European Court of Human Rights

THE FACTS

Whereas the facts presented by the Applicant may be summarised
as follows:

The Applicant is a stateless person, born in ... in Lithuania and
at present living in A.  His Application concerns three different
proceedings before the Swedish courts.

1. On ... 1947, the Applicant took out an annuity with the insurance
company Y, in A.  The Applicant maintains that it was on his part
a condition sine qua non that a gold clause was inserted in the policy.

The representative of the company denied this during the subsequent
proceedings which the Applicant instituted and which he eventually
lost by decisions of the A Court of first instance and of the Svea
Hovrätt on ... 1954 and ... 1955 respectively.  An application by
the Applicant to lodge an appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court
on ... .  The Applicant has lodged unsuccessful applications for a
revision of his case on the following dates:

... 1956, rejected ... 1956;  ... 1956, rejected ... 1956;  ... 1957,
rejected ... 1957;  ... 1957, rejected ... 1957;  ... 1958, rejected
... 1958;  ... 1960, rejected ... 1960;  ... 1960, rejected ... 1961;
... 1962, rejected on an unknown date;

All applications were rejected on the ground that the facts submitted
did not warrant a rehearing of the case.  In respect of the latest
applications, no reasons were given.

He submits that he is entitled to an annulment of the contract as
it does not correspond to the express condition which he made.  He
states that, having lived in Germany in the 1920's, experience has
told him that in inflationary periods only gold clauses keep intact
the value of annuities and pensions and that the shares which he sold
in order to pay the company were of high value and have trebled in
price during the last years;  further, that it is close to fraud to
pay out annuities and pensions in a depreciated currency, the more
so as pensions for civil servants are regulated according to the
fluctuations of the price index.

The Applicant complains that the witnesses for the Respondent Party
committed perjury and that the tribunals were biased against him.
Details are set out in his various submissions to the Commission.

2. In March 1954 and March 1955, the Applicant instituted proceedings
against three shipping companies, S, T and U and also against Mr V
in his private capacity.  The Applicant claimed, in respect of events
which occurred in 1942 - 46, broker's fees for the sale of a vessel
and fees for arranging charter parties for other vessels with the
International Red Cross, the International Refugee Organisation and
the International Committee for European Emigration.

The first case (against S and V), was heard by the Court of A
on ... 1954 and, during the hearing the Applicant's lawyer waived all
the Applicant's claims against the manager of the company and part
of his claims against Mr. V.  The Applicant does not now recognise
the validity of these waivers.

On ... 1955, the Court of A dismissed the Applicant's case.
On ...1955, the Svea Hovrätt dismissed his appeal and an application
to lodge a further appeal was rejected on ... 1956 by the
Supreme Court.

The Applicant's second case against the three companies was dismissed
by the same instances on ... 1956, ... 1957 and ... 1958 respectively.

The Applicant's requests for a revision were rejected on ... 1958
and ... 1961.  A request that criminal proceedings should be instituted
against his opponent's lawyer for demanding excessive fees was
likewise unsuccessful.

The Applicant alleges that the courts disregarded the evidence brought
by him as a result of their pronounced xenophobic sentiments and that
his opponents committed perjury.  He sets out in detail his complaints
in his submissions to the Commission.

Apparently, the Applicant refused to pay his lawyer the fees which
were due to him and, indeed, accused him of neglecting his
professional duties.  On ... 1961 and on ... 1962, the Court of A and
the Svea Hovrätt respectively held that the Applicant was obliged to
pay 6.500 Swedish kronar as lawyer's fees.  This judgment was executed
by the retention of a sum due to the Applicant from the above
insurance company.
His appeal against this decision was rejected by the Svea Hovrätt
on ... 1962 and by the Supreme Court on ... 1963.

4. In 1963, stating that he was reduced to poverty and completely
ruined, the Applicant attempted to repurchase the insurance policy,
the surrender value of which was 139.000 Swedish kronar.  The Applicant

finally complains that the taxation authorities of A assessed taxes
of ca 46.000 Swedish kronar to be paid by him.

Whereas the Applicant, in respect of all these proceedings, claims
damages of 5 million Swedish kronar, at which sum he estimates
his losses.  He does not indicate the Articles of the Convention upon
which he relies.

THE LAW

Whereas, with regard to the Applicant's complaints concerning the
proceedings in the civil actions brought by him against the insurance
company Y, against three shipping companies and against Mr V in his
private capacity, Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention  provides that
the Commission may only deal with a matter "within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken";

Whereas the Commission has already held in a number of previous cases
that the "final decision" within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26)
refers solely to the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all
domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of
international law;

Whereas in the present case, the Applicant has on several occasions
lodged petitions for the re-opening (resting) of the above proceedings
in accordance with Chapter 58 of the Swedish Code of Procedure
(Rättegangsbalk);

Whereas it appears from the title of Chapter 58 (Särskilda rättsmedel)
that the remedies mentioned are extraordinary remedies;

Whereas the proceedings relating to these remedies do not until
successful affect the validity of the final decision; whereas the
Applicant's petitions, under the provisions of Swedish law, for a
reopening of his cases were not effective and sufficient remedies and
do not, therefore, constitute domestic remedies under the generally
recognised rules of international law; whereas it follows that the
decisions regarding these petitions cannot be taken into consideration
in determining the final decision for the purpose of applying the
six-months time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26);

Whereas, therefore, the final decision regarding the Applicant's above
civil actions is the decision of the Supreme Court which was given
on ... 1956;  whereas the present Application was not submitted to the
Commission until 14th December 1962, that is more than 6 months after
the date of decision; whereas, furthermore, an examination of the case
does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which
might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period;

Whereas it follows that the Applicant, insofar as he complains of the
proceedings before the Court of A, the Svea Hovrätt and the Supreme
Court, has not satisfied the six-months time-limit laid down
in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention; whereas, therefore, this
part of the Application must be rejected in accordance with Article 27,
paragraph (3) (Art. 27-3), of the Convention; whereas in regard to the
Commission's finding concerning the nature of the domestic remedies in
the present case, it should be recalled that the Commission has
frequently stated in the case of criminal proceedings that a request
for revision, being an extraordinary remedy, can similarly not be taken
into account for the calculation of the six-months time-limit.

Whereas, in regard to the proceedings concerning his refusal to pay
his lawyer's fees and, in regard to his dispute with the Swedish
taxation authorities an examination of the case as it has been
submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in
the Commission and in particular in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention or Article 1 of the First Protocol (P1-1) whereas it follows
that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded and must
be rejected in accordance with Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2)
of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.