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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> X. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 3860/68 [1969] ECHR 21 (16 May 1969)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1969/3860_68.html
Cite as: [1969] ECHR 21
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X. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 3860/68 [1969] ECHR 21 (16 May 1969)
THE FACTS Whereas the facts presented by the applicant may be summarised as follows: The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1923 and at present detained in Wormwood Scrubs prison, London. 1. In January 1967 the appointed liquidator of a company called Z Trust brought a civil action against the applicant for payment of nearly £420,000. The company was registered in Liechtenstein but had a place of business in London. By judgment of .. October, 1967, given by Master A at the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division the applicant was ordered to pay the money claimed by the liquidator. It is stated in the judgment that the order was made. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Judge in Chambers, but on .. April 1968, was refused leave to defend the action pursuant to Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and was again ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum in question plus costs. An appeal from this judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on .. May, 1968 and the judgment confirmed. The applicant was heard in person by the Court of Appeal. In its decision the Court of Appeal states that the applicant had several times changed the grounds of his defence. At first he had put the plaintiffs to proof, later he sought to say that by an agreement the money which he had obtained was to be treated as a loan and he would have 20 years in which to pay, then he challenged the competence of the liquidator to bring the action. In support of the latter argument he had stated that the plaintiffs were not a company at all, that it had not existed in England and was not a legal entity. The Court rejected this argument by saying that no matter what the position of this company was in Liechtenstein, insofar as the English side of the business was concerned the British legislation enabled a liquidator to be appointed in England. The Court of Appeal also refused the applicant's request for leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Nevertheless the applicant petitioned the House of Lords which rejected his petition for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision on .. June, 1968. The applicant states that solely upon the above mentioned judgment against him he was adjudicated bankrupt. He alleges that the plaintiffs obtained the judgment by deliberately deceiving the Master, by misrepresentation and concealment of the facts, and by calculated perversion of the course of justice. He complains that he was not given permission to defend the action of call any evidence although he had denied the debt. He alleges violation of Article 6, paragraph (1) of the Convention and requests the Commission to set aside the judgment against him and to direct the British Government that the action against him be adjudicated again in a fair and open hearing. 2. On .. March, 1968, the applicant was convicted after a trial lasting 42 days by the Central Criminal Court, inter alia, (1) of having conspired with his co-accused, B, to cheat and defraud such persons as had taken out insurance policies with the W Insurance Company Limited by fraudently applying for their own benefit the proceeds of premiums paid upon such policies; (2) of uttering certain forged valuable security with intent to defraud knowing the same to be forged; (3) of, being Director, making a false entry in the balance sheet of W. The applicant was sentenced to a total of 8 years imprisonment. In addition two considerable fines were imposed and a sentence of 12 months imprisonment in default of the payment of any fine. The facts as they appear from the judgment of the Court of Appeal and which are related to those of the above mentioned civil proceedings may be summarised as follows: The applicant had founded W in 1963. He enlisted the co-accused, B, to help him run the company. Up to 1966 the company had developed considerably and its premium income was running at a rate of about £4,000,000 a year. Nevertheless in the same year it was unable to pay claims made under the policies it had issued. It was accordingly wound up on .. July, 1966. The applicant and B had, in 1964, opened a bank account in the name of the above mentioned Z Trust Company with a London bank. Into this account W had paid over £400,000 out of the money received as premiums. These sums were paid out to the applicant and B who used them for their own purposes. According to the court the evidence showed clearly that Z was a mere shadow with an impressive name which the applicant had acquired for a few hundred pounds. The sums withdrawn by the applicant and B from Z's account were loaned to them by Z, unsecured, unreceipted, bearing interest at the rate of 3 per cent and not repayable for 20 years. These business transactions led to the financial disaster of W. The applicant appealed against conviction and sentence, but his appeal was rejected by the full Court of Appeal on .. July, 1968. In its judgment the Court of Appeal, which, it appears, carefully examined the affair, states that the trial judge "reviewed the evidence fully and accurately and directed the jury upon the law correctly and lucidly". The Court of Appeal held that the applicant's complaint that the jury had been biased against him by a virulent press campaign, and by a television interview which was conducted as a trial against him before the criminal proceedings had commenced, did not justify quashing his conviction. With regard to the press campaign, which was mounted in July, 1966, the Court stated that the failure of W was a matter of public concern and the free press had the right and the duty to comment on such topics. The private individual is, according to the Court's findings, adequately protected by the law of libel. With regard to a television programme in which the applicant has been interviewed in February, 1967, and questioned about his responsibility for the failure of W although it was already obvious that he was about to be arrested and tried on charges of gross fraud, the Court expressed serious concern and stated that "trial by television" is not to be tolerated in a civil society. It held, however, that the interview, thought regrettable, also afforded no grounds for quashing the applicant's conviction because he voluntarily went to the television interview although he knew what he would be questioned about and because the trial did not take place until eleven months after the interview. The Court found that in the circumstances there was no real risk that the jury was influenced by the pre-trial publicity. The applicant's petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords was rejected on .. December, 1968. The applicant was represented by counsel. The applicant has submitted various copies of newspaper clippings, and excerpts from books called "... " and "..." in which he is characterised as a dubious or fraudulent businessman. All these publications had appeared before his trial. He has also submitted a recording of his television interview of .. February, 1967 in which he was severely attacked by the interviewer. The applicant has further submitted copies of letters which were published in The Times on .. July, 1968 and in which the writers condemned the "trial by television". A New York University professor expressed his opinion in one of these letters that the United States Supreme Court would have reversed the applicant's conviction on the ground of the public campaign before the trial. The applicant states that he had asked the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General to be tried by a court of judges but this request was rejected. He further states that he did not voluntarily give the television interview as was assumed by the Court of Appeal but was blackmailed into giving it. He alleges that he was given the alternative to appear and to answer question or to be attacked in his absence in which case the viewers would be informed that he had been given the opportunity of answering questions but was not prepared to do so. The applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial and that the Court of Appeal wrongly upheld his conviction. He points out that most of the evidence used against him consisted of company accounts, balance sheets, etc., which the lay-jury could not understand. He concludes that consequently the jury accepted the allegations of the prosecution only because they were brainwashed by what they had read about him in the newspapers and seen on television. He alleges violation of Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (2), of the Convention and requests the Commission to intervene and establish his rights. THE LAW Whereas, in regard to civil proceedings instituted against the applicant by the appointed liquidator of the Z Trust Company, an examination of the case as it has been submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1); whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention; Whereas the applicant further complains of the fact that the press had given extensive coverage to his case and that he was publicly accused in a television interview before his trial and whereas he alleges that this publicity had a prejudicial effect in that it influenced the jury against him; whereas in this regard he invokes Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (2) (Art. 6-1, 6-2), of the Convention; Whereas the Commission notes that the full Court of Appeal extensively examined the merits of the applicant's case and found that his conviction was well founded; Whereas the Court of Appeal sits and determines appeals without a jury; whereas consequently any errors which were committed by the jury as a result of bias caused by such previous publicity and which allegedly affected the judgment of the trial court, would have been rectified by the decision of the full Court of Appeal, dated .. July, 1968; whereas in this respect the Court of Appeal had, in fact, special regard to the applicant's complaint that there had been prejudicial publicity concerning his case and found that there was no real risk that the jury was influenced by the publicity"; whereas the Court of Appeal further found that "the case for the Crown was so overwhelming that no jury could conceivably have returned any different verdicts" against the applicant; Whereas the Commission, having examined the case as it was submitted by the applicant, finds no reason itself to adopt an opinion other than the expressed by the Court of Appeal; whereas accordingly the Commission does not find any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and especially in the Article invoked by the applicant; whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention; Whereas, insofar as the applicant complains generally of his conviction and sentence, as pronounced by the Central Criminal Court on .. July, 1968 an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the provisions of the Convention other than Article 6, paragraph (1) and (2) (Art. 6-1, 6-2); whereas in respect of the decisions complained of, it has to be recalled that in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, the Commission's only task is to ensure observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention; whereas, in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where the Commission considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, the Commission refers to its decisions Nos. 458/59 (X v. Belgium - Yearbook, Vol. III, p. 233) and 1140/61 (X v. Austria - Collection of Decisions, Vol. 8, p. 57); and whereas there is no appearance of a violation in the proceedings complained of; whereas it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention; Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE