O-201-08

1	THE PATENT OFFICE	
2		Harmsworth House, 13-15 Bouverie Street, London EC4 8DP.
3		
4		Monday, 23rd June 2008
5		Before:
6		MR. G. HOBBS QC
7	(The Appointed Person)
8		
	In the matter of TH	E TRADE MARKS ACT, 1994.
9	а	and
10	In the matter of U	K Trade Mark Application No. 2371858
11	I	N THE PINK in Class 16 by Gerard Dugdill
12		formerly in the name of Blue Moon publishing)
13	а	and
14	In the matter of C	opposition No. 93785 by Xcess Media
15		
16		of the Applicant from the
17	Decis	ion of Mr. Raoul Colombo
18		
		Stenograph Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer
19		12-14 New Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1AG. ephone No: 020-7936 6000)
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21	ml	
22	The Applicant appeared	in person.
23	MR. STEPHEN CHUBB and M the Opponent.	IS. KATHERINE CHUBB appeared in person for
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25	D E	C I S I O N (As approved)

1	THE APPOINTED PERSON: Mr. Gerard Dugdill is the recorded assignee
2	of Trade Mark Application No. 2371858, filed on 31st August
3	2004. The application for registration is opposed by Xcess
4	Media Limited. The Notice and Statement of Grounds of
5	Opposition were filed on 4th October 2005.
6	By steps and stages the opposition proceeded to the
7	point at which the Opponent's evidence in reply was due to be
8	filed under Rule 13C(5) of the Trade Mark Rules 2000 on or
9	before 28th May 2007. The evidence it needed to address in
10	reply was substantial. It consisted of a first witness
11	statement of Mr. Dugdill dated 31st January 2007 (this was 4
12	pages long with 10 exhibits) and a second witness statement of
13	Mr. Dugdill dated 28th February 2007 (this was 132 pages long
14	with a further 51 exhibits).
15	On 29th May 2007 the Opponent filed a form TM9
16	requesting an extension of time for filing its reply evidence
17	over until 28th August 2007. The reasons for the request were
18	summarised by Ms. Katherine Chubb on behalf of the Opponent in
19	the following terms: "I have disinstructed D Young & Co and I
20	am now dealing with the opposition in person on behalf of
21	Xcess Media Limited.
22	"We have not yet received our files from D Young and I
23	will need more time to read, understand and respond to Mr.
24	Dugdill's evidence, which is extremely lengthy, complex and
25	very confusing.

1	"My job as a magazine publisher is full time. I need to
2	adhere to demanding deadlines and work long hours so I can
3	only attend to this in my spare time.
4	"Now acting in person, it is impossible for me to
5	respond within the current deadline and I request more time as
6	the current deadline of 28th May is impossible for me to
7	meet."
8	On 8th June 2007 the Registry issued a preliminary view,
9	indicating that the Registrar was minded to refuse the
10	requested extension. This indication was subject to the
11	operation of Rule 54 of the Trade Marks Rules and, therefore,
12	subject to the Opponent's right to request a hearing at which
13	to argue that an extension of time should be granted.
14	However, on 22nd June 2007 the Registry issued another
15	preliminary view, this time indicating that the Registrar was
16	minded to grant the requested extension. This was also
17	subject to the operation of Rule 54 and, therefore, subject to
18	Mr. Dugdill's right to request a hearing at which to argue
19	that no extension of time should be granted.
20	Mr. Dugdill requested a hearing and this took place
21	before Mr. Raoul Colombo, acting on behalf of the Registrar,
22	on 12th September 2007. In the meantime, the Opponent sent
23	its evidence in reply to the Registry by fax on 28th August
24	2007, with the hard copies of the documents arriving by post
25	on 30th August 2007.

The question for determination at the hearing on 12th

September 2007 was not, as Mr. Dugdill maintained, whether the

Registrar's preliminary view issued on 8th June 2007 should be

upheld; nor was it, as the Hearing Officer maintained, whether

the Registrar's preliminary view issued on 22nd June 2007

should be upheld. Those indications were both

non-determinative and entirely non-binding for the purposes of

the hearing which had been appointed in accordance with the

requirements of Rule 54.

The question for determination was whether the Opponent's request for an extension of time, made in the form TM9 it had filed on 29th May 2007, should be granted or refused under Rule 68.

Since Mr. Dugdill objected to the request, the correct procedure was for the Opponent to begin by addressing the Hearing Officer in support of its request, for Mr. Dugdill to respond in support of his objections to the request and for the Opponent to reply to what Mr. Dugdill had said. That is, indeed, what happened at the hearing.

The Hearing Officer granted the request for an extension of time for the reasons he subsequently gave in a written decision issued under reference BL O-320-08 on 1st November 2007. His determination was as follows: "37. In reaching my decision to confirm the Registry's Preliminary View to allow the extension of time request, I took account of the guidance

provided by the Appointed Persons. I was satisfied that XML had provided strong and compelling reasons to support their request for more time to be allowed. XML had shown the reasons why more time was required to prepare and submit their evidence in reply. XML had, for financial reasons, taken the decision to dispense with their legal representation and as a consequence of this decision they had had to obtain all the papers entered into the proceedings from their previous legal representatives. There had been a delay in obtaining the papers and once obtained, XML were required to scrutinize what they regarded as being lengthy, complex and confusing material. All of this contributed towards a need for additional time within which to prepare a response to the evidence submitted by GD in support of the trade mark application.

"38. The decision to dispense with their legal representation was XML's and I accept that there is an argument for saying that they should have been better prepared to face the possible consequences of their decision. That said, I am mindful of the fact that by having dispensed with their legal representation, at such an advanced stage in the proceedings, XML found themselves to be in a disadvantageous position. This is because, even though GD is also a litigant in person operating no doubt under similar pressures and constraints as XML, XML had clearly relied on their legal

1	representatives to advise them and deal with all the issues
2	pertaining to the case. XML were therefore not as familiar
3	with the details of the proceedings compared to GD,
4	who had litigated the case from the outset.
5	"39. I was of the view, that having obtained the
6	relevant papers from D Young & Co, XML should be allowed a
7	period of time within which they could identify, prepare,
8	collate and submit their evidence in reply. This would, I
9	believe, place the parties to these proceedings on a more
10	equitable footing.
11	"40. I bore in mind that, by the date of the hearing,
12	the work of compiling all the evidence had been completed and
13	that the evidence had already been filed at the Registry.
14	When the Registrar is faced with having to decide on a
15	dispute, in particular one as acrimonious as this one appears
16	to be, it must be clearly to the benefit of all the parties to
17	have all of the evidential material placed into the
18	proceedings. This will ensure that the Hearing Officer, at
19	final determination, will have the benefit of having
20	before him all of the evidence and submissions. This must be
21	preferable to the possible alternative of the proceedings
22	being terminated and then having another set of proceedings
23	started between the same parties, covering the same issues and
24	with the same evidence being filed into the new proceedings.
25	"41. However, this is not to be taken as meaning that

1	the Registrar will always, when the evidence has been filed,
2	favour the party seeking the indulgence. Nevertheless, it must
3	surely be in the interest of all the parties to the
4	proceedings that the dispute is resolved expeditiously, fairly
5	and by saving expense wherever and whenever possible. This,
6	in general terms, accords with the observations of Laddie J in
7	the appeal case Hunt-Wesson Inc's Trade Mark Application
8	(1996) RPC 233 at 241:
9	'An opposition may determine whether or not a new
10	statutory monopoly, affecting all traders in the country, is
11	to be created. Refusing permission to an opponent who files
12	evidence late affects not only him but also may penalise
13	the rest of the trade although the matter is not clear,
14	it is probable that if the evidence is excluded and the
15	opponent, as a result, loses then he will be able to
16	return again in separate proceedings to seek rectification of
17	the register. An advantage of allowing in the evidence
18	is that it may well avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.
19	"42. Before reaching my decision to grant the extension
20	of time I considered the possible consequences that my
21	decision would have for GD. In reviewing all of the papers on
22	the case I came to the conclusion that there did not appear to
23	me that there would be any obvious or immediate consequences
24	for GD if the extension of time for three months was granted.
25	What was clear to me was that the parties were involved in a

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1	protracted and increasingly fractious dispute with some very
2	serious accusations having been made. In view of this, I
3	believed that the view expressed in the TMR's letter of 28
4	June 2007 to ensure that it would be in the interest of both
5	parties to have all the available evidential material admitted
6	into the proceedings and placed before the Hearing Officer at
7	final determination, was correct. In LIQUID FORCE (1999) RPC
8	429 the Appointed Person said:
9	' In the interest of legal certainty it is plainly
10	desirable that valid applications for registration should
11	succeed and valid objections to registration should be
12	upheld without undue delay.'
13	"43. Taking into account all the circumstances of the
14	case, including the fact that the evidence was now available
15	and ready to be admitted into the proceedings, I decided to
16	exercise the Registrar's discretion and allow the opponent'
17	request for an extension of time within which to file its
18	evidence in reply."
19	Mr. Dugdill gave Notice of Appeal to an Appointed Person
20	under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 asking for the
21	preliminary view issued on 8th June 2007 to be reinstated and
22	confirmed and, as a consequence of that, for the requested

extension of time to be refused. The Statement of Grounds in

support of the appeal was 27 pages long. It was accompanied

by 75 pages of attachments. The penultimate paragraph of the

Statement of Grounds stated: "I submit now that these matters, together with my third witness statement, filed now under Rule 13C(6), are reviewed again, and that the request is rejected."

Mr. Dugdill's third witness statement was dated 29th November 2007. It was 6 pages long and accompanied by 8 exhibits. This evidence has not yet been formally admitted into the Registry proceedings under Rule 13C(6). For the reasons given in my ruling earlier this afternoon, I declined to allow it to be tendered in evidence on this appeal.

It is necessary at this juncture to emphasise that the starting point for the purposes of the present appeal is the Hearing Officer's decision issued on 1st November 2007. I would only be entitled to set his decision aside under s.76 of the Act on the basis of manifest error or serious procedural irregularity.

As I have already indicated, the Hearing Officer maintained that the matter before him was the correctness or otherwise of the preliminary view issued on 22nd June 2007. He rejected Mr. Dugdill's contention that the question for determination was whether the preliminary view issued on 8th June 2007 should be reinstated and confirmed. All of this was beside the point. Fortunately, it appears to have been inconsequential in relation to the basic question which had to be decided, i.e. whether the request for an extension of time

should be granted or refused.

I do not accept that the Hearing Officer's decision is liable to be set aside on the basis of manifest error or serious procedural irregularity simply because he allowed himself to be drawn into a pointless debate about which of two non-determinative and entirely non-binding preliminary views should be regarded as subordinate to the other. I am satisfied that this did not deflect or distract him from determining the substantive merits of the question he needed to determine under Rule 68 in the context of the case as a whole.

So far as the substance of the determination is concerned, it is incumbent on Mr. Dugdill to show that the position adopted by the Hearing Officer in paragraphs 37-43 of his decision was not tenable on any proper view of the matter.

Having considered the Statement of Grounds in support of the appeal and having listened with care to the submissions made by Mr. Dugdill at this hearing, I am of the view that not only was the Hearing Officer correct to reach the conclusion that he did, but that it would not have been just and fair to the Opponent if he had ruled otherwise.

Mr. Dugdill's submissions, as summarised in his skeleton argument for the hearing, amounted in varying degrees to an invitation to me to exercise the relevant discretion under Rule 68 as if it had not already been exercised in the first

instance by the Registrar's Hearing Officer.

A point was taken about the fact that extensions of time had previously been granted in the proceedings. That point was neither here nor there in relation to the matter as raised and presented for consideration by the Hearing Officer.

It was emphasised by Mr. Dugdill on this appeal that there would self-evidently be prejudice to him if he was required to move forward in the opposition proceedings with a greater burden of evidence to address than would have been the case if the evidence in reply had not been allowed into the proceedings. I can see from the materials before me that the Hearing Officer was mindful of this consideration and he took it into account when assessing the justice and fairness of the case. He did not give it any wrong or improper weight in the overall context of his deliberations.

Mr. Dugdill further contended that there was nothing of assistance to the Opponent in the fact that it had disinstructed its trade mark attorneys. The contention was put to me, essentially, on the basis that this was not a factor to be taken into account. If it was anything, it was a self-inflicted inconvenience. I do not agree. The Hearing Officer was entitled to weigh this factor in his deliberations. He did so and I am not prepared to say that he gave any wrong or improper weight to it.

A point was also taken as to whether the Opponent had

exercised, or been shown to have exercised, due diligence during the initial period of three months allowed by the rules for the filing of its evidence in reply. Reference was made to the case of SYNERGY Trade Mark (BL 0/165/07) and also to the familiar citation of SIDDIQI'S APPLICATION (BL 0/481/00).

I agree that the Hearing Officer could have been more expansive than he was on the question of diligence during this initial three month period. It is evident from the fact that he referred to the SIDDIQUI decision in his decision (which is part of the working knowledge and experience of the Registrar's hearing officers) that the significance of this point was not lost on him. I am satisfied that he did not overlook it. It appears to me that he considered that it was outweighed by other factors.

Mr. Dugdill maintained that no reliance should have been placed on a letter which the Opponent had sent to the Registrar on 21st June 2007. I was taken through this letter at length. It was said to be "a pack of lies". I cannot possibly say that the contents of it are "a pack of lies", as contended. It is not evident to me, on looking at the statements made in that letter, that they are lies. There are, at worst, inaccuracies of expression in limited respects concerning the conduct of related High Court proceedings. I am satisfied on looking at that letter and comparing the contents of it with the decision given by the Hearing Officer

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that he gave only such weight to the uncontroversial aspects
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           of it as they were entitled to bear in the context of his
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           deliberations as a whole.
                 It must be remembered that the Hearing Officer's
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           decision was a case management decision. He needed to
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           identify the relevant factors and grade them according to the
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           weight that he thought they ought properly to be given in the
           context of the request for an extension that was before him.
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           He did so. I am satisfied that his decision is
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           unobjectionable and not liable to be set aside on appeal.
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                 For these reasons, shortly stated, the appeal is
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           dismissed and it will be dismissed with costs.
      MR. CHUBB: Thank you sir.
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       THE APPOINTED PERSON: You need to address me on the question of
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           costs. You asked in your written submission for an award of
           costs. I assume you are maintaining your application for
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           costs?
      MR. CHUBB: Yes, I am, sir.
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       THE APPOINTED PERSON: The only costs in front of me are the costs
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           of this appeal. I need to have some indication from you of
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           the amount of time that you have spent, not only at today's
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          hearing but in the course of reading the materials that were
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           put to you by the other side and dealing with them and getting
          ready for the hearing and I also need to hear whether you have
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           had travelling expenses and that sort of thing to be here.
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- 1 Would you like to give me some details?
- 2 MR. CHUBB: Obviously, in terms of the time, we have been here, I
- 3 guess, since 2 o'clock. We have travelled from Bromley by
- 4 train. It is about half an hour travelling time each way.
- 5 Costs are £5 return. There was a taxi fair of £12 to get
- 6 here. In terms of preparing for today ----
- 7 THE APPOINTED PERSON: Skeleton argument?
- 8 MR. CHUBB: ---- the skeleton argument, I would probably say it
- 9 took me about an hour to do, sir. I have to admit, I followed
- 10 Mr. Colombo's decision. In terms of looking on the internet
- 11 and trying to check the procedural matters, was probably about
- 12 another hour, sir.
- 13 THE APPOINTED PERSON: Reading the paperwork that was served on
- 14 you by Mr. Dugdill?
- MR. CHUBB: I would say that would be about another hour.
- 16 THE APPOINTED PERSON: Did you do this work alone or did you
- 17 collaborate?
- 18 MR. CHUBB: No, it is my own work, sir.
- 19 THE APPOINTED PERSON: Approximately speaking, about three hours
- 20 of work, two and a half hours of attendance and some travel
- time, half hour each way?
- 22 MR. CHUBB: Yes, sir.
- 23 THE APPOINTED PERSON: Mr. Dugdill, do you want to say whether you
- object to any allowance for costs being made in relation to
- 25 those matters?

1	MR. DUGDILL: The one point I would make is that I think that
2	costs in front of the Registry are viewed as being some sort
3	of contribution, rather than compensation.
4	THE APPOINTED PERSON: Yes. On the basis of the information I
5	have received, I will make an award in favour of the
6	successful party on this appeal. I shall award the sum of
7	£225, to be paid within 14 days of today's date by the losing
8	party to the prevailing party. Those are the costs in
9	relation to this appeal.
10	You will hear through the usual channels in due course
11	about the appeal in relation to security for costs and I have
12	already indicated earlier this afternoon that you may hear
13	from me with written indications of points that I would like
14	to be addressed. I will think about that when I have
15	familiarised myself with the papers in that other matter and I
16	will communicate with you in that connection.
17	That, I think, wraps it up for today. Thank you.
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