THE INFORMATION TRIBUNAL
(NATIONAL SECURITY APPEALS)
|NORMAN BAKER MP :||APPELLANT|
|SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT:||RESPONDENT|
Paragraph 1. Introduction 2. The statutory scheme 9. The issue 13. The facts 23. The Certificate 30. The NCND policy 33. Admitted exceptions 35. General observations 36. Jurisdiction and Powers 41. (1) Directly affected 42. (2) Legality 57. (3) Principles of JR 77. (4) Discretion 79. (5) The power to quash 82. Reasonable grounds 87. United States of America 88. Old files 98. Safeguards and other remedies 105. Government procedures. 107. Overview 113. Conclusion 114. Decision to quash 118. Summary
THE STATUTORY SCHEME
7(1) - 7(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and to sections 8 and 9, an individual is entitled
(a) to be informed by any data controller whether personal data of which that individual is the data subject are being processed by or on behalf of that data controller,
(b) if that is the case, to be given by the data controller a description of
(i) the personal data of which that individual is the data subject,
(ii) the purposes for which they are being or are to be processed, and
(iii) the recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed,
(c) to have communicated to him in an intelligible form
(i) the information constituting any personal data of which that that individual is the data subject, and
(ii) any information available to the data controller as to the source of those data, ".
" 28(1) Personal data are exempt from any of the provisions of
(a) the data protection principles,
(b) Parts II, III and V, and
(c) section 55, if the exemption from that provision is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
(2) Subject to subsection (4), a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that exemptions from all or any of the provisions mentioned in subsection (1) is or at any time was required for the purpose there mentioned in respect of any personal data shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.
(3) A certificate under subsection (2) may identify the personal data to which it applies by means of a general description and may be expressed to have prospective effect.
(4) Any person directly affected by the issuing of a certificate under subsection (2) may appeal to the Tribunal against the certificate.
(5) If on an appeal under subsection (4), the Tribunal finds that, applying the principles applied by the court on an application for judicial review, the Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate, the Tribunal may allow the appeal and quash the certificate.
(6) Where in any proceedings under or by virtue of this Act it is claimed by a data controller that a certificate under subsection (2) which identifies the personal data to which it applies by means of a general description applies to any personal data, any other party to the proceedings may appeal to the Tribunal on the ground that the certificate does not apply to the personal data in question and, subject to any determination under subsection
(7), the certificate shall be conclusively determined so to apply. (7) On any appeal under subsection (6), the Tribunal may determine that the certificate does not so apply.
(8) (12) .
" Re: The Data Protection Acts 1984 & 1998 and the European Data Protection Directive.
I refer to the above legal provisions. I wish to make a data subject application to yourselves under the Data Protection Acts 1984 and 1998 to inspect all data that you may hold on myself.
As you will know, the Office of the Data Protection Registrar is of the view that the UK's security and intelligence agencies are duty bound to comply with the Data Protection Principles and thus the Data Protection Acts.
Accordingly I would appreciate it if you would kindly now advise me as to the procedure you plan to adopt in order to process this request, and also the prospective timescale that will apply to this application.
I would be grateful for acknowledgement of receipt of this letter. I look forward to hearing from you."
"Further to the Director General's of 24 July 2000, I am now writing to respond to the detail of your letter of 12 July asking for copies of records held about you by the Security Service.
Under the Data Protection Act 1998 the Security Service intends to notify the Data Protection Commissioner that it processes data for three purposes. These are: staff administration, building security CCTV and commercial agreements. The Security Service has checked its records and holds no data about you in any of these categories.
Any other personal data held by the Security Service is exempt from the notification and subject access provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 on the ground that such exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security, as provided for in Section 28(1) of the Act. Thus, if it were to be the case that the Service held any data regarding you other than for the purposes set out in paragraph 2 above, the Data Protection Act would not confer a right of access. There is therefore no data to which you are entitled to have access under the Act, but you should not assume from this letter that any such data is held about you.
I would point out that a right of appeal exists under section 28 of the Act. The section provides that the exemption described above can be confirmed by a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown who is a member of the Cabinet, or by the Attorney General. A certificate relating to the work of the Security Service was signed by the Home Secretary on 22 July. Any person directly affected by the issuing of the certificate may appeal against the certificate to the Data Protection Tribunal "
"This letter purported to come from someone who worked for MI5. In the letter, it was alleged that data about me was forwarded to the Security Service by East Sussex Special Branch officers in about 1998, from a source within the South Downs Earth First! Ecology group. Further the letter alleges that knowledge by Special Branch that I was involved with environmental concerns may well have lead to my details being included on the database maintained by the Animal Rights National Index (ARNI) at Scotland Yard. I am aware that allegations of misuse of interception by conducting surveillance on members of pressure groups such as Friends of the Earth and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament received some credence from the revelations of the former Security Service officer Cathy Massiter. Apparently my file was "closed" in mid 1989 when I commenced employment in the Liberal Democrats whips' office. However, although the file was closed, it still exists."
"I can confirm that I was involved in campaigning for ecological issues in East Sussex in the late 1980's. I was not involved in any criminal activities and I was not then, am not now and never have been a supporter of the use of violence and I am committed only to peaceful methods to achieve political change within a democratic society. I know nothing about the collection of data on me by East Sussex Special Branch or anything about any proposed terrorist attacks or anything else which might come within the functions of the Security Service".
" (2) The section 28 certificate was signed by the Secretary of State pursuant to a request made to him, and on the basis of his knowledge of:-
(a) the Security Service, its functions and its primary role to protect national security, and his knowledge of the need to safeguard national security through secrecy;
(b) the safeguards and remedies open to anyone wishing to complain about any action taken by the Security Service and the alternative remedies thereby provided for those who are aggrieved by anything which he or she believes the Service has done in relation to them or their property
(c) the Data Protection Act 1998, and the intention behind section 28;
(d) past practice including the policy of successive governments to neither confirm nor deny facts relating to the operations of the intelligence and security agencies including whether they hold records on any particular individual".
" (4) An application by counsel for the Information Commissioner that she should have leave to be represented at the hearing was GRANTED in the following terms, in the exercise of the Tribunal's power under Rule 15(3) [of The Data Protection Tribunal (National Security Appeals) Rules 2000 S.I. 2000 No. 206 ("the Rules")]to give such directions as it thinks proper "to assist the Tribunal to determine the issues"
"The Information Commissioner shall be permitted to make a statement to the Tribunal containing such representations as she considers relevant to the Appeal, and to be represented by counsel at the hearing of the Appeal "
subject to certain procedural conditions which were set out.
"My concern in the present cases is, therefore, that so far as possible the Security Service should follow good information handling practice and accordingly that the origins of data protection in fundamental rights instruments should be recognised and that arguments for disapplying the rules found in the 1998 Act should be strictly tested for proportionality"
Additionally, she described the range of response given by police forces, both in the United Kingdom and by the European Police office established by the Europol Convention (Europol) to requests for disclosure of operational data where the data may be withheld under relevant statutory provisions either wholly or in part, including cases where the existence or nonexistence of data may itself not be disclosed.
" I, the Right Honourable Jack Straw MP, one of her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, in exercise of the powers conferred by the said section 28(2) do issue this certificate and certify as follows:-
- that any personal data that is processed by the Security Service as described in Column 1 of Part A in the table below are and shall continue to be required to be exempt from those provisions of the Act that are set out in Column 2 of Part A;
all for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
- Data processing in performance of the functions described in Section 1 of the Security Service Act as amended by the Security Service Act 1996 including but not limited to:
(i) obtaining personal data from human sources being agents or contacts of the security service;
(ii) obtaining personal data from other United Kingdom government departments, agencies or public authorities;
(iii) obtaining personal data from security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies and other liaison contacts of other governments;
(vi) recording, holding, organising, adapting, altering, retrieving, consulting, aligning, combining, blocking, erasing, destroying and otherwise using such data;
(vii) transmitting such data to and from and between Security Service Stations overseas;
(viii) disclosing or disseminating such data to other United Kingdom government departments, agencies or public authorities.
(i) Part II;
(ii) Part III;
(iii) Part V;
(iv) Section 55;
(v) The first data protection principle;
(vi) The second data protection principle;
(vii) The sixth data protection principle to the extent necessary to be consistent with the exemption contained in this certificate;
(viii) The eighth data protection principle
Part II - Rights of Data Subjects and Others
Part III - Notification by Data Controllers
Part V - Enforcement
(Note: this Part includes section 42, which entitles any person who is, or believes himself to be, directly affected by any processing of personal data to request the Information Commissioner`s assistance)
section 55 - (side note) Unlawful obtaining etc. of personal data.
THE NCND POLICY
"(a) Members or former members of agencies who know that data are held.
(b) Individuals who are subject to removal from the United Kingdom on Grounds of national security who have become conclusively aware of Security Service interest in them.
(c) Those involved in criminal proceedings who have conclusively become aware of Security Service interest in them.
(d) Others in whom Security Service interest has been publicly confirmed in [Court or other] proceedings."
We shall call these the " admitted exceptions" to the NCND policy.
(2) This secrecy is necessary in order to safeguard national security, whose importance as a policy objective in the contemporary world cannot be overestimated.
(3) The Appellant recognises that the NCND response to a subject access request is justified in certain cases. These are -
(a) when no data are held in fact and therefore no file exists. The NCND policy is justified in this case because if one person was correctly given a negative answer to his request, another person who received a NCND reply might deduce, correctly or otherwise that personal data was held about him. The second person might be an associate of the first e.g. in a terrorist organisation;
(b) when data are held, and the Service lawfully decides that a positive response or disclosure of any of the data would endanger national security in that particular case. This presupposes that individual consideration is given to the request;
(c) when data are held, and the Service is willing to acknowledge the existence of some of that data, and maybe also to release part of the data, to the person making the request, but it also decides, lawfully, that the existence of the remaining data should not be disclosed. In such cases, a modified form of NCND reply might state "Beyond what is disclosed, the Security Service does not process any data which you are entitled to receive" or some other variant of the Europol reply. (Mr Carr QC, for the Information Commissioner, suggested "The information which the Security Service is required to supply under the provisions of the Act is enclosed.)
(4) The remaining case is where data are processed (held) but the Service is unwilling to acknowledge its existence. This could arise if a justifiable decision was made that national security would or might be harmed by a positive response. But if the NCND reply is permitted in all cases, these could include ones where the Service made no decision on the particular request (if it could rely on a blanket exemption, it would not be obliged to do so), and others where a decision was made but was unjustified. The person making the request would then have no means of knowing whether a decision was taken, and if it was, whether it was justifiable or not.
(5) In short, we repeat, by certifying that the Service is exempt from the requirements of section 7(1)(a) of the Act, the Respondent has released it from any obligation to consider each request on its individual merits. The blanket exemption purportedly permits the Service to give a NCND reply to every request, and if the Certificate was issued on reasonable grounds the person directly affected by it has no means of challenging such response under the Act. At its most extreme, the Respondent's submission indeed means that the Tribunal effectively has no power to consider individual cases under section 28(4).
(6) The Certificate dated 22 July 2000 was said in the Respondent`s evidence to have been signed "pursuant to a request made to him" (Tester para. 2). This does not mean that it was signed in response to the Appellant`s request, although the dates might suggest that it was (see above). Mr. Burnett QC for the Respondent told us the dates are a coincidence, and he confirmed that the Certificate was intended to be used as a general response and for future cases also. As we have noted, this is permitted in terms by section 28(3) of the Act.
(7) Mr. Nicol QC therefore submitted that the primary issue in the appeal is whether the Respondent had reasonable grounds for issuing a Certificate which authorises the Service to respond with a NCND reply in every case, without necessarily deciding whether a positive response would endanger national security in the individual case.
(8) Mr Carr QC supported this submission, "focusing on the question, is it [reasonably] necessary or required for the purposes of national security, to have a blanket certificate, which as Mr Nicol has pointed out will in fact prevent [sc.permit non-] disclosure of everything, even in the innocuous case".
(9) It could be said that the certificate is not of itself unreasonable; it merely puts a weapon in the hands of the Security Service to use or not use as they see fit. They are not obliged to use it in any particular circumstance. We do not consider that this would, however, exculpate a certificate that was otherwise flawed.
JURISDICTION AND POWERS
(1) Who is a person "directly affected"?
(2) Does "reasonable grounds" include an issue as to whether the Minister went beyond his legal powers when he signed the Certificate?
(3) What are the principles of judicial review that we must apply?
(4) What is the significance of the Tribunal`s powers under section 28(5), these being expressed with the permissive "may"?
(5) Do we have power to "quash" the Certificate in part, or in relation to the present case only?
(1). "Directly affected"
" (1) There shall continue to be a security service (in this Act referred to as "the Service" under the authority of the Secretary of State.
(2) The function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.
(3) It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands."
"(4) It shall also be the function of the Service to act in support of the activities of police forces and other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime."
3) The Principles of Judicial Review.
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
- There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
(i) Is there an interference with the right to respect for the Appellant's private life in the application to him of the 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) policy?
(ii) If so, is that interference in accordance with the law?
(iii) If so, does it pursue a legitimate aim?
(iv) Is it necessary in a democratic society ie proportionate?
"Clearly these criteria are more precise and more sophisticated than the traditional grounds of review. What is the difference for the disposal of concrete cases? Academic public lawyers have in remarkably similar terms elucidated the difference between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality approach: ... The starting point is that there is an overlap between the traditional grounds of review and the approach of proportionality. Most cases would be decided in the same way whichever approach is adopted. But the intensity of review is somewhat greater under the proportionality approach. Making due allowance for important structural differences between various convention rights, which I do not propose to discuss, a few generalisations are perhaps permissible. I would mention three concrete differences without suggesting that my statement is exhaustive. First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the heightened scrutiny test developed in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith  QB 517, 554 is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights. It will be recalled that in Smith the Court of Appeal reluctantly felt compelled to reject a limitation on homosexuals in the army. The challenge based on article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the right to respect for private and family life) foundered on the threshold required even by the anxious scrutiny test. The European Court of Human Rights came to the opposite conclusion: Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493. The court concluded, at p 543, para 138:
"the threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could find the Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference with the applicants' rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national security and public order aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart of the court's analysis of complaints under article 8 of the Convention."
In other words, the intensity of the review, in similar cases, is guaranteed by the twin requirements that the limitation of the right was necessary in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a pressing social need, and the question whether the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued."
"The other matter concerns degrees of judicial review. Lord Steyn illuminates the distinctions between "traditional" (that is to say in terms of English case law, Wednesbury) standards of judicial review and higher standards under the European Convention or the common law of human rights. As he indicates, often the results are the same. But the view that the standards are substantially the same appears to have reached its quietus in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493 and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 548. And I think that the day will come when it will be more widely recognised that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn  1 KB 223 was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, in so far as it is suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation. The depth of judicial review and the deference due to administrative discretion vary with the subject matter. It may well be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not capricious or absurd."
"The differences in approach between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality approach may therefore sometimes yield different results. It is therefore important that cases involving Convention rights must be analysed in the correct way. This does not mean that there has been a shift to merits review. On the contrary, the respective roles of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and will remain so. To this extent the general tenor of the observations in Mahmood  1 WLR 840 are correct. And Laws LJ rightly emphasised in Mahmood, at p 847, para 18, "that the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in hand". That is so even in cases involving Convention rights. In law context is everything."
(i) Judges operating judicial review principles are not second stage administrators, even in ECHR territory. Theirs is a review, not an appellate role. So a margin of judgement is to be allowed to the administrator.
(ii) The intensity of judicial supervision is always dictated by context.
(iii) This is so 'even' where ECHR rights are invoked.
(5) The power to quash
United States of America
"The procedure for opening a file is strictly controlled. It may start as a temporary file, which has a maximum life of three years, when there is uncertainty whether the criteria for opening a permanent file are satisfied. These criteria have their basis in the Service's functions and require high standards of accuracy. If and when these criteria are satisfied, the permanent file will be opened. The Service then applies a system of colour coding which controls how the files are used. Once a file is opened, there is a period coded "green", during which inquiries may be made about the subject. The length of the green period varies according to the reason why the particular file was made. It may be extended as a result of the receipt of new information. At the end of the green period it changes to "amber", under which inquiries are prohibited, but any relevant information that the Service receives about the subject may be added to their file. After the designated amber period the file is coded "red". During this period, inquiries continue to be prohibited and any addition of substantive information is also prohibited. Finally, after a period of red coding, the file is microfilmed. The hard copy is destroyed and the entry for the file in the Service's central index is transferred from the Live Index to the Research Index. The research Index is usually consulted only when it is thought that old files may exist which are relevant to current work. In practice the volume of checks against the Research Index is small: for instance, it is not consulted in vetting checks."
" The Service's general policy is to retain records indefinitely in case they are of relevance at any time in the future to the Service's work. In the past, espionage investigations have been seriously hampered because the Service's earlier practice had not prohibited destruction. Reconstruction of a number of files was attempted but this was not satisfactory. Since then the Service has changed its policy and, save in exceptional cases, files are retained. The Service instituted its present general policy on retention of records on the basis that they are the key to their work and they cannot accurately predict when files will ever be needed again. In my opinion as a general policy this is acceptable".
"It seems somewhat ironical that the Service now retain such records, which it does not require for its own purposes and which it would otherwise have destroyed. But it is plain they must do so, if they are to enable the tribunal to carry out its investigations and in appropriate cases make an order for the destruction of the records and an award of compensation. (Schedule 1 paragraph 6)".
"It has long been the policy of the Security Service to review its file holdings and to destroy those files which it no longer requires for operational purposes and which do not merit retention on grounds of historical interest. In the period between its formation in 1909 and the early 1970s the Service destroyed well over 175,000 files. The destruction programme was then halted in response to concern that it had impeded investigations into espionage cases. In the early 1990s. following the collapse of Soviet Communism and the associated decline in the threat from subversion, the review and destruct programme was reinstated. Since then, more than 110,000 files have been destroyed or have been earmarked for destruction.
In reviewing files for destruction, the Service takes account of their operational value, their historical significance, and the Service's obligation to retain certain categories of records against the possibility of a complaint to the Security Service Tribunal. With these criteria in mind, the Security Service continues to review its closed files for destruction and will continue to destroy files which no longer need to be retained on those grounds. The rate of review and destruction is dependent upon the resources which the Service can afford to spare for the task".
Safeguards and other remedies
"It is open to anyone who believes that the Security Service improperly holds personal data on him or her to complain to the new .......Tribunal for a full independent investigation............the Tribunal is under a duty to hear, consider and determine any complaint within its jurisdiction unless it is frivolous or vexatious. The comprehensive nature of the Tribunal`s jurisdiction ........means that it is likely to be a more effective forum than the Data Protection Tribunal for the consideration of complaints that the Security Service (or any other intelligence agency) has acted improperly in respect of personal data processed by it."
His evidence referred also to the role of the Intelligence Services Commissioner, also created by RIPA 2000.
(i) extant proceedings under or by virtue of the Act; the nature of those proceedings is otherwise unrestricted in terms of party, subject matter, forum etc;
(ii) a Ministerial certificate identifying personal data to which it applies by means of a general description of s.28(2)(3)
(iii) a claim by data controller (DC) that it applies to 'any' personal data. This must mean particular data; see the subsequent phrase "the personal data in question";
(iv) an application by any other party to the proceedings: it poses the question 'other' than whom? In relation to a s.28(4) appeal; this means the Minister SI 2000 No. 206 2(3);
(v) a ruling by the Tribunal that the certificate either does or does not apply to the PD in question.
This subsection does not comes into play here at all because while criteria (i) (ii) and (iv) may be satisfied, criteria (iii) and (v) are not. Criterion (iii) is not satisfied because it is in issue whether relevant personal data exist. s.7(1)(a) invites disclosure of whether personal data are held or not; s.7(1)(b)(c) are by contrast are premised on the existence of such data held by a data controller. Criterion (v) is equally not satisfied. The exercise contemplates the Tribunal looking at (a) the certificate (b) the personal data in question (which ex hypothesi, the Tribunal must identify) and saying that (a) does/does not cover (b)). This exercise cannot be performed when Tribunal do not have (b).
(A) the blanket exemption given by the Certificate in relation to section 7(1)(a) is wider than is necessary to protect national security;
(B) it is common ground that some personal data relating to individuals is processed (held) by the Service which could be released to them without endangering national security;
(C) we have no evidence as to the number of requests received or likely to be received or as to the proportion of them which could lead to a decision to release personal data, if individual consideration was given to each request. We have no reason to suppose that the burden of dealing with them individually would be unduly onerous for the Service or that the proportion falling within (B) would be negligible or small;
(D) the blanket exemption relieves the Service of any obligation to give a considered answer to individual requests;
(E) we can conceive of no positive reason for giving a blanket exemption to all processing by the Service in respect of all its activities until such a time as personal data is released to the Public Record Office (if no files are destroyed, this is the effect of the evidence before us);
(F) the statutory functions of the Service, since 1989, have included matters which may, but do not necessarily overlap its task of safeguarding national security. (We bear in mind that even where personal data are acquired and held for other purposes its release (or a positive answer) to a section 7(1)(a) request could nevertheless be harmful to national security);
(G) the safeguards and other remedies available to individuals who are aggrieved by conduct of or on behalf the Service are insufficient to make reasonable the otherwise unreasonable issue of such a certificate;
(H) it has not been represented to us that it would be impossible or difficult to revise the wording of the Certificate, or to modify the internal procedures of the Service or of the Home Office so as to achieve a situation where each request is considered on its merits and either acceded to or refused accordingly. That, it seems to us, would be a proportionate and reasonable response, given the right to respect for their private lives which individuals now enjoy;
(I) limited evidence as to the practice in other countries did not identify anywhere where an identical unchallengeable exemption was permitted. Notably the practice in the U.S.A. was more considerate of individual rights than the practice in the United Kingdom exemplified in these proceedings;
(J) the Certificate as drafted defines the exemption by reference to the purposes for which and the circumstances in which personal data is processed by the Service, rather than the consequences for national security if the data is released or even its existence is acknowledged at the time of the request.
DECISION TO QUASH
Signed This 1st day October 2001 ..
The Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Evans (President) .
The Hon. Michael Beloff QC ..
Mr James Goudie QC
SUMMARY OF DECISION
INFORMATION TRIBUNAL NATIONAL SECURITY APPEALS
|NORMAN BAKER MP :||APPELLANT|
|SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT:||RESPONDENT|