

BL O-479-17

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO 3146197
BY BRAND FINANCIAL TRAINING LTD

AND

OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER NO 406980
BY THE FINANCIAL TIMES LIMITED

Background

1. Application 3146197 has a filing date of 25 January 2016, stands in the name of Brand Financial Training Ltd (“the applicant”) and, following an amendment to its specification, seeks registration of the trade mark **brandft** for the following services:

Class 41

Training; Training and education services; Training courses; Training services; Training consultancy; Training of financial personnel; Training services relating to finance; Training courses (provision of-); all being by the provision of technical learning resources, including, but not limited to, mock exams, video training, audio training, workbooks, calculations, based around the syllabi and learning requirements for qualification and retention of qualification for professionals and businesses in the fields of insurance, financial planning/advice or wealth management, or with an interest in the fields of insurance, financial planning/advice or wealth management.

2. Following publication of the application in *Trade Marks Journal* 2016/016 on 15 April 2016, a notice of opposition was filed by The Financial Times Limited (“the opponent”). An original claim under section 5(4) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”) having been withdrawn, the opponent now bases its opposition on grounds under sections 5(2)(b) and 5(3) of the Act relying on the following UK and EU (“EUTM”) trade marks:

Mark	Dates	Specification relied upon
3017887 FT	Filing date: 13 August 2013 Date of entry in register: 22 November 2013	Goods and services in classes 9, 16, 18, 28, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41 and 42
EUTM 13169735 FT	Filing date: 13 August 2014 Date of entry in register: 18 February 2015	Goods and services in classes 9, 16, 18, 28, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41 and 42

3. The applicant filed a counterstatement denying the grounds of opposition. I pause at this stage to note that the applicant implies some criticism of the opponent for relying on these particular registrations rather than other, longer standing registrations it may own and which may have been subject to the proof of use requirements set out in the Act. I make no comment on this other than to say it is a matter for an opponent to determine how and on what basis it wishes to prosecute its case. The applicant also claims to have been using its mark since “as early as 2008”. It notes that this pre-dates the dates of registration of the marks relied on by the opponent and so claims it has the earlier rights. For the reasons set out by Ms Anna Carboni sitting as the Appointed Person in *Ion Associates Ltd v Philip Stainton & Anr*, BL O-211-09 (see also Tribunal Practice Notice 4/2009) this claim is wrong in law and, absent any claim to invalidate the opponent’s marks, which the applicant accepts it has no intention of doing, I say no more about it.

4. Both parties filed evidence. Neither party requested to be heard but both filed written submissions in lieu of a hearing. I give this decision after a careful consideration of all the papers before me.

5. The opponent’s evidence takes the form of a witness statement from Ms Kendra James along with 17 annexes. Ms James states she has been Senior Legal Counsel for the opponent since March 2015. The applicant’s evidence consists of witness statements from Ms Catriona Standingford with 19 exhibits and Ms Michelle Anne Ward with 4 exhibits. Ms Standingford is the founder and sole director of the applicant company. Ms Ward is a Chartered Trade Mark Attorney representing the applicant. Whilst I have read all of it, I do not intend to summarise the evidence here but will refer to it as necessary in this decision.

Decision

6. I have set out above the marks relied upon by the opponent. Both are earlier marks within the meaning of section 6(1)(a) of the Act and, given that neither had been registered for the requisite period of five years at the date of publication of the application, they are not subject to the proof of use provisions set out in section 6A of the Act. The opponent is therefore entitled to rely on them for each of the goods and services for which they are registered.

7. I deal first with the objection founded on section 5(2)(b) of the Act which states:

“5(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because-

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark”.

8. In considering the objection under this ground, I take note of the following principles which are gleaned from the decisions of the EU courts in *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, Case C-251/95, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, Case C-39/97, *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* Case C-342/97, *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG & Adidas Benelux BV*, Case C-425/98, *Matratzen Concord GmbH v OHIM*, Case C-3/03, *Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH*, Case C-120/04, *Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v OHIM*, Case C-334/05P and *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, Case C-591/12P.

The principles

(a) The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a great degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of services

9. Whilst, as originally filed, the opposition was based on the earlier marks for each of the goods and services for which they are registered, in its written submissions filed in lieu of a hearing, the opponent makes specific reference only to its services in Class 41 which it claims are identical to the services of the application. I proceed in relation to these latter services only as the opponent can be in no stronger position in relation to its other goods and services. The opponent's specification of services in this class for each of its earlier marks are set out in Annex A to this decision.

10. In considering whether or not the respective services are identical, I take note of the decision in *Gérard Meric v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market*, Case T- 133/05, where the General Court ("GC") stated:

"29. In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by trade mark application (Case T-388/00 Institut fur Lernsysteme v OHIM- Educational Services (ELS) [2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or where the goods designated by the trade mark application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark".

The same is true, by analogy, in respect of services. Whilst the specifications of the two earlier marks relied upon by the opponent are slightly different, each of them include *education services; training services; design and provision of educational and training programmes, courses and examinations*. These services are not limited in their subject matters and will include each of the services covered by the applicant's specification. In addition, the opponent's specifications include the terms *education services relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics and training services relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics* which are identical services to the applicant's *Training of financial personnel, Training services relating to finance; Training courses (provision of-); all being by the provision of technical learning resources, including, but not limited to, mock exams, video training, audio training, workbooks, calculations, based around the syllabi and learning requirements for qualification and retention of qualification for professionals and businesses in the field of insurance,*

financial planning/advice or wealth management, or with an interest in the fields of insurance, financial planning/advice or wealth management.

The average consumer and the nature of the purchasing process

11. The average consumer is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. For the purpose of assessing the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question: *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, Case C-342/97*.

12. In *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch), Birss J. described the average consumer in these terms:

“60. The trade mark questions have to be approached from the point of view of the presumed expectations of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect. The parties were agreed that the relevant person is a legal construct and that the test is to be applied objectively by the court from the point of view of that constructed person. The words “average” denotes that the person is typical. The term “average” does not denote some form of numerical mean, mode or median.”

13. The average consumer of education and training services will include businesses or other professionals seeking to improve the knowledge of its staff. It will also include those members of the general public seeking to enhance their knowledge of a particular subject area, whether to enhance their employment prospects or for general interest purposes. These are services which are provided by specialists and the purchase is likely to be made with at least an average degree of care with consideration being given to such factors as the providers' field of expertise and methods of delivery as well as content (which may be tailored to the needs of the individual customer), any qualifications arising from successful completion and cost. Both visual and aural considerations are likely to play a part in the purchasing process.

Comparison of marks

14. It is clear from *Sabel BV v. Puma AG* (particularly paragraph 23) that the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The same case also explains that the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by them, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. As the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) stated at paragraph 34 of its judgment in Case C-591/12P, *Bimbo SA v OHIM*:

“.....it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion.”

15. It would be wrong, therefore, artificially to dissect the trade marks, although, it is necessary to take into account their distinctive and dominant components and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by them.

16. As each of the opponent’s marks are identical, the respective marks to be compared are as follows:

Opponent’s marks	Applicant’s mark
FT	brandft

17. The opponent’s marks consist of the two letters FT presented in plain block capitals. As neither letter is highlighted in any way, the distinctiveness rests in the whole. The applicant’s mark is presented in lower case and, whilst presented as a single word, will not be pronounced as such: it is neither a natural combination of letters in the English language nor is it a combination that would be easy to pronounce as a single word. Rather, the mark naturally breaks down into the word

“brand” and the letters “ft” as two distinct elements. I find support for this in the applicant’s own claims that the mark was coined from a former surname of the founder of the company-Brand- with the letters ft intended to be an abbreviation of the words financial training. I shall return to this latter point in due course.

18. The opponent submits that the word “brand”:

“has a clear and understood meaning of ‘trade mark’ or ‘label’. It also has the meaning of a ‘particular sort or class of goods, as indicated by the trade mark on them’ (Oxford English Dictionary). The verb ‘to brand’ means also ‘to promote a product and service’ (Oxford English Dictionary).”

In light of the above, it submits that it is the letters ft within the applicant’s mark which are the distinctive element.

19. The applicant submits:

“The first and dominant part of the Application is “brand” with no separate significance given to the element “-ft”...”

and further submits that the word “brand”:

“has a high level of distinctive character having no meaning or relevance in relation to the Applicant’s activities or the services covered by the Application”

and;

“It is long established case law in the UK that it is the first part of the mark on which the greatest emphasis is place, both in speech and in visual impact, when considering confusing similarity.”

20. In *El Corte Inglés, SA v OHIM*, Cases T-183/02 and T-184/02, the GC noted that the beginnings of word tend to have more visual and aural impact than the ends. The court stated:

“81. It is clear that visually the similarities between the word marks MUNDICOLOR and the mark applied for, MUNDICOR, are very pronounced. As was pointed out by the Board of Appeal, the only visual difference between the signs is in the additional letters ‘lo’ which characterise the earlier marks and which are, however, preceded in those marks by six letters placed in the same position as in the mark MUNDICOR and followed by the letter ‘r’, which is also the final letter of the mark applied for. Given that, as the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal rightly held, the consumer normally attaches more importance to the first part of words, the presence of the same root ‘mundico’ in the opposing signs gives rise to a strong visual similarity, which is, moreover, reinforced by the presence of the letter ‘r’ at the end of the two signs. Given those similarities, the applicant’s argument based on the difference in length of the opposing signs is insufficient to dispel the existence of a strong visual similarity.

82. As regards aural characteristics, it should be noted first that all eight letters of the mark MUNDICOR are included in the MUNDICOLOR marks.

83. Second, the first two syllables of the opposing signs forming the prefix ‘mundi’ are the same. In that respect, it should again be emphasised that the attention of the consumer is usually directed to the beginning of the word. Those features make the sound very similar.

21. The above is, however, no more than a general rule and common elements at the end of marks may also be sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion. In *Bristol Global Co Ltd v EUIPO*, T-194/14, the GC held that there was a likelihood of confusion between AEROSTONE (slightly stylised) and STONE if both marks were used by different undertakings in relation to identical goods (land vehicles and automobile tyres). This was despite the fact that the beginnings of the marks were different. The common element – STONE – was held to be sufficient to create the necessary degree of similarity between the marks as wholes for the opposition before the EUIPO to succeed. Each case therefore has to be determined on its own facts.

22. As set out earlier, the applicant submits that the word “brand” is derived from a former surname of the company’s founder whilst the letters “ft” were intended to be an abbreviation of the words “financial training”. This may be the case, however, I have to consider what the average consumer will make of the mark. I do not consider the average consumer would see the word “brand” as being a surname regardless of the fact the initial letter is not capitalised as would normally be the case with surnames. The word is an ordinary dictionary word in everyday use and will be well understood as being synonymous with the words “trade mark”. Given that meaning, I consider the use of this non-distinctive word at the start of the applicant’s mark will lead to the two letters “ft” being seen as a distinct element of the mark.

23. The opponent’s marks consist of the two letters FT. These letters appear as the final two letters of the applicant’s mark. Because of this, the opponent submits that the respective marks are visually similar. I agree although when considered as wholes, the degree of visual similarity is low.

24. The opponent submits the respective marks are aurally highly similar with FT/ft in each mark being similarly pronounced as individual letters. There is no dispute that FT/ft in each mark will be pronounced as individual letters, however, the applicant’s mark also begins with an element which has no equivalent in the opponent’s marks. When considered as wholes, I find that there is a medium degree of aural similarity between the respective marks.

25. The opponent submits the respective marks are conceptually highly similar. It refers to the dictionary meaning of the word “brand” and submits that the word “acts as a signpost for the distinctive letters FT, emphasising them” in the applicant’s mark.

26. Despite the applicant’s submissions regarding how its mark was coined, I do not consider the average consumer will see the letters “ft” as meaning financial training unless educated to that fact. In my view the letters FT/ft will not convey any particular conceptual meaning. Given the meaning of the word brand, I do not consider this adds any conceptual message to the applicant’s mark. I find the conceptual position to be neutral.

The distinctiveness of the earlier marks

27. In *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV*, Case C-342/97 the CJEU stated that:

“22. In determining the distinctive character of a mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 1999 in Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).

23. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51).”

28. The earlier marks each consist of the letters FT in plain block capitals. The applicant submits:

“The Earlier Marks, consisting of only two letters in block letters, do not naturally have a high level of inherent distinctiveness...”

29. Marks consisting of two letters are not precluded from registration per se. What is required is that the two letters have the necessary distinctive character. As the Trade Marks Work Manual states (at chapter 2.1):

“The more random and atypical the letters...the more likely it is that the sign will have the necessary distinctive character.”

30. In my view, the opponent's marks have no meaning in relation to the services for which they are registered and have an average degree of inherent distinctive character.

31. There is no dispute that the opponent is the publisher of a long-standing newspaper which provides a range of business and financial information to its readers and that it does so in print, online and via mobile technologies. In her witness statement, Ms Kendra James states the opponent also:

“...provides education and training services on a wide range of subjects under the FT and FT LIVE brands. The Opponent's activities include organising conferences and events and delivering education and training services through the website www.ft-live.com. This conferences and events division offers video streaming, webinars, online audience participation and access to a video archive.”

32. At Annex 9 to her witness statement, Ms James exhibits “promotional material relating to conference events in the UK, together with information taken from the ft-live website”. Much of this material post-dates the relevant date in these proceedings (25 January 2016) though there are some references to events which took place before this. For example, at page 87 are listed a number of events which took place in London before the relevant date. These include the FT Global Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Conference 2015 and the FT Property Summit 2015 both of which took place in November 2015, the FT Investment Management Summit Europe which took place in September 2015 and the FT Future of Insurance programme which took place in June 2015. At pages 78-83 is exhibited promotional material which includes the agenda for one of the opponent's conferences entitled “Tackling the Productivity Challenge”. The first page is headed with the letters FT (albeit presented on a black, squared background). Whilst the conference appears to have taken place after the relevant date, I have no reason to believe that it differs widely in

form from earlier events and was intended to provide attendees with information and strategies to improve their businesses.

33. What has not been provided in the opponent's evidence, are any details of e.g. who and how many people may have attended any particular training or educational events, any turnover or income which was derived in relation to them or anything which enables me to establish the opponent's share of the relevant market. In view of this, whilst the use of its marks in connection with these education or training events is likely to have enhanced their distinctiveness to some extent, I am unable to quantify that extent. I therefore conclude that the opponent has not established that the distinctive character of the earlier marks has been materially enhanced through use.

The likelihood of confusion

34. In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, a number of factors need to be borne in mind. The first is the interdependency principle i.e. a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective services vice versa. As I mentioned above, it is also necessary for me to keep in mind the distinctive character of the earlier trade mark as the more distinctive it is, the greater the likelihood of confusion. I must also keep in mind the average consumer for the services, the nature of the purchasing process and the fact that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has retained in his mind.

35. Earlier in this decision I found:

- Each of the applicant's services are identical to the services of the earlier marks;
- The average consumer for the services will be a business or a member of the general public;
- The purchase of the services will be both a visual and aural one, though the conceptual aspect must not be ignored;

- There is a low degree of visual similarity and a medium degree of aural similarity between the respective marks with the conceptual position being neutral;
- The earlier marks have an average degree of inherent distinctiveness which has not been shown to have been materially enhanced through use.

36. Confusion can be direct or indirect. Direct confusion involves the average consumer mistaking one trade mark for the other, while indirect confusion is where the average consumer realises the trade marks are not the same but puts the similarity that exists between the trade marks/services down to the responsible undertakings being the same or related.

37. In *L.A. Sugar Limited v By Back Beat Inc*, Case BL-O/375/10, Mr Iain Purvis Q.C. as the Appointed Person noted that:

“16. Although direct confusion and indirect confusion both involve mistakes on the part of the consumer, it is important to remember that these mistakes are very different in nature. Direct confusion involves no process of reasoning – it is a simple matter of mistaking one mark for another. Indirect confusion, on the other hand, only arises where the consumer has actually recognized that the later mark is different from the earlier mark. It therefore requires a mental process of some kind on the part of the consumer when he or she sees the later mark, which may be conscious or subconscious but, analysed in formal terms, is something along the following lines: “The later mark is different from the earlier mark, but also has something in common with it. Taking account of the common element in the context of the later mark as a whole, I conclude that it is another brand of the owner of the earlier mark.

17. Instances where one may expect the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

(a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even

where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right (“26 RED TESCO” would no doubt be such a case).

(b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand or brand extension (terms such as “LITE”, “EXPRESS”, “WORLDWIDE”, “MINI” etc.).

(c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension (“FAT FACE” to “BRAT FACE” for example).”

38. I do not consider the average consumer, on seeing the respective marks, would directly confuse them. I do consider, however, that there is a likelihood of indirect confusion as per sub-paragraph (b) above, the word **brand** being a non-distinctive element that is likely to lead to the mark being seen as a specific sub-brand having a certain style or as a brand extension. That being the case, the opposition succeeds in respect of all services for which the application was made.

The objection under section 5(3) of the Act

39. In view of my findings under section 5(2) of the Act, there is no need for me to go on to consider the objection under this ground and I decline to do so.

Summary

40. The opposition succeeds in full.

Costs

41. The opponent, having succeeded, is entitled to an award of costs in its favour. I make the award on the following basis:

For preparing the notice of opposition and reviewing the counterstatement:	£300
Evidence:	£800
Written submissions:	£500

Fees: £200

Total: £1800

42. I order Brand Financial Training Ltd to pay The Financial Times Limited the sum of £1800. This sum is to be paid with fourteen days of the expiry of the appeal period or within fourteen days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful.

Dated this 05th day of October 2017

**Ann Corbett
For the Registrar
The Comptroller-General**

Annex A

Registration No 3017887

Arranging, planning and conducting conferences, meetings, seminars and workshops; arranging, planning and conducting conferences, meetings, seminars and workshops relating to arranging, planning and conducting conferences, meetings, seminars and workshops relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics, politics, current affairs, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, energy, luxury, media and commodities issues; preparation and production of audio and visual presentations for conferences, meetings, seminars and workshops; organization of competitions, awards, quizzes, games and recreational activities; organizing and arranging of sporting, cultural and entertainment events; education services; training services; design and provision of educational and training programmes, courses and examinations; education services, namely, providing course certification and accreditation; certification of education training and awards; education services relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics, politics and current affairs; planning, arranging and conducting educational events; provision of training; training services relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics, politics and current affairs; planning, arranging and conducting training and/or education events; news reporting services, publication services; on-line publication services; electronic publication services; providing online electronic publications including non-downloadable content; production, presentation, provision and distribution of films, television and radio programmes, blogs, webinars, podcasts, vodcasts and news feeds; entertainment services; provision of the aforesaid services in electronic or computerized form; information, advisory and consultancy services relating to all the aforesaid services.

EUTM 13169735

Arranging, planning and conducting conferences, meetings, seminars and workshops; arranging planning and conducting conferences, meetings, seminars and

workshops relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics, politics, current affairs, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, energy, luxury, media and commodities issues; preparation and production of audio and visual presentations for conferences, meetings, seminars and workshops; organization of competitions, awards, quizzes, games and recreational activities; organizing and arranging of sporting, cultural and entertainment events; education services; education services and information provided on-line, via the Internet or via other communication networks; training services; design and provision of educational and training programmes, courses and examinations; education services, namely, providing course certification and accreditation; certification of education training and awards; education services relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics, politics and current affairs; planning, arranging and conducting educational events; provision of training; training services relating to business, business services, finance, financial services, economics, politics and current affairs; planning, arranging and conducting training and/or education events; news reporting services, publication services; on-line publication services; electronic publication services; providing online electronic publications including nondownloadable content; production, presentation, provision and distribution of films, television and radio programmes, blogs, webinars, podcasts, vodcasts and news feeds; entertainment services; provision of the aforesaid services in electronic or computerized form; provision of news online; information, advisory and consultancy services relating to all the aforesaid services.