "the prevention of disorder or crime".  The applicants
accept the importance of securing peace in Northern Ireland, but see
a clear distinction between other measures introduced in 1988 to combat
terrorism and the present restrictions, in that the broadcasting
restrictions do not in fact further the struggle against terrorism in
any way.  They consider that the real aim of the restrictions is to
represent to the public that Sinn Fein, a lawful political party, is
a party which deserves no support.

        The Commission recalls that the restrictions in the present
case refer in terms to proscribed organisations and to named
organisations which, although not prohibited, are known to have
connections with unlawful organisations.  Whilst the effect and
effectiveness of the restrictions must be considered in the context of
the discussion of the "necessity" for the directions, there is no
indication in the present case that the directions were anything other
than part of the measures taken to combat terrorism which were made in
good faith. The Commission accepts that the aim of the restrictions is
legitimate.

      Finally, the Commission must consider the question of the
necessity for the interference with the applicants' Article 10
(Art. 10) rights.  The European Court of Human Rights has summarised
the major principles of its case-law on the "necessity" test in Article
10 (Art. 10) of the Convention as follows:

      "(a) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
      foundations of a democratic society;  subject to paragraph 2 of
      Article 10 (Art. 10), it is applicable not only to 'information'
      or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as
      inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those
      that offend, shock or disturb.  Freedom of expression, as
      enshrined in Article 10 (Art. 10), is subject to a number of
      exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the
      necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established.

      (b)  These principles are of particular importance as far as the
      press is concerned. While it must not overstep the bounds set,
      inter alia, in the `interests of national security' or for
      `maintaining the authority of the judiciary', it is nevertheless
      incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on matters of
      public interest. Not only does the press have the task of
      imparting such information and ideas: the  public also has a
      right to receive them.  Were it otherwise, the press would be
      unable to play its vital role of `public watchdog'.

      (c) The adjective 'necessary', within the meaning of Article 10
      para. 2 (Art. 10-2), implies the existence of a 'pressing social
      need'.  The Contracting States have a certain margin of
      appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes
      hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law
      and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent
      courts.  The [Convention organs] are therefore empowered to give
      the final ruling on whether a 'restriction' is reconcilable with
      freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (Art. 10).

      (d)  The [Convention organs'] task, in exercising [their]
      supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the
      competent national authorities but rather to review under
      Article 10 (Art. 10) the decisions they delivered pursuant to
      their power of appreciation.  This does not mean that [their]
      supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent
      State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good
      faith; what [they have] to do is to look at the interference
      complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine
      whether it was 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and
      whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to
      justify it are 'relevant and sufficient'."

      (Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times (No. 2) judgment of
      26 November 1991, Series A no. 217, p. 29, para. 50)

      The Government submit that it cannot be right that the applicants
have the right to exercise their professions completely free from
Government interference.  They accept that the directions given to
broadcasting authorities will not directly reduce the number of
terrorist acts in Northern Ireland or in the United Kingdom, but state
that they are intended to reduce the impact and influence of the
advocates and supporters of such acts, and that they correspond to the
need to prevent the giving of overt support for certain organisations.
They refer to the Purcell case, where the Commission found that the
restrictions were designed to "deny representatives of known terrorist
organisations and their political supporters a possibility of using the
broadcast media as a platform for advocating their cause, encouraging
support for their organisation and conveying the impression of their
legitimacy".  They consider that, notwithstanding the compliance by
broadcasters with their various statutory or contractual duties,
interviews were broadcast before the notices were issued which gave
terrorists and their apologists a spurious air of authority.

      The Government regard the extensive experience of the executive
and the legislature of terrorist matters as justifying a greater margin
of appreciation than might be the case in other spheres involving
restrictions on freedom of expression.  They nevertheless point out
that the restrictions on the applicants' freedom of expression are less
onerous than those in the Purcell case, in that they are very precisely
targeted and they do not apply during elections.

      The applicants, in connection with the "necessity" test and
throughout their observations, essentially challenge the
proportionality of the interference.  They underline the enormous
penalty for failure to comply with the restrictions -  loss of the
right to broadcast - and lack of evidence on the part of the Government
to show (i) that Sinn Fein in fact obtained favourable media coverage
before the restrictions; (ii) that interviews with terrorists increase
their "standing", or (iii) that there is any public support for the
restrictions.

      Both parties discuss at some length the position of the
"proportionality" test in domestic law.  The Government submit in
essence that the judgments of the House of Lords in the present case
indicate that the domestic courts take broadly the same approach to
freedom of expression as the Convention organs.  The applicants submit
that the House of Lords merely pay lip service to freedom of expression
whilst in fact failing signally to undertake any serious examination
of the conflicting interests involved.

      The Commission notes that the extent of the interference in the
present case is limited.  Whilst the applicants are affected by the
directions in the way they perform their functions (see above), the
directions given on 19 October 1988 do not have any impact on the words
that can be spoken or the images that can be shown on television or the
radio.  The Commission accepts that it must be inconvenient for
journalists to have to use the voice of an actor for the broadcasting
of certain interviews, and appreciates that the logic of the
continuation of the directions is not readily apparent when they appear
to have very little real impact on the information available to the
public.  The very absence of such impact is, however, a matter the
Commission must bear in mind in determining the proportionality of the
interference to the aim pursued.

      The Commission further notes that although the Government do not
contend that the interference with the applicants' rights is a prime
element in the struggle against terrorism, it can be regarded as one
aspect of a very important area of domestic policy.  The European Court
of Human Rights has referred to the special problems involved in
combating terrorism (Eur. Court H.R., Brogan and others judgment of
29 November 1988, Series A no. 145, p. 33, para. 61; p. 27, para. 48;
Brannigan and McBride judgment of 26 May 1993, Series A no. 258, p. 50,
para. 47, with further references), and the Commission has no doubt as
to the difficulties involved in striking a fair balance between the
requirements of protecting freedom of information - especially the free
flow of information from the media - and the need to protect the State
and the public against armed conspiracies seeking to overthrow the
democratic order which guarantees this freedom and other human rights.

      The Commission finds, in the circumstances of the present case
and bearing in mind the margin of appreciation permitted to States, the
limited extent of the interference with the first to sixth applicants'
rights and the importance of measures to combat terrorism, that it
cannot be said that the interference with the first to sixth
applicants' freedom of expression was disproportionate to the aim
sought to be pursued.  The interference in the case of the seventh
applicant is of an even more limited nature, and the Commission finds
that the above reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to him.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.

2.    The applicants also allege a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13)
of the Convention.  Article 13 (Art. 13) provides as follows.

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

      The Commission recalls Article 13 (Art. 13) cannot be interpreted
so as to require a remedy in domestic law in respect of any supposed
grievance under the Convention: the grievance must be an arguable one
in terms of the Convention.  Moreover, the European Court of Human
Rights has pointed to the link between the notion of "arguable claim"
in its own case-law and the notion of "manifestly ill-founded" in
Article 27 (Art. 27) of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice
judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23, paras. 52 and 54).
The Commission has found the applicants' claims under Article 10
(Art. 10) to be manifestly ill-founded.  It also finds the claims under
Article 13 (Art. 13) to be not arguable.

      It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission by a majority

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE

Secretary to the Commission                 President of the Commission

      (H.C. Krüger)                                (C.A. Nørgaard)

                               A N N E X

                          List of applicants

1.    BRIND, Donald Malcolm, British, born in 1947, television producer
      for the BBC, resident in London

2.    EMERY, Fred Albert, British, born in 1933, television journalist
      for the BBC, resident in London

3.    GRAHAM, Alexander, British, born in 1953, independent television
      producer and editor, resident in London

4.    LEONARD, Victoria, British, independent radio producer, resident
      in London

5.    McGWIRE, Scarlett, British, born in 1954, broadcast journalist,
      resident in London

6.    PILGER, John Richard, Australian, television and radio presenter
      and journalist, resident in London

7.    NASH, Thomas Edward, British, born in 1933, clerk, resident in
      London