O-363-16

1	UK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE
2	4 Abbey Orchard Street London SW1P 2HT
3	Thursday, 23rd June, 2016
4	Indisday, 231d Julie, 2010
5	Before:
6	MISS EMMA HIMSWORTH, QC
7	(Sitting as the Appointed Person)
8	
	In the Matter of THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1994
9	and
10	In the Matter of Trade Mark No. 01550700
11	for FURNITURELAND and Trade Mark No. 02183949B
12	for FURNITURELAND Device (series of six) in the name of FURNITURE VILLAGE LIMITED
13	and
14	In the Matter of Cancellation Numbers 00500653 and 00500654 thereto by Furnitureland.co.uk Limited
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16	
17	(Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 1st Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court,
18	Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. Fax No: 020 7831 6864. email: info@martenwalshcherer.com)
19	email. Info@martenwarshererer.com/
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21	MR. JIM DAVIES of Elevation Legal appeared for the Appellant.
22	MR. GUY TRITON (instructed by Bracher Rawlins LLP) appeared for the Respondent.
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24	RULING ON APPLICATION
25	TO ADJOURN

THE APPOINTED PERSON: This is an application for an adjournment of the substantive hearing of the appeal. It is an application that was made by email, timed at 14.45 on 20th June 2016.

The application contained a statement as follows: "At the heart of the application to revoke TM1550700 is the unusual assertion by our client that the register failed to show the mark as live and/or as having been assigned to the present registrant in 2011, when previous successful non-use proceedings were commenced by our client against related marks. Since 2013, our client has sought information from the IPO that would clarify whether there was anything on the file that would assist in either confirming or disposing of this assertion. We appeared to have reached the end of the road with the IPO and have today filed a complaint to the ICO in respect of this matter. A copy of that complaint will be forwarded by separate email.

Our client does not wish to proceed on the false premise, if there were no issues with the mark; nor, we submit, should it have to without having the relevant authority investigate the file and the handling of the information it contains and contained."

There was an apology for the timing of the application, which was made on the Monday when the hearing of the appeal was due to take place at 10.30 on the Thursday of the same

week.

In order properly to deal with this application, it is necessary to go into a little of the history of this case.

This is an appeal in relation to applications for revocation on the basis of non-use for two trade marks, one of which is UK1550700, which has, on occasion, been referred to by the appellant as the 1993 mark. The application in respect of the 1993 mark was made on 16th October 2014 and revocation was requested with effect from 11th March 2011.

The relevant form, TM26(N) to commence these proceedings was, as already indicated, dated 16th October 2014, and contained the following statement, "Section C supporting statement. ...Non-use by the Registrant for the trade mark FURNITURELAND has been established for the 5 year period ending 10 March 2011. (Decision of the Appointed Person Geoffrey Hobbs QC 0-128-14). No evidence of use of this mark during that non-use period was tendered in those proceedings. This application would have been brought at the same time [the same time as the previous application made before Mr. Hobbs QC, which was dated 20th June 2011] had the register properly shown the existence of this registration," this registration being UK1550700.

The registered trade mark proprietor (the respondent to this appeal) subsequently filed the Form TM8 as a defence to the claim for revocation. Directions were given on behalf of

the registrar for the filing of evidence in that connection. As is recorded in the decision of the Hearing Officer below in this case, evidence was filed on behalf of the registered proprietor in due time but no evidence was filed on behalf of the applicant and, in particular, nothing was filed in support of the assertion that had been made in the Form TM26(N) noted above.

Just prior to the hearing of the substantive application that had been set by the Hearing Officer for 2nd November 2015 there was an application by the applicant (the appellant) to file late evidence and to cross-examine the registered proprietor's witness. The Hearing Officer considered those applications at what had originally been planned for the hearing date of the substantive application. She considered the evidence that had been sought to be admitted late and refused its admission to the proceedings. That refusal forms part of the appeal that is before me.

The substantive decision in these proceedings was given by Mrs. Corbett on 20th January 2016 following a hearing on 15th December. On 17th February 2016, the TM55 was filed by the appellant and on 1st April 2016 Mr. Hobbs QC issued some directions setting a deadline of 2nd May 2016 for the appellant to file a skeleton argument in support of the grounds of appeal that were contained in the TM55.

That deadline was not complied with and on 11th May 2016

a notice of default was issued providing that the appeal would be deemed withdrawn unless a skeleton of argument was filed, in accordance with the direction of Mr. Hobbs, by 20th May 2016. That default notice also provided for further directions extending time for the respondents to the appeal to likewise file their written submissions.

On 20th May 2016, a skeleton of argument was filed on behalf of the appellant and subsequently a skeleton of argument was filed on behalf of the respondent. Paragraph 6 of the appellant's skeleton of argument contained the following statement: "Since the hearing and decision Furnitureland (the appellant) has filed a further Freedom of Information Act request and received two replies which they consider interim at present. Further enquiries are ongoing."

This was the latest of a line of Freedom of Information Act requests made of the UK IPO on behalf of the appellant relating to the Registry file for the 1993 trade mark. The first such request of the UK IPO for documents relating to that trade mark were made on behalf of the appellant in November 2013. There was subsequent correspondence between the UK IPO and the appellant and in January 2014 a copy of the entire file was provided to the appellant under cover of a letter from Mr. Denahay, dated 7th January 2014.

Subsequent correspondence ensued between those acting on behalf of the appellant and the UK IPO, which culminated with

an email of 16th April 2014 from Mr. Rowan, Divisional

Director of Trade Marks and Design. For present purposes it
is important to note that Mr. Rowan stated as follows:

"Turning to your second point, according to our records trade
mark number 1550700 has always been shown as Registered on the
official Register and would have been picked up by a search of
the Register. All relevant renewal fees were paid and we have
no reason to believe that it has not appeared as Registered at
any time. We did migrate the data contained in the Register
over to a new IT system in 2013 but we are unaware of any
problems with this migration and there have been no other
examples brought to our attention of existing marks not shown
as Registered. If you could inform us of any dates when you
believe the trade mark did not appear in any search we can
conduct a further enquiry of our records."

That was some considerable time before the evidence in the present proceedings was due to be filed, which was in June 2015, but there was no follow-up at that stage with the UK IPO as to the absence of any further documents. In fact, no further correspondence on this topic with the UK IPO seems to have taken place until a new request was raised on 22nd April 2016 at 17.29, on behalf of the appellant. That was some two days after the parties were notified of the hearing of the appeal being fixed to take place on 23rd June 2016.

In the 2016 request to the UK IPO it was said that the

documents that were considered by the appellant to be relevant had not been provided and it was put that, "the need to find out what happened to this trade mark remains live".

The UK IPO responded to the request in various letters/emails after that date. On 17th June 2016, in an email to the UK IPO it was stated on behalf of the appellant: "We also propose that we apply to adjourn next week's hearing pending the hearing of our client's planned complaint to the ICO," that is, the Information Commissioner's Office. That suggestion of an adjournment or the absence of what were said to be further relevant documents was not communicated at any time prior to 20th June 2016 to the respondent, or indeed to myself. It would now appear that an application was made to the ICO, also dated 20th June 2016, late into the evening, the email being sent at 21.40.

The application before me for an adjournment is on the basis that the complaint to the ICO is liable to produce further documents or information. There are two preliminary points to be made in relation to this application. First of all, it is an application that has been made very late where such an application was not foreshadowed at any time and, second of all, it follows on from a course of dealing between those acting for the appellant and the UK IPO where there was silence on the part of the appellant from April 2014 to April 2016 on this issue, in circumstances where during that period

there was an opportunity for the appellant to file evidence before the Hearing Officer, which it chose not to do at the relevant time, and two hearings took place before the Hearing Officer in December 2015 one of which was to consider the admission of further evidence.

Against that background I have to decide whether there should be an adjournment pending the outcome of any decision of the ICO complaint. It seems to me that on balance, having heard from the detailed submissions of the parties and considered the papers before me that it is highly unlikely, that anything said by the Information Commissioner can be of relevance to what I have to decide: firstly, because it is a complaint and that complaint will deal with the procedural aspects and the record-keeping of the UK IPO and, secondly, because there has already been confirmed from the UK IPO on a number of occasions that they have no further documents that fall within the requests made on behalf of the appellant.

It is true that certain documents were produced by the UK IPO as a result of the request earlier this year, a request which although made very late in the day did result in the production of some further documents. I have looked at those documents, one of which relates to a change of proprietor's details in 2008 and was produced not from the original file that was the subject of an earlier request, but as I understand it, from another related file and, second of all,

what are referred to as, "Optics", which are documents said by the appellant to raise further questions and which are said on behalf of the respondent to be totally irrelevant.

It has been said on behalf of the appellant that the relevant dates that they are concerned with are dates between 20th June 2011 when the application was made in the related proceedings that were ultimately determined by Mr. Hobbs, that is 0-128-14, and at the latest November 2013 when a first request was made of the UK IPO for information relating to the 1993 mark. It is further said for the first time today that one of the questions in issue, as far as the appellant is concerned, is whether or not a renewal fee was paid in respect of the 1993 mark in or about 2010 and whether that was the reason, it is said, the 1993 mark did not appear on the register between those dates.

As to the dates are which are said by the appellant to be of importance it is those dates of which complaint is made as to the record-keeping on behalf of the UK IPO. It is of note that the documents produced by the UK IPO in response to the 2016 request, which the appellant seeks to say are very important, and which the respondent says are not, are optics for "Name and Address Clean Up Process" and "Search for Associated Name and Address Details" for Furniture Village Limited that are dated outside the periods that are said by the appellant to be of relevance, that is, July 2008, and

therefore it seems to me that those cannot have any direct relevance to the case that is before me.

On the basis of the materials before me does not seem to me that there is any proper reason to think that there are further relevant documents at the UK IPO. In any event, the result of any complaint will not lead, in my view, to the production of any other documents. The Intellectual Property Office has been quite clear as to what they have and have not retained and, as Mr. Tritton puts it, the Information Commissioner cannot cause documents that have been destroyed to be recreated, and that was accepted, quite rightly, by Mr. Davies this morning.

The result of any complaint to the Information

Commissioner can at best, it seems to me, produce the result

that says the UK IPO record-keeping is not perhaps what it

should be. I express no view on that except to note that the

UK IPO has already apologised to the appellant with respect to

the one error that would have appeared to have occurred.

The question that is now for me is should the hearing of the appeal be adjourned and I have come to the view that it should not be. It does not seem to me the outcome of the complaint that was made on 20th June this year can have any bearing on what I have to decide. I have to decide whether the Hearing Officer was correct to come to the decisions that she did. It does not seem to me to be appropriate at this

stage in the proceedings, to wait to see if a complaint which would appear only to deal with whether the UK IPO's record-keeping is sufficient, is going to assist me in that connection.

I should also make clear, as was rightly pointed out to me by Mr. Tritton, that it would appear that the issue of the trade mark renewal and the payment of the trade mark renewal have only been raised for the first time on behalf of the appellant at the hearing today. It was said on behalf of the appellant that that was because it had not occurred to them to request the documents relating to the payment of renewal fees prior to this point.

I am somewhat surprised that it is only at this very late stage that the appellant has considered this point in circumstances where the proceedings that had been commenced on 16th October 2014, and where first of all, Mr. Rowan expressly confirmed back in April 2014 in his email that all the renewal had been paid, and, second of all, as I have been shown by the respondent, the electronic historical details of the trade mark 1550700 show, as the appellant rightly accepted, that the 1993 trade marks was renewed and, indeed, recorded various other transactions.

I have also had regard to the fact, as submitted to me on behalf of the appellant, that the mark is currently on the register and therefore there is no prejudice to the respondent

should an adjournment be granted. However, in my view to grant an adjournment to wait for something that would appear to be of no assistance to the decision to be made on this appeal is not appropriate. Even were that not the position, in circumstances where there has been a history of delay and late compliance by the appellant in the present proceedings it is neither proportionate nor appropriate to grant an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal at this very late stage. This is particularly the case given the huge delay by the appellant in making the latest request to the UK IPO which was only made after the notification of the hearing date of the present appeal and not at any time prior to that during the pendency of the present proceedings. It seems to me that there needs to be finality to these proceedings. Therefore, taking into account all the circumstances, the application for an adjournment is refused and the hearing of the appeal should proceed.

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