
	1	THE	PATENT	OFF	ICE				
	2							The Conference Room, Harmsworth House, 13-15 Bouverie Street,	
	3							London EC4Y 8DP.	
200	4 2							Wednesday, 17th April	
	5						Before	2:	
	6		MR. S. THORLEY QC						
	7			pointed Person)					
	8								
	9			IN	THE MAT	FER of	ER of the Trade Marks Act 1994 and		
	10								
	11			IN THE MATTER of Trade Mark Application No 2,158,336 for a device mark in Classes					
	12				Pharmac	cy Lin	nited a	now in the name of Lloyds d as assignee of the	
	13				application from			I GEHE OK PIC.	
	14								
Pik	۵		Appeal	of	Applicar	nt fro	om the	decision of Mr. A.J.	
	15		acting	g on	behalf o	of the	e Regis	strar, dated 9th	
Nov	embe	r,	2001.						
	16								
	17								
Ltd	• ,	(Transo	cript of	: the	e shortha	and no	otes of	f Marten Walsh Cherer	
	18	Telephone No. 020-7405-5010.							
	19								
of	20					1		~ ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `	
		MR. J. M	IELLOR (inst	tructed k	oy Whi	.te & (Case) appeared on behalf	
	21	the	Applica	nt.					
	22	MR. D. M	IORGAN a	appea	ared on k	pehalf	of th	ne Trade Marks Registry.	
	23			DECISION (As Approved)					
	24								
	25								

1 THE APPOINTED PERSON: 1. This is an appeal to the Appointed 2 Person from a decision of Mr. Pike, the Hearing Officer acting for the Registrar, dated 9th November 2001, which 3 followed a hearing on 21st July 2001. It was an ex-parte 4 5 hearing in relation to an application no. 2,158,336 by a 6 company called GEHE UK Plc to register a trade mark in Classes 3, 5, 39 and 42 in relation to goods of a nature 7 which would be sold in a chemist's shop, to transport 8 9 relating to pharmaceutical products and to pharmacy services. The mark in question is a stylised form, which is shown 10 2. 11 in paragraph 1 of Mr. Pike's decision. It consists of what 12 is plainly intended to be a pestle and mortar surrounded by a circle. 13

14 3. The objection with regard to Class 39 was withdrawn,
15 and this appeal is not concerned with that part of the
16 application.

In his decision, Mr. Pike maintained an objection taken
under section 3(1)(b) of the Act on the basis that the mark
consists of "the device of a mortar and pestle which was
devoid of distinctive character"; for example, for goods
which are mixed together using this method and services
relating thereto.

5. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act reads as follows:
"3(1) The following shall not be registered.
"(b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive



character".

This was a mark which was unused as at the date of 6. 2 application, which was 14th February 1998, and therefore 3 there was no question of considering whether or not the mark 4 had become distinctive as a result of use made of it, and 5 6 therefore registrable by virtue of the proviso to section 3. 7. Mr. Pike stated the test for distinctiveness pursuant 7 to section 3(1)(b) by reference to that laid down by 8 9 Jacob J. in the TREAT case [1996] RPC 281, page 306, when he said: "What does 'devoid of distinctive character' mean? 10 Т 11 think the phrase requires consideration of the mark on its 12 own, assuming no use. Is it the sort of word (or other sign) which cannot do the job of distinguishing without first 13 educating the public that it is a trade mark?" 14

15 8. Mr. Pike then considered the facts of the case, and he16 concluded as follows in paragraphs 10 and 11:

17 "10. This application is for a sign which appears to be a representation of a mortar and pestle contained within a 18 circle. A mortar is a vessel in which substances are ground 19 20 or crushed with a pestle, a pestle being the tool used to crush, mash or grind materials in a mortar. To my own 21 knowledge the mortar and pestle has been in use as a tool by, 22 inter alia, pharmacists and chemists for many years. 23 Whilst 24 I accept that in these days there may well be more modern and more efficient tools available for such activities I am of 25

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the view that the device of a mortar and pestle remains as a symbol which indicates the nature of the goods and services provided by pharmacists and chemists."

"11. The representation of the mortar and pestle 4 contained in this application is in outline and it is 5 б represented in such a way that it may be described as one being superimposed on the other. The representation has the 7 effect of portraying a pestle placed inside a mortar, this 8 9 being enclosed within a circle. In my view the circle itself is a simple geometric device which does no more than provide 10 11 a basic border to the more substantial elements of the mark." 12 9. As a result of this, he concluded that the degree of stylisation was so small and insignificant that the mark 13 would be seen by any prospective purchaser as an ordinary 14 representation of a mortar and pestle, which he considered to 15 16 be totally non-distinctive. He, therefore, refused the 17 registration.

18 10. Against that decision the assignees of the application, Lloyds Pharmacy Limited, have appealed by a notice of appeal 19 dated 6th December 2001, and they have been represented at 20 21 the hearing of this appeal by Mr. Mellor of Counsel. Mr. Mellor supplied me with a very full skeleton outlining the 22 points which were to be taken on this appeal, and I think I 23 can, without injustice, summarise them as being two. First, 24 he said that Mr. Pike on 21st July 2001 did not have the 25



1 advantage of being able to consider the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the Baby-Dry case 2 -- Procter & Gamble Company v. Office for Harmonisation in 3 the Internal Market [2002] ETMR 22. This Judgment was given 4 on 20th September 2001. It was Mr. Mellor's contention that 5 б this Judgment had introduced a test which was very different to that of the test laid down by Jacob J. in the TREAT case, 7 so, he contended, the Hearing Officer had approached the 8 9 question of registrability on the wrong basis.

10 11. Secondly he contended that in any event the degree of
11 stylisation in this mark was sufficient to warrant
12 registration even on the somewhat stricter test that he felt
13 Jacob J. had set.

I turn, first, to the Baby-Dry case. This case has 14 12. already been the subject of a number of comments both in the 15 16 courts in this country and before the Appointed Persons. Т 17 do not propose in this Judgment to set out the whole of paragraphs 35-43, which embody the substance of the Judgment. 18 Mr. Mellor is entirely correct that in paragraphs 35 and 36 19 20 the court drew attention not only to the requirement of 21 distinctiveness under Art. 7.1 of Regulation 40/94, the equivalent of section 3 of our Act, but also to Art. 12, 22 which equates to the defences available to infringement. 23 24 Hitherto in this country, it was customary to consider the 25 question of registrability without regard to the possibility



that once registered a party may be able to plead a defence to infringement by reason of a non-trade mark use. It is plain from Baby-Dry that that consideration now carries less weight.

The Judgment in Baby-Dry, however, sets out the manner 5 13. б in which registrability is to be tested and this can, in my judgment, best be identified from the language of paragraph 7 42, where, dealing with word marks, the Court stated: "The 8 9 determination to be made depends on whether the word combination in question may be viewed as a normal way of 10 11 referring to the goods or of representing their essential 12 characteristics in common parlance." Plainly, the test can be re-stated to deal with device marks of the sort we have 13 14 here.

15 14. Can the device in question be viewed as a normal way of 16 referring to the goods or services in question, or of 17 representing their essential characteristics? As a matter of 18 wording, I do not perceive that there is any difference 19 between that approach and the approach of Jacob J., who posed 20 the question: Is the word or other sign one which cannot do 21 the job of distinguishing?

15. The difference, if there be one, I think, is a difference of degree. Mr. Mellor submitted that Baby-Dry would never have been registered as a trade mark without evidence of distinctiveness by the UK Registry prior to the



I think there is substance in his submission. Baby-Dry mark. 1 Therefore, in approaching the registrability of a mark after 2 Baby-Dry I do not think that it is correct to conclude that 3 4 the approach to testing for distinctiveness is different. However, it may well be that on the facts of a particular 5 case a mark which previously would not have been registrable 6 7 may now be registrable if one asks the question that one is required to ask, namely, "Is the mark a normal way of 8 9 referring to the goods?"

10 16. Each case must be a question of fact and degree, and 11 any attempt on my part to lay down strict guidance is fraught 12 with difficulty. I do not propose to do so.

I turn then to the facts in this case. The device is, 13 17. 14 undoubtedly, a device which shows a pestle and mortar. It is 15 a stylised pestle and mortar. It is a very simple stylisation. Mr. Mellor suggested in his skeleton that it 16 was "minimalist" -- I agree -- but the fact that it is 17 18 minimalist does not mean that it is not eye-catching and does 19 not mean that it is incapable of distinguishing.

20 18. Mr. Mellor criticised Mr. Pike for adopting what he saw 21 as an old-fashioned view of the significance of a pestle and 22 mortar, and in particular criticised his conclusion that the 23 device of a pestle and mortar remained a symbol which 24 indicated the nature of goods and services provided by 25 pharmacists.



1 19. This raises a difficulty which not infrequently occurs 2 in ex-parte proceedings. The Hearing Officer has to use his own judgement in default of evidence as to what a word or a 3 device means or would indicate to the relevant consumer. 4 Hearing officers have significant experience in performing 5 6 this task and it is plainly right that they should do so 7 without, in every case, placing a burden upon the applicant of adducing evidence designed to assist the Registrar in 8 9 reaching a decision. It would be an intolerable burden on the system if that had to be done in each case. 10 11 20. Mr. Morgan, who appeared on behalf of the Registrar 12 before me, suggested that if a challenge of this nature were to be mounted on appeal, (it apparently not having been at 13 14 any rate at the forefront of the argument on the hearing) it would be right to remit the matter to the Registry for 15 16 relevant evidence to be filed. This, of course, is a step which is open to me, but it is a step which I would take with 17 18 the greatest reluctance. The mark was applied for in February 1998, over four years ago, and there is a public 19

interest in ensuring that marks be registered or rejected as
early as possible. Therefore, it is only in an exceptional
case that I would adopt the course of remitting a matter.
21. In the present case, I do not believe that it is
necessary for me to remit this case. I have felt able to
come to a conclusion on the matter as it stands before me.



1 22. Although there are three classes of goods and services, 2 I do not believe that any logical distinction can be drawn between them. The Class 42 Pharmacy services mark relates to 3 the services of an ordinary chemist and the goods in guestion 4 are, in general terms, goods which would be sold through a 5 6 chemist's shop. Undoubtedly, in the past, as Mr. Mellor 7 accepts, a device of a pestle and mortar was a symbol which was used in relation to the pharmacy profession, and he told 8 9 me that in Boots in High Holborn there is still a representation of a pestle and mortar on the shelf above the 10 11 pharmacy department. He does not, therefore, quarrel with 12 the fact that a pestle and mortar might be a symbol which 13 could indicate the nature of goods and services provided by 14 pharmacists and chemists, but what he does say is that, having regard to the language of Baby-Dry, a pestle and 15 16 mortar is not a normal way of referring to pharmaceutical 17 goods or services or of representing their essential 18 characteristics in common parlance. I agree. 23. I have come to the conclusion that following the 19 20 guidance of the Court of Justice in Baby-Dry I must have 21 regard to the actual representation of the mark and to ask 22 whether that representation may be viewed as a normal way of referring to pharmaceutical services. In reaching the 23 conclusion that it does not, I do take into account the 24

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stylisation of the mark. It impressed me as being both



eye-catching and, to use Mr. Mellor's word, minimalist, but nonetheless distinctive. It is not merely a pestle and mortar.

24. I must approach this case on the basis of the mark 4 applied for and should not be distracted into considering 5 б whether any device of a pestle and mortar would be unregistrable. Approaching this case on the basis of that 7 mark and taking into account the facts I have, I am satisfied 8 that it is not barred from registration by virtue of section 9 10 3(1)(b) and, accordingly, this appeal succeeds. 11 Normal order? No costs? MR. MELLOR: Yes, Sir. Thank you. 12 13 MR. MORGAN: Thank you. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

