In the case of Hokkanen v. Finland,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions
of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the following judges:
Mr R. Ryssdal,
President,
Mr Thór Vilhjálmsson,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mr I. Foighel,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 25 March and on 24 August
1994,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 9 December 1993,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art.
32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no.
19823/92) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Commission under
Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Teuvo Hokkanen, a Finnish national, on his own
behalf and on that of his daughter, Ms Sini Hokkanen, also a Finnish national,
on 10 April 1992. The application was however declared inadmissible in respect
of Sini (see paragraph 50 below).
The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Finland recognised the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The
object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the
case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Articles
6 para. 1, 8 and 13 (art. 6-1, art. 8, art. 13) of the Convention as well as
Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5).
In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he wished to take
part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule
30).
The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr R.
Pekkanen, the elected judge of Finnish nationality (Article 43 of the
Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21
para. 3 (b)). On 7 January 1994, in the presence of the Registrar, the
President drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr Thór
Vilhjálmsson, Mr C. Russo, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr I. Foighel, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr
J. Makarczyk and Mr K. Jungwiert (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule
21 para. 4) (art. 43).
As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Finnish Government
("the Government"), the applicant’s lawyer and the Delegate of the
Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant
to the order made in consequence on 26 January 1994, the Registrar received the
applicant’s and the Government’s memorials on 21 February 1994. On 18 March the
Secretary to the Commission indicated that the Delegate did not wish to file a
memorial in reply.
On 22 February 1994, following a request from Sini
Hokkanen and her maternal grandparents, Mr Reino and Mrs Sinikka Nick, the
President, having consulted the Chamber on the same date, granted Mr and Mrs
Nick, but not Sini Hokkanen, leave to submit written observations (Rule 37
para. 2) on any facts which they considered had been dealt with inaccurately in
the Commission’s report of 22 October 1993. On 8 March the Registrar received
their observations.
6. On various dates between 17 February and 16 March 1994
the Commission produced a number of documents, which the Registrar had
requested from it on the President’s instructions.
In accordance with the President’s decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 21 March
1994. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government
Mr T. Grönberg,
Ambassador,
Director General for Legal
Affairs, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Agent,
Mr A. Kosonen, Legal
Adviser,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Co-Agent,
Mr M. Helin, Adviser
on Legislation,
Ministry of Justice, Adviser;
- for the Commission
Mrs J. Liddy, Delegate;
- for the applicant
Mr H. Salo, Lawyer, Counsel,
Mr J. Kortteinen,
Lawyer,
Mr A. Rosas, Law
Professor
at Åbo Akademi, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Mrs Liddy, Mr Salo, Mr Rosas and
Mr Grönberg, and also replies to its questions.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. Events leading to the first set of custody proceedings
Mr Hokkanen, a Finnish citizen, was born in 1953. He lives
at Tuusula.
He has a daughter, Sini, who was born in September 1983.
Following the death in April 1985 of Mrs Tuula Hokkanen (the child’s mother, to
whom the applicant had been married since 11 June 1983), Sini was looked after
by her maternal grandparents, Mr Reino and Mrs Sinikka Nick (hereinafter
referred to as "the grandparents"). According to the applicant, he
had agreed to this as a provisional arrangement so that he could deal with
various problems caused by his wife’s death, including the reorganisation of
his farming activities.
In late 1985 the grandparents informed the applicant that they
did not intend to restore Sini to him. Efforts, involving the Social Welfare
Board (sosiaalilautakunta, socialnämnden) of Tuusula, were made to achieve
reconciliation between the applicant and the grandparents, but to no avail.
On 2 May 1986 the County Administrative Board
(lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen) of Uusimaa as the competent Chief Bailiff
(ulosotonhaltija, överexekutor; see paragraph 44 below) rejected a request by
the applicant to have Sini returned in accordance with section 8(2) of the 1975
Act on the Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of and the Right of
Access to Children (laki 523/75 lapsen huollosta ja tapaamisoikeudesta annetun
päätöksen täytäntöönpanosta, lag 523/75 om verkställighet av beslut som gäller
vårdnad om barn och umgängesrätt - "the 1975 Act"). It observed that
the applicant had consented to the arrangement leaving Sini in the care of the
grandparents. In view of the time which had elapsed since she had moved to them
and of the little contact Sini had had with the applicant, returning her could
be contrary to her own interests; both parties should therefore institute
custody proceedings before the District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätten)
of Tuusula. They did so.
B. First set of custody proceedings
1. Proceedings before the District Court
Following a hearing on 16 July 1986, the District Court
ordered provisionally that Sini should remain with her grandparents; at the
same time it granted the applicant access rights, according to which Sini was
to stay with him every fourth weekend and, from 8 August 1986, every fourth
week.
On 30 September 1986 the County Administrative Board
ordered the grandparents to respect the applicant’s visiting rights on pain of
an administrative fine (uhkasakko, vite) of 2,000 Finnish marks each. However,
they did not comply.
On 31 October 1986 the District Court held a further
hearing. It adjourned the case and again provisionally granted the applicant
access rights: as from 5 November he could visit his daughter at her
grandparents’ home for two hours every Wednesday and six hours every Sunday
and, as from 1 December, she was to visit him at the same times and for the
same periods at his home. The grandparents refused to comply with these
arrangements.
On 21 January 1987 the County Administrative Board
rejected a request from the applicant asking it to enforce the right of access
granted to him by the District Court on 16 July 1986. It observed that the
District Court, in its decision of 31 October 1986, had varied his right of
access. The County Administrative Board was therefore of the view that its
decision of 30 September 1986 that the grandparents would be liable to pay
fines should they fail to comply with the access order (see paragraph 11 above)
no longer applied.
By judgment of 26 January 1987, the District Court
confirmed the applicant’s custody and ordered that Sini be handed over to him.
It took into account, among other things, a report of 22 January 1987 by the
Child Guidance Centre (kasvatusneuvola, uppfostrings- rådgivningen - "the
Centre") of Central Uusimaa.
On 10 March 1987 the County Administrative Board ordered
the grandparents to comply with the District Court’s judgment of 26 January on
pain of a fine of 8,000 marks each should they fail to do so. The grandparents
persisted in not complying.
2. Appeal by the grandparents to the Court of Appeal and measures
taken by the County Administrative Board
On 6 May 1987, on an appeal by the grandparents, the
Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Helsinki upheld the District Court’s
judgment of 26 January. On 23 June it dismissed their appeal against the County
Administrative Board’s decision of 10 March.
On 7 May 1987 the County Administrative Board had again
ordered the grandparents to return Sini to the applicant within a week and to
pay 2,000 marks each of the fines imposed on them previously. The Board further
ordered that, in the event of the grandparents’ failure to return her, the
Bailiff should use coercion to ensure that she was so returned.
3. Appeal by the grandparents to the Supreme Court
On 30 July 1987 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta
domstolen) granted the grandparents leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s
judgments of 6 May and 23 June 1987. It ordered a stay, or alternatively
suspension, of both judgments (see paragraph 16 above).
The Supreme Court, in two separate judgments of 17 May 1988,
dismissed the appeal and lifted the two decisions staying execution.
The grandparents asked the local Social Welfare Board to
investigate whether execution of the Supreme Court’s judgments would be in Sini’s
interests. The Board referred the matter to the National Social Welfare Board
(sosiaalihallitus, socialstyrelsen).
At the same time, the grandparents requested the Supreme Court
to stay the execution of, and annul, its judgments of 17 May 1988, which it
refused to do on 13 September.
C. Requests by the applicant to the police and complaint to the
Chancellor of Justice
In the meantime, on 13 and 18 May 1987, the applicant had
asked the District Chief of Police of Järvenpää to execute the County
Administrative Board’s decision of 7 May (see paragraph 17 above). On 28 May
the authorities discovered that the grandparents had moved Sini and that her
whereabouts were unknown. The Järvenpää police then contacted their counterpart
in Mäntyharju, where the grandparents had a summer home. Subsequently Sini was
found to be with her grandparents at their summer home. On 10 June the
applicant requested the Chief of Police of Mäntyharju to return her, but the
latter official refused to do so, finding it contrary to the child’s interests
to interrupt her summer vacation.
On 29 May 1987 the applicant complained to the Chancellor
of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekanslern), alleging that the authorities
had failed to take sufficient action to find and return Sini. The Chancellor
replied on 6 July 1988 that he did not consider that any measures were called
for in view of, firstly, the steps taken to execute the County Administrative
Board’s decision of 7 May 1987; secondly, the Supreme Court’s subsequent
decision to stay the execution of the Court of Appeal’s judgments of 6 May and
23 June 1987 (see paragraphs 16 and 18 above) and, thirdly, the grandparents’
request for a stay and annulment in respect of the Supreme Court’s judgments of
17 May 1988 (see paragraph 19 above).
D. Second set of custody proceedings
1. Administrative proceedings
On 30 May 1990 the National Social Welfare Board
recommended that the Social Welfare Board in Tuusula take steps to have custody
of Sini transferred from Mr Hokkanen to the grandparents, to obtain access for
the applicant and to have a person other than him appointed Sini’s guardian.
On 25 July 1990, at the Social Welfare Board’s request, the
Guardianship Board (holhouslautakunta, förmyndarenämnden) of Tuusula submitted
an opinion on the above matter, stating that the applicant had performed his
duties as a guardian in a satisfactory manner. It did not consider the transfer
of custody and guardianship advisable and concluded that he should continue as
Sini’s custodian and guardian.
2. Proceedings before the District Court and applicant’s requests
for enforcement of his right of access
On 13 August 1990 the Social Welfare Board of Tuusula
asked the District Court to transfer custody to the grandparents. The Board
noted that the applicant was a fit person to bring Sini up and was able to
offer her a good home environment. The Board placed emphasis on the fact that
since 1985 she had been living with the grandparents, with whom she had close
relations. In view of the fact that Sini had not met her father for many years
it was necessary for their meetings in the autumn of 1990 to be well prepared
and that they should take place in a neutral environment. It also recommended
that the applicant remain Sini’s guardian.
On 19 September 1990 the District Court held a hearing
but adjourned the case until 14 November after deciding to obtain an opinion
from the Guardianship Board. The Board submitted a report on 31 October,
recommending that the applicant cease to be the child’s guardian.
At the hearing scheduled for 14 November 1990 the District
Court again adjourned the case, this time until 8 May 1991, pending an opinion
from the Child Guidance Centre of Central Uusimaa. On 7 May 1991 the Child and
Family Guidance Centre (perhe- ja kasvatusneuvola, familje - och
uppfostringsrådgivningen) of Tuusula, which had taken over the former’s
functions, confirmed the views expressed by that Centre in its opinion of 22
January 1987 (see paragraph 14 above). It observed that the grandparents had
refused to allow Sini to be subjected to an examination (requested by the
National Board of Social Welfare) and to participate in related interviews. It
also referred to a statement of 13 December 1989 by a working group of the
Lastenlinna Children’s Hospital that, although Sini related to the grandparents
as her psychological parents, there were no psychological obstacles as far as
she was concerned to her meeting the applicant; on the contrary, such meetings
were in her interests.
During the proceedings before it the District Court had,
on 14 November 1990, provisionally ordered that Sini remain with the
grandparents and granted the applicant certain rights of access: in December
1990 and January 1991 he was to be permitted to meet his daughter for six hours
on the first Sunday of the month at a place chosen by the Board and in the
presence of one of its officials; as from January they were in addition to meet
from Saturday noon to Sunday noon on the third weekend of the month and, as
from February, also the first weekend.
However, the grandparents would not allow the applicant to meet
the child outside their home. On 20 December 1990 he asked the County Administrative
Board to take enforcement measures. He renewed this request on 31 January 1991.
On 28 March 1991 the Board ordered the grandparents to
comply with the District Court’s provisional order of 14 November 1990 and
decided that failure to do so would make them liable to pay an administrative
fine of 5,000 marks each. The grandparents persisted in their refusal to
comply. The applicant did not request the enforcement of the fines, such a
request being a legal condition for their imposition.
The District Court, by judgment of 8 May 1991, rejected
the Social Welfare Board’s request to transfer custody and guardianship. It
moreover noted that its provisional access order of 14 November 1990 no longer
applied.
3. Appeals to the Court of Appeal and refusal of leave to appeal
by the Supreme Court
On 24 July 1991, on separate appeals by the grandparents
and the Social Welfare Board, the Court of Appeal ordered a stay of execution
of the District Court’s judgment of 8 May 1991 (see paragraph 24 above).
By judgment of 25 September 1991 the Court of Appeal, by
a majority, held that the applicant should remain Sini’s guardian but
transferred custody to the grandparents, finding that the fact that she had
lived with them since 30 April 1985 militated strongly in favour of her
remaining in their care. It referred to the above-mentioned opinion of 13
December 1989 by the Children’s Hospital (see paragraph 24 above), according to
which she had strong ties of security, confidence and affection with her
grandparents and perceived their home as her own. No substantial changes should
be made to this situation. She should be able to meet the applicant and develop
a normal relationship with him. In view of her low age (eight at the time) and
the fact that she had not been in a position to form her views independently,
the Court of Appeal considered that no significant importance could be attached
to Sini’s own wish not to see the applicant, mentioned in the Child and Family
Guidance Centre’s opinion of 7 May 1991 (see paragraph 24 above).
The judgment prescribed the following access arrangements:
during the first three months the applicant and his daughter were to meet for
four hours one Saturday each month, at a place chosen by the Tuusula Social
Welfare Office, in the presence of one of its officers and, after that, every
other weekend between Saturday noon and Sunday noon. She was to spend Christmas
with her grandparents and two weeks of the following summer with the applicant;
subsequently her stays during holidays should alternate between the applicant
and the grandparents.
On 19 December 1991 the Court of Appeal quashed the
County Administrative Board’s order of 28 March 1991 requiring the grandparents
to comply with the District Court’s provisional order of 14 November 1990
regarding access (see paragraph 25 above). The Court of Appeal had regard to
the lower court’s decision of 8 May 1991 (see paragraph 27 above), which in
effect revoked its decision of 14 November 1990.
On 21 January 1992 the Supreme Court refused the
applicant leave to appeal.
E. Further proceedings regarding access
1. Request for enforcement to the local Social Welfare Board
On 25 June 1992 the Social Welfare Board of Järvenpää
replied to an enforcement request by the applicant. It observed that the Child
and Family Guidance Centre of Järvenpää had offered the grandparents "an
opportunity to obtain assistance and to discuss the matter concerning visiting
rights" but they had refused to contact the Centre. The latter had, in a
letter to the Board of 16 June 1992, stated that in those circumstances
"nothing else could be done by the Centre".
2. Request for enforcement to the County Administrative Board and
the ensuing court proceedings
In the meantime, on 22 June 1992 the applicant asked the
County Administrative Board to take steps to execute the Court of Appeal’s
judgment of 25 September 1991 (see paragraph 29 above). He referred to the fact
that in 1991 all three meetings planned between him and Sini had failed to take
place, as the grandparents had refused to bring her. They had moreover declined
to respond to attempts to arrange further meetings.
On 23 June 1992 the County Administrative Board gave an
interim decision ordering the applicant to communicate the documents in the
case to the grandparents in order to enable them to comment on his request to
the Board. This they did on 21 July. The decision further indicated that the
case would be struck off the list if the applicant did not renew his
enforcement request within a year.
On 10 November 1992 the applicant renewed his request of 22
June to the County Administrative Board. Following this, the Board, as required
by the relevant legislation, referred the matter to the conciliator for
mediation (see paragraph 45 below). The latter submitted a report to the Board
on 2 December and the applicant filed his comments on 7 December.
On 31 December 1992 the County Administrative Board
ordered the grandparents to comply with the Court of Appeal’s decision of 25
September 1991, on pain of having to pay an administrative fine of 5,000 marks.
On the other hand, the Board dismissed a request by the
applicant for Sini to be transferred to him; such a measure could only be taken
in enforcement of a custody order. However, it noted that the grandparents had
totally refused to co-operate in attempts to arrange for the applicant to meet
his daughter. Bearing in mind her age and the grandparents’ strong influence
over her, she could not be considered sufficiently mature for her views to be
taken into account.
The County Administrative Board had regard also to the
conciliator’s above-mentioned report (see paragraph 34 above), submitted by the
Social Welfare Board of Järvenpää. According to that report the grandparents
had agreed to allow the applicant to see Sini in their own home, whilst the
applicant had categorically refused to have anything to do with them. The
conciliator in question had met Sini only in the grandparents’ presence in
their home on 27 November 1992. On being questioned about her father she had
been very reserved but had said that she objected to seeing him. The
conciliator was of the view that Sini’s wishes in this regard should be taken
into consideration.
The grandparents refused to bring Sini to a meeting with
the applicant which the Social Welfare Board of Järvenpää had arranged to take
place on 3 April 1993.
By judgment of 21 October 1993 the Court of Appeal,
referring to section 6 of the 1975 Act (see paragraph 47 below), upheld an
appeal lodged by the grandparents against the County Administrative Board’s
decision of 31 December 1992 (see paragraph 35 above). The Court of Appeal
noted that, according to a medical report of 8 September 1992 by Dr Arajärvi,
Sini was physically and mentally healthy and a psychological test had shown
that she was clearly of above average intelligence for a twelve-year-old; she
should not therefore be forced to meet the applicant but be allowed to decide
for herself. Moreover, the conciliator’s report (see paragraphs 34 and 35
above) stated that she had clearly and consistently refused to meet the
applicant and was sufficiently mature for her wishes to be taken into account. The
judgment concluded that in view of the child’s maturity, access could not be
enforced against her wishes and lifted the fines imposed on the grandparents.
On 4 February 1994 the Supreme Court refused the applicant
leave to appeal.
F. Contacts between the applicant and Sini
The applicant visited Sini in the grandparents’ home on a
few occasions until 1986. The last time he met her was on 14 January 1987.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Custody and access
Custody of children is governed by the 1983 Act on
Custody and Access Rights with regard to Children (laki 361/83 lapsen huollosta
ja tapaamisoikeudesta, lag 361/83 ang. vårdnad om barn och umgängesrätt -
"the 1983 Act"). Section 1 provides that the aim of such custody is
to ensure the child’s balanced development and well-being, regard being had to
the latter’s special needs and wishes, as well as to encourage a close
relationship between the child and the parents. The custodian represents the
child in his or her personal matters, unless the law provides otherwise
(section 4).
The parents, or any other person to whom care of the
child has been entrusted, are his or her custodians (section 3). Parents who
are married to each other at the time of the child’s birth are the latter’s
custodians (section 6).
The District Court may order that custody of a child be
entrusted to one or more persons together with, or instead of, the parents
(section 9 para. 1). It may transfer custody from the parents to other persons
only if, from the child’s point of view, there are particularly strong reasons
for doing so (section 9 para. 2).
The District Court is moreover empowered to decide on access
(section 9). The aim of access is to secure a child’s right to maintain
contacts with a parent with whom he or she is not living (section 2).
In deciding on matters of custody and access the competent
court must take into account the wishes and interests of the child in
accordance with the following considerations: primary emphasis must be placed
on the interests of the child and particular regard should be had to the most
effective means of implementing custody and access rights in the future
(section 9 para. 4 and section 10 para. 1); the child’s views and wishes must,
if possible and depending on its age and maturity, be obtained if the parents
are unable to agree on the matter or if the child is being cared for by a
person other than its custodian or if it is otherwise deemed necessary in the
latter’s interests; the consultation must be carried out in a tactful manner,
taking into account the child’s maturity and without causing harm to its
relations with the parents (section 11).
Pending court decisions on matters of custody and access,
the competent court may issue an interim order as to where the child should
live, access arrangements and, in special circumstances, custody (section 17
paras. 1 and 2).
A decision on custody, access or a child’s place of
residence is, unless it states otherwise, immediately enforceable (section 19).
B. Enforcement of custody and access rights
According to section 1 of the 1975 Act (for references,
see paragraph 9 above), the Act applies to the enforcement of a court decision,
including an interim order, regarding custody and access. It may also apply to
the enforcement of an order that a child should live with a particular person or
that it should be handed over to its custodian.
A request for enforcement may be submitted to the Chief Bailiff
in the area where the child lives (section 2), which authority is vested in the
County Administrative Board (section 1 of the 1895 Act on Enforcement -
ulosotto laki 1895/37, utsökningslagen 1895/37).
Pursuant to section 4, as amended by Act no. 366/83,
before ordering enforcement the Chief Bailiff must assign as a conciliator a
person appointed by the Social Welfare Board or another suitable person to
mediate between the parties with a view to enforcing the decision. Such
mediation is aimed at persuading the person taking care of the child to comply
voluntarily with his obligations under the relevant decision.
Conciliation may not be ordered if it is evident from previous
attempts that it would be unsuccessful or, in the case of a custody decision,
if immediate enforcement is in the child’s interests and dictated by strong
reasons.
The Chief Bailiff may impose an administrative fine in connection
with an enforcement decision or, when the matter relates to the custody of a
child or the handing over of a child to its custodian, he may order the Bailiff
to transfer the child (section 5).
A fine as mentioned above must be fixed on the basis of the
means of the person concerned (chapter 2, section 4 (b) para. 2, of the 1889
Penal Code). If the fine cannot be collected, it must be converted into a
prison sentence (section 5 para. 1, as amended by Act no. 650/86).
Enforcement must not take place against a child’s own
wishes if he or she is twelve years of age or is sufficiently mature for her
wishes to be taken into account (section 6 of the 1975 Act, as amended by Act
no. 366/83).
A decision by the Chief Bailiff under the 1975 Act may,
unless otherwise stated therein, be enforced immediately (section 13 para. 1).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
In his application (no. 19823/92) of 10 April 1992 to the
Commission, Mr Teuvo Hokkanen, on his own and Sini’s behalf, complained that,
in breach of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, the public authorities had
failed to take appropriate measures to facilitate their speedy reunion. In this
regard he also relied on Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5) (right to equality
of spouses in their relations with their children). He further complained that,
contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, he had not been
given a fair and oral hearing before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
in 1991 to 1992. In addition he alleged a breach of this provision in that the
custody proceedings had not been concluded within a reasonable time and that
the Supreme Court had failed to give reasons for its refusal of 21 January 1992
to grant leave to appeal. Finally, he complained that he had not been afforded
an effective remedy as required under Article 13 (art. 13), in respect of the
failure to take measures to facilitate reunion, the excessive length of the
proceedings and the ineffectiveness of the administrative fines imposed upon
the grandparents in view of their financial circumstances.
By decision of 9 February 1993, the Commission declared
admissible the complaints made by Mr Hokkanen on his own behalf under Article 8
(art. 8) of the Convention, Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5) and, in so far
as they concerned the length of the second set of custody proceedings, those
relating to Article 6 para. 1 and Article 13 (art. 6-1, art. 13) of the
Convention. It declared inadmissible the complaints lodged on Sini’s behalf on
the ground that Mr Hokkanen could not file an application for her as he was no
longer her custodian at that time.
In its report of 22 October 1993 (Article 31) (art. 31), the
Commission expressed the following opinion:
(a) by nineteen votes to two that there had been a violation of
Article 8 (art. 8);
(b) unanimously that no separate issue arose under Article 5 of
Protocol No. 7 (P7-5);
(c) by sixteen votes to five that there had been no violation
of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1);
(d) by twenty votes to one that it was not necessary to examine
the complaints under Article 13 (art. 13).
The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the concurring
and dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to
this judgment.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE COURT
At the hearing on 21 March 1994 the Government confirmed
the final submission in their memorial inviting "the Court to hold that
there have been no violations of the Convention in the present case".
AS TO THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 (art. 8) OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant submitted that the Finnish authorities had
failed to promote his speedy reunion with his daughter. They had allowed the
grandparents to keep Sini in their care and prevent his access to her in
defiance of court decisions and had transferred custody to them. He alleged a
violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, which reads:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
The Government disputed this contention. The Commission upheld
it in so far as it concerned the alleged non-enforcement of parental rights but
did not state any opinion on the transfer of custody.
The Court notes from the outset that since the Convention
entered into force with respect to Finland on 10 May 1990, it will, like the
Commission, limit its examination to whether the facts occurring after that
date disclosed a breach of the Convention (see, for instance, the Moreira de
Azevedo v. Portugal judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 189, pp. 17-18,
para. 70; the Stamoulakatos v. Greece judgment of 26 October 1993, Series A no.
271, pp. 13-14, paras. 32-33). Events prior to 10 May 1990 will be taken into
account merely as a background to the issues before the Court, in particular
the large number of administrative and judicial actions taken by the applicant,
the fact that all the decisions in his favour had been effectively resisted by
the grandparents and that the embittered relationship between them and the
applicant did not favour a co-operative approach to resolving the dispute.
A. Applicability of Article 8 (art. 8)
Sini was the child of a marriage and was thus ipso jure
part of that "family" unit from the moment of birth and by the very
fact of it. She lived with the applicant and her mother from her birth in
September 1983, until she was handed over to her maternal grandparents after
her mother’s death in April 1985. After that the applicant met her on some
occasions until January 1987. He was her custodian until September 1991 and
remains her legal guardian. Since 1985 he has continuously sought to have
access to her and to have her returned to him.
These links are undoubtedly sufficient to establish
"family life" within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8), which is thus
applicable. Indeed applicability was not disputed before the Court.
B. Compliance with Article 8 (art. 8)
The essential object of Article 8 (art. 8) is to protect
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities. There
may in addition be positive obligations inherent in an effective
"respect" for family life. Whilst the boundaries between the State’s
positive and negative obligations under this provision do not lend themselves
to precise definition, the applicable principles are similar. In particular, in
both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck
between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole,
and in both contexts the State is recognised as enjoying a certain margin of
appreciation (see the Keegan v. Ireland judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A no.
290, p. 19, para. 49).
The Court’s role is not to substitute itself for the competent
Finnish authorities in regulating custody and access issues in Finland, but
rather to review under the Convention the decisions that those authorities have
taken in the exercise of their power of appreciation (see, mutatis mutandis,
the Handyside v, the United Kingdom judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no.
24, p. 23, para. 50). In so doing, it must determine whether the reasons
purporting to justify the actual measures adopted with regard to the applicant’s
enjoyment of his right to respect for family life are relevant and sufficient
under Article 8 (art. 8).
In previous cases dealing with issues relating to the
compulsory taking of children into public care and the implementation of care
measures, the Court has consistently held that Article 8 (art. 8) includes a
right for the parent to have measures taken with a view to his or her being
reunited with the child and an obligation for the national authorities to take
such action (see, for instance, the Eriksson v. Sweden judgment of 22 June
1989, Series A no. 156, p. 26, para. 71; the Margareta and Roger Andersson v.
Sweden judgment of 25 February 1992, Series A no. 226-A, p. 30, para. 91; and
the Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2) judgment of 27 November 1992, Series A no. 250,
pp. 35-36, para. 90). In the opinion of the Court, this principle must be taken
as also applying to cases such as the present where the origin of the
provisional transfer of care is a private agreement.
The applicant and the Commission reasoned that a positive
obligation for the Contracting State to take coercive measures was more called
for where a child is in de facto care in defiance of the law and of court
orders than after the termination of de jure care. The non-enforcement of the
applicant’s custody rights, as from 10 May 1990 until the transfer of the
custody of Sini on 25 September 1991, as well as the non-enforcement of his visiting
rights constituted a lack of "respect" for his "family
life" in violation of Article 8 (art. 8). Notwithstanding the reasonable
steps he had taken to have his parental rights enforced there was a striking
lack of effective response. This fact, together with the length of the
enforcement proceedings, had created a situation where his reunification with
Sini had become difficult.
In addition, as regards the transfer of custody, the applicant
contended that the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 25 September 1991 conferred
legitimacy on the illegal de facto care assumed by the grandparents. Although
the grandparents had retained the child unlawfully, the length of time they had
kept her was perceived by that court as an important justification for transferring
custody. The measure further weakened the protection of his parental rights,
notably as regards access to his daughter.
In the Government’s submission a distinction should be
drawn between, on the one hand, a parent’s custody and visiting rights in
respect of a child and, on the other hand, the enforcement of such rights. Although
there may be plausible reasons for a parent to have custody and access rights,
it does not necessarily follow that these should be enforced, especially if it
would be incompatible with the interests and welfare of the child. That was the
position under Finnish law, which viewed a parent’s custody of a child as a
right first and foremost in the interest of the well-being and balanced
development of the child and not primarily for the benefit of the parent. They
referred also to Article 3 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Article 19 para. 1 (b) of the 1980 European Convention on the
Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of
Custody of Children (European Treaty Series no. 105) and Articles 1 and 12
para. 3 of the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (done at the Hague on 25 October 1980). The Government therefore
disagreed with the contention of the applicant and the Commission that forcible
measures should be more readily resorted to in the situation facing the
applicant. At any rate, it would not have been appropriate to use coercion to
implement his parental rights.
Whilst conceding that the applicant had not been able to
exercise his access rights in the way specified in the relevant court
decisions, the Government emphasised that this was due to the non-compliance by
the grandparents with those decisions. The latter being private persons, the
State was not directly responsible under international law for their acts or
omissions.
In any event, the applicant’s own conduct was open to
criticism: he had not availed himself of the possibility of visiting Sini in
the grandparents’ home; he had failed to finalise the enforcement proceedings
relating to the District Court’s decision on access of 14 November 1990, by not
requesting imposition of the fines indicated by the County Administrative Board
on 28 March 1991; and for several months he had omitted to renew his request
for enforcement of the access rights granted to him by the Court of Appeal on
25 September 1991 (see paragraphs 26 and 34 above).
The Government concluded that, in view of the difficult
circumstances of the case, the national authorities had done everything that
could reasonably be expected of them to facilitate reunion.
The Court recalls that the obligation of the national
authorities to take measures to facilitate reunion is not absolute, since the
reunion of a parent with a child who has lived for some time with other persons
may not be able to take place immediately and may require preparatory measures
being taken to this effect. The nature and extent of such preparation will
depend on the circumstances of each case, but the understanding and
co-operation of all concerned will always be an important ingredient. Whilst
national authorities must do their utmost to facilitate such co-operation, any
obligation to apply coercion in this area must be limited since the interests
as well as the rights and freedoms of all concerned must be taken into account,
and more particularly the best interests of the child and his or her rights
under Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention. Where contacts with the parent might
appear to threaten those interests or interfere with those rights, it is for
the national authorities to strike a fair balance between them (see the
above-mentioned Olsson (no. 2) judgment, pp. 35-36, para. 90).
What is decisive is whether the national authorities have taken
all necessary steps to facilitate reunion as can reasonably be demanded in the
special circumstances of each case (ibid.). The Court does not deem it
necessary to deal with the applicant’s and the Commission’s general argument on
an obligation under Article 8 (art. 8) to take forcible measures (see paragraph
56 above).
Turning to the particular facts the Court will deal first
with the alleged non-enforcement of the applicant’s access rights and then with
the alleged non-enforcement of his custody rights and the transfer of custody
to the grandparents.
1. Non-enforcement of access
As regards the alleged non-enforcement of access the
Court notes that during the period under consideration the prevailing view of
the Finnish authorities was, until the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 21 October
1993, that it was in the child’s best interest to develop contacts with the
applicant, even if she might not wish to meet him. What is more, at least from
the Supreme Court’s judgments of 17 May 1988 until the Court of Appeal’s
judgment of 25 September 1991, the Finnish courts considered not only that the
applicant was best suited as custodian but also that the child should return to
live with him (see paragraphs 14, 16, 18 and 27 above). Arrangements for his
access to the child were specified in the District Court’s interim decision of
14 November 1990 and in the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 25 September 1991
(see paragraphs 25 and 29 above). Since the grandparents failed to comply with
the access arrangements set out in these decisions, the County Administrative
Board, at the applicant’s requests, ordered their enforcement subject to
administrative fines being imposed upon them (see paragraphs 26 and 35 above);
but these measures proved to be of no avail in face of the grandparents’
persistent refusal to comply.
Against a background of ineffective court decisions and
enforcement orders, the actions of the social welfare authorities consisted
mainly of planning three meetings in 1991, taking steps to conciliate the
applicant and the grandparents in late 1992; and arranging for one further
meeting in the spring of 1993; none of which materialised (see paragraphs 33-36
above).
The difficulties in arranging access were admittedly in large
measure due to the animosity between the grandparents and the applicant. Nonetheless
the Court does not accept that responsibility for the failure of the relevant
decisions or measures in actually bringing about contacts can be attributed to
the applicant. Both the District Court’s and the Court of Appeal’s decisions
regarding access had recognised the need to arrange meetings at a neutral place
outside the grandparents’ home (see paragraphs 23, 25 and 29 above). Whilst the
grandparents consistently refused to comply with these decisions, the applicant
actively sought their enforcement. The suggestion by the Government that the
situation would have been any different had he requested the imposition of the
administrative fines or not omitted for some time to renew his enforcement
request is highly improbable (see paragraphs 26 and 34 above).
From the foregoing it cannot be said that, bearing in
mind the interests involved, the competent authorities, prior to the Court of
Appeal’s judgment of 21 October 1993, made reasonable efforts to facilitate
reunion. On the contrary, the inaction of the authorities placed the burden on
the applicant to have constant recourse to a succession of time-consuming and
ultimately ineffectual remedies to enforce his rights.
On the other hand, in the judgment of 21 October 1993 the Court
of Appeal came to the conclusion that the child had become sufficiently mature
for her views to be taken into account and that access should therefore not be
accorded against her own wishes (see paragraph 37 above). The Court sees no
reason to call this finding into question.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that, notwithstanding
the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the competent authorities, the
non-enforcement of the applicant’s right of access from 10 May 1990 until 21
October 1993 constituted a breach of his right to respect for his family life
under Article 8 (art. 8). However, there has been no such violation in respect
of the period thereafter.
2. Non-enforcement of custody rights and transfer of custody
It remains to be determined whether there was also a
violation with respect to the non-enforcement of the applicant’s custody rights
and the subsequent transfer of the custody to the grandparents.
The Court observes that as of 10 May 1990, the child, who had
been placed with her grandparents when she was one and a half years old, had
been living with them for approximately five years. During this period she had
very few contacts with her father, the applicant, and had not met him since early
1987 (see paragraph 38 above). On 30 May 1990, steps to have the custody
transferred to the grandparents were recommended by the National Social Welfare
Board (see paragraph 22 above) and, on 13 August 1990, the local Social Welfare
Board instituted proceedings to this effect before the District Court. The
Board’s request was dismissed by it on 8 May 1991 but upheld by the Court of
Appeal on 25 September 1991; leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court
on 21 January 1992 (see paragraphs 23, 27, 29 and 31 above).
The Court is of the view that in such circumstances there were
sufficient grounds to justify non-enforcement of the applicant’s custody right
pending the outcome of the custody proceedings.
Furthermore, as to the outcome of these proceedings, it
is undisputed that the transfer of custody constituted an interference with the
applicant’s right to respect for family life under paragraph 1 of Article 8
(art. 8-1), that this interference was "in accordance with the law"
and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting "the rights" of the
child within the meaning of paragraph 2 (art. 8-2). The Court sees no reason to
doubt that the transfer of custody was "necessary in a democratic
society". The Court of Appeal’s judgment, which was based on expert
opinion, had regard to the length of the girl’s stay with the grandparents, her
strong attachment to them and her feeling that their home was her own (see
paragraphs 29 and 31 above). These reasons were not only relevant but also
sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). The
competent national authorities, which were in principle better placed than the
international judge in evaluating the evidence before them (see, amongst many
authorities, the above-mentioned Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2) judgment, pp. 35-36,
para. 90), did not overstep their margin of appreciation in arriving at the
decisions they did. Even taking into account the failure of the authorities to
secure the applicant access to his child, the measure cannot be regarded as
disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting her interests.
These aspects of the applicant’s complaint do not
therefore give rise to a separate breach of Article 8 (art. 8).
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF PROTOCOL No. 7
(P7-5)
Before the Commission the applicant maintained that the
same facts as constituted the alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention also gave rise to a breach of Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5)
(right to equality of spouses in their relations with their children). The
Commission concluded that no separate issue arose under the latter provision.
The applicant did not pursue this complaint before the Court,
which does not find it necessary to deal with the matter of its own motion.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 PARA. 1 OF THE
CONVENTION (art. 6-1)
A. Scope of the issues before the Court
The applicant complained under Article 6 para. 1 (art.
6-1) of the Convention that the second set of custody proceedings, in the first
place, and, secondly, the ensuing enforcement proceedings exceeded a reasonable
time. Thirdly, in the latter proceedings, he did not have a fair and impartial
hearing before the Court of Appeal.
However, only the facts of the first complaint were declared admissible
by the Commission. The Court will, in accordance with its established case-law,
limit its examination to that complaint (see, for instance, the Helmers v. Sweden judgment of 29 October 1991, Series A no. 212-A, p. 13, para. 25; and the above-mentioned
Olsson (no. 2) judgment, pp. 29-30, para. 75).
B. Reasonableness of the length of the second set of custody
proceedings
The applicant alleged a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) of the Convention, according to which:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a]
tribunal ..."
Both the Government and the Commission disagreed with this
contention.
The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be
considered in the light of the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in
particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of
the relevant authorities. On the latter point, the importance of what is at
stake for the applicant in the litigation has to be taken into account (see the
Vallée v. France judgment of 26 April 1994, Series A no. 289-A, p.17, para.
34).
The applicant maintained that the proceedings had been
unduly delayed by the fact that the District Court had twice suspended them for
no pressing reasons, the second time for a period of six months. The extensive
investigations requested by the District Court were unnecessary as they were
based exclusively on material already available to it (see paragraphs 14 and 24
above). The authorities thus did not satisfy the requirement of exceptional
diligence to be observed in such cases.
The Court finds that the relevant period to be taken into
consideration started on 13 August 1990, when the Social Welfare Board made a
request to the District Court for transfer of custody, and ended on 21 January
1992, when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal (see paragraphs 23 and 31
above).
Although it is essential that custody cases be dealt with
speedily, the Court sees no reason to criticise the District Court for having
suspended the proceedings twice in order to obtain expert opinions on the issue
before it.
As regards the six months’ delay the difficulties which the
social welfare authorities encountered as a result of the grandparents’ refusal
to allow Sini to be subjected to investigation and to take part in related
interviews must not be overlooked (see paragraph 24 above). Irrespective of
whether there were sufficient reasons for suspending the hearing for as long as
six months, it has to be noted that the overall length of the proceedings was
approximately eighteen months. In itself this is not excessive for proceedings
comprising three judicial levels.
Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the
Court, like the Commission, finds that the length of the second custody
proceedings did not exceed a "reasonable time" and that there was
thus no violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 (art. 13) OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the non-enforcement of his
custody and access rights and the length of the proceedings violated Article 13
(art. 13), which provides:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity."
This complaint amounts in substance to the same as those
made under Articles 6 and 8 (art. 6, art. 8). The Court, having regard to its
findings above, shares the Commission’s view that it is not necessary to
examine this grievance.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art. 50) OF THE CONVENTION
Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention reads:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by
a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is
completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the ...
Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial
reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the
decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party."
A. Non-pecuniary damage
The applicant sought 200,000 Finnish marks in
compensation for non-pecuniary damage, attributable to the anxiety and distress
he had felt as a result of the lack of enforcement of his parental rights and
the transfer of custody.
The Government considered the amount excessive, whereas the
Commission’s Delegate did not comment.
The Court sees no reason to doubt that the applicant
suffered distress as a result of the non-enforcement of his access rights and
that sufficient just satisfaction would not be provided solely by the finding
of a violation. Deciding on an equitable basis, as is required by Article 50
(art. 50), it awards him 100,000 marks for non-pecuniary damage. This figure is
to be increased by any value-added tax that may be chargeable (see, for
instance, the Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom judgment of 26
November 1991, Series A no. 216, p. 38, para. 84).
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant further claimed reimbursement of costs and
expenses, totalling 229,906.47 marks and 2,770 French francs, in respect of the
following items:
(a) 37,751.47 marks for legal fees and expenses in the
domestic proceedings, of which 31,692.20 marks related to the period after the
entry into force of the Convention in respect of Finland; in addition at least
15,000 marks which he would normally have been billed if invoices had not been
reduced to meet his modest resources after the cessation of an insurance
policy;
(b) 161,600 marks for 202 hours’ work (at 800 marks per hour)
by his lawyers in connection with the Strasbourg proceedings;
(c) 15,555 marks and 2,770 francs to cover expenses incurred
by the appearance of three lawyers at the Court’s hearing on 21 March 1994.
The applicant further asked the Court to add to any award made
with regard to the above "all possible value-added taxes".
The Government maintained that only costs and expenses
which had been necessarily incurred after 10 May 1990 (date of ratification of
the Convention by Finland) should be taken into consideration and they objected
to 15,000 marks being added to the domestic costs, the amount being based
merely on hypothetical calculations. In their view the number of working hours
and the hourly rate were excessive and representation of the applicant by one
lawyer alone would have been sufficient. They also disagreed with the applicant’s
approach to including value-added taxes.
The Delegate of the Commission did not comment.
As to item (a), the Court recalls that an award may be
made only in so far as the costs were actually and necessarily incurred in
order to avoid or obtain redress for the non-enforcement of his right of access
from 10 May 1990 until 21 October 1993. This does not include costs in connection
with the proceedings before the Court of Appeal leading to its decision of the
latter date. It does not appear that the applicant had a legal obligation to
pay the additional 15,000 marks claimed. As these costs were not actually
incurred, this part of the claim must also be rejected. In the light of the
above, the Court awards him 15,000 marks for domestic costs together with any
relevant value-added tax.
As regards item (b), the Court, deciding on an equitable basis,
awards the applicant 120,000 marks, also to be increased by any relevant
value-added tax, from which must be deducted the 8,070 French francs already
received for legal fees from the Council of Europe by way of legal aid.
The applicant has moreover received 13,654.43 French francs in
respect of item (c) and the Court does not find it necessary to make any
further award under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds unanimously that the non-enforcement of the
applicant’s right of access from 10 May 1990 until 21 October 1993 constituted
a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention;
2. Holds by six votes to three that there was no such
violation thereafter;
3. Holds by six votes to three that the non-enforcement after
10 May 1990 of his right of custody and the subsequent transfer of the custody
to the grandparents did not constitute a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention;
4. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to examine the
applicant’s complaint under Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5);
5. Holds unanimously that the Court’s examination under
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention is limited to the complaint
concerning the length of the second set of custody proceedings and that there
has been no violation of this provision;
6. Holds unanimously that it is not necessary to examine the
applicant’s allegations under Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention;
7. Holds unanimously that Finland is to pay to the applicant,
within three months and together with any value-added tax that may be
chargeable, 100,000 (hundred thousand) Finnish marks for non-pecuniary damage,
and, for legal fees and expenses, 135,000 (one hundred and thirty-five
thousand) marks less 8,070 (eight thousand and seventy) French francs to be
converted into Finnish marks at the rate applicable on the date of delivery of
the present judgment;
8. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 September 1994.
Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Herbert PETZOLD
Acting Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the partly dissenting
opinion of Mr De Meyer, joined by Mr Russo and Mr Jungwiert, is annexed to this
judgment.
R.R.
H.P.