O-055-08

1	THE PATENT OFFICE	
2		Harmsworth House, 13/15 Bouverie Street, London, EC4Y 8DP
4		Thursday, 17th January 2008
5	I	Before:
6	MR. RICHARD ARNOLD QC	
7	(Sitting as the Appointed Person)	
8		
9	In the Matter of THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1994	
10	-	- and -
11	In the Matter of an Interlocutory Hearing held in relation to Application No. 2395325 in the name of ROBERTO GIORDAN and	
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13	In the Matter of Application Invalidity by VIRGIN ENTERPH	n No. 82591 for a Declaration of RISES LIMITED
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15	Appeal from the decision of Mr. R. Colombo, acting on behalf of the Registrar, dated 29th August 2007	
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18	(Computer-aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., 6th Floor, 12/14 New Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1AG. Telephone No: 020-7936 6000. Fax No: 020-7427 0093)	
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21	MR. M. EDENBOROUGH instructed by on behalf of the Registered Prop	HARGREAVES ELSWORTH LTD appeared prietor.
22	MS. C. HUTCHINSON of GRANT SPENCER CAISLEY & PORTEOUS LLP appeared on behalf of the Applicant.	
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25	D E (CISION

1 MR. ARNOLD:

2 Introduction

- 3 1. This is an appeal by the registered proprietor of trade
- 4 mark No. 2395325 against a decision of Raoul Colombo dated
- 5 29th August 2007 (0-250-07) in which he set out the reasons
- 6 why he had granted the applicant for a declaration of
- 7 invalidity in these proceedings a one month extension of time
- 8 for filing its evidence-in-chief.

9 The facts

- 10 2. The trade mark was applied for on 25th May 2005 and
- 11 proceeded to registration on 9th December 2005. The trade
- 12 mark is VIRGIN SMILE. It stands in the name of Roberto Giordan
- for goods in Class 10: Massage apparatus, vibrators, dental
- 14 apparatus and instruments; and in Class 21 for: Electric and
- 15 non-electric toothbrushes.
- 16 3. On 14th August 2006 Virgin Enterprises Limited applied
- 17 for a declaration of invalidity on grounds raised under
- 18 sections 5(2)(b), 5(3) and 5(4)(a) of the Trade Marks Act
- 19 1994.
- 20 4. The statement of grounds annexed to the applicant's form
- 21 TM26(I) runs to 19 paragraphs and annexes two lengthy
- 22 schedules. Some flavour of the document, and therefore the
- grounds relied upon, can be gathered from the first two
- 24 paragraphs, which read as follows: "Virgin Enterprises Limited
- 25 ('the Applicant') is the proprietor of the trade marks VIRGIN,

Virgin Signature and marks comprising VIRGIN throughout the
world. Virgin holds more than 1800 registrations of marks
comprising VIRGIN around the world extending to numerous
classes. The Applicant also holds a further 220 pending
applications to register marks comprising VIRGIN in the United
Kingdom and other countries throughout the world.

"The Applicant holds 31 United Kingdom trade mark registrations of the mark VIRGIN word per se and 10 Community trade mark registrations of the mark VIRGIN word per se. The Applicant holds a further 131 registrations of marks comprising VIRGIN or of the Virgin Signature in the United Kingdom and 33 Community trade mark registrations of marks comprising VIRGIN or of the Virgin Signature. The Applicant holds 8 pending Community trade mark applications for marks comprising VIRGIN and one further pending United Kingdom trade mark application. The Applicant's marks are hereinafter referred to as the Applicant's earlier trade marks except where a specific mark is discussed."

- 5. In due course the registered proprietor filed a form TM8 and counterstatement, and the applicant was given a period of six weeks expiring on 11th January 2007 for filing its evidence-in-chief.
- 6. On 11th January 2007 the applicant requested an extension of time of two months giving the following reasons for that request: "The applicant has prepared a Witness

Statement of more than twenty five pages summarising the use which has been made of the VIRGIN mark in relation to a wide range of different goods and services since 1970. The Witness Statement includes sales figures for the brand as a whole worldwide. We have not yet managed to isolate the figures relevant to the United Kingdom in particular. We have also obtained global advertising expenditure but have not yet isolated advertising expenditure for the United Kingdom.

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"We have compiled evidence concerning the range of products on which the mark has been used, public recognition of the VIRGIN brand, details of the number of visitors to the VIRGIN website in the United Kingdom, information concerning use by licensees and affiliated companies, details of a survey conducted in 2002 showing public recognition of the brand and numerous exhibits showing use and information about use.

Although a great deal of information has been collected, taking account of the Christmas period, the short six week period set for evidence has been insufficient to complete the compilation of evidence and a further two month period is requested." That extension was granted, as I understand it, without objection from the registered proprietor.

7. On 12th March 2007 the applicant requested a further extension of time, this time of one month, giving the following reasons for that request: "The Applicant requests a further month to complete its submission of evidence in relation to the

subject invalidity application. The Applicant encloses an
unsigned version of a Witness Statement of Mark James which it
has prepared in support of its invalidity application. The
Applicant has also managed to prepare many of the 53 exhibits
to the attached document but there are some missing items
which we are still seeking to compile and a little more time
is required to conclude these exhibits. That extension of
time was again granted, as I understand it, without

objection from the registered proprietor.

8. On 11th April 2007, that is to say, the day on which the second extension of time expired, the applicant requested a third extension of time, again of one month, giving the following reasons for the request: "We have received all of the exhibits to the draft evidence but the last exhibits were only received on 5 April 2007 and we have been unable to complete the photocopying of the voluminous material in view of the Easter break. We therefore request a further one month period merely to conclude photocopying of the exhibits, execution of the Witness Statement and copying of evidence sets for the registered proprietor."

9. The registrar's preliminary view was that the third extension should be granted, but on this occasion the registered proprietor objected. That objection was maintained at a hearing that took place on 28th June 2007.

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The hearing officer's decision

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10. The hearing officer directed himself in accordance with the decisions in *LIQUID FORCE Trade Mark* [1999] RPC 429 and Siddiqui's Application [2001] ETMR 38. The substance of his reasoning is contained in paragraphs 21 to 24 of his decision which read as follows:

"21. In reaching my decision to confirm the Registry's Preliminary View to allow the extension of time request, I took account of the guidance provided by the Appointed Persons. I was satisfied that GSCP had provided strong and compelling reasons to support their request for more time to be allowed. GSCP had shown what had been done, what needed to be done and why it had not been done. I was prepared to accept that GSCP had, once the registered proprietor had filed his notice of defence and counter statement and had decided to join the proceedings, acted diligently in identifying, obtaining, collating and photocopying their evidence. This involved identifying, from a very large number of their client's earlier rights in a wide and diverse range of goods and services, those earlier rights and their supporting exhibits which would best provide support to their application. The work of compiling all these documents and exhibits into a number of complete sets for admittance into the proceedings was, in part, delayed by the Easter holidays. In view of these circumstances the request for an additional

period of one month within which to complete the photocopying and submit the evidence was, in my judgment, neither excessive nor unreasonable.

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"22. My decision at the hearing was also influenced to some extent by the fact that the work of compiling all the evidence had been completed and that the evidence had, by the time of the hearing, already been filed at the Registry. In this type of situation, it is the Registrar's view that, in proceedings, where there is an issue to be resolved and the parties are intent on defending their position, that it is always preferable to allow the proceedings to continue to a main hearing where the Hearing Officer can then decide the case with the benefit of all the evidence and arguments before him. This must be preferable to the possible alternative of the proceedings being terminated and then having another set of proceedings started between the same parties, covering the same issues and with the same evidence being filed into the new proceedings.

"23. However, this is not to be taken as meaning that the Registrar will always, when the evidence has been filed, favour the party seeking the indulgence. Nevertheless, it must surely be in the interest of all the parties to the proceedings that the dispute is resolved expeditiously, fairly and by saving expense wherever and whenever possible. This, in general terms, accords with the observations of Laddie J.

in the appeal case *Hunt-Wesson Inc's Trade Mark Application*(1996) RPC 233 at 241:

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"'An opposition may determine whether or not a new statutory monopoly, affecting all traders in the country, is to be created. Refusing permission to an opponent who files evidence late affects not only him but also may penalise the rest of the trade although the matter is not clear, it is probable that if the evidence is excluded and the opponent, as a result, loses then he will be able to return again in separate proceedings to seek rectification of the register. An advantage of allowing in the evidence is that it may well avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.'

"24. At the Hearing and in the submissions made, both parties expressed the wish to have these proceedings dealt with as quickly and as fairly as possible. HE, on behalf of the registered proprietor, informed me that his client, who was present at the Hearing, was being caused severe commercial difficulties due to the length of time being taken to resolve these proceedings. In light of this, taking into account all the circumstances of the case including the fact that the evidence was now available and ready to be admitted into the proceedings, and also GSCP's comments in respect of the very real likelihood of fresh proceedings resulting as a consequence of a decision to overturn the Preliminary View, I decided to exercise the Registrar's discretion and allow the

1 applicant's request for an extension of time within which to

file their evidence. This would enable the proceedings to

3 move forward and allow the registered proprietor the

4 opportunity to submit his evidence to oppose the application

for invalidation."

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Standard of review

11. This being an appeal against a decision on a case management matter, the appropriate standard of review is that the hearing officer's decision should not be interfered with unless he erred in principle or failed to take into account relevant factors or took into account irrelevant factors.

The appeal

12. The registered proprietor contends that the hearing officer erred in law in four respects. In summary: first, that he failed correctly to apply the principles set out in <code>Siddiqui's Application</code>; secondly, that he failed to apply the principle that an extension of time should only be granted in an exceptional case; thirdly, that he erroneously concluded that if he did not allow further time this would necessarily lead to a multiplicity of proceedings whereas the respondent contends that is not certain and, in any event, further proceedings could be struck out as an abuse of process; and, fourthly, that he failed to take into account certain matters that he should have taken into account, in particular, that he failed to seek adequate explanations from

- 1 the applicant of certain matters.
- 2 13. In his submissions, counsel for the registered
- 3 proprietor particularly focused on the first of these alleged
- 4 errors. He pointed out that it was held in Siddiqui's
- 5 Application that an application for an extension of time
- 6 requires the applicant for the extension to show clearly what
- 7 he has done, what he wants to do and why it is that he has not
- 8 been able to do it. Counsel submitted that, while the applicant
- 9 for a declaration of invalidity had addressed the first two of
- 10 these requirements, it had failed properly to address
- 11 the third requirement.
- 12 14. He pointed out that the applicant for a declaration
- of invalidity was able to commence its proceedings
- at a date of its own choosing; that the applicant for a
- declaration of invalidity would have known that a counter-
- 16 statement might be filed which admitted none of the matters
- 17 relied upon in support of the application and that, therefore,
- 18 it might be required to prove them all; that the applicant
- 19 for a declaration of invalidity knew or should have known that
- 20 it could not presume that it would be granted an extension of
- 21 time; and, in particular, he emphasised that the nature of the
- 22 evidence filed by the applicant (as shown by the draft
- 23 statement of Mr. James that had, by the date of the third
- 24 application for an extension, been filed) was largely
- 25 historical and was of such a nature that, not only could it be

- 1 anticipated and prepared in advance, but it was very likely to
- 2 have been prepared for use in other litigation. Moreover, he
- 3 submitted that the nature of that evidence was such
- 4 that, in substance, all that was likely to be required
- 5 was that it should be updated. He also submitted that,
- 6 so far as exhibits were concerned, they could have been
- 7 prepared and copied exhibit by exhibit as time went along.
- 8 15. So far as that submission is concerned, I do not accept
- 9 that the hearing officer erred in law or in principle. On the
- 10 contrary, he expressly directed himself in accordance with
- 11 Siddiqui's Application and, in paragraph 21 of his decision,
- 12 he did consider all three of the requirements that were
- 13 established in that case. Counsel's submission, in my judgment,
- 14 amounts to an argument that the hearing officer ought to have
- decided differently from how he did decide. But that is not
- the relevant test on an appeal of this nature.
- 17 16. So far as the second ground of appeal is concerned,
- 18 again, I am not persuaded that the hearing officer
- 19 made any error of law or principle. It is clear from paragraph
- 20 18 of his decision that he was aware that the request for an
- 21 extension of time was one that was required to be
- justified by strong and compelling reasons.
- 23 17. Turning to the third matter relied on, it is clear from
- 24 his decision that the hearing officer regarded the likelihood
- of further proceedings being the consequence of a refusal of

- 1 the extension sought as an important factor in favour of the
- extension being granted. In my view, it cannot be said that
- 3 he made any error of law or principle in making that
- 4 assessment in the circumstances of the present case.
- 5 While it may be true that there was no certainty that
- 6 the applicant for a declaration of invalidity would file
- 7 further proceedings if these ones were terminated
- 8 as a result of its failure to file its evidence-in-chief
- 9 in due time, it seems to me that the hearing officer
- 10 was entitled to take the view that that was highly
- 11 likely.
- 12 18. As to the submission that further proceedings might be
- 13 struck out as an abuse of process, that is not a suggestion
- 14 that counsel for the registered proprietor has developed or
- 15 attempted to substantiate. While I do not say that that is
- not a possibility, I take the view that, in the absence of a
- 17 more substantial argument to support that suggestion, the
- 18 hearing officer was entitled to take the view that that was
- 19 not very likely.
- 20 19. As to the fourth ground of appeal, this really amounts
- 21 to a series of submissions as to the detailed circumstances of
- 22 the case and the weight that should be given to them. So far
- as those are concerned, in my judgment the hearing officer's
- 24 approach cannot be criticised. He clearly considered the
- 25 circumstances of the present case, gave them the relative

- 1 weight that he considered they were entitled to and reached a
- 2 conclusion.
- 3 20. The highest it can be put, in my view, is that it could
- 4 be said that an extension of time of one month, essentially
- 5 for photocopying, was generous and that, while an extension of
- 6 time might have been justified, that did not necessarily
- 7 justify an extension of a whole month. But it does not follow
- 8 that the hearing officer's decision was one that fell outside
- 9 the ambit of his discretion.
- 10 Conclusion
- 11 21. The appeal is dismissed.
- MR. ARNOLD: Costs?
- 13 MS. HUTCHINSON: We would like to ask for costs in the appeal.
- MR. ARNOLD: How much are you asking for?
- MS. HUTCHINSON: I forgot to look up the scale before I came out,
- I am afraid.
- 17 MR. ARNOLD: I do not have the current scale to hand anyway, but
- 18 it is not necessarily determinative in a situation like this
- 19 because the scale fees are more directed to substantive
- 20 hearings than to interim hearings.
- 21 MR. EDENBOROUGH: I will just see whether I have them here, but I
- do not think I have.
- MS. HUTCHINSON: I think there was a recent similar situation
- where costs of about £700 were awarded.
- MR. ARNOLD: Are you suggesting to me that your actual costs are

- 1 as much as that?
- 2 MS. HUTCHINSON: Higher.
- 3 MR. ARNOLD: All right. So do I take it from what you say that
- 4 you are asking for £700?
- 5 MS. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
- 6 MR. ARNOLD: Mr. Edenborough?
- 7 MR. EDENBOROUGH: Sir, shall I just check whether I have the scale
- 8 here or is that not relevant?
- 9 MR. ARNOLD: If you would like to take a moment to do that, by all
- means.
- 11 MR. EDENBOROUGH: (Pause) No, I am sorry, sir. With respect to
- 12 the £700, in our submission even if that were less than the
- actual costs that have been incurred, it is still
- 14 disproportionate with respect to this matter coming before
- 15 you. If costs are going to be awarded against us then those
- 16 costs should be much smaller than that; low hundreds.
- 17 MR. ARNOLD: What would you say to this? It might be said that in
- 18 this tribunal there is a distinction to be made between costs
- 19 of substantive hearings and costs of case management hearings.
- 20 So far as substantive hearings are concerned, the basic policy
- 21 that operates, both in the registry and in this appeal
- jurisdiction, is to have scale costs which are deliberately
- 23 not reflective of the actual costs that litigants incur. That
- is so as to ensure that litigants are not discouraged from
- 25 having their disputes resolved by concerns over costs.

1 However, when there are case management decisions to be taken which are exercises of discretion, it might be said that 3 there are good policy reasons why appeals against such 4 decisions should be discouraged save in clear cases where such 5 appeals are really justified and that, for those reasons, 6 something approaching a more compensatory approach should be 7 adopted. What would you say to that? MR. EDENBOROUGH: I would say, sir, that would be fundamentally 8 9 wrong for the following reason. What you then basically do is, by the imposition of penal costs, because that is, in 10 essence, what it amounts to, you would stifle all appeals 11 against CMC-type decisions. That cannot be right. People 12 come to the registry expecting costs of a certain order and if 13 14 what you are doing with respect to the more minor decisions is 15 making those costs orders far larger and out of proportion to 16 the costs orders that would be made with respect to the 17 substantive matter then, in my submission, the people who come to the registry would be rightly outraged. That is not what 18 they would expect and if that were to happen it needs to be 19 20 foreshadowed clearly by a Practice Notice. MR. ARNOLD: Ms. Hutchinson, is there anything else you want to 21 22 say? 23 MS. HUTCHINSON: I think that you have to take into account

whether there was any realistic prospect of the decision being

turned over on appeal. I think in actual fact there is good

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- 1 reason to award costs which note the fact that there almost
- 2 certainly was not a realistic prospect of this decision being
- 3 turned over on appeal, so there has been considerable delay
- 4 and work for everybody in having to hear the appeal, and that
- 5 that should be recognised in the costs.
- 6 MR. EDENBOROUGH: Might I just say one thing, sir?
- 7 MR. ARNOLD: Yes.
- 8 MR. EDENBOROUGH: That is, if you were to adopt that policy, then
- 9 might I ask you, sir, to set out your decision fully reasoned
- 10 with respect to the costs issue because, in my submission,
- 11 that would be a significant departure from what has happened
- 12 before and the mere award of a number would not contain the
- 13 reasoning that you are clearly contemplating.
- MR. ARNOLD: Anything else?
- MR. EDENBOROUGH: No. It was only to invite you, if you were
- going to make such an order, to fully reason it, sir.
- 17 MR. ARNOLD: The applicant for a declaration of invalidity having
- 18 succeeded on the appeal now asks for an award of costs.
- 19 The applicant's attorney asks me for an award in the sum
- 20 of £700 on the basis, as I understand it, that in a recent
- 21 case a similar sum was awarded and that her client's actual
- costs are in excess of that amount.
- 23 Counsel for the registered proprietor did not dispute
- 24 that costs should follow the event but submitted that they
- should be nothing like that magnitude, and that something more

according to the normal nominal costs that are typically awarded in this jurisdiction should be awarded, although he did not put forward any specific alternative figure.

In my view, the applicant for a declaration of invalidity's attorney is right to make the submission that this was not only an appeal against a case management decision on an extension of time but also an appeal that had no realistic prospect of success.

In my judgment, appeals against case management decisions in the registry, particularly decisions about extensions of time, are to be discouraged save where there is a real reason and justification for such an appeal. In the circumstances of the present case, I do not consider that there was such justification.

Accordingly, I consider that it is right to approach this case on the footing that an award of costs that more closely approximates to the applicant for a declaration of invalidity's actual costs is justified. That does not mean that an indemnity award is necessarily appropriate.

Considering matters in the round, I propose to order that the registered proprietor pay the applicant for a declaration of invalidity the sum of £500 as a contribution to its costs.

Thank you very much.

MR. EDENBOROUGH: I am sorry, sir, there is one point. Might I take instructions on the period in which that should be paid?

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MR. ARNOLD: Certainly.
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                           (Counsel took instructions)
      MR. EDENBOROUGH: Would it be possible to have 14 days?
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      MR. ARNOLD: Certainly. I am sorry, I should ask Ms. Hutchinson
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          if there is any objection to that.
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      MS. HUTCHINSON: None at all.
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      MR. ARNOLD: Indeed, 14 days.
      MR. EDENBOROUGH: Thank you, sir.
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      MR. ARNOLD: Thank you both.
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It is an applicant in person.