UK Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions

[1997] UKSSCSC CSG_6_1995 (30 May 1997)


 


CSG/6/95


The Office of Social Security and Child Support Commissioners

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT 1992

APPEAL TO THE COMMISSIONER FROM A DECISION OF A SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL TRIBUNAL UPON A QUESTION OF LAW

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

MR COMMISSIONER W M WALKER QC

Tribunal :

Tribunal Case No :

1. This is an appeal by the adjudication officer. I hold the decision of the appeal tribunal dated 23 February 1995 to be in error of law and accordingly I set it aside. But because I think it appropriate so to do, I exercise the power conferred by section 23(7)(a)(i) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and give the decision which I consider should have been given by the tribunal.

2. That decision is to find the claimant entitled to Invalid Care Allowance from 26 November 1992 and to remit the case to the adjudication officer to carry that decision into practical effect, including dealing with any question arising under the provisions of the Social Security (Overlapping Benefits) Regulations 1979, as also power to review and revise this award as may be required on account of the claimant's death.

3. This case came before me at a hearing requested by the appellant adjudication officer. He was represented by Mr Jeremy Heath, of the Office of the Solicitor to the Department of Social Security. The claimant was represented by Miss Alison Stirling, of the Free Representation Unit of the Faculty of Advocates, on behalf of the Citizens Advice Bureau, Inverness. I am grateful to each for the careful formulation and the clarity of their respective submissions.

4. Before proceedings further I should note two matters. First that sadly the claimant died subsequent to the tribunal hearing. Her husband, by tragic irony, is now in charge of the case having been appointed to proceed with the claim on 9 February 1996. As Mr Heath pointed out, that appointment, in terms of R(SB) 5/90, is retrospective. For convenience, however, I shall continue to refer to the late Mrs Edwards as "the claimant". The second matter is that most regrettably this decision is issued only long after the hearing. Reflection on the verbal submissions persuaded me to direct further written submissions. The final such, in reply to others, were received early in April 1997.

5. The case concerns entitlement to invalid care allowance (ICA). I gratefully adopt the findings of fact made below. The claimant was born on 6 December 1922. She last worked in employment in or about 1979. She became unemployed in order to care for her husband. She received unemployment benefit between 1979 and 1980 and thereafter was not in receipt of invalidity benefit. She attained the age of 60 in December 1982 and that of 65 in December 1987. On 26 November 1993 she claimed ICA with backdating to 2 October 1992. On 29 November 1993 an adjudication officer held her not entitled to the allowance for the period from 2 October 1992 to 25 November 1992 because that period was more than 12 months before the date of her claim nor from and after 26 November 1993 because she then was over the age of 65 and had not been entitled, nor could be treated as having been entitled, to the allowance immediately before attaining that age. That decision was based upon section 70 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, as then in force. Apart from the caring and other qualifications, that section provided that a person was not entitled to ICA if, having attained pensionable age, he or she had not been entitled nor could be treated by regulations as having been entitled to it immediately before attaining that age. At that time the retirement age for a female was 60. Regulation 10 of the Social Security (Invalid Care Allowance) Regulations 1976, as then in force, prescribed the circumstances in which a person over pensionable age might be treated as having been entitled to the allowance immediately before attaining that age. That was if, immediately before attaining pensionable age a claimant:-

"... would have satisfied the conditions for entitlement [to ICA] but for the provisions of the Social Security (Overlapping Benefits) Regulations 1975, as amended."

These last regulations concern only any overlap between the claimant's retirement pension, which would have had to be taken into consideration had she been found entitled to the allowance. The claimant appealed to the tribunal.

6. The tribunal gave as their unanimous decision that the claimant:-

"... satisfied the conditions of entitlement to invalid care allowance from at least 22.12.84. Her claim to invalid care allowance made on 26.11.93 can be treated as establishing underlying entitlement to invalid care allowance from 22.12.84."

The latter date was chosen because it was when Article 4 of Council Directive 79/7 EEC came into direct effect. That Article forbade any discrimination on the ground of sex, either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status, so far as concerned the scope of the conditions of access to designated statutory schemes and the calculation of benefits and the conditions governing the duration and retention of entitlement to benefit. The schemes to which the Directive applied, by Article 3 thereof, were those providing protection against the risks of sickness, invalidity, old age, accidents at work and occupational diseases and unemployment. It is clear from the tribunal's reasons that they were concerned to determine the case largely in the expectation that any decision would be appealed by the adjudication officer. They referred to certain decisions by the European Court of Justice, to section 1(2)(b) of the Administration Act and to the fact that the Directive finally had been implemented only by the Social Security (Severe Disablement Allowance and Invalid Care Allowance) Amendment Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No 2556), with effect from 28 October 1994. I note, from paragraph 30 of the adjudication officer's written submission dated 24 August 1995, that the claimant's entitlement to ICA with effect from 28 October 1994 was and is not in dispute (page 7 of documents).

7. As I understand from their reasons, the basis of the tribunal decision was that there had been an indirect discrimination on the ground of sex because of the difference in pension ages between men and women. That difference alone, the tribunal felt, had barred this claimant from ICA where a man would have been entitled to it. That discrimination had been struck down by the overriding European provision with effect from December 1984. The claimant had then become notionally entitled thereto or, as they put it, she had then acquired an underlying entitlement. Their reasons record that backdating beyond one year from the date of claim was not sought. They accepted that any arrears would be restricted by section 1(2) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 but their decision does not appear to give effect, thereto. The adjudication officer now appeals, with leave of the Chairman.

8. Mr Heath submitted, first that the tribunal, from the terms of their decision, had awarded invalid care allowance from 22 December 1984. But section 1 of the Administration Act provides at sub-section (1) that:-

"... no person shall be entitled to any benefit unless, in addition to any other conditions relating to that benefit being satisfied -

(a) he makes a claim for it in the manner, and within the time, prescribed..."

To which provision sub-section (2) adds that:-

"Where under sub-section (1) a person is required to make a claim or to be treated as making a claim for a benefit in order to be entitled to it -

:

(b) [does not apply] the person shall not be entitled to it in respect of any period more than 12 months before [the date of claim], except as provided by section 3 below [which is not relevant]."

The origin of those provisions is to be found in section 17 of the Social Security Act 1985 which introduced section 165A to the Social Security Act 1975. I accept that, in so far as this claimant required to claim ICA and only made her claim on 26 November 1993, the effect of section 1 of the Administration Act prevents her being found entitled to that benefit prior to 26 November 1992. Steenhorst-Neerings -v- Bestuur Van De Bedrijfsvereniging Voor Detailhandel Ambachtenen Huisvrouwen [1995] 3 CMLR 323, a decision by the European Court of Justice, held that a general provision restricting entitlement prior to the date of claim, equally applicable to men as to women, is not struck down even where a Directive has not been implemented at the relevant time - paragraphs 14 and 15 at page 341. The backdating provision is therein referred to as "the retroactive effect of claims for benefits". I am satisfied that the tribunal decision was somewhat unclear as to from what, if any, date they were making a positive award of ICA. Upon that basis I hold their decision to be erroneous in law. Hence it has been set aside.

9. Mr Heath next turned to the question of whether the claimant came within the personal scope of the European provision. There appeared some vagueness as to when she had ceased work and when she had commenced caring for her husband. Thus in document 121 of the bundle, part of the record of evidence given to the tribunal, this was recorded:-

"I have not worked since 1982. I gave up work in 1979 and have not worked since.

I have never been in receipt of invalidity benefit. I was on unemployment benefit from 1979 to 1980.

My husband was able to work during the day up to 1982."

On the other hand the tribunal in their findings of fact at document 124 made their conclusion from that quite clear: they said that the claimant:-

"... last worked in or about 1979. She became unemployed in order to care for her husband. She was in receipt of unemployment benefit for one year from 1979 to 1980."

On the evidence these were facts which the tribunal were entitled to find. Mr Heath, I think, rather accepted that. He then pointed to article 2 of the Directive which applies it to the working population:-

"... including self-employed persons, workers and self-employed persons whose activity is interrupted by illness, accident or involuntary unemployment and persons seeking employment - and to retired or invalided workers and self-employed persons."

He drew to my attention Drake -v- Chief Adjudication Officer [1986] ECR 1995, another decision of the European Court of Justice, which established that the Directive is to be applied to benefits both where the claimant is the invalid and where the invalid is another person for whom the claimant is caring. In light of that I hold that the tribunal were entitled to conclude that the Directive applied to the claimant, having found that she gave up work in order to look after her husband. There did not appear to be any real dispute about that. To that extent this case differs from that on file CG/5425/95. There the claimant had given up employment in order to have and upbring a family although she later took on a caring role. As was made clear in Johnston -v- Chief Adjudication Officer [1991] 3 CMLR 917, such a person is not covered by the Directive; only those who are available on the labour market, or have ceased to be so through one of the risks specified in the Directive, are covered. Here invalidity was the risk and Drake established that it was enough that it was the spouse of the person so covered to whom the risk materialised. The distinction was most recently affirmed, in favour of this claimant, in paragraphs 11 and 12 of another decision by the ECJ - Züchnerv Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) Bremen [ECJ Case C-77/95] in which judgment was issued on 7 November 1996. So far so good. But CG/5425/95 also introduces the central issue.

10. In that case Mr Commissioner Howell QC concluded that a person could not be prevented from entitlement to ICA because she had not claimed it before reaching the age of 60 or 65 years since domestic legislation had denied that any such claim could exist. That was in contravention of directly applicable European law. Legal certainty, in European law, he said, was a fundamental principle which thereby had been infringed. He opined that, had that claimant qualified for the benefit of European law, he would have held her entitled to benefit, but subject to the 12 month limitation. But, in fact, she fell at the earlier hurdle. The learned Commissioner's conclusion about legal certainty, Mr Heath submitted, was an obiter dictum. Mr Heath carefully sought to persuade me that that dictum should not be followed in this case.

11. The thrust of Mr Heath's submissions was directed, first, towards distinguishing the present case from that of Emmott -v- Minister for Social Welfare [1991] ECR 4269, which was the basis of paragraph 13(5) of CG/5425/95 wherein the learned Commissioner derived the principle of legal certainty and concluded that a provision of national law which denied a benefit infringed that principle. The rubric of the report in [1991] 3 CMLR notes three points as made in Emmott. The first endorses a long held rule, namely that:-

"In the absence of Community rules on the subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member-State to determine the rules of procedure governing actions at law aimed at securing protection of the rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. But the rules so applied must in no case be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature and must not be framed in such a way as to render virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by Community law. [Paragraph 16 of the Judgment.]"

The other two points were, first, that only where the State failed to take implementing measures as required by a Directive does a person affected thereby acquire the right to rely on the Directive in judicial proceedings against the defaulting State (paragraph 20 of the Judgment). Finally, when an individual wishes to rely on rights derived directly from a Directive the defaulting State must not rely on the previous delay in initiating proceedings against it so that a domestic rule about a time limit for taking action cannot begin to run until the Directive has been properly transposed into national law (paragraph 23 of the Judgment). The facts in Emmott were that the claimant had been entitled to a modified amount of Irish disability benefit at various rates between December 1983 and June 1988. In July 1988 she instituted proceedings for judicial review of decisions of the Irish authorities, founding upon Ireland's failure to transpose the Directive into domestic law within the permitted period. It was not transposed until July 1985. The Irish Government contended that the claimant had failed to observe Irish procedural time limits. The European Court's conclusion, in paragraph 24 of the Judgment, was that Community law precluded the Irish authorities from relying upon national time limits during such period as they had not properly transposed the Directive. That, Mr Heath suggested, was a somewhat different proposition from that enunciated by Mr Howell. Moreover, in this case, he submitted that there had been nothing to stop this claimant raising action such as by claiming the benefit. The domestic time limit enshrined in section 1, as it now is, of the 1992 Act went only to the extent of a finding of entitlement and not to raising action or claiming.

12. At paragraph 16 of this decision Mr Howell noted Mr Heath's then proposition as being that because no entitlement to invalid care allowance had been established on a claim made before the claimant was 65 she had been rightly refused it on a subsequent claim just as would have been a man. The learned Commissioner found the flaw in that argument to be that it had been the complete failure of domestic legislation to provide her with any means of making a claim, or for having it accepted, before she was 65 coupled with the domestic failure to apply the principle of equal treatment for many years after that, which had deprived her of benefit. I see and sympathise with the learned Commissioner's point. But I must accept that that part of his decision was obiter and have to decide the matter directly and have come to the opinion that there is another approach which leads, happily, to much the same result. Emmott was concerned primarily with a time limit set on initiating litigation. I am not persuaded that a social security claim is entirely the same thing. I can see that limitations on backdating, as it is called, or what Europe regards as the "retroactive" effect of a claim, can appear similar. Section 1 of the Administration Act speaks of no entitlement for more than 12 months prior to the date of claim. To suggest that as a way of time limiting any claim to 12 months prior to the day of claim, to my mind, is a false approach and takes the provision out of context. There are expressed time limits for claiming those benefits which, in my view, more easily equiperate to time limits for litigation - thus in regulation 19(1) of and Schedule 4 to the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987, (SI 1987/1968)

13. Turning to Mr Heath's other main point, I accept that there was nothing to have prevented this claimant from making her claim earlier, however unlikely it may have appeared from domestic legislation that she could have succeeded. As Mr Heath pointed out more than once, there was nothing in law - or I suppose even in fact - to prevent her from sending in a completed claim form. He referred to Alonso-Pérez -v- Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Case C-394/93 ECJ 23 November 1995) where the European Court again held that in the absence of any Community rules on the subject, as here, it was for the domestic legal system of the Member State to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law designed to ensure that protection of rights acquired from the direct effect of Community law. Such conditions were repeated to require to be no less favourable than those relating to similar domestic actions nor to be framed in such a way as to render virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by Community law. (Paragraph 28 of the Judgment). That requirement, he claimed, was satisfied in this case. The lodging of an earlier claim by or for this claimant could not be said to have been rendered virtually impossible by any domestic procedural provision. It followed that this claimant could not now obtain assistance from any European doctrine. Further, and since, Mr Heath also submitted, this claimant could not establish entitlement by way of a claim as necessary under said section 1 of the Administration Act at any date prior to her attaining the age of 65 her claim must fail.

14. In response Miss Stirling found quite heavily on Emmott as being very similar to the present case. She regarded the prohibition against claiming, in effect, in respect of any period more than 12 months prior to the actual date of claim as the equivalent of the time-bar in that case. She submitted that there had been conferred by the Directive an entitlement to the benefit in 1984 when it had become of direct application. However, no claim then presented could have succeeded having regard to the then state of domestic legislation which not only had failed to come into line with the Directive but, indeed, had contradicted it. (Indeed Mr Heath had indicated that it was not until the decision in Drake on 24 June 1986 that it had been accepted that persons such as this claimant could have any right to the allowance. There had been a publicity campaign, he had said, in the mid 1980s and a press release in 1988 all designed to alert those affected by discrimination in respect of the allowance. Even so, the legislation had not then been changed because that was not thought to be necessary.)

15. Miss Stirling also referred to the case of Steenhorst-Neerings -v- Bestuur Van De Bedrijfsvereniging Voor Detailhandel Ambachtenen Huisvrouwen Case C-338/91 ECJ 27 October 1993, which determined that after a Directive came into direct effect any inequality of treatment attributable to the previously applicable conditions for entitlement could not be maintained. The Directive then could be relied upon by an individual in order to preclude the application of any national provision inconsistent with it. But again, the right to claim any such benefit must be exercised under the conditions determined by national law provided that these are no less favourable than those relating to similar domestic actions and that they were not framed so as to render virtually impossible the exercise or rights conferred by community law. In that case a national rule restricting the retroactive effect of a claim for benefits for incapacity for work satisfied those two conditions - paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the Judgment). I note that the Advocate General, at paragraph 28, said that in Emmott:-

"The plaintiff in the main proceedings encountered the objection that her action was barred. As right of action was time-barred, she could no longer assert any right. Here, the right of action is not in question, but its consequences in time: the plaintiff can obtain only part of the rights which she derives from community law."

He also expressed scepticism about the absence of a procedural time limit which could allow an individual to claim several years after his right arose. He observed that that argument had been rejected in Emmott and, in any event, that such an eventuality could only result from prolonged failure by the State to implement the Directive into national law. It would then be unfair to require the beneficiary of rights from a Community measure to suffer the consequences of such failure because of the expiry of national procedural time limits. He went on to observe that the effect of such a time limit in European law is only taken into account if the effect of its application is related to the principle of equal treatment. The Court in its Judgment, at paragraph 23, however, observed that:-

"... the aim of the rule restricting the retroactive effect of claims for benefits ... is quite different from that of a rule imposing mandatory time limits for bringing proceedings."

That distinction is in line with mine in paragraph 12 above. The Court held the former only not to be struck down by European law. Miss Stirling submitted strongly that the present national restriction on retroactive effect was but a rule imposing a time limit on bringing claims, or at any rate one but thinly disguised. I have already indicated some sympathy with that view, but for the reasons given above am not satisfied that it is sound where there is also, as here, a corpus of directly expressed such time limits.

16. I also have some sympathy with Miss Stirling's contention that it would have been virtually impossible for the claimant to have made her claim once, or even after, the Directive could have been directly founded upon. She was then over the retiral age for women of 60. That and the legal confusion created not only by the express prohibition in domestic law against her being able to establish entitlement but even the possible difficulties under European law as it then stood, would, I am satisfied, have led any claim by her being rejected with little hope of redress at any level. The test in Emmott and others concerns "virtual impossibility" but only as regards the effect of domestic procedure governing the claiming of benefit which were less favourable than those relating to actions of a purely domestic nature and so that test does not seem to arise in this case.

17. The considerations thus far lead me to ponder whether there might not be another approach to the matter, which had not been fully investigated at the hearing. I therefore issued a direction in November 1996 seeking further but written submissions.

That which has been accepted appears from what follows. The nub of he issue was the extent to which, if any, the coming into direct effect of the Directive had conferred any "entitlement" to ICA upon the claimant and, if so, what became of such entitlement as time passed and domestic law changed.

18. It is, I think, helpful now to recapitulate the salient dates:-

1. 1979: claimant gives up work to care for husband.

2. 1982: December: claimant is aged 60.

3. 1984: December: Directive 79/7 EEC came into direct force in Great Britain

4. 1985: September: requirement of a claim introduced as a condition for entitlement.

5. 1987: December: claimant is aged 65.

6. 1993: November: claim is made.

7. 1994: October: British law brought into compliance with the Directive.

From that it will be seen that when the claimant passed the domestic retiring age for women, as it was, she could not rely upon the Directive's direct effect. But when that Directive did come into direct effect she acquired a right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of her sex in respect of such social security rights as that to ICA. That means that thereafter she could claim to be treated upon the same basis as a man and so could have claimed ICA until she reached 65. Between December 1984 and September 1985 there was no domestic legal requirement that she make a claim as a condition precedent to entitlement. Indeed it is common ground that section 17 of the Social Security Act 1985 was enacted to counter the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Insurance Officer -v- McCaffrey [1985] 1 All ER (HL) 5. That case concerned Northern Irish social security law, but the provisions in question directly paralleled those of Great Britain. The essential provision, section 79(1) of the Social Security (Northern Ireland) Act 1975, provided that:-

"Subject to the following provisions of this Chapter, and, in the case of retirement pensions, to section 27(6), it shall be a condition of a person's right to any benefit that he makes a claim for it in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time."

The Insurance Officer's case before the House was that section 36 which prescribed the conditions upon which a person became entitled to a particular benefit, had been modified by the later section so that, as Lord Scarman said:-

".. there is no entitlement until a claim is made; since the respondent failed to make a claim before she attained pensionable age, she cannot, he submits, show, as section 36(4) required that she should show, that she was entitled to the pension immediately before she attained that age."

That demonstrates that the issue there was very much the issue here having regard to the terms of regulation 10 of the ICA Regulations cited above. Lord Scarman went on:-

"The submission is, in my view, totally misconceived. First, entitlement is governed by section 36. The section does not define entitlement by reference to the making of a claim or require a claim as a condition precedent to entitlement. Second, section 79(1) has to be construed so as to be consistent with the entitlement which is created by section 36, and not vice versa. Any other approach makes nonsense of section 36. A government department, faced with the complexity of administering social security, may perhaps be forgiven for putting the cart before the horse. But a Judge can have no excuse. The logic of entitlement and claim is clear: claim is based on the existence of entitlement. Third, section 79(1) does not speak of "entitlement". It merely declares it to be "a condition of a person's right to any benefit that he makes a claim". These words do not have to be construed as a reference to entitlement. They can equally well, as a matter of ordinary English, be a reference to the right to be paid. And this is the meaning appropriate to a section dealing with the administration of benefit. Accordingly, I read the sub-section as having this effect: a claimant not only has to show the existence of an entitlement but has also to make a claim in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time in order that he may be paid. This construction avoids introducing a restriction on entitlement not to be found in section 36 and makes sense of section 79(1) as a provision dealing with the administration of benefit."

With the speech of Lord Scarman the other four Lords of Appeal agreed.

19. I draw from that that there could be a distinction between entitlement to a benefit and a right to it in the sense of obtaining payment. From September 1985 domestic procedural law required a claim as a condition precedent to either. But if they were severable then, as it appears to me, this claimant became entitled to ICA in October 1994 when the Directive came into direct effect. Nobody suggests that she did not at all times satisfy any conditions other than claiming. She ten had no right to it because she had not claimed; she could not be expected to claim because even then domestic substantive law appeared to deny her, albeit falsely, the right if not also entitlement. The question is what if any difference occurred in September 1985 when section 17 of the Social Security Act 1985 came into effect. Could and did it remove the entitlement so far as derived from the Directive? The section does not appear to be retrospective nor is any submission to that effect made to me. The submissions by the adjudication officer in response to my Direction seem to suggest that the domestic procedural change effected by section 17 of the 1985 Act did remove entitlement. If it did then, as it seems to me, that would satisfy the Emmott/Steenhorst Neerings test of rendering virtually impossible - indeed here expressly impossible - a right conferred by European law namely the right to entitlement to ICA until age 65 derived from the direct effect of the Directive. But I think that more fundamentally the concept of any such change offends against the supremacy of European law. Accordingly the claimant must have remained vested, as it were, in her entitlement. For such as her section 17 of the 1985 Act, would have to be read as meaning "save so far as not already entitled". But I need not go that far. The question comes back to whether the claimant immediately before attaining retirement age "would have satisfied the conditions necessary for entitlement" - regulation 10 of the ICA Regulations. That age for equality purposes is now to be taken as 65 - here December 1987. The only flaw suggested as of that date is that she had not made a claim. But if what I have set out above is correct in her case she only needed a claim to obtain payment; her entitlement had been locked in with effect from December 1984 by a combination of satisfying both the domestic conditions and the effect of coming into direct effect of the Directive which removed for her the only adverse domestic condition. To that effect I consider that the tribunal were on the right lines although in the end they made a decision bad in law.

20. In short, I consider that this claimant satisfied the conditions for entitlement immediately before she attained her pensionable age which after December 1984 moved from 1982 to 1987. It is for these reasons that I consider that this claimant, no doubt like any others who also managed to be between the personal retirement ages of 60 and 65 during the period between December 1984 and September 1985, was not caught by the introduction of said section 17. So far as section 1 of the 1992 Act is concerned, this claimant has been able to demonstrate as discussed entitlement as of the date of that claim although the effect of the limitation on retroactive awards means that she cannot obtain any actual payment in respect of her entitlement prior to November 1992.

21. I revert to Lord Scarman's speech in McCaffrey and note that at the end he cautioned that the Department needed no fear of any opening of the floodgates to a rush of stale claims. He pointed to the effect of the 12 month limitation on payment in arrears. The Department legislated. Nonetheless I venture the same cautionary observation, with respect.

22. This appeal succeeds but only to the effect narrated above.

Signed

W.M. Walker QC
Commissioner

30 May 1997