Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the Appeal of Goshain Tota Ram vs. Rajah Rickmunee Bullub, from the late Sudder Dewanny Adambut, North-Western Province at Agra; delivered the 28th June, 1869.

Present:

SIR JAMES W. COLVILE. LOND JUSTICE SELWIN. LOND JUSTICE GIFFARDO

SIR LAWRENCE PREL

THIS is an Appeal against the concurrent decision of the two Courts below, which have found that the Respondent, the Plaintiff in the action, is entitled to be restored rather to an office in the nature of the headship of a Temple, than to the possession of lands in the ordinary sense in which lands are sued for in ejectment, and that the title set up by the Appellant cannot prevail against him.

Their Lordships have so constantly, that it is hardly necessary to repeat it, said that in such circumstances they will never disturb the concurrent decision of both Courts below upon a question of fact, unless it very clearly appears that there has been some misearriage of justice, some mistrial, or that the conclusion is very plainly erroneous.

In the present case it is contended that the documentary evidence which has been put in by the Piaintiff in the suit—by the Respondent on this Appeal—was improperly admitted. It does not seem to their Lordships that that is the case, or, at least, that there has been such an admission of evidence as would be fatal to the decision of the Courts below. No doubt the evidence was not, in accordance with the new code of procedure, brought in at the time of filing the plaint. It was brought in at two subsequent periods. There seems therefore to have been an irregularity in that respect, which is adverted to in the Judgment of the Sudder Court.

Their Lordships, however, do not find that the 39th clause of Act VIII. of 1859 makes the admission of any documentary evidence that is not so brought in, so improper as to be a ground of appeal against the ultimate determination of the cause by the Court which has admitted it. On the contrary, what that clause at the end of it says is:—"Any document not produced in Court by "the Plaintiff when the plaint is presented, shall "not be received in evidence on his behalf at the "hearing of the suit, without the sanction of the "Court."

In the present case there seems to their Lordships to be abundant proof that the evidence was received with the sanction of the Court. A great part of it (some of the documents and accounts being in the Bengalee language) seem to have been referred to a subordinate officer, an Ameen, for inspection and verification, and it was ultimately acted on by the Court. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that if the sanction of the Court can purge the original defect, it has been so purged.

Their Lordships sitting here, have not been in the habit of determining appeals upon the mere fact that certain evidence may have been improperly admitted. It has always been a rule of this Committee to do substantial justice between the parties, to take the Record as it is sent over, and to see whether there is sufficient evidence on the whole record to justify the conclusion to which the Court below have come. The Sudder Court, although in these cases they adverted to the irregularity in the proceedings of the principal Sudder Ameen, have expressed their opinion that the Defendant was not ultimately prejudiced by the course which had been pursued.

The contention on the side of the Appellant is that this is in the nature of an action of ejectment, and that there is really no evidence whatever of the title of the Respondent, who, being Plaintiff in the cause, was bound to make out the title. It appears, however, to their Lordships that there was ample evidence to go to the Jury that the persons who actually resided in the Temple were the mere agents of the Rajah Gourbullub, and that

there was also ample evidence to go to the Jury that Rajah Gourbullub was the adopted son of the person whom he claimed to represent. In that state of things their Lordships think that the burthen of proof was properly treated as shifted upon the Defendant, and the transaction upon which he relies seems to their Lordships, as it seemed to the Courts below, to be one of a suspicious character. Both those Courts have found that it was not a true transaction, and that even if the instrument had been really executed by the woman with a knowledge of its contents, no title to the Temple would have passed thereunder. Their Lordships are not prepared to say that either of these conclusions is wrong.

Under these circumstances their Lordships see no grounds for disturbing the decision of the Courts below, and must humbly recommend Her Majesty to dismiss this appeal with costs.

