THE PATENT OFFICE
Court Room 2, 13-15 Bouverie Street,
London, EC4.
Monday, 10th January, 2000.
Before:
MR. SIMON THORLEY QC
(Sitting as the Appointed Person)
In the Matter of The Trade Marks Act 1994
and
In the Matter of United Kingdom Trade Mark Application No. 2,176,423 "SHOP" (Series of Six) to register a trade mark in Classes 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41 and 42 in the name of Precis (1615) Limited
and
In the Matter of an Appeal to the Appointed Person from decision of Mr. J. Hamilton-Jones under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 against the Decision dated 21st June, 1999.
(Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer
Limited, Midway House, 27-29 Cursitor Street, London EC4A 1LT. Telephone Number: 0171-405-5010. Fax No: 0171 405 5026)
MR. J.D. McCALL (of W.P. Thompson & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Applicants/Appellants.
MR. A. JAMES (Principal Hearing Officer) appeared as the
Registrar's Representative.
JUDGMENT (As Approved)

1 MR. THORLEY: This is an appeal to the Appointed Person from a
2 decision of Mr. Hamilton-Jones dated 21st June, 1999. In that
3 decision he refused registration of a series of six marks on a
4 number of grounds.

Fundamental to his decision was his conclusion that none of the marks were acceptable for registration having regard to the provisions of sections 3(1)(b) and (c) of the Trade Marks Act 1994.

The applicants are a company, Precis (1615) Limited, and the series of marks were applied for in a large number of classes.

On this appeal the applicants have proceeded only in relation to the fifth and sixth marks. These marks are similar save that in the sixth mark colour is specified. The Hearing Officer concluded that the sixth mark represented the applicant's best case, and Mr. McCall of W.P. Thompson & Co, agents for the applicants who appeared before me, accepted that this was the case. I, therefore, propose to deal, first, with the sixth mark.

It has been common ground on the appeal before me that registration stands or falls on consideration of section 3(1)(b). In particular, Mr. James, who appeared on behalf of the Registry, waived any further objection under section 3(6).

The sixth mark consists of the word "SHOP" in large letters with what is accepted to be a representation of an exclamation mark following the word "SHOP" but elevated

somewhat above it. Underneath are the words THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL, with the word THE in white on a blue background, the remainder of the mark being in orange and blue; the word SHOP being in orange on a blue background and the words HOME SHOPPING being in blue on an orange background.

Both before the Hearing Officer and before me,

Mr. McCall contended that the combination of the words and the

presence of the exclamation mark, together with the colour

element, rendered the mark distinctive so that registration

should not be prevented under section 3(1)(b). He accepted

that the word SHOP by itself was not distinctive, and that the

words THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL were a descriptor of a kind of

business, but he used those latter words as part of his

argument in contending that their presence promoted the rest

of the mark -- that is the word SHOP and the exclamation mark

-- into references of trade mark signification.

There has been no use of this mark, or there is no contention of any use of this mark, as at the date of application. Therefore, I have to consider the prima facie case under section 3(1)(b). Section 3(1)(b) provides: "The following shall not be registered - (b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character."

Mr. McCall submitted before me that the word "any" was important and that a mere spark of distinctiveness would be enough. Mr. James suggested that this was not the correct interpretation of section 3(1)(b). He contended that it was

necessary, having regard to the structure of the section, to
regard section 3(1)(b) as posing the question, "Does the trade
mark have the necessary character to function as a trade
mark?"

He also referred me to the decision of Robert Walker LJ in Proctor & Gamble Company's Application [1999] RPC 673 at 680, which was cited by Mr. Hamilton-Jones. His Lordship stated: "Despite the fairly strong language of s.3(1)(b), 'devoid of any distinctive character' - and Mr. Morcom emphasised the word 'any' - that provision must in my judgment be directed to a visible sign or combination of signs which can by itself readily distinguish one trader's product - in this case an ordinary, inexpensive household product - from that of another competing trader."

When one has regard to section 3(1)(b), it is, in my judgment, necessary to take it in the context of the section as a whole, and particularly to have regard to the fact that section 3(1)(b), unlike section 3(1)(a), is conditioned by the proviso to section 3. A mark which is devoid of any distinctive character can, none the less, be registered if as a result of use it has become sufficiently distinctive.

Conversely, under section 3(1)(a), a mark which does not satisfy the requirements of section 1(1) -- that is a mark which is capable of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings -- cannot be registered even if it has acquired a distinctive character as

1 a result of use.

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In my judgment, Mr. McCall is placing too light a restriction upon section 3(1)(b) when he suggests that a mere spark of distinctiveness is enough.

I am bound by and, with respect, agree with the reasoning of Robert Walker LJ. One must have regard to the mark as a whole, and ask whether the combination of signs contained in the trade mark can by itself readily distinguish the products or services of one trader from those of another.

I turn now to the facts of the present case. In his argument before me Mr. McCall expanded upon his grounds of appeal, but I think it is fair to say that his arguments are encapsulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of those grounds of appeal, which read as follows: "It is submitted that the applied for mark, as a whole, does have sufficient distinctive character to qualify for registration. The individual elements of the mark may be considered non-distinctive because of their generic or descriptive nature, but the combination of the various elements in the mark i.e. the word SHOP, the exclamation mark at a 2 o'clock position to the word SHOP, the words THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL, the colours blue and orange and the emphasis on the word THE by showing it in white on a blue background combine to form a registerable mark. The presence of the words 'THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL', determine the meaning of the word SHOP within the mark as a whole, making it quite clear that what appears above is a title or

badge of identification, rather than an exhortation to shop, as proposed by the Registrar. The fact that the exclamation mark appears at a 2 o'clock position to the word SHOP and not on the same line as the letters S, H, O and P, as one would expect in normal text, is a vital clue in alerting the viewer to the fact that SHOP is being used, not in its ordinary sense, but in a trade mark sense. Use of otherwise non-distinctive symbols can, if shown in unusual ways, immediately promote an ordinary word into a trade mark. It is the unusualness, or the unexpected manner of use, which consumers have learned to identify as being fanciful and which can render what are apparently commonplace words into badges indicating origin. In fact often it takes very little added matter to render a commonplace word into an immediately recognisable trade mark.

"(5) The applied for mark is used to identify a home shopping channel which is broadcast on television. There are only a handful of shopping channels on cable and satellite TV at the moment. The Appellant's shopping channel is selected from a list of channels. It is immediately obvious to the viewer that the word SHOP! THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL is a home shopping channel identified by the word SHOP!"

I deal first with the contention that the appellant's shopping channel is selected from a list of channels and that it is immediately obvious to the viewer that SHOP! THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL is a home shopping channel identified by the

word SHOP! I do not believe I can take this into account.

This is not a case where evidence of use is being relied upon.

I have to consider the notional and fair use of this trade

mark and ask myself the question whether, on a notional and

fair use upon the goods applied for, this mark has the

necessary capacity to distinguish?

The argument put forward correctly exhorts me to have regard to this mark as a whole and not to dissect it into its individual integers. Equally, I cannot ignore that the primary features of the mark are the ordinary English words SHOP! and THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL, which Mr. McCall, quite correctly, accepted by themselves were not distinctive.

In his decision, Mr. Hamilton-Jones correctly, in my view, considered the elements of the mark and then considered the mark as a whole. What he said was this: "The mark consists of several elements. Firstly, there is the word 'Shop' presented in a large typeface and to the top right of this word is the device that, in my view, closely resembles an exclamation mark. Directly below this word are the words 'The Home Shopping Channel' which are presented in a smaller typeface. The mark is presented in three colours which are claimed as an element of the mark.

"In my view the words contained in the mark are the most prominent feature of it and the meanings of them are well known. It seems to me that the combination and presentation of these words is one that indicates that the applicant provides

or intends to provide a television shopping channel from which the public can purchase goods and services. The enlargement of the word 'Shop' is likely to be taken as an exhortation to shop via the applicant's home shopping channel. It follows from this, in my view, that other traders may also wish to use such a combination in relation to goods and services which are sold or provided by such a television channel, for example, on promotional material.

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"However, I must, of course, consider the mark as a whole before deciding whether it is devoid of any distinctive character. In doing so I need to take account of the presence of the device and colour elements and whether the combination of these and the words result in a distinctive trade mark.

"Turning first to the device element, this, as I have already mentioned, appears to me to closely resemble an exclamation mark and I think it extremely likely that this is how it would be regarded by anyone looking at the mark.

Indeed, this is how the device was described by Mr. McCall at the hearing. An exclamation mark is, of course, commonly used after exclamations. In the context of this mark, it is my view that this sign is being used to emphasise that the purpose of the services being provided is to enable people to shop. I do not consider that the raised position of the device detracts from this.

"As regards the colours contained in the mark, I do not consider that there is anything particularly distinctive about

these colours or about the way in which they are presented.

Advertisements in promotional material or for that matter on television are often in colour. The colours blue and orange (the white being mere background) are no more distinctive than any other two colours. Further, the colours are presented mere background to the words."

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Mr. Hamilton-Jones went on to cite from the passage in Robert Walker LJ's judgment in the Proctor & Gamble case and concluded that the dominance of the word SHOP and the words THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL was too great and that, therefore, the mark could not be registered.

I cannot fault the approach of the Hearing Officer as a matter of law. He considered the prominent features of the mark but made sure that he considered the mark as a whole. He concluded that the descriptor THE HOME SHOPPING CHANNEL did not, as Mr. McCall submitted, serve to elevate the word SHOP and the exclamation mark into trade mark significance. He concluded that it was an exhortation to use the channel to shop. In this respect, I agree with the Hearing Officer and not with Mr. McCall.

To my mind, there is insufficient material of a non-descriptive nature in this trade mark for it to qualify for registration having regard to the provisions of section 3(1)(b). The test is not that there should be a mere spark of distinctiveness, but even if that were the test, I am doubtful that this mark contains such a spark.

Mr. James pointed to the fact that this mark as applied for as a series of marks with the fifth mark where colour does not feature, and suggested, therefore, that colour was not a material factor in this mark. I cannot accept that as a matter of law. If I were satisfied that the sixth mark were registerable and the fifth mark was not, it would be proper to allow registration of the sixth mark only. It does, however, I think, indicate that the colours themselves are not considered to be particularly distinctive. Indeed, blue, orange and white are regularly used as colours.

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This leaves only, to my mind, the rather odd exclamation mark, but I am not satisfied that that, in the context of this mark, is in any way sufficient to elevate the sign into a registerable trade mark.

For these reasons, I will dismiss the appeal, but before doing so I should make some observations on some precedents which were put forward by Mr. McCall suggesting that there was a consistent practice in the Registry in relation to word marks containing the word SHOP in allowing registration in circumstances not dissimilar to the case before me. In particular, he drew attention to three marks registered in 1987, each of which was for the words "SHOP ELECTRIC". It is fair to say that there is a disclaimer in all of those marks for the words SHOP and ELECTRIC, but there is no indication on the documents before me that the marks were registered as a result of use.

He also drew attention to a mark SHOPNET for computer 1 2 terminals, a mark EuroShop for the conducting of fairs, and the mark ESHOP for scientific apparatus and instruments. 3 It is not for me on this appeal to indicate whether or 4 not, in my view, those marks should have been registered. I 5 6 do not, in any event, have any information as to the extent to 7 which there was any evidence of use. On an appeal, my duty is 8 to consider the mark applied for and only the mark applied 9 for. If, as a result of a decision of this Tribunal, the 10 Registry is minded to alter its practice, that is a matter for 11 them. 12 For the reasons given, I am wholly satisfied that this 13 mark, without evidence of use, should not be registered as it 14 falls foul of section 3(1)(b). The appeal will, accordingly, 15 be dismissed. In accordance with the usual practice, there will be no order as to costs. 16 MR. JAMES: I was not going to ask for any costs. 17 18 MR. McCALL: Thank you. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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