O-143-17

1	THE UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE
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3	The Rolls Building 7 Rolls Buildings Fetter Lane
4	London EC4A 1NL
5	Monday, 6th March 2017
6	Before:
7	MR. GEOFFREY HOBBS QC (Sitting as the Appointed Person)
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9	In the Matter of the Trade Marks Act 1994
10	- and -
11 12	In the Matter of an Appeal to the Appointed Person under Section 76
13	- and -
14	In the Matter of Consolidated Actions between ORLA SHIELDS
15	(the Appellant) and RENTR LIMITED (the Respondent)
16	- and -
17	In the Matter of Opposition No. 600000290 by Ms. Shields to UF Trade Mark Application No. 3106641 RENTR in Classes 9, 36, 37 and 42 in the name of RL
18	- and -
19	In the Matter of Opposition No. 404702 by RL to UK Trade Mark
20	Application No. 3101924 RENTR (word mark) in the name of Ms. Shields
21	- and -
22	In the Matter of Opposition No. 405030 by RL to UK Trade Mark
23	Application No. 3100235 RENTR in the name of Ms. Shields
24	- and -
25	In the Matter of Opposition No. 405046 by RL to UK Trade Mark Application No. 3107538 RENTR in the name of Ms. Shields

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2	In the Matter of an Appeal to the Appointed Person from the decision of Ms Judi Pike, acting on behalf of the Registrar, th Comptroller-General, dated 12th August 2016.
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4	(Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., 1st Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP. Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. Fax No: 020 7831 6864 e-mail: info@martenwalshcherer.com)
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8	MR. AARON NEWELL of Lewis Silkin LLP appeared for the Appellant.
9 10	MS. TANIA CLARK of Withers & Rogers LLP appeared for the Respondent.
10	MR. ALLAN JAMES appeared for the Registrar.
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13	APPROVED DECISION
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THE APPOINTED PERSON: This is an appeal from a case management decision, delivered in writing by the Registrar's Hearing Officer, Ms Judi Pike, on 12 August 2016. The appeal is brought with the permission of the Hearing Officer under rule 70(2) of the Trade Marks Rules 2008. The background to the appeal is a little complicated. I cannot avoid going into some of the detail of it for the purposes of this decision.

On 20 March 2015, Ms Orla Shields applied under number 3100235 to register a figurative representation of the word RENTR as a trade mark for use in relation to "real estate agency services" in class 36 and "repairs to buildings" in class 37. She applied under number 3101924 on 31 March 2015 to register the plain word RENTR as a trade mark for use in relation to "mobile application for the rental market to help landlords manage their properties and tenant relationship as well as to find tradesmen for repairs" in class 9, "information relating to property management and tenants provided via mobile application" in class 36, "information relating to tradesmen for repairs, provided by a mobile application" in class 37, and "design of mobile application for the rental market to help landlords manage their properties and tenant relationship, as well as to find tradesmen for repairs" in class 42.

On 7 May 2015, she applied under 3107538 to register the word RENTR figuratively represented in a form that was nearly identical to the figurative representation covered by her

application number 3100235.

B002591983.

The trade mark covered by the 7 May application was put forward for registration in respect of an expanded version of the list of goods and services in classes 9, 36, 37 and 42 covered by the 31 March application for registration.

Ms Shields further applied on 15 June 2015 under number 014254122 to register the plain word RENTR as an EU trade mark for use in relation to a plethora of goods and services in classes 9, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42 and 45. This application was filed with a claim to priority from application number 3101924 which was, as I have said, filed on 31 March 2015.

All four of these applications for registration were opposed by Rentr Limited on the basis of earlier rights which it claimed to have acquired through use of the mark RENTR in the UK. The three applications for registration in the UK were also opposed under section 3(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 on the basis that they were made in bad faith.

The opposition to UK application number 3100235 was filed under number 405030. The opposition to UK application number 3101924 was filed under number 404702. The opposition to UK application number 3107538 was filed under number 405046. The opposition to

For its part, Rentr Limited applied under number 3106641 on 30 April 2015 to register the plain word RENTR as a trade

EU application number 014254122 was filed under number

mark for use in relation to goods and services in classes 9, 36, 37 and 42 which it identified in terms identical to those used in Ms Shield's corresponding application for registration filed under number 3101924 on 31 March 2015.

The 30 April application filed by Rentr Limited was opposed by Ms Shields on 4 August 2015, on the basis that it conflicted with the rights to which she was entitled as proprietor of EU trade mark application number 014254122, UK trade mark application number 3101924, and UK trade mark application number 3100235. The opposition was filed as a fast track opposition under number 600000290.

On 12 August 2015, Rentr Limited filed a Form TM8 defence and counter statement in which it requested a stay of the opposition to its application for registration on the basis that all three of the earlier trade mark applications cited against it were, in their own turn, the subject of active opposition proceedings.

The Registry responded to the request for a stay in an official letter of 23 October 2015, stating:

"The Registry has considered the request for suspension and the preliminary view is that the fast track opposition should be suspended to await the filing of a defence in the related opposition actions under No's 405030 and 405046. Upon the filing of such a defence the Registry intends to exercise discretion under Rule 62(1)(g) of The

Trade Marks (Fast Track Opposition) (Amendment) Rules 2013, to treat the fast track opposition as a conventional opposition in order to consolidate with Opposition No's 405030 and 405046. A consolidated timetable for evidence and submissions will then be set.

"If either party objects to this view they should file written arguments and request a hearing on the matter within 14 days from the date of this letter, that is on, or before, 6 November 2015. If no request for a hearing is received the preliminary view will automatically be confirmed."

In the absence of any objection to that proposal, the Registry proceeded to give directions for the further conduct of the four sets of opposition proceedings then pending before the Registry in the UK. The directions were notified to the parties in an official letter of 26 November 2015, which stated as follows:

"CONSOLIDATION

"The Registry has considered the matter and has noted that there are related proceedings namely Application number 3106641, Opposition number 600000290, Application number 3101924, Opposition number 404702 and Application number 3107538, Opposition number 405046. Given the nature of the cases the Registry directs under Rule 62(g)of the Trade Marks Rules 2008 that the cases be consolidated. Unless the Registry receives any adverse comments from either party this course of action

will take place and Opposition number 600000290 will become the lead case. It then follows that all future correspondence and evidence should be headed up to relate to all cases.

"It is noted that evidence has been filed in respect of opposition number 404702. However, rather than accept this the Registry's view is that it should be amended and incorporated into the consolidated timetable of evidence which is now being set for the case and the related series of opposition cases.

"EVIDENCE BY BOTH PARTIES

"You are advised that rather than evidence being filed separately for each of the above cases, the parties can file one set of evidence which refers to all cases which would save time and expense for the parties.

"In addition rather than the parties filing evidence in turn, both parties will be given the same date to file their evidence in support of both proceedings.

"In accordance with Tribunal Practice Notice 2/2010 a period of two months is allowed for both parties to submit evidence and/or submissions as appropriate. The evidence and / or Submissions should therefore be received on or before 26 January 2016 and both sides should copy each other in on the evidence in accordance with Rule 64(6). Failure to do so will result in the evidence not being admitted into the proceedings.

"The Registry has an overriding objective to ensure that proceedings are completed within a reasonable time. As a

result the Registry would expect the parties to adhere to the following timetable:

"Both parties to file evidence in support: 26 January 2016 (headed for all cases).

"Both parties to file evidence in reply: two months from receipt of other party's evidence.

"On receipt of the above evidence a period of one month will be given for both parties to notify the Registry whether or not they intend to file further evidence of fact in reply. If such a request is received a further period of one month will be allowed to file any evidence.

"Upon the conclusion of the evidence rounds the parties will be asked if they wish to be heard on this matter."

There are a number of comments I need to make at this juncture in relation to this letter. First, there is a degree of ambiguity about the meaning of the word "consolidation" as used in relation to Registry proceedings. The word is generally not used in relation to such proceedings to refer to amalgamation or unification of the kind that may take place when several sets of proceedings are merged into a single proceeding by way of an order for consolidation in the High Court. Rather, it refers to the process of directing that several sets of proceedings pending before the Registrar should proceed together and be dealt with collectively for case management purposes, so as to facilitate a single

combined hearing and result in a single combined determination of the various matters in dispute between the parties. That is what the official letter of 26 November 2015 was referring to when it provided for "consolidation" of the four specified sets of opposition proceedings.

Second, as recognised in the official letter of 23 October 2015, it is necessary when giving directions for separate sets of proceedings to proceed together in that way for the tribunal to be clear as to the sequence in which evidence is required to be filed and as to the status which it, and any associated documentary disclosure, shall have at the single combined hearing for the purposes of the single combined determination of the issues between the parties. The assumption, in the absence of any direction to the contrary, is that evidence and disclosure provided in accordance with the directions given will be filed and available for the purposes of all and not only some of the proceedings that are being processed collectively.

Third, that is indeed the basis upon which the directions for evidence were set out in the official letter of 26 November 2015. The letter expressly stated that, "Rather than evidence being filed separately for each of the above cases, the parties can file one set of evidence which refers to all cases". It went on to specify that the Registry would expect the parties to adhere to a three-stage timetable. At stage one, both

parties were expected to file evidence in support, headed for all cases, by 26 January 2016.

If all had gone according to plan, there would have been a volley of evidence. Each side would have filed evidence simultaneously in support of their position across all four cases.

At stage two, both parties were expected to file what the letter described as "evidence in reply" to the other party's evidence at stage one. Given that there were three stages in the timetable for evidence, it would have been clearer and more accurate to have described the evidence at stage two as "evidence in answer" rather than "evidence in reply".

If all had gone according to plan, there would have been a second volley of evidence, with each side simultaneously filing evidence in answer, across all four cases, within two months of receiving the evidence it had received from the opposite party across all four cases at stage one.

At stage three, there was to be a period of up to two months within which each side would be able to file "further evidence of fact in reply" to the evidence in answer which it had received across all four cases from the opposite party at stage two.

I note that the letter did not specify that this should be evidence "strictly in reply", but the tenor of the direction was

basically to that effect.

I should say at this point that I regard that three-stage approach to the filing of evidence as an entirely appropriate approach for the Registrar to have adopted in the circumstances of a case such as the present where there are, as I have indicated, issues of bad faith to be decided.

Neither side contested the directions for evidence set out in the official letter of 26 November 2015. Rentr Limited, to whom I shall now refer as "the respondent", filed evidence and observations across all four cases on 26 January 2016 in accordance with the timetable set by the Registry.

Ms Shields, to whom I shall now refer as "the appellant", did not. Her professional representatives filed a Form TM9 on 26 January 2016 requesting an extension of two months within which to comply with the direction for filing evidence at stage one.

At this point, the proceedings began to slide out of control. The respondent objected to the requested extension of time. On the basis of comments it had received from the respondent, the Registry expressed the preliminary view, in an official letter dated 17 February 2016, that "on the basis the other side's evidence is substantial" an extension of time expiring on 24 February 2016 would be granted for the filing of evidence by her personally, but that the request for an extension should otherwise be refused.

The stance adopted by the Registry is apparent from the following timetable proposed in that letter:

"The Registry would expect the parties to adhere to the following timetable below:

"Filing of evidence on behalf of Orla Shields as referred to above: 24 February 2016.

"On the filing of the above evidence a period of one month will be given for Rentr Limited to notify the Registry whether or not they intend to file further evidence of fact in reply. If such a request is received a further period of one month will be allowed to file any evidence.

"Upon the conclusion of the evidence rounds the parties will be asked if they wish to be heard on this matter.".

That proposal seems to me to have involved an attempt to discard rather than extend the timetable for evidence set by the official letter of 26 November 2015. It did so by excluding the opportunity for Ms Shields to file evidence across all four cases at stages one and three of a three-stage process and by confining her to the filing of evidence in answer to the respondent's evidence within a shortened period from receipt of it, expiring on 24 February 2016.

She requested and was granted a hearing to consider the matter. The parties were notified in an official letter dated 24 February 2016 that a case management conference had been set for

1 10 March 2016, and that "The setting of a revised evidential timetable will be discussed at the Case Management Conference".

The outcome of the case management conference on 10 March 2016 is set out in a decision letter of the same date:

"At the case management conference held this morning, I confirmed that the period for Ms Shields to file her evidence in chief in the consolidated proceedings has now passed, without any evidence having been filed. Ms Shields now has until 11 May 2016 to file evidence strictly in reply to Rentr Limited's evidence in chief. There is no need to set a period for Rentr Limited to reply because there is no evidence from Ms Shields to reply to.

"In a normal opposition, the evidential rounds go like this:

- "a) The opponent files evidence to support its grounds and to refute the defence.
- "b) The applicant files evidence to support its defence and reply to the opponent's evidence.
- "c) The opponent has a chance to file evidence strictly in reply to the applicant's evidence (which it has not seen before).

"In consolidated cross-proceedings, such as these, the evidence rounds (as set out in the Registry letter dated 26 November 2015) go like this:

"a)Both parties are given the same date so that:(i)each party

files evidence to support its own grounds of opposition; to refute the other side's evidence; and to support its own defence; (ii)both parties are then given the same date (two months later)to file evidence strictly in reply.

"Both parties are, therefore, given an equal chance to file evidence in chief and to reply to the other side's evidence, just as they are in a normal opposition."

I pause at this point to observe that the decision recorded in this letter appears to me to disregard the fact that the time set for the filing of evidence at stage one of the three-stage timetable was extendable under rule 77(6)(b) of the Trade Marks Rules 2008 and also the fact that the appellant had filed an application on Form TM9 asking for it to be extended and also the fact that the newly revised evidential timetable envisaged, contrary to the three-stage timetable established for the purposes of "consolidation" in the official letter of 26 November 2015, that each side would end up with only one opportunity to file evidence across all four cases.

Moreover, the observations made in the decision letter with regard to "the evidence rounds as set out in the Registry letter dated 26 November 2015" do not accurately describe the operation and effect of the direction set out in that letter.

They indicate to me that the decision recorded in the letter of 10 March 2016 was based on a misunderstanding of the procedure which the November letter had actually put in place.

The appellant subsequently filed three witness statements on 11 May 2016 as "Ms Shields' evidence in reply" across all four cases. The Registry wrote on 18 May 2016 saying that the evidence was accepted, subject to minor matters of pagination which it asked the appellant's professional representatives to rectify. However, the respondent objected to the evidence which had been filed as not being evidence strictly in reply, but rather evidence in chief which was inadmissible for having been filed after expiry of the 26 January 2016 deadline for the filing of stage one evidence in accordance with the directions given in November 2015.

A further case management conference took place on 10

August 2016, to consider the approach which the parties and the Registry should adopt with regard to the further conduct of the consolidated opposition proceedings. The appellant was given the opportunity to provide the Hearing Officer with written submissions after the hearing elaborating on her criticisms of the Registry's approach to procedure in the consolidated oppositions. These were filed on 10 August 2016.

The Hearing Officer issued her decision letter on 12 August 2016, stating as follows:

"Further to Wednesday morning's case management conference, I have now considered Mr Newell's submissions, received Wednesday afternoon. Having given them my full attention, I remain unconvinced that Mr Newell's position is

1 the correct one.

"It is standard Tribunal practice to consolidate cross-actions and to set simultaneous evidence filing patterns accordingly. Rule 62 of the Trade Marks Rules 2008 and Tribunal practice Notice 2/2010 refer. Accordingly, what should have happened is this:

"On or before 26 January 2016, both parties were to file evidence, to cover the following:

"Ms. Shields was to file evidence to support her opposition under Section 5(1)/5(2) and to refute Rentr Limited's defence (in its counterstatement) (evidence is not obligatory for these grounds); Ms Shields was to file evidence to support her defence against Rentr Limited's grounds under sections 3(6) and 5(4)(a); Rentr Limited was to file evidence to support its defence of Ms Shield's application, under sections 3(6) and 5(4)(a), and to refute her defence (in her counterstatement).

"In a standard opposition, the opponent files its evidence in chief, then the applicant files one set of evidence, which is its evidence in chief to support its defence and to reply to the opponent's evidence in chief.

Finally, the opponent files evidence strictly in reply to the applicant's evidence. In a cross-consolidation, both parties file evidence in chief at the same time. They then get a further two months to file evidence strictly in reply to each

other's evidence.

"Therefore, both parties in a standard opposition get one chance to file evidence in chief and one chance each to file evidence in reply. Both parties in a cross-consolidation get one chance to file evidence in chief and one chance to reply. The evidence rounds are simultaneous rather than sequential, but there is an equal chance to file evidence in chief and reply, just as in a standard opposition.

"Mr Newell did not query the timetable, which set the simultaneous pattern for filing evidence, set out in the caseworker's letter of 26 November 2015; nor did he challenge my explanation either at the case management conference held on 10 March 2016, nor as set out in my letter of the same date.

"For the record, the caseworker's letter of 26 November 2015 contained an error in that there should not have been a further (third) period, for filing further evidence (in reply), as set out in the penultimate paragraph of that letter.

"The upshot of all of this is that Ms Shields decided not to file evidence by 26 January 2016 because, as Mr Newell explained on Wednesday, she did not have to, having the earlier filed trade mark. That is fine, as far as her section 5(1)/5(2) opposition is concerned. However, she failed to file evidence to support her defence against the section 3(6)

and 5(4)(a) grounds, which should have been filed by that date.

"What appears now to have happened is that, in filing evidence strictly in reply to Rentr Limited's evidence, Ms Shield's evidence contains both evidence in reply (correctly) and evidence in chief (incorrectly). It is unacceptable to circumvent the missing of the evidence in chief date by including facts which should have been filed as evidence in chief, as evidence in reply. This is because Rentr Limited has not seen that evidence before. If Ms Shields had filed it when it should have been filed (in January), Rentr Limited would have been able to reply to it two months later, as per the timetable.

"Accordingly, I will now set a date for a further case management conference to consider Dr Murphy's submissions on the admissibility of some of Ms Shield's evidence, and also his client's request to file further evidence to meet the challenges raised by Ms Shields to some of its evidence.

"At the next case management conference, there will be no further discussion of the Tribunal's approach to consolidated evidence rounds. The only issue will be Dr Murphy's submissions regarding the admissibility of Ms Shields' evidence. Mr Newell should be prepared to contest the submissions regarding those parts which are, or are not, reply evidence by pointing out to which parts of Rentr Limited's

evidence he considers that his client's evidence is in reply.

The case management meeting will be held on Friday 9 September

2016 at 10.30 am.".

The reasoning in this decision letter goes all the way to discarding the three-stage timetable established for the purposes of "consolidation" in the official letter of 26 November 2015. It purports to dismiss the third stage from consideration as an error mistakenly introduced into the consolidated proceedings by the caseworker who issued the relevant directions on behalf of the Registrar.

It erroneously maintains by way of justification for doing so that the three-stage process of filing evidence sequentially in standard opposition proceedings is equivalent to a two-stage process in which both parties are (1) initially required to file evidence simultaneously and without sight of any evidence from the other, and (2) subsequently permitted to file evidence simultaneously in reply to the evidence they have received from the other.

In addition it departs from the two-stage process which it ascribes to the directions given in November 2015 by reducing it to a process in which the appellant only has the opportunity to file evidence strictly in reply to the evidence filed by the respondent on 26 January 2016. The respondent has no opportunity to file evidence in reply to any evidence filed by the appellant which might be admitted into the

proceedings. And it rules out all further discussion of the tribunal's approach to consolidated evidence.

The net effect of this decision letter is that the directions for evidence set out in the official letter of 26 November 2015 might just as well never have been given.

The parties have been left in a position where the Registry has not only moved forward on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of the 26 November 2015 timetable, but also migrated away from its own reinterpretation of it without putting another coherent timetable in place for the conduct of the consolidated proceedings.

In my view, it would be procedurally irregular in the context in which the 12 August 2016 decision came to be delivered to plough on with the procedure envisaged by that decision.

I consider that justice to both parties requires the August decision letter to be set aside in its entirety and for the proceedings to be remitted to the Registry for what I would describe as a "holistic" case management conference, to take place before a different Hearing Officer, with a view to giving such directions for the filing of evidence as the Registrar considers to be most appropriate for the purpose of achieving a fair resolution of the issues in dispute between the parties in the events which have happened.

My decision therefore is that the Hearing Officer's

decision letter of 12 August shall be set aside. I direct that the costs of this appeal be treated as costs incurred in the Registry proceedings, to be dealt with by the Registrar at the conclusion of those proceedings in the usual way.

Unless anybody wants to say anything, I think that concludes today's hearing. The judgment will be transcribed. I will check it, make any changes which seem necessary to make things I have said a little more coherent than when I said them, then the judgment will be issued to the parties in the ordinary way. A transcript of the oral hearing will be made available to the parties on the usual timescale, which is generally between a week and two weeks from today. Thank you for your submissions.

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