European Court of Human Rights



 

                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

 

 

                      Application No. 18187/91

                      by C.W.

                      against the United Kingdom

 

 

 

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 10 February 1993, the following members being present:

 

             MM.  S. TRECHSEL, President of the Second Chamber

                  G. JÖRUNDSSON

                  A. WEITZEL

                  J.-C. SOYER

                  H. G. SCHERMERS

                  H. DANELIUS

             Sir  Basil HALL

             Mrs. G. H. THUNE

             MM.  F. MARTINEZ

                  J.-C. GEUS

 

             Mr.  K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber

 

 

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

 

      Having regard to the application introduced on 12 March 1991 by

C.W. against the United Kingdom and registered on 14 May 1991 under

file No. 18187/91;

 

      Having regard to

 

-     the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

      the Commission;

 

-     the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

      2 July 1992 and the observations in reply submitted by the

      applicant on 10 October 1992;

 

      Having deliberated;

 

      Decides as follows:

 

THE FACTS

 

      The applicant is a British citizen.  He was born in 1957.  He is

currently detained at H.M. Prison Albany.

 

      The facts, as submitted by the parties and as apparent from the

documents enclosed with the application may be summarised as follows.

 

      On 20 February 1991 the applicant was sentenced to three years'

imprisonment for common assault.  He had pleaded guilty to this offence

at trial.

 

      The applicant was transferred from H.M. Prison Norwich to H.M.

Prison Blundeston in March 1991.

 

      At Blundeston there is a policy that prisoners should spend

13 weeks after induction in a workshop, unless medical reasons prevent

it.  At his reception before the Prison Works Committee the applicant

was told that he would be expected to work in the print shop. The

applicant says that he stated that he would not work in the print shop

because his Vegan beliefs prevented him from working with animal tested

products (i.e. dyes).

 

      On 13 March 1991, the applicant refused to go to work in the

print shop.  He was charged with the disciplinary offence of disobeying

a lawful order contrary to rule 47 para. 19 of the Prison Rules.  The

charge was dealt with on 19 March 1991 and a penalty of 2 days' loss

of remission imposed.

 

      On 19 March 1991 the applicant was again charged with refusing

to obey an order to go to work.  The penalty of stoppage of £ 1 of his

wages was imposed on 22 March 1991.

 

      A further charge attracted the penalty of a £ 2 wage stoppage on

17 April 1991.

 

      The Government state that in the above disciplinary proceedings,

the applicant made no mention of his Vegan beliefs.  In a statement

read out on 19 March 1991, the applicant is recorded as saying:

 

      "I will not try to pull the wool over your eyes with a load of

      garbage in this matter.  I will state clearly the reason why I

      did refuse work in the print shop ...

 

      I am not a person to work inside.  I would rather lose all the

      remission that I got than to be forced to work inside a factory

      ..."

 

      The applicant however submitted an internal complaint on 14 March

1991 about being required to work in the print shop.  He protested that

he did not consider inside work suitable and that also his belief as

a Vegan prohibited working with products that are unnecessarily tested

on animals.  By reply dated 19 March 1991 he was informed of the

relevant policy.  In addition it was suggested to him that he submit

a change of labour form for the purposes of getting on a fresh-air

party.  He was informed that when he had completed his 13 weeks in a

workshop and when he had reached the top of the relevant waiting list,

his application would be considered.  It appears that the applicant did

not submit a change of labour form.  The applicant submitted a further

complaint on 27 March 1991.  By reply dated 16 April 1991 he was

informed that until he submitted a change of labour form an application

for outside work would not be considered.  The applicant submitted

another complaint on 24 April 1991.  By reply dated 30 April 1991 the

applicant was reminded of the relevant policy and told that since he

was in solitary confinement his complaint relating to workshops was

academic.

 

      From 18 April 1991, the applicant had been placed in segregation

under rule 43 of the Prison Rules, after which he was not under an

obligation to work in the print shop.  The Government state that he was

removed from association as a result of his conduct in making threats

to staff and to foment a riot.  Before his transfer to another prison,

he was convicted of further disciplinary offences, including 2 assaults

on prison officers and setting fire to his cell.

 

      On 6 September 1991, the applicant was transferred to another

prison.

 

      On 11 February 1992, the applicant wrote to the Home Secretary,

who by reply of 1 May 1992 stated that he was satisfied after detailed

enquires that the dyes used are of organic or synthetic pigments and

that they are not tested on animals.

 

      By letter dated 29 March 1991, the Vegan Society informed the

applicant that although the majority of printing dyes are synthetic

they will have been tested on animals at some stage.

 

      The applicant applied for leave to appeal against his sentence.

He was refused leave to appeal by a single judge of the Court of

Appeal.  After this refusal he applied to the Full Court of Appeal.

His application was rejected on 13 November 1991.

 

 

COMPLAINTS

 

      The applicant complains of the policy at H.M. Prison Blundeston

whereby he was required to work in the prison print shop.  He also

complains of the loss of remission and the fines imposed on him for his

refusal to work in the print shop.

 

      He also complains about his sentence, that his application for

leave to appeal was hampered by the prison authorities in that he has

not been permitted phone calls or appropriate forms and in that he has

been denied access to the prison legal aid officer and that visits by

his solicitor have been stopped.

 

 

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

 

      The application was introduced on  12 March 1991 and registered

on 14 May 1991.

 

      On  2 April 1992, the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government and to ask for written

observations on the admissibility and merits of the application insofar

as it concerned Article 9 of the Convention.

 

      The Government's observations were submitted on 7 July 1992 after

one extension in the time-limit and the applicant's observations in

reply were  submitted on 10 October 1992 also after one extension in

the time-limit.

 

 

THE LAW

 

 

1.    The applicant complains that he was obliged to work in the print

shop and punished for failing to do so despite his Vegan beliefs.

 

      The Government submit that the applicant has failed to exhaust

domestic remedies in respect of his complaint since he did not complain

to the Board of Visitors.  The Commission notes however that the Board

of Visitors has only the power to make recommendations to the Governor.

It finds therefore that this avenue of redress does not constitute a

remedy which is adequate or sufficient for the purposes of Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention.

 

      The Commission has therefore examined the applicant's complaints

under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, which provides:

 

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience

      and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion

      or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others

      and in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief,

      in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

 

      2.   Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be

      subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are

      necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public

      safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or

      for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

 

      The Commission recalls that the applicant refused to work in the

print shop because as a Vegan he wished to avoid contact with animal

products or products which had been tested on animals.  The Commission

notes that the Government do not contest that Veganism is capable of

concerning "conscience" or "belief" within the meaning of Article 9

(Art. 9) of the Convention.  The Commission's case-law establishes that

this provision protects the sphere of private, personal beliefs and the

acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes (see e.g. No.

10358/83, Dec. 15.12.83, D.R. 37, p. 142). The Commission finds that

the Vegan convictions with regard to animal products fall within the

scope of Article 9 para. 1 (Art. 9-1) of the Convention.

 

      The Government allege however that the applicant's Vegan beliefs

were not the primary reason for his refusal, rather his desire to work

outdoors; they refer in this respect to the records of the disciplinary

proceedings, in particular, the prepared statement which he made in

those proceedings and in which he made no reference to his Vegan

beliefs.  The Commission notes however that the applicant had expressly

invoked the requirements of his Vegan beliefs in written complaints to

the prison authorities before and contemporaneously with the

disciplinary proceedings.  The Commission therefore finds that a motive

of his refusal, though apparently not the only motive, was his Vegan

beliefs.

 

      The Government further deny, in any event, that the dyes in the

workshop had been manufactured out of animal products or tested on

animals.  The applicant, in support of his objection, has only provided

a letter from the Vegan Society informing him that most dyes used had

been tested on animals at some stage.

 

      However, even assuming that the above facts disclose an

interference with the applicant's rights under Article 9 (Art. 9) of

the Convention, the Commission finds such interference to be justified

under the second paragraph of that provision for the reasons set out

below.

 

      Concerning the requirements of the second paragraph of Article

9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, the Commission finds that the

interference was "prescribed by law" in that any requirement to work

is contained in the Prison Rules and pursued the aim of preserving good

order in the prison.

 

      The Government submit that it is necessary to have a system of

allocation of work which is perceived to be fair and without

favouritism and that as a result prisoners inevitably do not enjoy free

choice of employment.  The Commission recalls that all prisoners were

generally required to work in the print shop for a period of 13 weeks

after which time other employment was available.  It notes the factual

conflict as to the nature and extent of the connection between the dyes

and animals, the fact that it was only one of the applicant's reasons

for refusing the work and also the relatively minor nature of the

penalties imposed on the applicant for refusing to comply with the

normal work regime.

 

      In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the principle

of proportionality has not been infringed and to the extent that there

has been an interference, the interference is justified under paragraph

2 of Article 9 (Art. 9-2) of the Convention.

 

      It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

 

 

2.    The applicant also complains of a number of other matters,

including the length of his sentence, and of alleged obstruction by the

prison authorities in the conduct of his appeal, in particular in the

restriction of phone calls, access to the prison legal aid officer and

visits from his solicitor.

 

      As regards the length of his sentence, the Commission notes that

the applicant was sentenced to a period of 3 years imprisonment for

assault.  It finds nothing in the facts of the case to indicate that

this in any way discloses a violation of any of the provisions of the

Convention.  It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded

with the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (art. 27-2) of the Convention.

 

      As regards the applicant's complaints that he was obstructed in

his appeal, the Commission is not required to decide whether or not the

facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation

of this provision as, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it

may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been

exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international

law.

 

      The Commission notes that the applicant did not complain of these

matters to the Secretary of State.  Moreover, an examination of the

case as it has been submitted does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstances which might have absolved the applicant,

according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from

raising his complaint in the proceedings referred to.

 

      It follows that the applicant has not complied with the condition

as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and his complaints must in

this respect be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the

Convention.

 

 

      For these reasons the Commission unanimously

 

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

 

 

 

Secretary to the Second Chamber      President of the Second Chamber

 

 

        (K. ROGGE)                           (S. TRECHSEL)