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2	(Sitting at) The Rolls Building 7 Rolls Buildings
3	Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NL
4	Monday, 3rd August 2015
5	Before:
6	MR. GEOFFREY HOBBS QC
7	(Sitting as the Appointed Person)
8	
9	In the Matter of the Trade Marks Act 1994
10	- and -
11	In the Matter of an Appeal to the Appointed Person under Section 76
12	
13	- and -
14	In the Matter of UK Trade Mark Application No. 2646493 SIMPLY (Series of five) in classes 03, 05, 08, 16, 29, 30,
15	31, 32, 33 and 34 in the name LIDL STIFTUNG & Co. KG
16	To the Meller of the Provided Brown Country
17	In the Matter of an Appeal to the Appointed Person from the decision of Ms. Carol Bennett, acting on behalf of the Registrar, the Comptroller-General, dated 16th February 2015
18	
19	(Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd. 1st Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court,
20	Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP. Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. Fax No: 020 7831 6864
21	e-mail: info@martenwalshcherer.com)
22	
23	MISS DENISE McFARLAND (instructed by Urquhart-Dykes & Lord
24	LLP) appeared on behalf of the Applicant/Appellant.
25	APPROVED DECISION

1	THE APPOINTED PERSON: On 19th December 2012 Lidl Stiftung & Co.
2	KG applied under number 2646493 to register five
3	representations of the word "simply" as a series of trade marks
4	for use in relation to wide ranges of goods listed in various
5	classes, including classes 3, 5, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34.
6	These were the five signs for which registration in series was
7	requested:

Simply...
Simply...
Simply
SIMPLY

No claim for registration was made on the basis of distinctiveness acquired through use in relation to any goods of the kind listed in the relevant classes.

The fourth and fifth signs were deleted from the application in March 2013 in response to an official objection maintaining that they did not form a series, as defined in section 41(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, with the preceding three signs.

The application to register those three signs in series was subsequently refused for the reasons given in a decision issued under reference BL 0-070-15 by Ms. Carol Bennett on

1	behalf of the Registrar of Trade Marks on 16th February 2015.
2	The Hearing Officer concluded that the application for
3	registration should be refused under section 3(1)(b) of the
4	1994 Act on the basis that the signs in question were devoid,
5	that is to say unpossessed, of distinctive character for
6	goods of the kind listed in the relevant classes and also for
7	descriptiveness under section 3(1)(c) of the Act on the basis
8	that they consisted exclusively of signs or indications which
9	may serve, in trade, to designate characteristics possessed by
10	such goods.
11	Her assessment with regard to the descriptiveness of the
12	three signs in issue from the viewpoint of the relevant
13	average consumer of such goods was as follows:
14	"15. Turning my assessment to the mark applied for,
15	I refer to the dictionary definition for the word 'simply' as
16	defined in Collins English Dictionary:
17	"Simply. adverb 1. in a simple manner, 2. merely; only,
18	<pre>3. absolutely; altogether; really => a simply wonderful</pre>
19	holiday, 4. (sentence modifier) frankly; candidly.
20	"16. The dictionary reference defines the term as
21	meaning 'in a simple manner', 'merely' or 'only'. When this
22	meaning is used in relation to prepared goods such as e.g.
23	soap, food for babies and general food products, it would be
24	taken to describe a characteristic of those products - namely
25	the simplicity and naturalness of the goods. In respect of

soap products, this could be those that are not perfumed and contain only natural ingredients; in respect of food, drink and tobacco products these could be those that have no artificial additives, colourings, flavourings or coatings and are regarded as being superior because of their natural purity. Consumers have been encouraged through advertising and media campaigns such as e.g. Change4Life® to eat less processed food as they generally contain more sugar, salt, additives and calories than the natural product. An indication that the goods consist only of the natural product is a quality that consumers would potentially seek out when purchasing such goods.

"17. The mark also contains an element of stylisation in the first mark, and an element of punctuation or ellipsis, namely three dots following the word in all three marks. It is my view that the stylised font is fairly standard and adds no distinctive character to the whole. As such, I do not need to consider it further. The series of dots usually indicates an intentional omission of a word(s) from a statement without altering its original meaning. Depending on their context and placement in a sentence, ellipses can also indicate an unfinished thought, or a leading statement. In this case, addition of the ellipsis after the word 'Simply' introduces a way to add a dramatic pause and, given the range of goods that this mark would be used upon, it would naturally lead the

1	average consumer into completing the phrase by adding the name
2	of the goods as in e.g. simply soap, simply fish,
3	simply juice. 'Simply' suggests 'purity' and 'simplicity'
4	and, when used on the products intended for protection, infers
5	that it is all it consists of. Use of the ellipsis does
6	nothing to displace the totally descriptive meaning of the
7	combination in the minds of the average consumer.
8	•••
9	"19. Taking into account all the above, I have
10	concluded that the mark applied for consists exclusively of a
11	sign which may serve, in trade, to designate a characteristic,
12	namely the purity or basic nature of the goods. It is
13	therefore excluded from registration by section 3(1)(c) of the
14	Act."
15	She went on to consider the position on a residual or
16	sweeping up approach under section 3(1)(b):
17	"24. As regards this 'residual or sweeping up
18	function', my view would be that even if the addition of the
19	three dots had the effect of taking the sign outside of the
20	scope of section $3(1)(c)$, the sign would nonetheless still be
21	devoid of distinctive character under section 3(1)(b) only.
22	That is to say, the average consumer would not see the
23	elements, when taken together, as performing the essential
24	function of a trade mark by indicating the origin of the
25	goods. The sign as a whole will be perceived as syntactically

1	correct, visually and linguistically meaningful in a way which
2	is more likely than not to relate to the goods without
3	indicating origin in the minds of the relevant class of
4	person. In my view, the average consumer would see the phrase
5	as origin neutral and not to be that of any particular
6	supplier of the goods the subject of the application. For
7	this reason the mark is also refused on the alternative basis
8	under 3(1)(b).
9	"25. I have concluded that the sign applied for will
10	not be identified as a trade mark without first educating the
11	public that it is an indication of trade origin. I therefore
12	conclude that the mark applied for is devoid of any
13	distinctive character and is thus excluded from prima facie
14	acceptance under section 3(1)(b) of the Act."
15	The applicant now appeals under section 76 of the Act,
16	maintaining, as foreshadowed in its Grounds of Appeal, that,
17	although the Hearing Officer's decision and reasoning stand to
18	be accepted as correct in relation to the second and third of the
19	three signs in the series, the first sign in the series possesses
20	what the other two signs concededly do not: a distinctive
21	character by reason of its visual appearance as graphically
22	represented in the application for registration.

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upon which the signs were put forward for registration in series under section 41(2), i.e. that they "resemble each other as to their material particulars and differ only as to matters of a non-distinctive character not substantially affecting the identity of the trade mark".

For present purposes I shall assume that this internal inconsistency would be addressed, if it has not already been addressed, by deleting the second and third signs from the application for registration under Rule 28 of the Trade Marks Rules 2008. That reduces the issue on this appeal to a narrow question: whether the word "simply" is visually presented in the graphic representation of the first sign in a manner sufficient to differentiate it materially, in trade mark terms, from the graphic representations of the other two signs, which continue to be unregistrable in relation to the goods of interest to the applicant in accordance with the Hearing Officer's reasoning and decision to that effect.

The cursive script and the quasi-brushstroke style of representation in the first sign do not appear to me to present it to the eye in a manner that would cause the relevant average consumer to perceive and remember it as anything more than a mildly stylised version of the word "simply".

The visual treatment is, in my view, saturated with the verbal message of the word as connoting that the goods to

Τ	which it refers are plainly, purely, naturally or
2	straightforwardly prepared examples of the kind of thing that
3	the consumer may be looking for.
4	I agree with the Hearing Officer in thinking, as she
5	indicated in paragraph 17 of her decision, that the
6	stylisation of the first sign is not sufficient to endow it
7	with a distinctive character. To put it another way, the
8	first sign and the second and third signs in the series of
9	three are equally unregistrable in the prima facie case.
10	The reasoning and approach of the General Court in Case
11	T-203/14 Mo Industries LLC v OHIM EU:T:2015:301 appears to

The reasoning and approach of the General Court in Case T-203/14 Mo Industries LLC v OHIM EU:T:2015:301 appears to me to be applicable by analogy to the first sign. In that case the sign put forward for registration was the laudatory word "splendid" graphically represented in the following manner:

Splendid

The Court regarded the stylisation as insufficient to render the word registrable on the following basis:

"26. It is, admittedly, true that the graphic style of the typeface used has certain specific features. However,

cursive script is an ordinary and traditional style which is

professional context, and which remains largely unremarkable

used by both children and adults, in daily life or in a

1	from the perspective of any consumer and, in the present case,
2	of the relevant public (see, to that effect, judgment of 19
3	May 2010 in Zeta Europe v OHIM (Superleggera), T-464/08,
4	EU:T:2010:212, paragraph 33).
5	"27. Thus, the view cannot be taken that the typeface
6	used makes it difficult to read the term 'splendid' and, in
7	particular, that customers would require a certain degree of
8	concentration in order to identify the letters 'p', 'l' and
9	'e'. The applicant's argument that consumers who come across
10	the mark would not immediately think of its meaning is
11	likewise unfounded.
12	"28. Accordingly, the relevant public will immediately
13	understand the term 'splendid', applied to the goods covered
14	by the mark applied for, as a laudatory reference to their
15	aesthetic quality.
16	"29. In the third place, that finding cannot be called
17	into question by the presence, in place of the dot over the
18	letter 'i', of a figurative element which is a Community trade
19	mark registered in respect of goods in Class 25 and services
20	in Class 35.
21	"30. It must be recalled that the assessment of the
22	distinctive character of the mark applied for must relate to
23	the overall impression that it produces and not to each of its
24	elements, taken separately (judgment of 2 July 2009 in
25	Euro-Information v OHIM (Representation of a hand holding a

1	card with three triangles), T-414/07, ECR, EU:T:2009:242,
2	paragraph 36; see also, to that effect, judgments of 15
3	September 2005 in BioID v OHIM, C-37/03 P, ECR, EU:C:2005:547,
4	paragraph 29, and of 8 May 2008 in Eurohypo v OHIM, C-304/06
5	P, ECR, EU:C:2008:261, paragraph 41).
6	"31. Thus, and as the Board of Appeal rightly noted in
7	the contested decision, the fact that the mark applied for
8	contains, in place of the dot over the letter 'i', a
9	figurative element which is a registered Community trade mark
10	is not conclusive for the purposes of assessing the
11	distinctive character of that mark as a whole.
12	"32. Moreover, if it were to be assumed that,
13	considered in isolation, the figurative element placed over
14	the letter 'i' has a distinctive character, that distinctive
15	character could not benefit the mark applied for in so far as
16	that mark is composed of other dominant elements which are
17	decisive in the overall impression that it produces (see, to
18	that effect, judgment in Representative of a hand holding a
19	card with three triangles, paragraph 30 above, EU:T:2009:242,
20	paragraph 48)."
21	That is entirely constant with the approach adopted in
22	the cases considered and applied by Arnold J in Starbucks (HK)
23	Limited & others v British Sky Broadcasting Group plc & others
24	[2012] EWHC 3074 (Ch), paragraphs 96, 97, 116 and 117. At
25	paragraph 117 he commented upon the examination of marks for

registration in terms which I consider to be pertinent to the application for registration as it has been put forward for consideration on appeal in the present case.

"117. I would comment that it appears to me that PCCW only succeeded in obtaining registration of the CTM because it included figurative elements. Yet PCCW is seeking to enforce the CTM against signs which do not include the figurative elements or anything like them. That was an entirely foreseeable consequence of permitting registration of the CTM. Trade mark registries should be astute to this consequence of registering descriptive marks under the cover of a figurative figleaf of distinctiveness, and refuse registration of such marks in the first place."

If the stylisation of the first sign in the series of three were to be regarded as sufficient to render the sign eligible for registration, the result would, in my view, be a figleaf registration of a sign unpossessed of any real distinctive character. I am not persuaded otherwise by the arguments addressed to me in support of the proposition that the first sign in the series of three should be taken to fall on the right side of the line when considered in the light of non-binding practice statements and when compared for consistency with the approach to registrability applied to other signs featuring the word "simply" that have been accepted for registration at the national and Community level.

1	The question I am required to consider on this appeal is not
2	whether the non-binding practice statements are correct or
3	whether those other signs or any of them were rightly or
4	wrongly accepted for registration in circumstances I know
5	little or nothing about, but whether, in accordance with the
6	requirement for legality of decision-taking, the particular
7	sign I am now considering appears to have been rightly
8	excluded from registration by the decision under appeal.
9	I am satisfied that it was, under section 3(1)(b) of the
10	Act. As to whether or not it could also have been rightly
11	excluded from registration under section 3(1)(c) of the Act, I
12	express no concluded view.
13	The appeal is accordingly dismissed. It is dismissed
14	with no order as to costs in accordance with the usual
15	practice of this tribunal in relation to appeals against ex
16	parte decisions of the Registrar.
17	MISS McFARLAND: Thank you, sir. I think there is nothing else.
18	THE APPOINTED PERSON: I think that concludes it.
19	MISS McFARLAND: We are grateful that you have produced your
20	decision quite so promptly.
21	THE APPOINTED PERSON: Thank you for the compliment. I wish I
22	could do it more often than I actually have succeeded in
23	doing. Thank you for that and thank you for your submissions.
24	