Claim No. SCT 120/2017
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE
In the name of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum,
IN THE SMALL CLAIMS
Hearing: 9 August 2017
Final submissions: 20 August 2017
Amended Judgment: 28 August 2017
AMENDED JUDGMENT OF SCT JUDGE MARIAM DEEN
UPONthe Claim Form being filed on 22 May 2017;
AND UPONthe Claimant amending her Claim Form on 30 May 2017 to reflect her Claim being against the Defendant company rather than the Defendant company’s partner Heloise in her personal capacity;
AND UPONthe Counterclaim
AND UPONthe parties being called on 12 June 2017 for a Consultation with SCT Officer Lema Hatim and the parties not having reached settlement;
AND UPONthe case being stayed pursuant to the Order of SCT Judge
AND UPONthe stay Order being lifted on 27 July 2017;
AND UPONa Hearing having been held before SCT Judge Mariam Deen on 9 August 2017, with the Claimant Ms. Haneuland the Defendant’s representative Ms Heloise in attendance;
ANDUPONreviewing the documents and evidence submitted in the Court
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.The Defendant pay the Claimant AED24,200.82in respect of end of service gratuity.
2. The Claimant pay the Defendant AED9,402.64in respect of damages relating to breach of fiduciary obligations.
Ayesha Bin Kalban
Date of Issue: 27 August 2017
Date of Re-issue: 28 August 2017
1.The Claimant is Haneul (the “Claimant”), an individual filing a claim against the Defendant regarding her employment.
2. The Defendant is Hege Limited Liability Partnership (the “Defendant”), a DIFC
3. The underlying dispute arises over the employment of the Claimant by the Defendant as a Senior Administrator, Marketing and Client Relations pursuant to an employment contract commencing on 16 January 2011 (the “Employment Contract”).
4. The Claimant filed a claim on 22 May 2017, with the DIFC Courts
5. On 30 May 2017, the Claimant amended her Claim Form to properly identify the Defendant as being the company she was employed by, rather than the Defendant company’s partner Heloise (“Ms. Heloise”), in her personal capacity.
6. The Defendant responded to the claim on 7 June 2017, indicating that it intended to defend all of the Claim and a Counterclaim was filed on 11 June 2017 for damages relating to the unauthorised removal of the Defendant’s property and associated costs, the repayment of a loan made to the Claimant and the cost of resources engaged in resolving the dispute.
7. The parties met for a Consultation with SCT Officer Ms. Lema Hatim on 12 June 2017 but were unable to reach a settlement.
8. On 9 August 2017, I heard submissions from the Claimant, Ms. Haneul and the Defendant’s representative Ms. Heloise, following which the case was reserved for judgment. Both parties were provided the opportunity to submit further documentation based on the arguments made at the Hearing by no later than 13 August 2017. I requested that additional documentation regarding the value of the outstanding loan be provided by no later than 20 August 2017.
9. The Claimant’s case is that she was employed by the Defendant from 16 January 2011 to 20 May 2017 and that she had resigned on 5 April 2017.
10. The Claimant filed a claim seeking payment of her unpaid salary, the amount of AED 8,500 for the period from 21 April 2017 to 20 May 2017 and AED 27,150 in respect of end of service gratuity, in accordance with Article 59 of the Employment Law. The total claim value was AED 31,650 and the Claimant noted that she owed the Defendant AED 4,000 which was the outstanding amount of a loan made to her, which she asked to be deducted from the end of service gratuity entitlement.
11. In the Hearing, both parties agreed that the outstanding salary, amounting to AED 8500, had been paid by the Defendant and the Claimant confirmed that it was no longer being claimed. Furthermore, it was confirmed by the parties that the outstanding loan amount had reduced to AED 2,000 and this was evidence by the Claimant’s email to the Court on 20 August 2017, with a copy of her bank statement showing that deductions had been made from her wages in April and May.
12. The Claimant tendered her resignation on 5 April 2017 and agreed to serve a 3 months’ notice period pursuant to Clause 14 of the Employment Contract, accordingly, the Claimant’s last day was scheduled to be on 5 July 2017.
13. The Claimant’s replacement was hired by the Defendant and a handover process commenced. In a letter dated 14 May 2017, the Claimant informed the Defendant that although her notice period was due to end on 5 July, she would no longer be attending work. She stated:
“As per my resignation dated April 5, my notice period was originally agreed to July 5 but given the circumstances as well as both agreed last week meeting (May 11), I have decided to have my last day May 21, 2017”
14. The Claimant proceeded to explain that she would like the 15 May 2017 to be unpaid leave and her remaining 4 days annual leave to be adjusted for the period between 16 May 2017 to 20 May 2017. She also claimed that she had been denied access to computer files and email and that the handover was “pretty done” and therefore, her attendance at work was no longer needed. In addition, the Claimant requested for her end of service gratuity to be calculated as soon as possible.
The Defence and Counterclaim
15. In response to the Claimant’s Claim, the Defendant denied that it owed the Claimant end of service gratuity as it was entitled to terminate the Claimant’s employment for cause pursuant to Article 59A of the DIFC Employment Law:
“An employer or an employee may terminate an employee’s employment for cause in circumstances where the conduct of one party warrants termination and where a reasonable employer or employee would have terminated the employment.”
16. The Defendant also relied on Clause 15 of the Employment Contract, which states:
“The Firm may terminate this contract without prior notice if in the reasonable opinion of the Firm, you fail to meet the reasonable performance expectations of your role and continue to do so for a period of not less than one month after receiving written notice of warning. Any such notice shall stipulate the Firms reason for believing your performance fails to meet expectations; or
If you commit a serious breach of the contract or of any applicable Law of the UAE
17. The Defendant submitted that there were multiple grounds for terminating the Claimant’s employment for cause, the most significant allegations are summarised as follows:
(a) The Claimant unilaterally decided to end her employment on 14 May 2017, without completing her notice period (ending on 5 July 2017) or the handover process / training of the Claimant’s replacement, thereby breaching Clause 14 of the Employment Contract.
(b) The Claimant arranged for carpet tiles to be removed from the Defendant’s storage facility and delivered to her personal address, without the Defendant’s approval. The Defendant is seeking recovery of the value of the tiles which is estimated as being AED 3,500 in addition to AED 400 as the cost of delivery.
(c) The Claimant deleted files from the Defendant’s data drive on 10 May 2017, as confirmed in a report by the Hallwell Support Desk Team on 2 July 2017. The Defendant submitted that the Claimant was aware of the ‘Hallwell migration’ taking place and produced an email dated 7 March 2017 which was addressed to the Claimant and other employees regarding data security and instructing them to “secure our client/ proprietary data”. This email is relied upon in support of the allegation that the Claimant deleted data on 10 May 2017, despite being warned against doing so on 7 March 2017.
(d) The Claimant breached the Defendant’s trust by using the Defendant’s FedEx account to ship items to her personal address in the Philippines (Defendant’s Exhibit 12).
(e) The Claimant abused her position by forging an invoice (Defendant’s Exhibit 15) addressed to the Defendant by ‘HENDRYTRAVELS’ dated 16 February 2017 and booking flight tickets for her personal use (Defendant’s Exhibit 11) in the sum of AED 1560, for which the Defendant was invoiced. In addition, it is alleged that the Claimant obtained salary certificates inappropriately (Defendant’s Exhibit 16) and abused her position by listing the Defendant’s details with Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent, and naming herself as the authorised signatory, for the purpose of obtaining loans (Defendant’s Attachment A).
(f) It is also alleged that the Claimant sought to take annual leave during her notice period (as stated in her letter dated 14 May 2017) without following the correct approval process and that she has been previously warned against this type of behaviour (Defendant’s Exhibit 18).
18. The value of the Counterclaim totals AED 16,025 and is made up of recovery of the following:
(a) AED 3,500 - the cost of carpet tiles that the Claimant arranged to be removed from the Defendant’s storage facility without authorisation;
(b) AED 400 – the cost of delivering the carpet tiles from the Defendant’s storage facility to the Claimant’s personal address;
(c) AED 2,000 – the unpaid loan made by the Defendant to the Claimant; and
(d) AED 10,125 – the cost of additional resources engaged in resolving the above issues such as the time spent preparing the counterclaim and liaising with third parties to collate supporting evidence.
19. In response to the Counterclaim, the Claimant denied that she misappropriated the carpet tiles and submitted that Ms. Heloise had consented to her taking them as they were not being used by the Defendant. The parties agreed at the Hearing that the delivery cost of AED 400 has now been paid by the Claimant, they also agreed that AED 2,000 is outstanding on the loan made by the Defendant to the Claimant. However, the Claimant denied that she should be responsible for any of the costs resulting from the dispute or incurred by the Defendant in preparation for the Hearing.
20. This dispute is governed by DIFC Law No. 4 of 2005, as amended by DIFC Law No. 3 of 2012 (the DIFC Employment Law) in conjunction with the Employment Contract.Termination for Cause
21. The Defendant seeks to deny the Claimant payment of end of service gratuity and asks for the Court to declare that the Claimant was terminated for cause, as this would activate Article 60(4) of DIFC Employment Law:
“An employee is not entitled to a gratuity payment where the employee has been terminated for misbehavior. A termination for such cause exists in circumstances where the employee’s conduct warrants termination and where a reasonable employer would have terminated the employee. An employer may dismiss an employee without notice in such circumstances.”
22. The Defendant relies on numerous grounds of the Claimant’s alleged misconduct, the most significant of which are listed in paragraph 18 above. However, even if the misconduct was sufficient to warrant the Claimant’s employment being terminated for cause, there is no evidence to suggest that the Defendant terminated or even attempted to terminate the Claimant’s employment for cause.
23.The Defendant relies on the case ofRaul Silva v United Investment Bank Limited  DIFC CA 004in submitting that the test to be applied for determining whether a reasonable employer would have terminated its employee is an objective one. It is also argued that the DIFC Employment Law is silent as to the timing in which an employer may exercise its right to terminate an employee for cause and that an employer should not be precluded from terminating employees for cause even after they have tendered their resignation (potentially to avoid the consequences of their misconduct).
24. I agree that employers are not precluded from terminating an employee for cause following his/her resignation, provided that the employee’s conduct warrants termination and a reasonable employer would have terminated the employee at that time. On that basis, it may have been reasonable for the Defendant to terminate the Claimant’s employment for cause upon receipt (or shortly thereafter) of the Claimant’s letter dated 14 May 2017, indicating that the complete notice period would not be served. However, this intention was not expressed to the Claimant at any time. In fact, in its next correspondence with the Claimant via email on 21 May 2017, the Defendant stated:
“Your communication has confirmed the following:
i.Failure to complete the agreed notice period;
ii. You unilaterally determined your last working day;
iii. Failure to complete the handover, (by your own admission you have noted in your letter that the handover is ‘pretty done’ which therefore suggests it is not fully complete);
iv. Failure to provide full information, documents and support to the Firm or the new Office Manager;
v. Deletion of data (requiring subsequent restoration)
vi. Outstanding loan amount
Taking into account the above, there is an amount that has been determined which will be shared with you upon visa cancellation…”
25. Had the Defendant sought to terminate the Claimant for cause at this juncture, it would have had the effect of denying the Claimant her end of service gratuity pursuant to Article 60(4) of DIFC Employment Law. However, the Defendant did not indicate any intention to terminate for cause and although the Claimant’s misconduct is outlined, I am not satisfied that an intention to terminate for cause can be inferred from this email. Particularly as the Defendant appears to refer to ‘an amount that has been determined’ in respect of end of service gratuity, whereas this entitlement would have been lost if the Defendant had intended to terminate the Claimant for cause. If an employer seeks to deny an employee a right that would ordinarily be owed under the provisions of the DIFC Employment Law, it is the responsibility of that employer to make it clear what is intended and the reasons justifying that action.
26. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the Defendant terminated or attempted to terminate the Claimant for cause and, therefore, she is entitled to end of service benefits by virtue of Article 60 of the DIFC Employment Law.End of Service
27. The Claimant’s employment began on 16 January 2012 and I deem her last day of employment to be 14 May 2017, her last day in the office. Therefore, for the purposes of calculating the end of service gratuity award, the Claimant was employed by the Defendant for 6 years and 119 days (6.33 years).
28. Pursuant to Article 60 of DIFC Employment Law, the end of service gratuity is calculated on the following basis:
“(2) The gratuity payment shall be calculated as follows:
(a) Twenty one (21) days’ wage for each year of the first five (5) years of service.
(b) Thirty (30) days’ wage for each additional year of service …
The employer may deduct from the gratuity any amounts owed to the employer by the employee.
(3) Where the termination occurs prior to the end of any full year of employment, the gratuity payment shall be calculated on a proportionate basis.”
29. End of service gratuity is calculated using the employee’s last basic salary, which the parties have agreed was AED 5,500. Therefore, the Claimant’s last basic daily wage was AED82(5500 x 12 / 365). For each of the first 5 years of her employment she is entitled to 21 days basic daily wage (5 x 21 = 105 days) and for the remaining 1.33 years of employment, she is entitled to 30 days basic daily wage (1.33 x 30 = 39.9 days) which makes a grand total of144.9 days. Accordingly, the Claimant’s end of service gratuity amounts toAED 26,200.82(144.9 x 180.82).
30. I am satisfied that the Claimant has yet to repay the AED 2,000 loan made to her by the Defendant and therefore, this can be deducted from the gratuity amount, pursuant to Article 60(2)(b) of the DIFC Employment Law. The resulting end of service gratuity amount isAED 24,200.82(26,200.82 – 2000).
31. The Defendant’s counterclaim is multifaceted and I will consider each aspect in turn.Carpet tiles
32. It is the Defendant’s case that the Claimant arranged for carpet tiles to be removed from the Defendant’s storage facility and delivered to the Claimant’s personal address without the prior consent or approval of the Defendant. Email correspondence between the Claimant and ‘Helma’ staff in March 2017 has been provided to support the allegation that the Claimant had arranged for carpet tiles to be delivered to her home from the Defendant’s storage facility, resulting in the Defendant incurring the AED 400 delivery charge.
33. In the Hearing, the Claimant did not deny taking possession of the carpet tiles and it was agreed that she had reimbursed the Defendant for the delivery cost at the Consultation stage a week earlier. The Claimant contended that the Defendant had given her verbal permission to take the carpet tiles as they were not being used, but she conceded that there was no written approval or evidence supporting this. The Defendant denied that any permission was given to the Claimant and reiterated that the carpet tiles had been misappropriated and that it was seeking compensation for its loss. It was also argued that the Claimant had effectively hidden the AED 400 delivery charge invoice from the Defendant as the usual requisitions process had not been adhered to, which supported the fact that the Claimant’s behaviour in procuring the carpet tiles amounted to misconduct.
34.The Defendant conceded that it did not know how many carpet tiles were taken, nor the exact value of them and confirmed that the invoice for replacement tiles in the amount of AED 3,500, was an estimate of the loss. As this Counterclaim is brought by the Defendant, the burden of proving the value of the loss suffered is also to be borne by the Defendant; additional time was allowed to the Defendant in order to produce supporting evidence relating to the value of the tiles but no further submissions were received.
35. In the absence of evidence confirming the value of the carpet tiles I am not inclined to make an award relating to them. However, the Claimant’s behaviour in procuring the tiles without formal consent and her failure to accept responsibility for the delivery cost until it was raised in this Counterclaim will be taken into consideration below.Breach of Contract
36. The Defendant submits that the Claimant has breached Clause 15 of the Employment Contract by failing to complete the agreed 3 months’ notice period. In her letter of 14 May 2017, the Claimant alluded to an agreement between the parties for the notice period to be cut short. The Defendant vehemently denies that it consented to the Claimant leaving her employment early and asserts that there were merely discussions about the Claimant working some of her notice period from home and potentially starting work for her new employer early, however, no agreement was reached, nor approval given.
37. In the absence of evidence supporting the Claimant’s assertion that the Defendant agreed to the Claimant serving a shorter notice period, I find that the Claimant breached her Employment Contract by failing to complete her notice period. At the time of her resignation on 5 April 2017, the Claimant agreed to work for 3 additional months, until 5 July 2017; therefore, by leaving without warning on 14 May 2017 she has been absent from 15 May 2017 to 5 July, a total of 52 days.Misconduct
38. The items mentioned above in paragraph 18 (and relied upon in the Defendant’s arguments that the Claimant ought to have been terminated for cause) will be further considered in terms of misconduct:
(a) The Defendant submitted that the result of failing to complete her notice period is that the Claimant also failed to complete the ‘handover’ process and training of her replacement. The Defendant provided an email to the Claimant’s replacement on 18 May 2017, containing a list of outstanding tasks that the Claimant failed to complete before her departure. The Defendant also relies on the Claimant’s own letter dated 14 May 2017, in which she states that the handover was “pretty done”, to assert that it was not fully completed. The Claimant claimed that she was denied access to emails and folders which made it difficult for her to complete the handover process, however, the Defendant produced email correspondence with ‘Halwell IT Support’ to demonstrate that her access was re-established. In any event, the Defendant asserted that not all of the Claimant’s handover/training work required access to email or computer files.
(b) The Defendant also alleged that the Claimant deleted a folder from the Defendant’s main server and produced confirmation that this was restored by the ‘Halwell IT Support’ Team (Defendant’s Exhibit 4). The Claimant responded that the file was merely renamed by her as it contained her name and she was leaving – however, the ‘Halwell Report’ confirms that the folder was deleted by the Claimant and recovered by them. This is despite all staff being warned against deletion of data, via email on 7 March 2017.
(c) The Defendant accused the Claimant of breaching its trust by using the Defendant’s FedEx account to ship personal items to her personal address in the Philippines (Defendant’s Exhibit 12). The Claimant did not deny that she had used the FedEx account but responded that employees of the Defendant were permitted to avail themselves of the Defendant’s services/accounts as long as they were paid for, however, she failed to show that the Defendant had been reimbursed for her use of its FedEx account.
(d) The Claimant accepted that she had produced what she called a ‘dummy invoice’ addressed to the Defendant by HENDRY TRAVELS (Defendant’s Exhibit 15). In the Hearing, the Claimant submitted that this is a common procedure adopted in procuring visa’s and that the invoice was cancelled shortly after it was created and used by her. The Defendant asserted that it was unaware of this ‘misuse’ of its company details and was concerned about the reputational damage this could cause to it.
(e) The Claimant also accepted that she had booked air tickets through the Defendant’s agent HENDRY TRAVELS for a family member in the amount of AED 1560 (Defendant’s Exhibit 11). A genuine invoice for this amount was addressed to the Defendant, who in turn is seeking reimbursement from the Claimant. The Claimant submitted that a payment plan between herself and HENDRY had already been arranged and that she would continue to abide by that plan and pay the full amount owed so that the Defendant would not become liable. Evidence to this effect was produced to the Court in the form of emails on 13 August 2017 and I am satisfied that this particular issue is now resolved.
(f) In addition, it is alleged that the Claimant abused her position by obtaining salary certificates inappropriately (Defendant’s Exhibit 16) and listing the Defendant’s details with Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent, naming herself as the authorised signatory for the purposes of obtaining loans (Defendant’s Attachment A).Fiduciary Obligations
39. In its Counterclaim, the Defendant suggested that the Claimant’s above-mentioned misconduct amounted to a breach of trust. The Claimant was effectively an office manager and second point of contact for Ms. Heloise, therefore, she was in a position of trust and power, which the Defendant claims was abused.
40. In light of the Defendant’s submissions, it is important to consider DIFC Law No 5 of 2005 (the “Law of Obligations”) which sets out the nature of fiduciary obligations. Article 158 of the Law of Obligations confirms that an employee owes a fiduciary duty to the employer, as there is presumed to be a relationship of trust and confidence between them.
41. Article 159 of the same Law states that a fiduciary's obligation of loyalty comprises of the following duties listed in Schedule 3, as appropriate in all the circumstances:
A fiduciary must act in good faith in what he considers to be the interests of the principal without regard to his own interests.
2. Conflict of interest
(a) A fiduciary must not place himself in a position where his own interest conflicts with that of his principal.
(b) If there is a conflict between an interest or duty of a fiduciary, and an interest of the principal in any transaction, he must account to the principal for any benefit he receives from the transaction.
(c) A Fiduciary does not have to account for the benefit if the interest or duty has been disclosed to and approved by the principal.
3. No secret profits
A fiduciary must not use the principal's property, information or opportunities for his own or anyone else's benefit unless his principal has consented or the use has been fully disclosed to the principal and the principal has not objected to it.
A fiduciary must only use information obtained in confidence from his principal for the benefit of the principal, and must not use it for his own advantage or for the benefit of any other person.
5. Care, skill and diligence
A fiduciary owes the principal a duty to exercise the care, skill and diligence which would be exercised in the same circumstance by a reasonable person having both:
(a) the knowledge and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the same position as the fiduciary; and
(b) the knowledge and experience which the fiduciary has.”
42. In paragraphs 18 and 39 I have summarised the allegations made by the Defendant against the Claimant and the Claimant’s responses, if any. Although I am not convinced that any of the misconduct outlined would amount to a breach of the Claimant’s fiduciary obligations to the Defendant on their own, I am of the view that taken cumulatively, they do constitute a breach of the fiduciary duties owed by an employee to its employer.
43. By failing to complete her notice period, the Claimant breached her duty of loyalty and care, skill and diligence, as she jeopardised the training of her replacement and the continuity of her role. The benefit that the Claimant received through her use of the Defendant’s HENDRY TRAVELS and FedEx accounts constitute a conflict of interest as there is a distinct lack of evidence to show that their use had been disclosed to and approved by the Defendant. The same can be said of the Claimant’s misappropriation of the carpet tiles, which would appear to constitute a secret profit.
44. Article 160 of the Law of Obligations sets out the consequence of a breach of fiduciary obligations:
“(1) Where a fiduciary breaches his obligation of loyalty:
(a) he is liable to pay damages to his principal in respect of any loss suffered by the principal in accordance with the Law on Damages
(b) he is liable to account to his principal for any benefit he has acquired in consequence of the breach.”
45. There is clearly a fiduciary relationship between the parties and as I have found the Claimant’s misconduct to amount to a breach of her duty to the Defendant, it is in the interests of justice for there to be consequences resulting from that breach.
46. This leaves the question of the appropriate remedy to grant the Defendant for the Claimant’s breach of her fiduciary obligation to it. Part 2 of the DIFC Law of Damages and Remedies, Law No. 7 of 2005, states:
“8. Right to damages
Any non-performance gives the aggrieved party a right to damages either exclusively or in conjunction with any other remedies except where the non-performance is excused under the Law of Contract…
10. Measure of damages
Subject to the limitations stated in this Part 2 of the Law, the injured party has a right to damages as measured by:
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party’s performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that the injured party has avoided by not having to perform.
11. Certainty of harm
(1) Compensation is due only for loss, including future loss, that is established with a reasonable degree of certainty.
(2) Compensation may be due for the loss of an opportunity in proportion to the probability of its occurrence.
(3) Where the amount of damages cannot be established with a sufficient degree of certainty, the assessment is at the discretion of the Court.”
47. As the loss to the Defendant cannot be established with certainty and as the Court has the discretion to assess appropriate calculation of damages in these circumstances, pursuant to Article 11(3) of the DIFC Law of Damages and Remedies, I am of the view that damages should be awarded with reference to the Claimant’s failure to complete the notice period – as the breakdown in the employment relationship and the Counterclaim stems from that fact.
48. As mentioned above in paragraph 38, the Claimant failed to attend for 52 days of her notice period, without prior approval from the Defendant. I find that damages should be calculated using the Claimant’s basic daily wage (AED180.82) and multiplied by each day of her unserved notice period. The resulting amount isAED 9,402.64(52 x 180.82). This shall be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant as damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary obligations owed by the Claimant to the Defendant.
49. I will not be awarding any of the AED 10,125 amount sought by the Defendant as reimbursement of the cost of resources engaged in resolving the dispute. The Small Claims Tribunal adopts a streamlined process without the need for legal representation, this is for the specific purpose of keeping costs low and avoiding unnecessary delay. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to allow for the recovery of costs incurred in the preparation of this case.
50. The Defendant shall pay the ClaimantAED 24,200.82in respect of end of service gratuity.
51. This amount shall be offset byAED 9,402.64, being the amount owed to the Defendant in damages resulting from the breach of her fiduciary obligations.
52. Therefore, the final amount due to the Claimant isAED 14,798.18.
53. Each party shall bear its own costs.
Ayesha Bin Kalban
Date of Issue: 27 August 2017
Date of Re-issue: 28 August 2017