Title: [1991] UKSSCSC CU_59_1989 (20 March 1991)
Author: Standard PC
Last saved by: Joe
Company: Headquarters

R(U) 3/91

R(U) 3/91
(Appendix)

R(U) 3/91
Mr. M. J. Goodman	CU/59/1989
20.3.91	
Voluntarily leaving employment – waiver of notice on voluntary redundancy – whether claimant “dismissed ... by reason of redundancy”
The claimant was “counselled for redundancy” on 8 March 1988. On that date he released the employer from any notice obligation under his contract (he was entitled to twelve weeks notice). The redundancy was effective from 19 March 1988. Work was available to the end of the notice period and no wages were payable in lieu of the waived notice.
The local adjudication officer decided that the claimant had left his employment voluntarily without just cause, and disqualified him for a period of 10½ weeks (the period of the waived notice when work would have been available).
The social security appeal tribunal decided that section 20(3A) of the Social Security Act 1975 did not assist the claimant and they upheld the adjudication officer’s decision. The claimant appealed to the Commissioner.
Held that:
1.	where dismissal takes place in anticipation of a forthcoming redundancy situation, the dismissal is by reason of redundancy (para. 9);
2.	on the facts of this case the claimant was dismissed within the meaning of section 83(2) & 85 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, and the dismissal was by reason of redundancy (para. 13);
3.	the claimant could avail himself of the protection afforded by section 20(3A) of the 1975 Act, therefore he is not disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit on the grounds that he left his employment voluntarily under section 20(1)(a) of the 1975 Act.
Note: the use of the word “dismissed” in section 20(3A) of the Social Security Act 1975 is not confined to the technical meaning of dismissal in sections 83(2) & 85 of the 1978 Act. It also covers the situation where, in anticipation of future redundancies, an employer and an employee mutually agree when and on what terms the employee will leave the employment (paras. 16‑19).

decision of the social security commissioner

1.	I allow the appeal by the claimant’s trade union against the decision of the social security appeal tribunal dated 8 September 1988 as that decision is erroneous in law and I set it aside. I give the decision which the tribunal should have given, namely that the claimant is not disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit under section 20(1)(a) of the Social Security Act 1975 as a result of the termination of his employment on 21 March 1988. That is because the claimant was then dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 81(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 after volunteering or agreeing so to be dismissed and therefore shall not be deemed to have left his employment voluntarily: Social Security Act 1975, section 20(1)(a) and 20(3A) and section 101 (as amended).
2.	This is an appeal to the Commissioner by the Transport and General Workers Union to which union the claimant, a man aged 41 at the relevant time, belonged. The appeal is against the unanimous decision of a social security appeal tribunal dated 8 September 1988 which dismissed the claimant’s appeal from a decision of the local adjudication officer dated 25 May 1988 disqualifying the claimant for receiving unemployment benefit from 21 March 1988 to 1 June 1988 because he voluntarily left his employment without just cause (Social Security Act 1975, section 20(1)(a)).
3.	On my direction, the appeal was the subject of an oral hearing before me on 7 February 1991 at which the claimant was present and the appellant trade union was represented by Mr. F. Whitty of the union’s legal department. The adjudication officer was represented by Mr. K. A. Turner of the Office of the Chief Adjudication Officer. I am indebted to Mr. Whitty and to Mr. Turner for their assistance to me at the hearing. The facts of this case are set out in the summary of facts prepared by the adjudication officer for submission to the tribunal, which summary reads as follows:
“[The claimant] had been employed by South Yorkshire Transport as a one person [bus] operator. His employment began on 13 July 1969 and he latterly worked at the East Bank Garage. Due to the effect of the 1985 Transport Act, the company had to reduce staff by about 400 during the early part of 1988 and under the terms of an agreement reached between South Yorkshire Transport and all the unions concerned a redundancy package was agreed. All employees who were to be made redundant would receive a payment in compensation for loss of an established job. Also, under the terms of the agreement staff could waive their right to notice under [section 49 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978] and receive a payment under the Agreement. No wages in lieu of notice were to be paid as the Company could provide work for all their employees for the requisite period. Employees who worked at a garage which was scheduled to close would be transferred to another garage when the time for closure was agreed. [The claimant] was employed at East Bank Garage which was scheduled to close. On 8 March 1988 he was counselled for redundancy and signed a waiver notice to the effect that he released the Company from any notice obligation under his contract. His redundancy would be effective from 19 March 1988 and he would receive £3,000 compensation as in the agreement para. 7.2. On 21 March 1988 [the claimant] made a claim for unemployment benefit. He was given an opportunity to comment on the situation by the benefit office but declined to do so. Following legal advice the adjudication officer accepted that the payment received by [the claimant] was not a payment in lieu of notice (affected by Social Security (Unemployment, Sickness and Invalidity Benefit) Regulations [1983] reg. 7(1)(d)). However, because work was available for him to do, it was considered that he had left his employment voluntarily and was subject to consideration under Social Security Act 1975, section 20(1)(a). It was decided by the adjudication officer that a period of disqualification equal to the period of notice required was appropriate. Accordingly [the claimant] was disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit from 21 March 1988 to 1 June 1988 (both dates included).”
4.	In the tribunal’s reasons for decision i.e. upholding the disqualification on the ground of voluntary leaving (1975 Act, section 20(1)(a)), they gave the following reasons for decision:
“1. 	The tribunal considered in detail all the arguments put forward in this case and decided that as [the claimant] had waived his right to notice and as work would have been available to him to the end of the twelve week notice period [i.e. the twelve weeks notice for twelve years service, to which he was entitled under section 49 of the 1978 Act] i.e. to 18 June 1988 then he has to be considered as redundant only at the end of notice period and section 20(3A) of Social Security Act 1975 does not assist him.
2.	[The claimant] waived his right to notice and left his employment before he was actually told which garage he would be transferred to ‑ he did not wait to see if working from another depot was viable. He therefore voluntarily left his employment without just cause.”
5.	Section 20(3A) of the Social Security Act 1975 to which the tribunal referred was inserted by section 10 of the Social Security Act 1985, to remove the difficulties which had emerged as a result of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Crewe v. Social Security Commissioner [1982] 2 All ER 745. In that case it was held that a school teacher who had volunteered for redundancy and consequent early retirement could not show that his voluntarily leaving was with “just cause” within the meaning of section 20(1)(a) of the 1975 Act. Subsections (1)(a) and (3A) of section 20 of the 1975 Act read as follows:
“20. (1)  A person shall be disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit for such period not exceeding 26 weeks as may be determined in accordance with sections 97‑104 of this Act (adjudication by adjudication officers and officers and other statutory authorities) if-
(a)	he has lost his employment as an employed earner through his misconduct, or has voluntarily left such employment without just cause; 
…… 
(3A)	For the purposes of this section, a person who has been dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 81(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 after volunteering or agreeing so to be dismissed shall not be deemed to have left his employment voluntarily.”
6.	It is clear that where subsection (3A) applies the phrase “shall not be deemed” in effect means that the claimant cannot be taken voluntarily to have left his employment without just cause within the meaning of section 20(1)(a) and is not therefore subject to disqualification on that ground. That is of course the only ground in this case on which any disqualification could have been imposed. 
7.	Section 20(3A) refers to “a person who has been dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 81(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978”. Section 81(2) of the 1978 Act provides as follows:
“81 (1) ……
(2)	For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to-
(a)	the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or
(b)	the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in a place where he was so employed, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.”
8.	It should be noted that section 81(2) of the 1978 Act does not itself contain any definition of what is meant by the word “dismissed”. This is important, in my view (see below). On the facts of the present case, if the claimant was in fact dismissed by his employer there is in my view no doubt that (contrary to the tribunal’s decision) he was dismissed “by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 81(2) [of the 1978 Act]” (1975 Act, 20(3A). It is not entirely clear whether the tribunal found as a fact that the claimant was dismissed but on the assumption that they did so find, then both Mr. Whitty and Mr. Turner submitted to me that their decision could not be supported and I accept their concurring submissions.
9.	The definition in section 81(2) of the 1978 Act (see above) of dismissal by reason of redundancy includes a situation where the employer “intends to cease” business or where the requirements of the business “are expected to cease or diminish”. That makes it clear that, where a dismissal takes place in anticipation of a forthcoming redundancy situation, the dismissal is by reason of redundancy. That in my judgment is undoubtedly what happened here. There was no doubt that there was a redundancy situation. Provided therefore the claimant could show that he was “dismissed” within the meaning of subsection (3A) of section 20 of the 1975 Act, then he was in my judgment entitled to the benefit of that subsection and could not be disqualified on the ground of voluntarily leaving his employment. I do not consider that it can be correct to say as the tribunal did that as work could have been available to the claimant to the end of the twelve week notice period that “he has to be considered as redundant only at the end of the notice period”. That is taking a factual view of the matter which ignores the forward looking part of the above‑cited definition of dismissal by reason of redundancy, in section 81(2) of the 1978 Act.
10.	The real question then as indeed was agreed by both Mr. Whitty and Mr. Turner at the hearing before me, is whether in fact the claimant, to secure the benefit of subsection (3A) of section 20 of the 1975 Act, can show that he was “dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy . . .”
11.	In trying to ascertain the meaning of this, it should be first borne in mind that section 81(2) of the 1978 Act (to which subsection (3A) of the 1975 Act refers) does not itself define dismissal. Dismissal for the purpose of redundancy payments under the 1978 Act is in fact defined in section 83(2) of the 1978 Act as follows:
“83. (1) . . . . . . . . .
(2) An employee shall be treated as dismissed by his employer if, but only if,-
(a)	the contract under which he is employed by the employer is terminated by the employer, whether it is so terminated by notice or without notice, or
(b)	where under that contract he is employed for a fixed term, that term expires without being renewed under the same contract, or
(c)	the employee terminates that contract with or without notice, in circumstances . . . such that he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct.”
12.	In addition, section 85 of the 1978 Act provides for a situation where an employer has given notice to an employee to terminate his contract of employment and the employee then gives a counter notice in writing to the employer (during the obligatory period of minimum notice, see section 49 of the 1978 Act) to terminate the employment contract earlier. The employee is then under section 85 of the 1978 Act still to be taken as dismissed by the employer.
13.	On the facts of the present case, I consider that the claimant could undoubtedly show that he was dismissed within the meaning of sections 83(2) and 85 of the 1975 Act. The documentation before the tribunal clearly leads to that conclusion. The Agreement which had been entered into by all the trade unions involved and by the management of the bus company made detailed provision for the redundancies. It was dated 11 January 1988 and paragraph 5.4 of it provided:
“5.4  Method of Carrying out Dismissals
(a)	Volunteers shall be invited by Notice.
(b)	Redundancy volunteers will be notified in writing of the Company’s decision and, where accepted, the date on which it is intended that their services will no longer be required.
(c)	Staff selected for compulsory redundancy will be notified in writing of the Company’s decision on the date on which it is intended that their services will no longer be required.
NOTE:
Redundancy notices may be issued prior to 6 March 1988 and volunteers may be required to leave during the consultation period. Staff compulsorily selected for redundancy will not be required to leave prior to 11 March 1988.” (my emphasis)
14.	There is no doubt on the facts of this case, in my view, that the claimant had no option but to leave. The only question was at what date he was to leave. It may well be that he was a volunteer in that apparently he signed a list of those who were prepared to be made redundant at the particular depot but there is equally no doubt in my view that what occurred was a dismissal of him, even within the technical meaning of that word in sections 83 and 85 of the 1978 Act. Indeed the whole of paragraph 5.4 of the Agreement is headed “Method of carrying out dismissals”.
15.	However, I do consider it desirable in cases of this kind that there should be some guidance given if possible as to what is meant generally by the use of the word “dismissed” in subsection (3A) of section 20 of the Social Security Act 1975. The context of the section must be borne in mind, namely to reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Crewe case (see above), where no distinction was made by the Court of Appeal between cases where there was a dismissal by the employer and other cases of employees leaving because of a redundancy situation.
16.	An employee can, in certain circumstances, be regarded as having left his employment voluntarily if he “deliberately and knowingly acts in a way which makes it necessary for the employer to dismiss him” (R(U) 16/52, para.8). Nevertheless in my judgment the use of the word “dismissed” in sub-section (3A) of section 20 of the 1975 Act is not confined to the ‘technical’ meaning of dismissal in the sections 83(2) and 85 of the 1978 Act. “Dismissed” in section 20(3A) must also in my view cover any situation where the employer has made it clear that some employees of the claimant’s category must either immediately or in the near future leave the employment by reason of redundancy. If then in a sensible manner (incidentally encouraged by the 1977 Code of Practice) the claimant and his employer come to some mutual agreement as to when and on what terms the claimant leaves, then that is in my judgment equally a case of a dismissal under sub-section (3A) of section 20 of the 1975 Act even if there is no ‘technical’ dismissal by the employer of the employee on a given date and even if the claimant volunteered to be one of those made redundant.
17.	It may well be that in many of these cases there has been a dismissal within the meaning of sections 83(2) and 85 of the 1978 Act since if an employer unequivocally indicates to an employee that he must go and it is reasonably clear what is the date by which the employee must go (e.g. at the expiry of the statutory notice under section 49 of the 1978 Act) then that would constitute a dismissal within the meaning of sections 83(2) and 83 of the 1978 Act. A fortiori it would constitute a dismissal within the meaning of section 20(3A) of the 1975 Act.
18.	Even where there is not a ‘technical’ dismissal, the existence of a mutual consent to the employee being a volunteer for redundancy or to leaving at a particular date, even if the employee could have worked a little longer or need not have volunteered, does not in my view prevent such an employee from being able to take advantage of section 20(3A) of the 1975 Act. Indeed subsection (3A) speaks of “volunteering or agreeing to be dismissed” by reason of redundancy. It is in my judgment highly undesirable that the protection conferred by that subsection shall depend on whether or not on the facts of any particular case there can be found an actual dismissal in the ‘technical’ sense. A similar result has been arrived at in relation to disqualification for losing employment through misconduct under section 20(1)(a) of the 1975 Act (R(U) 17/64, R(U) 2/76 and cf. R(U) 17/64, R(U) 10/71, and R(U) 2/76).
19.	I have read and considered two unreported decisions in Scotland of another Commissioner, on files CSU/33/1988 and CSU/34/1988, CSU/34/1988, (CSU/33/1988 does not materially differ) is set out in full in the appendix to this decision. In my view they are distinguishable on their facts but if they are thought to indicate that in all cases where the protection of section 20(3A) of the 1975 Act is sought strict compliance must be shown with the definitions of dismissal in sections 83(1) and 85 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, then I respectfully differ from them and cannot follow them on that point.

Date: 20 March 1991 	(signed) Mr. M. J. Goodman 
	Commissioner

APPENDIX
Text of unreported decision CSU/34/1988

1.	My decision is that the decision of the social security appeal tribunal dated 6 September 1988 is erroneous in law and is set aside. The decision which I give in its place is that the claimant is disqualified for receiving unemployment benefit for the period of six weeks from 19 March 1988 to 29 April 1988 (both dates included) upon the ground that he voluntarily left his employment without just cause.
2.	This is an appeal by the claimant with leave granted by a tribunal chairman on a question of law against the above mentioned tribunal decision. The claimant’s appeal was heard along with an appeal in the case on Commissioner’s file CSU/33/1988 raising similar issues. The claimant was represented by Mr. D. Milliken of the Rights Office, Fife and the adjudication officer was represented by Mr. N. Butt of the Office of the Solicitors to the Department of Health and Social Security.
3.	I was informed that a large number of other similar cases arising from a reduction in the workforce at Rosyth Dockyard had been or were before social security appeal tribunals. The guidance of a Commissioner’s decision was desired. I was also informed by Mr. Milliken that a large number of former employees at the dockyard had not claimed unemployment benefit as a result of advice from the Department of Employment not to claim or that it was not worth claiming benefit. It is of course part of the duties of the Department of Employment and Department of Social Security to give advice to potential claimants for benefit. In this instance however the persons concerned were, if they claimed unemployment benefit, at worst liable to disqualification for receiving such benefit for a period of weeks, the length of which fell to be determined initially at the discretion of an adjudication officer whose decision would thereafter be subject to appeal. Mr. Butt on behalf of the adjudication officer as I understood it accepted that these persons should not have been deterred from claiming benefit.
4.	In the present case the claimant did claim unemployment benefit but was disqualified by an adjudication officer for receiving benefit for a period of ten weeks from 19 March 1988 to 27 May 1988 on the ground within the meaning of section 20(1)(a) of the Social Security Act 1975. The claimant had applied and had been accepted for early severance from his employment with Babcock Thorn PLC who in 1987 took over the management of HM Dockyard, Rosyth. The claimant appealed to a social security appeal tribunal and contended that his dismissal was by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 20(3A) of the same Act, which provides as follows:
“(3A) For the purposes of this section, a person who has been dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 81(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 after volunteering or agreeing so to be dismissed shall not be deemed to have left his employment voluntarily.”
5.	The tribunal in a majority decision (the chairman dissenting) refused the claimant’s appeal. The tribunal made the following findings in fact:
“That [the claimant] voluntarily took part in an Early Severance Scheme and left his employment on the 18 March 1988. [The claimant] was not dismissed but agreed to leave in return for a Severance Payment and an Annual Compensation Payment.”
The tribunal’s reasons were stated in the following terms:
“Although Section 20(3A) of the Social Security Act 1975 provides for voluntarily redundancy not to be deemed as leaving employment voluntarily in [the claimant’s) case he was not dismissed but agreed to leave in a mutual deal with his employer.”
The chairman’s dissent was expressed in the following terms:
“Mr. Locke disagreed with the members as he felt whatever the form of words used [the claimant] had agreed to accept the voluntary redundancy and the provision of Section 20(3A) which came into force on the 22 July 1985 would be rendered of no effect if because of volunteering to lose his job [the claimant] was said not to be dismissed. The employer confirmed that the result of the scheme was to reduce the work force and invited [the claimant] to accept severance terms after considering the response to the scheme from all the employees.”
6.	At first sight the majority decision of the tribunal may appear to be a masterpiece of compression but it is only necessary to look at the dissenting chairman’s reasons to see that both the findings and the reasons of the majority are too brief and are inadquate to deal with the issues raised by section 20(3A) of the Social Security Act 1975. Furthermore, having decided that section 20(3A) did not apply the tribunal ought to have considered and explained their conclusions on the question whether the claimant could show “just cause” within the meaning of section and the imposition of a period of disqualification of ten weeks is wholly unexplained.
7.	For these reasons the decision of the tribunal does not comply with the requirements of regulation 25(2)(b) of the Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1986 and must be set aside as erroneous in law. I have considered the evidence in the appeal papers and that given before me at the hearing and have come to the conclusion that there is sufficient to enable me to give the decision which the tribunal should have given and that it is not appropriate to remit the case for a further hearing. The facts before the adjudication officer, which I adopt, show that the claimant was employed at Rosyth from January 1954 to 18 March 1988 where the Dockyard was latterly under the management of Babcock Thorn PLC. In November 1987 the employers provided the employees with an opportunity to apply for “early severance”. They stated that this was in line with their previously declared plans to adjust the mix of skills within the Dockyard. (This involved slimming down the workforce of approximately 5,500 by some 200 workers a year over a five year period.) The claimant applied for early severance and was sent a letter inviting him to accept severance terms involving a lump sum and annual compensation. The claimant accepted these terms and his employment terminated on 18 March 1988. It is not in dispute that the severance arrangements were voluntary. The claimant however at one stage contended that he had not volunteered for early severance but there is in the appeal papers a letter from the claimant dated 11 January 1988 in which he confirms a telephone conversation of 7 January 1988 in which he expressed his decision to apply for early severance on the terms advised to him.
8.	In the claimant’s case he had been working as a professional and technical officer (electrical) supervising a gang of men engaged in electrical refitting work on conventional submarines in a particular centre at Rosyth Dockyard. It was apparent to him that he was working on the last two submarines in the yard’s current programme. He understood from subsequent contacts that the centre in question had been disbanded and also that there were fewer supervisors now employed at the yard. The steps by which the claimant’s employment and that of the others selected came to an end consisted of an invitation by the employers to the employees to make application for consideration for early severance, followed by an application by the employee to be considered for severance. Thereafter the company, having scrutinised the applications in the light of their anticipated work requirements chose those whom they were willing to release. They then invited such employees by letter to accept the financial terms of severance offered. That letter then called for an acceptance by the employee in which he acknowledged that he was leaving without statutory notice or pay in lieu of notice. In this claimant’s case the leaving date was specified not in that letter but separately later.
9.	 Although the word “redundancy” was studiously avoided by the employers in their communications I am entirely satisfied that the severances took place in a redundancy situation, both in the overall sense and in relation to this claimant, in that it is clear that the requirements of the employer’s business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind had ceased or diminished or were expected to cease or diminish within the meaning of section 81(2)(b) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. Section 81(2)(b) of that Act, which I shall call “the 1978 Act”, provides as follows:
“ . . (2) For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to-
(a)	. . . or
(b)	the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.”
10.	In considering whether or not the claimant is able to bring himself within the scope of section 20(3A) of the Social Security Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) it is convenient first to consider the position for the purposes of redundancy under the 1978 Act. Section 81 deals with employees dismissed by reason of redundancy. In terms of section 83(2), disregarding the situation in fixed term contracts or the case of constructive dismissal, and with immaterial exceptions, an employee is for the purposes of inter alia section 81, to be treated as dismissed by his employer if the contract under which he is employed is terminated by the employer. It is nevertheless clear that under those provisions there may be a dismissal by the employer by reason of redundancy notwithstanding that the employee concerned has agreed to be dismissed or has volunteered to be selected for redundancy. See Burton, Alton and Johnson Ltd v. Peck [1975] ICR 193, and Morley v. C. T. Morley Ltd [1985] ICR 499.
11.	However in the case of Birch and another v. University of Liverpool [1985] ICR 470 the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the presence of a redundancy situation ruled out the possibility of an agreed termination of a contract of employment not involving a dismissal. Further, the court ruled that dismissal for the purposes of section 83(2)(a), the definition point in the present case, meant unilateral termination, with or without consent, and the court distinguished termination by mutual agreement. Notwithstanding the making of this somewhat narrow distinction the court emphasised that it was necessary to look at the substance rather than the form of the transaction in order to determine if there was a dismissal. Bearing these considerations in mind I would have to conclude, following Birch, that for the purposes of the 1978 Act the claimant in this case was not dismissed by his employers by reason of redundancy; instead, although there was a redundancy situation, the voluntary severance achieved by the steps outlined in paragraph 7 above represented a termination of the claimants contract by mutual consent.
12.	It is necessary now to consider if those employment law principles are wholly incorporated by section 20(3A) of the 1975 Act. It was argued by Mr. Milliken in effect that the reference in that subsection to the 1978 Act extended only to the definition of the words “by reason of redundancy” and that the word “dismissed” should be given the ordinary non‑technical meaning of “sent away”. I was referred on behalf of the adjudication officer to the unreported case on Commissioner’s file CWU/10/1986 in which the Commissioner clearly took the view that the word “dismissed” fell to be construed in accordance with the 1978 Act although he did not consider any argument to the contrary. The words “dismissed” and “dismissal” do not so far as I am aware, bear any special meaning in social security law and are not defined in the 1975 Act. Sub-section 20(3A) of course expressly extends to persons who have volunteered or agreed to be dismissed, but as shown above a person can be held to have been dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy within the meaning of the 1978 Act notwithstanding that he had volunteered or agreed to be dismissed. There is nothing to indicate that Parliament intended the provisions of section 20(3A) to apply to a different range of cases from that to which the same words would apply for purposes of the 1978 Act. In my judgment the word “dismissed” must be given the meaning which it has for the purposes of redundancy under the 1978 Act and I therefore reject Mr. Milliken’s submission.
13.	I accordingly hold that in the circumstances of this case the claimant was not dismissed by reason of redundancy within the meaning of section 20(3A) and is unable to take advantage of the exemption conferred by that sub‑section. In those circumstances it is for the claimant to establish that he had “just cause” for leaving his employment voluntarily when he did. The claimant stated during investigation of his claim that he did not accept the employer’s offer of early severance until it was apparent that his section would be closed down. However it is agreed that the severances were voluntary. It follows that if the claimant had not volunteered his employment would have required to continue elsewhere in the yard. It is clear from the evidence before me that the claimant made efforts to obtain alternative employment in advance of the date of severance. He did in fact obtain other employment but only after a short interval of unemployment. It is clear that the employers wished to reduce their number of supervisors and there was a substantial financial inducement to the claimant to accept voluntary severance. In considering “just cause” I have to have regard to the interests of the general body of contributors underwriting the National Insurance Fund as well as to the rights of the claimant as an individual contributor who wished to claim benefit. See Crewe v. Anderson [1982] 1 WLR 1209, Court of Appeal. I am unable to find “just cause” established by the claimant in the circumstances of this case. He is therefore liable to disqualification in terms of section 20(1)(a). The maximum period of such disqualification at the material time was the period of 13 weeks. The circumstances indicated above are not in my judgment such as to merit disqualification for the maximum period. Having considered the whole circumstances I conclude that disqualification for a period of six weeks is appropriate. My decision is accordingly as set out in paragraph 1 above.
14.	The appeal of the claimant is allowed to the limited extent indicated in this decision.

Date: 20 March 1991	(signed) Mr. J. G. Mitchell	Commissioner