19 1976

IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL

ON APPEAL FROM THE NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN:

THE COUNCIL OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ASHFIELD

Appellant

AND:

NORMAN JAMES PEEL JOYCE, THOMAS WYNN HEANEY, AUSTIN KEITH SMITH, JOHN NELSON JOYCE and FRANCIS ROBERT HEANEY

Respondents

CASE FOR THE APPELLANT

SOLICITORS FOR THE APPELLANT

G.M. Laurence Larkins & Hazard, 247 George Street, SYDNEY SOLICITORS FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Allen Allen & Hemsley, 2 Castlereagh Street, SYDNEY

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RECORD

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

1. This is an appeal as of right from
a final order of the Court of Appeal
of the Supreme Court of New South
Wales (Reynolds, Hutley and Samuels
J.J.A.) made on the 17th July, p.189
1975 on a case stated by the Land
and Valuation Court. p.131
2. The Land and Valuation Court

(Hardie J.) had allowed appeals by
the respondents against rates
p.121
levied by the appellant for the
p.132 L1.712
1966 and 1968 years in respect of
L1.22-27
land owned by the respondents on
the grounds that the land in question was exempt from rating pursuant

to both sec. 132 (1) (d) ("land which belongs to any ... public charity, and is used or occupied by the ... charity ... for the purposes thereof) and sec. 132(1) (h)(i) ("land which belongs to a religious body and which is occupied and used in connection with - (i) any church or other building used or occupied for public worship") of the Local Government Act 1919 as amended (the Act).

3. The Court of Appeal ordered that

Question 1 in the stated case be p.189

answered as follows:-

"The subject land is exempt from rating by virtue of section 132 (1)(d) of (the Act) but not by virtue of section 132 (1)(h)(i)."

and further ordered that the appellant's appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

p.189

ing Church of Jesus Christ of

Latter Day Saints v. Henning (1964)

A.C. 420 that the main building on
the land was not used or occupied

p.178p.180

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for public worship, and therefor
the respondents claim to exemption
under secion 132 (1)(h)(i) was not
made out. The respondents have not
cross appealed from the Order of the
Court of Appeal, and the appellant
has been informed that the respondents will not rely upon section 132
(1)(h)(i) before the Board.

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5. The issue before the Board in this appeal, therefore, is whether the subject land was exempted from rating in the years in question by section 132 (1)(d) of the Act. The full text of this paragraph is as follows:

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"(d) land which belongs to any public hospital, public benevolent institution, or public charity, and is used or occupied by the hospital institution or charity as the case may be for the purposes thereof;"

6. The respondents are the owners of a p.131 L.32 p.132 L.5 large parcel of land within the

Municipality on part of which stands p.132 L1.13-21

a Church Hall used for religious services by a religious body known as the Exclusive Brethren. The remaining land was in the main vacant land used by the persons attending services in the Hall for parking their motor vehicles. The respondents held the land on which the Church Hall stood on the terms of a Trust Deed dated 27th November, 1945, which provided

inter alia:

p.133 L1 13-17

p.133 L1.13-17

p.141 L1.15-23

"The trustees may use the
Hall or permit the Hall to
be used for meetings therein of Christians for religious purposes or for any
other charitable purpose or
purposes which the trustees
may from time to time in
their absolute discretion
select but for no other purposes."

7. In earlier proceedings between these parties the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales had held in 1959

(Joyce v. Ashfield Municipal Council

4 L.G.R.A. 195) that the land on

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4.

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which the Hall stood was exempt from rating pursuant to section 132(1)(d) of the Act.

- 8. In the rating years in question in p.133 L1.1320
 this appeal the appellant did not
 levy rates on the land upon which p.131 L.32
 the Hall stood, but only on the adjoining vacant land used for car p.134 L1.1825
 parking and on other adjoining
 land occupied by other buildings.
 - 9. One of the issues which were liti- p.123 L.34 gated in the Land and Valuation p.128 L.9

 Court was whether or not the lands in question were held upon the trusts of the Deed of 27th November, 1945.
- 20 10. Hardie J. in his reasons for judgment said:

"It is clear in my view that p.127 L.16 p.128 L.9 the lands are held by the trustees either on the general charitable trusts as expressed in the Deed of November 1945 or on trust for use in connection with the adjoining hall so long as it continues to be used by the Brethren for religious worship

and related activities. In my view it matters not. for the purposes of the appellants! case which of these inferences should be drawn from the oral and documentary evidence. If the relevant trusts are those specified in the Deed of November 1945 then the decision in the earlier litigation (Supra 4 L.G.R.A. 195) establishes the claim of the appellants. If on the other hand the trusts are of a more limited nature referable to the use of the hall by the members of the particular sect to which the trustees belong then in my view the land qualifies for the exemption

The Court of Appeal held that the 11. lands in question were not exempt from rating under section 132(1)(h) p.189 (i). Now in this further appeal to

(h)(i).

specified in section 132(1)

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the Board the appellant challenges
the correctness of the 1959 decision of the Full Court in <u>Joyce</u> v.
Ashfield Municipal Council (above)
that the trusts of the Deed of November 1945 and the use of the land
attract the exemption conferred by
section 132(1)(d) of the Act on
"public charities."

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BASIS OF APPEAL

12. The appellant submits that the decision of the Full Court in <u>Joyce</u>

v. <u>Ashfield Municipal Council</u> (1959)

4 L.G.R.A. 195 was erroneous, and should now be overruled for the following reasons:

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(a) The expression "public charity" found in section 132(1)(d) of the Act is not a technical legal expression which attracts the rule in 1.R.C. v. Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 at 580 where Lord Macnaghten said:

"... according to the Law
of England a technical
meaning is attached to the

word 'charity' and to the word 'charitable' in such expressions as 'charitable uses,' 'charitable trusts' or 'charitable purposes.'"

- (b) In any event the context in which the expression "public charity" is found is section 132(1)(d) and section 132 as a whole are sufficient to displace any prima facie presumption that the word 'charity' in section 132(1)(d) is used in a technical legal sense.
- (c) In its context in section 132
 (1)(d) of the Act "public charity" means an institution devoted to the relief of human poverty and distress.

(d) The dictum of the Judicial

Committee in Adamson v.

Melbourne Board of Works (1929)

A.C. 142 at 147 that the decision of the Judicial Committee in Chesterman v. Federal

Commissioner of Taxation (1926)

A.C. 128 must be regarded as

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having overruled the earlier decision of the High Court in Swinburne v. F.C.T. (1919) 27 CLR 377 was incorrect and should not be followed.

- (e) The principles established by

 Swinburne v. F.C.T. (above)

 remain good law, and are

 applicable to the construction of section 132(1)(d)

 of the Act.
- in following and applying
 the dictum in Adamson's case
 and the decision in
 Chesterman's case when deciding Salvation Army Property Trust v. Shire of
 Ferntree Gully (1952) 85
 CLR 159 (an appeal from
 Victoria).
- have been in error in holding that the dictum in

 Adamson's case, the decision
 of the Judicial Committee in

 Chesterman's case and the decision of the High Court in

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the <u>Salvation Army</u> case (above)
bound them to give the expression "charity" in section 132(1)
(d) of the Act its technical
legal meaning.

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(h) The 1959 decision of the Full Court in Joyce v. Ashfield Municipal Council in any event is incorrect because a group of private individuals holding real estate upon general discretionary charitable trusts cannot constitute a "public charity", and having regard to the terms of the trusts upon which the hall was held the land was not used or occupied by a public charity but by the individuals who attended religious services at the hall.

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13. Neither the High Court nor the Privy

Council has hitherto been called

upon to consider that part of section

132(1)(d) of the Act which exempts

from rating land belonging to a

"public charity".

14. As Lord Denning speaking for the

Judicial Committee in Newcastle

City Council v. Royal Newcastle

Hospital (1959) A.C. 248 at 254

said:

levied in New South Wales,
not on the occupiers as in
England, but on the owners;
and they are calculated, not
by reference to the annual
value as in England, but
by reference to the unimproved capital value: and
all land, occupied or unoccupied, is subject to the
payment of rates unless it
can be brought within one of

the statutory exceptions."

"It should be noticed at

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HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF SECTION PRIOR TO ADAMSON'S CASE

15. So far as relevant the Local Government Act 1919 came into operation on 1st January, 1920. Section 132(1) as then enacted is set out in Appendix A. At that time section 132(1)(d) contained a requirement that the use

and occupation of the land be solely by the public charity etc. for the purposes thereof. This requirement was removed by Act No. 33 of 1927.

alia the Local Government Act 1906
and the Local Government (Amending)
Act 1908 which contained the exemptions from rating which were in
force immediately before the commencement of the Act. The relevant
section of the earlier legislation
was section 131(1), the full text
of which is set out in Appendix B.
Section 131(1)(b) of the earlier
legislation exempted from rating -

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"cemeteries, public hospitals, benevolent institutions and buildings used exclusively for public charitable purposes."

17. It is submitted that a comparison between the exempting sections of the 1906 and 1919 Acts leads to a conclusion that in 1919 the N.S.W.

Parliament substituted an exemption in favour of "public charity" for the

earlier exemption in respect of

"... buildings used exclusively

for public charitable purposes"

in order to limit the scope of

the exemption hitherto available.

- 18. In these circumstances it is submitted that the expression "public charity" in section 132(1)(d) of

 the 1919 Act should not be construed as if it were equivalent to "public charitable purposes" or "charitable purposes".
 - 19. Nevertheless that is the effect of the N.S.W. decisions which have been given on this part of section 132(1)(d) since 1929.
- 20. In Swinburne v. F.C.T. (1920) 27

 CLR 377 the High Court held that

 in section 18(1) of the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act

 1915 as amended the expression

 "public charitable institution"

 meant a public institution which

 was charitable in the sense that

 it afforded relief to persons in

 necessitous or helpless circumstances. It was held that the

tion excluded the principle stated by Lord Macnaghten in I.R.C. v. Pemsel quoted above, and that the word "charitable" in that context did not bear its technical legal meaning.

- 21. Between 1923 and 1929, influenced

 at least in part by Swinburne's

 case, the N.S.W. Courts in a

 series of decisions held or assumed

 that the expression "public charity"

 in section 132(1)(d) comprehended

 an institution devoted to the relief

 of persons in necessitous or help
 less circumstances. The relevant

 decisions were -
 - (i) <u>Farrell</u> v. <u>Bathurst Municipal</u>

 <u>Council</u> (1923) 6 LGR 108;
 - (ii) Meaney v. Waratah Municipal
 Council (1923) 6 LGR 127;
 - (iii) Whatmore v. St. Peters

 Municipal Council (1926) 8

 LGR 42;
 - (iv) Fleming v. Randwick Municipal
 Council (1928) 9 LGR 61, and
 - (v) Randwick Municipal Council v.

 <u>Kessell</u> (1929) 9 LGR 86.

- 22. During this period the High Court reached similar conclusions on other legislation. See -
 - (i) Kelly v. Municipal Council
 of Sydney (1920) 28 CLR 203;
 - (ii) Christ College Trust v. City
 of Hobart (1928) 40 CLR 308,
 and
- 10 (iii) Roman Catholic Archbishop of

 Sydney v. Metropolitan Water

 etc. Board (1928) 40 CLR 472.

CHESTERMAN'S CASE AND ADAMSON'S CASE

held in Chesterman v. F.C.T. 32 CLR
362 that in section 8(5) of the
Estate Duty Assessment Act 19141916 (Commonwealth) the expression
"charitable purposes" was used in
its popular and not in its technical legal sense. At that time
section 8(5) of that Act provided -

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"Estate Duty shall not be assessed or payable upon so much of the estate as is devised or bequeathed ... for religious, scientific, charitable or public educational purposes."

24. However, on appeal to the Privy Council the decision of the High Court was reversed. Chesterman v. F.C.T. (1926) A.C. 128. Board rejected the respondent's arguments based on tautology, and held that although there was overlapping between the categories referred to in section 8(5) the 10 reference to "charitable ... purposes" added something to the other words, and there was nothing in the subsection as a whole which required that a non technical meaning be given to that expression. The advice prepared by Lord Wrenbury did not refer to Swinburne's case.

20 25. Then in 1928 Adamson v. Melbourne

etc. Board of Works (1929) A.C. 142

was decided. The appeal involved

the construction of section 94 of

the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board

of Works Act 1915 (Vic.) which

granted an exemption from water

rates in favour of "charitable

institutions". Anglin C.J. speaking

for the Board said at page 147:

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"... it is obvious that, although Swinburne's case is not expressly adverted to in the report of the Chesterman case it must be regarded as overruled by that decision. Indeed the principle of construction upon which the Swinburne case rests is directly opposed to that which forms the foundation of the judgment of this Board in Chesterman's case."

- timate decision was that on the true construction of the section the rating exemption was only

 available to charitable institutions which were owned or conducted by a municipal council, so that the Lost Dogs! Home which had claimed the benefit of the exemption was not entitled to it.
 - 27. The appellant does not in any way challenge the correctness of the decision in Chesterman's case.

However, it does submit that the passage from the advice of the Board in Adamson's case which has been quoted above was not necessary for the decision and was erroneous.

28. The principle of construction on which the Swinburne decision rested is summarised in the majority judgment at 27 CLR page 384 where after citing Lord Macnaghten's well known remarks in Pemsel's case they said:

"But no technical signification has attached itself at all events in
Australia, to the expression "public charitable
institution". We are
not to pull the phrase
to pieces and consider
the various meanings of
its component parts but
we have to read the composite expression as
written ...".

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER ADAMSON'S CASE

- 29. In 1952 came the High Court decision in Salvation Army (Victoria) Property Trust v. Shire of Ferntree Gully 85 CLR 159. In that case it was held that land used for a training farm for delinquent boys was 10 used "exclusively for charitable purposes" within the meaning of Section 249(1)(b)(ix) of the Local Government Act 1946 (Vic.), and that the expression "charitable purposes" in that section should be given its technical legal meaning.
- 30. In a joint judgment Dixon,
 Williams and Webb J.J. applied
 the Privy Council decision in
 Chesterman's case and rejected
 an argument for the respondent
 that Parliament must have intended to use the word "charitable" in its popular sense,
 because the other construction
 would lead to redundancy and
 tautology. At page 175 their

Honours said after referring to Chesterman's case -

"There is in this case, as there was in that case, no sufficient indication of intention that the word "charitable" should be given any other than its legal meaning. There has been, perhaps, too great a tendency in the Australian Courts, as the Privy Council rather hinted in Adamson v. Melbourne etc. Board of Works to depart from the legal meaning of "charitable" on rather slight grounds. Our Courts in the future should be slow to do this unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intention."

31. In a separate concurring judgment

Fullagar J. at page 182 said that

the relvant passage from the judg
ment of the Board in Adamson's case

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had the force of a dictum only.

He went on to say:

"Moreover there is much to
be said for the view that
making full allowance for
Chesterman's case, the
actual decision in Swinburne's
case was nevertheless
correct."

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He then held that <u>Chesterman's</u> case established that the legislative context, and the existence of overlapping exemptions in that case were not sufficient to displace the prima facie rule.

- 32. The text of section 249 of the
 Victorian Act which was before
 the High Court in the Salvation
 Army case is set out in Appendix C.
- 33. Then in 1954 for the first time since Adamson's case the construction of the expression "public charity" in section 132 (1)(d) of the Act was squarely raised for decision in Y.M.C.A.

 v. Sydney City Council (1954)

20 L.G.R. 34 before Sugerman J.

His Honour held at pages 40-43

that Chesterman's case, Adamson's case and the Salvation Army case required him to hold that the word "charity" in section 132(1)

(d) should be given its technical legal meaning.

10 34. Sugerman J. stated the conclusion he felt constrained to reach in the Y.M.C.A. case at page 41 -

"In construing section 132
(1)(d), we must, therefore,
take the word "charity" in
the phrase "public charity"
in its legal sense unless a
contrary intention appears;
Pemsel's case, and the indications of a contrary intention must be clear;
Salvation Army (Vic.) case.
"Charity" and "charitable"
are primarily to be read
thus, not only when used
alone or in such expressions

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as "charitable purposes",

but also when used in such

expressions as "public charitable institution" or "public charity".

The appellant submits that his Honour was in error in holding that Chesterman's case, Adamson's case, and the Salvation Army case compelled him to reach this conclusion.

35. His Honour continued at page 41-42:

"We are not at liberty to approach the collocation of words "public hospital, Public benevolent institution, or public charity" from the standpoint of enquiring what is their natural or ordinary or popular meaning when they are thus gathered together in paragraph (d), and thereby segregated from the other subjects of exemption set out in their separate paragraphs. Nor may we conclude that, making such an approach, their collocation

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and segregation in paragraph (d),

the word "public" which runs
through them, the eleemosynary
character of a public benevolent institution and the
eleemosynary ingredient in
the idea of a public hospital ... sufficiently indicate
that the expression "public
charity" was also intended
to have an eleemosynary
reference."

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36. His Honour then proceeded to examine some of the other paragraphs of section 132(1) and said at page 42:

"Thus it might be enquired what purpose is served by the words of paragraph (h)

(i) -

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'land which belongs

to a religious body

and which is occupied

and used in connection

with any church or other

building used or occup
ied for public worship!
if this same subject matter is

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in any event covered by the exemption in paragraph (d) construed as extending generally to "charity" in its legal sense. And it might be enquired why the legislature should have been at pains to specify with precision this and other purposes of use of land owned by religious bodies which are necessary to gain exemption if it intended that "public charity" in paragraph (d) should have its legal meaning so as to confer exemption in respect of this purpose and of all such other religious purposes as are also charitable. As between paragraph (d) and paragraph (h)(i) there is not an overlap of the two exemptions with nonoverlapping margins covered only by one or other of the exemptions such as occurred

in Chesterman's case; the overlap of paragraph (h)(i) by paragraph (d) is complete. The answer to these difficulties also is that so far as this Court is concerned the matter is concluded by authority."

- 10 In Joyce v. Ashfield Municipal Coun-37. cil (1959) 4 L.G.R.A. 195 the Full Court followed the Y.M.C.A. case but Walsh J. (as he then was) at pages 211-212 after expressing doubts about the correctness of the construction of section 132(1)(d) adopted in the Y.M.C.A. case said that he felt constrained to follow it because of the authorities in the Privy Council and the High 20 Court to which Sugerman J. had referred.
 - 38. Subsequently in McGarvie Smith

 Institute v. Campbelltown Municipal

 Council (1965) 83 W.N. (part 1) 191

 at 192-194 Else-Mitchell J. ex
 pressed his independent opinion that

 the result in the Y.M.C.A. case was

not correct, but he too felt constrained to follow it. Further reference to this question was made in the Court of Appeal in <u>Joyce</u> v. Commissioner of Land Tax (1973)

1 N.S.W. L.R. 402 at 404, 409-410 and 417.

39. Section 132(1) as in force through-10 out the 1966 and 1968 rating years is set out in Appendix D.

1959 JOYCE DECISION INCORRECT IN ANY EVENT

- 40. Even if the Y.M.C.A. decision is correct there is still no "public charity" in this case within the meaning of the section. At best the land is held by trustees for charitable purposes and this does not establish the existence of a 20 "public charity" for the purposes of section 132(1)(d). In our submission the mere execution of the Deed of Trust of November 1945 and the vesting of real estate in the trustees of that trust cannot suffice to constitute a "public charity".
- p.139-p.151 p.133 L1.13-

41. There is in the present case no

"public charity" to which the land can be said to belong and there is no "public charity" which uses or occupies the land for its purposes.

- 42. The fact that the trustees under this trust use the land or permit 10 it to be used for a purpose that is within the charitable trusts on which the land is held does not constitute use or occupation by a public charity for the purposes of that charity within the meaning of section 132(1)(d).
- 43. Other paragraphs of section 132(1) specifically exempt land vested in trustees, and used for some particular purpose, but section 132(1) 20 (d) contains no express reference to trustees, or to land vested in trustees. The reference in the paragraph to land which belongs to a public charity, and is used or occupied by the charity for the purposes thereof indicates in our submission that there must be something more than a mere charitable trust and user of the land 30

p.134 L1.23p.125 L1.23-

in accordance with that trust before there can be a "public charity"
within the section.

14. In any event the 1945 Deed does not p.141 limit the charitable trusts on which the land is held to "public" charitable trusts. Without such an express limitation the land cannot be held to "belong" to "public charity" so as to fall within section 132(1)(d). Mere occupation or user by the public charity do not fulfil the requirements of the paragraph.

STARE DECISIS NOT APPLICABLE

- 45. The questions in issue in this appeal are not covered by any decision of either the Privy

 20 Council or the High Court which is precisely in point, and it has been clear ever since 1954 that the decisions on section 132(1)

 (d) were open to challenge in an appeal to the Board or to the High Court.
 - 46. In any event the decision of the House of Lords in Campbell College

Belfast v. Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland (1964)

1 W.L.R. 912 establishes that the doctrine of stare decisis is not relevant in the field of rating law because the rating charge occurs afresh each year and an incorrect basis of rating should not be perpetuated.

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47. The appellant, therefore, submits that the appeal should be allowed for the following (amongst other) -

REASONS

Council in Adamson v.

Melbourne etc. Board of

Works (1929) A.C. 142 at

147 was not correct and

should not be followed.

- 2. The decisions of the Privy

 Council in Chesterman v.

 F.C.T. (1926) A.C. 128 and

 in Adamson's case (above) do

 not govern the construction

 of section 132(1)(d) of the

 Act.
- 3. Salvation Army Property Trust
 v. Shire of Ferntree Gully
 30.

(1952) 85 CLR 159 should be overruled in relation to the construction of the rating exemption there in question.

- 4. In any event the Salvation

 Army case does not govern

 the construction of section

 132(1)(d) of the N.S.W. Act.
- 5. Y.M.C.A. v. Sydney City
 Council (1954) 20 LGR 35
 and Joyce v. Ashfield
 Municipal Council (1959)
 4 LGRA 195 were wrongly
 decided and should be overruled.
- Macnaghten in I.R.C. v.

 Pemsel (1891) A.C. 531 at
 580 is not applicable to
 the construction of the expression "public charity" in
 section 132(1)(d) of the Act.
- 7. Section 132(1) as a whole,
 and paragraph (d) in particular indicate with sufficient
 clarity a legislative intention that the word "charity"

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in paragraph (d) should not be given its technical legal meaning.

- 8. A comparison between the form of the rating exemption in favour of charities in force immediately prior to the passing of the 1919

 Act and the form of section 132(1)(d) establishes that the legislature used the word "charity" in its narrower eleemosynary sense, and not in its technical sense in section 132(1)(d) of the Act.
- 9. Joyce v. Ashfield Municipal
 Council (1959) 4 L.G.R.A. 195
 in any event was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
- 10. The present case is covered by the decision of the Court of Appeal in <u>I.R.C.</u> v. <u>Scott</u> (1892) 2 QB 152 rather than by the decision of the Privy

Council in Chesterman v.

F.C.T. (1926) A.C. 128.

K.R. HANDLEY Q.C.

NOEL A. HEMMINGS

COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT

APPENDIX A

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1919 (NSW)

Section 132(1) All land in a municipality or shire (whether the property
of the Crown or not) shall be ratable except -

Definition of ratable land.

cf. L.G. Acts, 1906-8, s.131

- (a) land which is vested in the

 Crown or in a public body or

 in trustees and is used for

 a public cemetery: and
 - (b) land which is vested in the

 Crown or in a public body or

 in trustees and is used for
 a common: and
 - (c) land which is vested in the

 Crown or in a public body or

 in trustees and is used for

 a public reserve; and

(d) land which belongs to any
public hospital, public
benevolent institution, or
public charity, and is used
or occupied by the hospital
institution or charity as
the case may be solely for

(e) land which is vested in the Crown or in a public body or.:

the purposes thereof; and

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in trustees and is used solely for the purposes of a free public library; and

(f) land which is vested in the
University of Sydney or in
a college thereof and is
used or occupied by the
University or college as
the case may be solely for
the purposes thereof; and

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(g) land (other than land which is dedicated as a State forest or reserved for the growth of timber) which is the property of the Crown and is not occupied or is occupied only by public works which are in course of construction by or for the Crown; and

- (h) land which is occupied by and is used directly in connection with a church or other building which is used or occupied solely for public worship; and
- (i) land which is a public place.

APPENDIX B

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1906-1908 (NSW)

Section 131(1) All land, whether the property of Her Majesty or not, shall be ratable, except the following descriptions of land and the land occupied by and used in connection with the buildings hereinafter mentioned:-

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- (a) Commons, public parks, and public reserves not held under lease or license;
- (b) cemeteries, public hospitals, benevolent institutions, and buildings used exclusively for public charitable purposes;

- (c) churches and other buildings used exclusively for for public worship, and free public libraries;
- (d) lands the property of the

 Crown which are not occupied

 or on which any public works

 are in course of construction

 by or for the Crown;
- (e) lands vested in the University of Sydney, or in the colleges

thereof, and occupied and used by such university or colleges, or any of them, solely for the purposes of education; and

(f) lands held under lease or agreement for lease from the Crown for purposes of oyster culture.

APPENDIX C

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1946 (Vic.)

- Section 249(1) All land shall be ratable property within the meaning of this Act save as is next hereinafter excepted (that is to say):-
 - (a) Land the property of His

 Majesty which is unoccupied

 or used for public purposes.
- 10 (b) Land used exclusively for -
 - (i) Commons
 - (ii) Mines
 - (iii) Public Worship
 - (iv) Mechanics institutes
 - (v) Public Libraries
 - (vi) Cemeteries
 - (vii) Primary schools in
 which education is
 given free to the
 scholars
 - (viii) Institutions or schools

 for technical instruc
 tion which receive in

 aid of their funds any

 sums from the consoli-
 - (ix) Charitable purposes

dated revenue

(x) Lands dedicated by the trustees of agricultural

colleges as sites for agricultural colleges or experimental farms.

- (c) Land vested in or in the occupation of or held in trust for or under the management and control of -
 - (i) Any municipality or the council thereof, or,
 - (ii) any authority under the
- (d) Land vested in fee in -
 - (i) The Victorian Railways
 Commissioners.
 - (ii) The Minister of Public
 Instruction.
 - (iii) The Board of Land and Works.
 - (iv) The Commissioners of the Melbourne Harbour Trust.
 - (v) The Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works.
 - (vi) The Commissioners of the Geelong Harbour Trust.
 - (vii) The Geelong Waterworks and Sewerage Trust.
- (e) Land held in trust and used exclusively for the purposes of -

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- (i) a memorial to persons who served in the war which commenced in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fourteen or the war which commenced in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-Nine or any continuation thereof;
- (ii) a club the members of
 which are persons who
 served in either or both
 of the said wars and no
 others.
- (f) Land in the occupation of or under the management and control of any religious body and upon which is situated any hall or other building used in connection with any church exclusively for any purposes connected with or in support of the objects of such religious body.
- (g) Land vested in or held in trust for any religious body and used exclusively for either or both of the following purposes:-
 - (i) As a residence of a practising Minister of religion;

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- (ii) Education and training of persons to be ministers of religion.
- (h) Land in the occupation of or under the management and control of any committee or managers of any hospital (being a subsidized institution under the Hospitals and Charities Acts) if upon that land there is established a hospital or part of a hospital conducted by such committee or managers in association with such subsidized institution and that land is part of or contiguous with the land upon which such subsidized institution is established.
- 20 (2) Land shall not be deemed not to be used exclusively for any of the purposes referred to in sub-paragraphs (iii), (vii), (viii) or (ix) of paragraph (b) of subsection (l) of this section by reason only of the fact that any building on such land is used not only for any purposes referred to in the said sub-paragraphs but also for

any purpose connected with or in support of the objects of any religious educational or charitable body or authority occupying or controlling such land.

APPENDIX D

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1919-1967 (NSW)

Section 132(1) All land in a municipality or shire (whether the property
of the Crown or not) shall be ratable except -

Definition of ratable land.

cf.L.G. Acts. 1906-8, s.131

- (a) land which is vested in the

 Crown or in a public body or

 in trustees and is used for a

 public cemetery: and
- (b) land which is vested in the

 Crown or in a public body or

 in trustees and is used for
 a common: and
- (c) land which is vested in the

 Crown or in a public body or

 in trustees and is used for

 a public reserve; and

(d) land which belongs to any
public hospital, public
benevolent institution, or
public charity, and is used
or occupied by the hospital
institution or charity as the
case may be for the purposes

(e) land which is vested in the Crown or in a public body or

thereof; and

Amended, Act No. 33 1927, s.7 (d)(i)

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in trustees and is used solely for the purposes of a free public library; and (f) land which is vested in the University of Sydney or in a college thereof and is used or occupied by the University or college as the case may be solely for 10 the purposes thereof; and (fi) land which is vested in the New paragraph University of New England added, Act No. 34 1953, s.40 or in a college thereof and is used or occupied by the University or college as the case may be solely for the purposes thereof; and (fii) 20 land which is vested in the New paragraph added, Act No. Macquarie University, or in 29 1964. s.32 a college thereof, and is used or occupied by the University or college, as the case may be, solely for the purposes thereof; and (fiii) land which is vested in the New paragraph 30 University of Newcastle or added, Act No. 72 1964, s.36 in a college thereof and is used or occupied by the

the case may be, solely for the purposes thereof; and (g) land owned by the Crown, not Substituted paragraph, Act No.65, 1931, being s.4 (b)(i)(i) land held under a lease from the Crown by any 10 person for private purposes: Amended Act (ii) land occupied and used No.35 1937, s.3 and Secby the Crown in connec- ond Schedule tion with any industrial undertaking: and Substituted (h) land which belongs to a reparagraph, Act 20 No.65 1931, s.8 (a) ligious body and which is occupied and used in connection with -(i) any church or other building used or occupied for public worship; Amended Act (ii)any building used or No.35, 1937, 30 s.3 and secoccupied solely as ond schedule the residence of a minister of religion in connection with any such church or building;

University or college, as

- (iii) any building used or occupied for the purpose of religious teaching or training:
- (iv) any building used or occupied solely as the residence of the official head and/or the assistant official head of any religious body in the State of New South Wales or in any diocese within that State; and
- (i) land which is a public place; and

(j) land which belongs to and
which is occupied and used
in connection with any
school registered under the
Bursary Endowment Act 1912,
or any certified school
under the Public Instruction
(Amendment) Act, 1916, including any playground which
belongs to and is used in

New paragraph added, Act No. 33 1927, s.7 (d)(iii)

Substituted paragraph, Act No.41 1928, s.6 (b)

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Amended Act No.65 1931, s.8 (b): Act No.7 1962, s.3 (1)

connection with any such

school and any building

occupied as a residence by

any caretaker, servant, or teacher of any such school which belongs to and is used in connection with the school; and

(k) land reserved for any purpose under a scheme prescribed under Part XIIA of this Act where such land has been acquired by a responsible authority in accordance with the provi-

sions of the scheme and is

not land held under a lease

from the responsible author-

ity for private purposes.

New paragraph added Ibid