European Court of Human Rights

THE FACTS

Whereas the facts as presented by the Applicant may be summarised as
follows:

The Applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1908, and living at
Älvdalen (Sweden).

1. He first wrote to the Commission in September, 1964, complaining
that, as a result of a decision taken by the authorities, the local
hospital at Älvdalen could no longer receive as many patients as
before, and that, in particular, women awaiting their confinement were
obliged to go to the hospital at Mora, which is situated at some
distance from Älvdalen. He considered that this was contrary to Article
3 of the Convention. He did not raise this allegation in the
Application form which he later submitted, or in any of his subsequent
pleadings, and it is possible, therefore, that he did not intend to
pursue this particular complaint.

2. The Applicant also complains of three decisions given on .. July,
1962, by the Ovansiljan District Court for Land Cases (Ovansiljans
domsagas ägodelningsrätt). He has submitted the text of two of these
decisions, but has failed to explain the contents of the third
decision. It seems that he appealed against the three decisions and
that - presumably after his appeal had been rejected by the Svea Court
of Appeal (hovrätt) - the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), on .. May,
1964, decided not to grant him leave to have his further appeal
examined by the Supreme Court.

As regards the two decisions submitted by the Applicant, the contents
may be summarised as follows:

(a) During certain proceedings regarding the partition of land which
had previously been the joint property of the inhabitants of the
village of Brunnsberg, a dispute arose as to whether a certain forest
area belonged to the inhabitants of this village or whether it was the
property of the Crown.
The Applicant and certain other persons maintained that the forest area
had been in the possession of the village community already in the 15th
century, and he referred to certain provisions in Swedish law,
according to which property to a piece of land may be founded on
"possession since time immemorial" (urminnes hävd), even if no legal
title regarding the acquisition of the land can be shown to exist.

On the other hand, the State maintained that the forest area belonged
to the Crown since this area was an integral part of a larger piece of
land in regard to which the Crown had been officially registered as
being the owner.

The dispute was referred to the District Court for Land Cases, which
heard the case on .. June, 1962. The Applicant and another person
appeared before the Court and asked for an adjournment of the hearing
until .. October, 1962, so as to give them an opportunity to instruct
a lawyer in the case. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court
that this request was rejected by the Court. Consequently, the
Applicant and his colleague pleaded in person before the Court, and
they also submitted a number of documents in support of their opinion
that the forest belonged to the village community. They also asked for
legal aid in the case. The representative of the State contested the
statements of the other party, and maintained that the land in dispute
belonged to the Crown.
The Court, by its judgment of .. July, 1962, ruled that the forest area
was the property of the Crown and at the same time rejected the request
for legal aid.
The Applicant alleges that, as a result of this judgment as upheld on
appeal, he and the other members of the village community had been
deprived of their property, and he has submitted substantial
documentation in order to show their right of property. He also adds
that the District Court had rejected their claims without giving them
a fair hearing; in this respect, he points out that an adjournment was
not granted by the Court, and that he was not given adequate
opportunity to present his case and to call evidence. A fair hearing
had also been refused by the Supreme Court which had not admitted his
appeal.

The Applicant invokes Articles 1, 2, 6, paragraphs (1), (3) (a), (b),
(c), (d), and (e), 13 and 14 of the Convention.

(b) While considering that they were the owners of certain land (a
special sort of meadows, called "myrslogar"), the Applicant and other
persons requested that the authorities should determine, by an official
act, the exact boundaries of their land. As the State contested that
the Applicant and the other persons concerned were owners, the dispute
regarding the ownership was referred to the District Court for Land
Cases.
In its judgment of .. July, 1962, the District Court stated that, in
regard to the right of property to some of the meadows concerned, the
Supreme Court had, already in 1944, made a final ruling and that,
therefore, the District Court could not re-examine the question of
ownership. As regards the remaining parts of the land in dispute, the
District Court arrived at the conclusion that the Crown was the owner.
By the same judgment, the District Court also rejected the request for
legal aid submitted by the Applicant and other persons. It seems that
the Applicant had also asked for an adjournment of the proceedings in
this case, but that his request had been rejected by the District
Court.
The Applicant maintains that the Supreme Court's decision of 1944 could
not be binding on him, since he had not been a party to the proceedings
in 1944. Consequently, the District Court ought not to have based its
judgment on this previous decision.
The Applicant also refers to a number of documents which, in his
opinion, support his assertion that he and the other persons concerned
are the real owners of the meadows. He also invokes certain decisions
given by the Supreme Court.

The Applicant apparently relies on the same provisions of the
Convention as mentioned above under (a).

3. The Applicant also complains of certain expropriation proceedings
and his complaint, in this respect, may be summarised as follows:

In regard to the expropriation of certain land for defence purposes,
the State instituted proceedings against the Community of Brunnsberg
as being the owner of the land. The case was dealt with by the
Ovansiljan Expropriation Court (Ovansiljans domsagas
expropriationsdomstol). In addition to the representatives of the Crown
and the Brunnsberg Village, the present Applicant also appeared before
the Court, claiming compensation for the expropriation of the ground
that he owned a share of the property concerned.

By judgment of .. December, 1965, the Expropriation Court agreed to the
proposed measure of expropriation and fixed the compensation to be paid
by the State. As regards the Applicant, however, the Court concluded
that it had in no way been shown that the expropriation concerned his
right and that, therefore, his claims and submissions could not be
examined by the Court.

There is no indication that the Application lodged an appeal from this
decision.

The Applicant alleges that the Court was not impartial, since one of
the lay judges (nämndemän) had a personal interest in the outcome of
the proceedings. In this respect, he submits that the lay judge
concerned owned land in the parish of Älvdalen and that the land-owners
in that parish held a joint interest in the property which was subject
to expropriation. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court that
he had raised this point before the Court but that the Court had found,
after deliberation, that there were no circumstances which could
prevent the judge concerned from participating in the case.
On this point, the Applicant invokes Articles, 6, paragraph (1), 13 and
14 of the Convention.

The Applicant has also submitted a number of documents intended to show
that he had a certain right in the expropriated land and that,
consequently, the Court ought to have decided on his claims in the
case.
It seems that he also objects to the measure of expropriation as such,
which he considers as a violation of the right of property.

THE LAW

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the hospital
facilities at Älvdalen (paragraph 1 of the statement of facts), it is
to be observed that, according to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the
Convention, the Commission may receive petitions from any person
"claiming to be the victim" of a violation of a right or freedom
guaranteed by the Convention;

Whereas, in the present case, the Applicant alleges that Article 3
(Art. 3) of the Convention is violated by reason of the inadequate
hospital facilities at Älvdalen; whereas, however, he does not claim
to be himself a victim of this violation of the Convention;

Whereas it follows that, in regard to this complaint, the conditions
under which the Commission may receive an application from an
individual are not satisfied; and whereas therefore this part of the
Application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention
within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof;

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains that he was refused legal
aid in the different proceedings before the District Court for Land
Cases (paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), the
Commission has had regard both to Article 6, paragraph (1)
(Art. 6-1),and to Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), of the
Convention;

Whereas, in respect of Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), it
is to be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1
(Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in Section
I of the Convention; and whereas under Article 25, paragraph (1)
(Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of those rights and
freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an Application
presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals; whereas otherwise its examination is outside the
competence of the Commission ratione materiae;  whereas it is true
that, under Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c),of the
Convention, everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right,
subject to certain conditions, to be granted free legal assistance;
whereas, however, as the Commission has frequently stated, the right
to free legal aid in civil cases is not as such included among the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention; whereas it follows
that the Application in so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph
(3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), is incompatible with this provision of the
Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2);

Whereas the Commission has also had regard to the general clause of
Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas it
results from this provision that, in the determination of his civil
rights, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing; and whereas an
examination of the case as it has been submitted does not show that the
refusal to grant the Applicant free legal aid constituted in any way
a violation of this right; whereas it follows that the Application, in
so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2),of the Convention;

Whereas the Applicant further complains of the fact that the
proceedings before the District Court were not adjourned and alleges
that in general he was not granted a fair hearing (paragraph 2 (a) and
(b) of the statement of facts); whereas he also complains that in one
case the District Court based itself on a previous court decision which
was not binding on him (paragraph 2 (b) of the statement of facts);

Whereas in these respects an examination of the case as it has been
submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Article
6 (Art. 6); whereas it follows that these parts of the Application are
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaints as to the conclusion
reached by the Courts regarding the ownership of certain land
(paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), an examination of
the case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of
a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and
the Protocol;

Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, the
Commission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19
(Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance of
the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention;  whereas,
in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,
except where the Commission considers that such errors might have
involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms
limitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, the
Commission refers to its decisions Nos. 458/59 (X. v. Belgium -
Yearbook III, page 233) and 1140/61 (X v. Austria - Collection of
Decisions, Volume 8, page 57); and whereas there is no appearance of
a violation in the proceedings complained of; whereas it follows that
this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the decision of the
Expropriation Court and the proceedings before that Court (paragraph
3 of the statement of facts), it is to be observed that, under Article
26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with a
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the
generally recognised rules of international law; whereas Swedish law
provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal (hovrätt) and for a
further appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) in respect of
the refusal of a lower court to let a third person participate in civil
proceedings (Chapter 49, sections 4 and 5, and Chapter 54, section 3,
of the Swedish Code of Procedure);  and whereas the Applicant
apparently failed to appeal from the Expropriation Court's decision of
.. December, 1965 which included the Court's refusal to recognise him
as party in the proceedings concerned; whereas, therefore, he has not
exhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law; whereas,
moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted does not
disclosethe existence of any special circumstances which might have
absolved the Applicant, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at his
disposal; whereas, therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion of
domestic remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27, paragraph (3)
(Art. 26, 27-3),of the Convention has not been complied with by the
Applicant.

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.