1	THE PATENT OFFICE
•	The Conference Room,
2	Harmsworth House, 13-15 Bouverie Street,
3	London EC4Y 8DP.
4	Monday, 2nd December 2002
5	Before:
J	202020
6	MR. G. HOBBS QC
7	(Sitting as the Appointed Person)
,	
8	
9	In the Matter of the Trade Marks Act 1994
	-and-
10	
11	In the Matter of Trade Mark No: 2053772 in the name of FIRST GROUP PLC
LT	FIRST GROUP PLC
12	-and-
1 2	To the Methon of Application for Thurslidity
13	In the Matter of Application for Invalidity thereto under Invalidity No: 11363 by NATIONAL CAR RENTAL
14	SYSTEM INC
15	
16	Appeal of the Applicant from the decision of
	Mr. D.W. Landau, acting on behalf of the Registrar, dated
17	17th May 2002
18	
	(Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,
19	Midway House, 27/29 Cursitor Street, London EC4A 1LT.
20	Telephone No: 020-7405 5010. Fax No: 020-7405 5026.)
- 0	
21	
22	MR. J. MITCHENER (of Messrs Field Fisher Waterhouse) appeared as Agent on behalf of the Appellant/Applicant.
22	as Agent on behalf of the Appellant, Applicant.
23	MR. M. KRAUSE (of Messrs Haseltine Lake Trade Marks) appeared
2.4	as Agent on behalf of the Respondent/Registered Proprietor.
24	 D E C I S I O N
25	(Approved by the Appointed Person)

1

THE APPOINTED PERSON: The words EASTERN NATIONAL were registered with effect from 24th January 1996 as a trade mark for use in relation to "passenger transportation services incorporating related travel arrangement services" in Class 39.

2.1

2.6

They were registered under number 2053772 in the name of First Group Plc ("the Respondent"). In accordance with the provisions of section 72 of the Trade Marks Act 1994, the registration of the Respondent as the proprietor of the trade mark is prima facie evidence of the validity of the original registration.

On 17th January 2000 National Car Registration Inc ("the Applicant") applied for a declaration of invalidity in relation to registration 2053772. The application was made on various grounds. I need only mention that the validity of the registration was challenged under sections 5(2)(b) and 5(4)(a) of the 1994 Act.

So far as relevant for present purposes, the challenge under section 5(2)(b) was based on the Applicant's earlier registered trade mark number 2017578, consisting of the following word and device:



registered with effect from 13th April 1995 for use in relation to "automobile rental and reservation services" in Class 39.

This earlier trade mark registration also benefits from the rebuttable presumption of validity prescribed by section 72 of the 1994 Act.

The challenge under section 5(4)(a) was based on the contention that the word NATIONAL was so closely identified with the Applicant's automobile rental and reservation services that it was likely, in January 1996, that people in the United Kingdom would be deceived or confused if the words EASTERN NATIONAL were used as an indication of trade origin in relation to "passenger transportation services incorporating related travel arrangement services" unconnected with the Applicant.

2.4

The Respondent joined issue with the Applicant on these objections in a Counterstatement filed on 25th April 2000. The application for a declaration of invalidity came on for hearing before Mr. D.W. Landau, acting on behalf of the Registrar of Trade Marks, on 7th May 2002. In a written decision issued on 17th May 2002 Mr. Landau held that the registration in question was not invalid on any of the grounds alleged by the Applicant. He rejected the application for a declaration of invalidity and ordered the Applicant to pay the Respondent £635 as a contribution towards its costs of the proceedings.

On 14th June 2002 the Applicant gave notice of appeal to an Appointed Person under section 76 of the Act contending that its objections to validity under sections 5(2)(b) and 5(4)(a) should have been upheld and that the hearing officer was wrong to reject them on the grounds that he did. I

propose to deal first with the appeal under section 5(4)(a).

2.4

The Applicant tendered three witness statements with a view to demonstrating that the word NATIONAL had, at the relevant date, become distinctive per se of the trade origin of automobile rental and reservation services for which it was responsible by way of trade or business in the United Kingdom. These were the witness statements of Jeremy Mills, Nigel Trotman and Nigel Tuffey. Their evidence was given in the form of synchronised statements written in what appear to have been closely prescribed terms. Such statements invite scepticism of the kind expressed by Lord Esher M.R. in Re Christiansen's TM [1885] 3 RPC 54 at 60:

"Now, to my mind, when you have evidence given upon affidavit, and you find a dozen people, or twenty people, all swearing to exactly the same stereotyped affidavit, if I am called upon to act upon their evidence, it immediately makes me suspect that the affidavits are then not their own views of things and that they have adopted the view of somebody who has drawn the whole lot of the affidavits, and they adopt that view as a whole and say 'I think that affidavit right' and they put their names to the bottom."

The hearing officer took the view that no real weight could be given to the evidence of these three witnesses in relation to the issues that he was required to determine. I

think	he	was	riaht.	to	adopt.	that	position.

The most that I can get from the evidence filed on				
behalf of the Applicant is that there was, for a period of				
approximately 20 years down to 1998, a collaborative				
relationship under which the automobile rental and				
reservation services provided by the Applicant in North				
America were promoted in association with EUROPCAR automobile				
rental and reservation services under the umbrella brand				
TNTERRENT				

The Applicant's Vice President of Franchise Development, Larry Soleta, refers in paragraph 6 of his witness statement to use of the designation NATIONAL alongside the EUROPCAR and INTERRENT names. He suggests that this combination will have educated the public to the affiliation between the two companies and also helped his company to maintain a high degree of recognition in Europe as a distinct business. He says that "As a result any person who became familiar with the EUROPCAR mark also became aware of the NATIONAL mark."

However, in paragraph 8 of her witness statement Jane Colton, Chief Legal Counsel for ANC Rental Corporation, makes it clear that the Applicant does not suggest that by means of any of these activities in Europe it had acquired "goodwill" in the narrowest (by which I take her to mean legally specific) sense of the word in the designation NATIONAL.

I cannot see any basis in the evidence for concluding

that the Applicant's activities had rendered the word

NATIONAL distinctive per se of any services actually
provided by the Applicant in the United Kingdom. The word
is inherently apt to describe a class or category
of services of the kind provided by the Applicant. It fits
easily into the classification of such services as being
local, national or international. The evidence on file is not
sufficient, in my view, to establish that the word NATIONAL had
acquired a distinctive character through use in the United
Kingdom in relation to the Applicant's services prior to January
1996. Over and above that, there does not appear to me to have
been any real likelihood that the Respondent's use of the
designation EASTERN NATIONAL for "passenger transportation
services incorporating related travel arrangement services" would
cause deception or confusion as a result of any use previously
made of the designation NATIONAL in relation to the Applicant's
services.

There is a basic difference, in terms of the need fulfilled, between the services offered by the Applicant and those offered by the Respondent. In the one context the customer is going to be transporting him or herself and in the other context the customer is going to be transported by someone else. I do not think that this difference would, of itself, be sufficient to negate the risk of deception or confusion if words or elements with a high degree of distinctive power and

similarity were used to identify the trade origin of the rival services to members of the public in the United Kingdom. However, the present case is not a case of that kind. The ordinariness of

the word NATIONAL and the absence of evidence sufficient to establish distinctiveness through use of it in the United Kingdom lead me to conclude that this is a case in which small differences should be regarded as sufficient to distinguish the rival uses of the designations in question. In my view, the Applicant has not established that it was in a position to object to use of the designation EASTERN NATIONAL in relation to the services of interest to the Respondent on the ground that such use would, in January 1996, have involved a likelihood of misrepresentation damaging to the goodwill of a business belonging to the Applicant in the United Kingdom.

I now turn to consider the appeal under section 5(2)(b). The question for consideration under this section is whether there are similarities, in terms of the marks and services in issue, that would have combined to give rise to a likelihood of confusion if the earlier and later marks had been used concurrently in the United Kingdom in relation to services of the kind for which they were respectively registered and proposed to be registered in January 1996.

In paragraph 22 of its judgment in case C-39/97 Canon

K.K. v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc. the European Court of

Justice emphasised that, even if the objection arises in a case

where a mark is identical to another with a highly distinctive character, it is still necessary to adduce evidence of similarity between the goods or services covered by the rival marks. I should observe at this juncture that no such evidence was adduced

in the present case. The hearing officer was therefore left to make up his mind on the basis of common general knowledge and the application of common sense to the materials that were in evidence before him.

In paragraphs 26 et seq of its judgment in the **Canon** case, the European Court of Justice held that there can be no likelihood of confusion in the sense required by section 5(2)(b) of the 1994 Act if it does not appear that the public could believe that the goods or services covered by the trade marks in issue come from the same undertaking or economically linked undertakings.

When, as in the present case, the marks in issue are not identical, they need to be distinctively similar in order to be capable of inducing such a belief in the mind of the average consumer of the goods or services concerned.

Marks which converge upon a particular mode or element of expression may or may not be found upon due consideration to be distinctively similar. The position varies according to the propensity of the particular mode or element of expression to be perceived, in the context of the marks as a whole, as origin specific (as for example in Wagamama Ltd. v City Centre

Restaurants Plc [1995] F.S.R. 713) or origin neutral (as for example in The European Ltd. v. Economist Newspapers Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 283). The relevant propensity may, on established principles, be inherent or acquired through use. This leaves room for evidence demonstrating that the mode or element of expression

in question has an established significance which the average consumer would ascribe to the marks in issue.

However, the requisite degree of distinctiveness cannot be demonstrated simply by evidence of entries in the Register of Trade Marks. Entries in the Register do not of themselves affect the way in which marks are perceived and remembered.

under section 5(4)(a), I consider that this is a case in which the similarities, such as they are, between the marks in issue and the services in issue are not sufficient to give rise to the required likelihood of confusion. The hearing officer seems to have concluded in paragraph 56 of his decision that the relevant objection was liable to be rejected either for lack of similarity between the services in issue or for lack of similarity between the marks in issue. In view of the established principle that a lesser degree of similarity between services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between marks and vice versa (see paragraph 17 of the Judgment of the ECJ in Canon and paragraph 19 of its judgment on Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV) it is necessary to focus on the

net effect of the given similarities and differences. I therefore prefer to uphold his determination under section 5(2)(b) on the basis that confusion does not appear to have been likely upon assessment of the net effect of the similarities and differences between the marks and services in issue. In the circumstances, the appeal under section 5(2)(b) of the Act fails. For these

7	reasons, shortly stated, the appeal will be dismissed
8	For proceedings; see separate transcript
9	