

Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Section 50) Environmental Information Regulations

Decision Notice

Date: 30 March 2010

Public Authority: Department for Transport
Address: Great Minster House
76 Marsham Street
London
SW1P 4DR

Summary

The complainant asked for details of contact between the public authority and The Prince of Wales and His Royal Highness' representatives. The public authority refused to disclose the information requested by the complainant citing sections 37(1)(a), 40(2) and 41(1) of the Act. The Commissioner has considered this case and has concluded that the complainant clearly requested copies of correspondence between the public authority and The Prince of Wales and his representatives – a point which was in dispute. However, the Commissioner has concluded that this information is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41(1). Where such information constitutes environmental information as defined by the Environmental Information Regulations, the Commissioner is satisfied that such information is exempt from disclosure on the basis of the exceptions contained at regulation 12(5)(f) or 13(2).

The Commissioner has also decided that a list of approaches made by The Prince of Wales and His Royal Highness' representatives to the public authority, along with the number of any approaches, is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41(1).

The Commissioner's Role

1. The Commissioner's duty is to decide whether a request for information made to a public authority has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of Part 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the "Act"). This Notice sets out his decision.

2. The Environmental Information Regulations (EIR) were made on 21 December 2004, pursuant to the EU Directive on Public Access to Environmental Information (Council Directive 2003/4/EC). Regulation 18 provides that the EIR shall be enforced by the Information Commissioner (the "Commissioner"). In effect, the enforcement provisions of Part 4 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the "Act") are imported into the EIR.

The Request

3. The complainant submitted an email to the Department for Transport (DfT) on 22 February 2006. This email contained a number of requests which focused on correspondence which the DfT may have exchanged with HRH The Prince of Wales and representatives of His Royal Highness. The full text of this email is included in an annex which is appended to this Notice.
4. The DfT contacted the complainant on 20 March 2006 and explained that it believed that it was entitled to refuse to confirm or deny whether it held any of the requested information on the basis of section 37(2) of the Act. However, DfT explained that this was a qualified exemption and it needed to extend the time it needed to consider the public interest test.
5. The DfT contacted the complainant again on 18 April 2006 and explained that it had concluded that the public interest lay in maintaining the exemption and thus it was entitled to refuse to confirm or deny whether it held information falling within the scope of his requests.
6. On 27 April 2006 the complainant asked for an internal review of this decision to be conducted.
7. The DfT informed the complainant of the outcome of the review on 20 June 2006. The review upheld the decision not to confirm or deny whether any information was held.
8. Following the intervention of the Commissioner (details of which are given below) the DfT contacted the complainant again in March 2009. In this communication the DfT confirmed that it had re-considered the balance of the public interest test and it believed that the public interest now favoured confirming that it did hold information falling within the scope of the requests. However, the DfT explained that it

believed that all of this information was exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 37(1)(a) and some of the information was also exempt from disclosure on the basis of sections 41(1) and 40(2). The DfT also confirmed that it did not hold a list or schedule of correspondence falling within the scope of the requests and although it agreed that it could create one, it believed the contents would be exempt from disclosure.

The Investigation

Scope of the case

9. The complainant contacted the Commissioner on 25 June 2006 and asked him to consider the DfT's refusal to provide him with the information that he had requested.

Chronology

10. Although the complainant originally contacted the Commissioner in June 2006, due to a backlog of complaints received about public authorities' compliance with the Act, the Commissioner was unable to begin his investigation of this case immediately. Therefore it was not until 19 February 2007 that the Commissioner contacted the DfT in relation to this complaint. The Commissioner asked the DfT to confirm to him whether it held any information falling within the scope of the requests, and if so, to provide him with a description of this information.
11. The Commissioner also contacted the Cabinet Office in order to discuss the issues relating to this case as a number of other government departments had received similar requests seeking details of correspondence with The Prince of Wales and his Household and the Cabinet Office was involved in co-ordinating the various public authorities' responses. (The Commissioner subsequently received a number of complaints about the responses provided by these public authorities.)
12. On 11 July 2007 the DfT provided the Commissioner with a response to his letter of 19 February 2007. In this letter the DfT confirmed to the Commissioner that it held information falling within the scope of the requests and provided the Commissioner with a list of the correspondence relevant to the requests. However, the DfT maintained its position that in dealing with the complainant's requests it was entitled to rely on section 37(2), and also section 41(2) to refuse to

confirm or deny whether it held such information. Regardless of this position, the DfT noted that part of the requests sought a list of approaches made to the DfT but the fulfilment of such requests would involve the creation of new information, i.e. an actual list, which under the Act it believed it was not required to do.

13. In March 2008 representatives of the Royal Household, the Cabinet Office and the Commissioner's office met to discuss the issues raised by the various complaints the Commissioner had received involving requests for The Prince of Wales' correspondence with government departments.
14. On 7 July 2008 the Commissioner wrote to the Royal Household in order to seek further views on the application of the exemptions in these cases.
15. The Commissioner received a response from the Royal Household in November 2008.
16. In December 2008 representatives of the Royal Household, the Cabinet Office and the Commissioner's office met again in order to further discuss the issues raised by these complaints.
17. On 27 January 2009 the Commissioner contacted the DfT to explain that it was his understanding that following recent discussions the DfT was no longer refusing to confirm or deny whether it held information falling within the scope of these requests. The Commissioner therefore asked the DfT to contact the complainant and confirm to him that it did in fact hold information which fell within the scope of his requests. The Commissioner also asked the DfT to provide his office with copies of the information which fell within the scope of these requests.
18. As noted above, in March 2009 the DfT contacted the complainant and confirmed that it held information but considered it to be exempt from disclosure on the basis of the exemptions contained at sections 37(1)(a), 40(2) and 41(1). The DfT also confirmed that its position was that it did not hold a list or schedule of correspondence falling within the scope of the requests and although it could produce one it would be exempt from disclosure.
19. On 5 March 2009 the DfT provided the Commissioner with copies of correspondence it had received from representatives of The Prince of Wales' Household.
20. The Commissioner contacted the DfT again on 24 July 2009 in order to clarify a number of issues in relation to the DfT's position on this case.

21. The DfT sent the Commissioner a response on 13 November 2009. In this response the DfT confirmed that its position was that although it held some information which fell within the scope of requests numbered 1 to 5 it considered this information to be exempt from disclosure on the basis of sections 37(1)(a), 40(2) and 41(1). The DfT also explained that having conducted searches it did not hold any information falling within the scope of requests 6 and 7.
22. In response to a number of letters sent on other cases involving correspondence with The Prince of Wales the Commissioner also received a letter from the Cabinet Office on 7 October 2009. In this letter the Cabinet Office provided further arguments to support the application of section 41(1) of the Act to withhold information exchanged between the public authorities and The Prince of Wales.
23. On 3 December 2009 the Commissioner contacted the DfT again in order to clarify the basis upon which it had been able to locate the information falling within the scope of the requests without exceeding the appropriate cost limit. The Commissioner's reasoning for seeking such clarification was because in a number of the related cases, although the public authorities had initially identified some information which fell within the scope of the requests, it had subsequently transpired that to fulfil the requests in their entirety would in fact exceed the appropriate cost limit. The Commissioner also noted that he believed that some of the information which fell within the scope of the requests may constitute environmental information as defined by the Environmental Information Regulations (EIR).
24. The DfT sent the Commissioner a response on 3 February 2010 in which it explained why it had been able to locate all of the information it considered to fall within the scope of the requests within the cost limit. Furthermore the DfT confirmed again that its position was that, although it held some information falling within the scope of request 1 to 5, it did not believe that it held any information falling within the scope of requests 6 and 7. The DfT explained that, as it believed that the only information which it held which fell in the scope of the requests was a list of approaches and numbers of approaches and not actual correspondence or internal documents, such information did not constitute environmental information.

Findings of fact

25. As the information in the Chronology explains the Commissioner exchanged communications about this complaint both with the public authority to which the request was submitted and also with the Cabinet

Office. In some instances the Cabinet Office has provided the Commissioner with submissions on the application of a particular exemption under the Act or exception under the EIR and asked the Commissioner to consider these submissions when reaching his decision in all cases involving requests for correspondence with The Prince of Wales. The Commissioner has agreed to do so. Therefore although for consistency and ease of reference the remainder of this Notice suggests that information or a particular submission has been provided by the DfT it may be the case that it was in fact provided by the Cabinet Office on its behalf.

Analysis

Substantive Procedural Matters

26. Before setting out his findings in relation to whether the information requested by the complainant should be disclosed, the Commissioner has clarified the nature of the information which he considers to fall within the scope of the complainant's requests.
27. In the Commissioner's opinion, the requests submitted by the complainant can be separated into three types:
 - The requests numbered 1 and 2 seek **lists of approaches** made by The Prince of Wales or his representatives to the DfT and details of the nature of such approaches, e.g. the issues discussed in any approach;
 - The requests numbered 3 to 5 seek the **number of times** The Prince of Wales or his representatives contacted the DfT;
 - Request 6 sought various internal documents; and
 - Request 7 sought pieces of correspondence.
28. The Commissioner notes that in early responses to the complainant and submissions to him, the DfT suggested that it did not hold a list of any such approaches (or indeed a record of the number of approaches) and that to provide such information would involve the creation of new information and under the Act it was not required to create new information. Despite this, in more recent submissions to the Commissioner the DfT argued that such information was in fact exempt from disclosure.
29. For clarity the Commissioner wishes to confirm that his position is that where a request is made for a schedule or list of documents, even if no schedule has been compiled, if the information which would be in the

schedule is held, the request can and should be complied with unless the contents of the schedule, once compiled, would also be exempt. The Commissioner originally outlined this view in decision notice FS50070854 involving a request to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Therefore in the circumstances of this case the Commissioner believes that, as the DfT holds correspondence falling within the scope of request 7, it is in a position to provide the complainant with a list of these approaches, including the nature of any approach, and confirm the number of such approaches, subject of course to the application of any exemptions.

30. As noted, request 7 seeks correspondence held by the DfT. The Commissioner notes that the complainant has phrased his request in a particular way, namely 'Please provide all correspondence between the DfT and any outside organisation or individual...**which relates** [emphasis added] to approaches from the HRH The Prince of Wales and or employees/representatives acting on his behalf'.
31. The Commissioner notes that in recent submissions he has received from the DfT it indicated that it did not believe that correspondence sent to it by The Prince of Wales or his representatives actually fell within the scope of any of the complainant's requests, including request 7.
32. The Commissioner wishes to clarify that in his opinion request 7, by seeking information which 'relates to correspondence' with the Prince of Wales or those who represent him, does not exclude the actual correspondence itself. In other words this request includes correspondence between the DfT and The Prince of Wales and those who represent him, as well as any information which relates to such correspondence. This is because, in the Commissioner's opinion, it is clear that any request which seeks information which relates to particular correspondence also covers the correspondence itself.
33. In relation to request 6, the Commissioner notes that this sought internal documents held by the DfT which in any way related to approaches from The Prince of Wales or his representatives. The DfT has explained to the Commissioner that in order to establish whether it held such information it conducted a number of searches and no information was held. In light of these searches the Commissioner accepts that the DfT does not hold information falling within the scope of request 6.
34. In summary then the Commissioner believes that the DfT holds some information falling within the scope of requests 1 to 5, information

falling within the scope of request 7 but no information falling within the scope of request 6.

35. The Commissioner has initially considered whether the information falling within the scope of request 7 is exempt from disclosure on the basis of the exemptions cited by the DfT. He has then gone on to consider whether the information that would fulfil requests 1 to 5 is exempt from disclosure.

Is any of the requested information 'environmental'?

36. However, before considering whether the information falling within the scope of request 7 is exempt from disclosure the Commissioner considered whether such information constitutes environmental information.

37. Regulation 2(1) of the EIR defines 'environmental information' as any information in any material form on:

'(a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements;

(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment referred to in (a);

(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements;

(d) reports on the implementation of environmental legislation;

(e) cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of the measures and activities referred to in (c); and

(f) the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the

environment referred to in (a) or, through those elements, by any of the matters referred to in (b) and (c)'

38. The Commissioner considers that the phrase 'any information...on' should be interpreted widely in line with the purpose expressed in the first recital of the Council Directive 2003/4/EC, which the EIR enact. In the Commissioner's opinion a broad interpretation of this phrase will usually include information concerning, about or relating to the measure, activity, factor etc in question. In other words, information that would inform the public about the matter under consideration and would therefore facilitate effective participation by the public in environmental decision making is likely to be environmental information.

39. The Commissioner finds support for this approach in two decisions issued by the Information Tribunal. The first being *The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v Information Commissioner and Friends of the Earth* (EA/2007/0072). In this case the Tribunal found:

'that the Decision Notice [in which the Commissioner has concluded that none of the requested information was environmental information] fails to recognise that information on 'energy policy' in respect of 'supply, demand and pricing' will often fall within the definition of 'environmental information' under Regulation 2(1) EIR. In relation to the Disputed Information we find that where there is information relating to energy policy then that information is covered by the definition of environmental information under EIR. Also we find that meetings held to consider 'climate change' are also covered by the definition.' (Tribunal at paragraph 27).

40. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal placed weight on two arguments advanced by Friends of the Earth (FoE), the first being that information on energy policy, including the supply, demand and pricing issues, will often affect or be likely to affect the environment and the second that the term 'environmental information' should be interpreted broadly:

'23. Mr Michaels on behalf of FOE contends that policies (sub-para (c)) on 'energy supply, demand and pricing' often will (and are often expressly designed to) affect factors (sub-para (b)) such as energy, waste and emissions which themselves affect, or are likely to affect, elements of the environment (sub-para (a)) including, in particular and directly, the air and atmosphere and indirectly (in respect of climate change) the other elements.

24. He provides by way of simple and practical example, national policy on supply, demand and pricing of different energy sources (e.g., nuclear, renewable, coal, gas) has potentially major climate change implications and is at the heart of the debate on climate change. Similarly, national policy on land use planning or nuclear power has significant effect on the elements of the environment or on factors (e.g. radiation or waste) affecting those elements.

25. Mr Michaels further argues that the term 'environmental information' is required to be construed 'very broadly' so as to give effect to the purpose of the Directive. Recognition of the breadth of meaning to be applied has been recognised by the European Court of Justice, by the High Court and by this Tribunal in *Kirkaldie v Information Commissioner & Thanet District Council* EA/2006/001. The breadth is also recognised in the DEFRA guidance 'What is covered by the regulations'. It does not appear, Mr Michaels argues, that the Commissioner has adopted such an approach.'

41. Moreover in reaching this conclusion the Tribunal appeared to reject BERR's arguments that there must be a sufficiently close connection between the information and a probable impact on the environment before it can be said that the information is 'environmental information'.
42. The second Tribunal decision is *Ofcom v Information Commissioner and T-Mobile* (EA/2006/0078) which involved a request for the location, ownership and technical attributes of mobile phone cellular base stations. Ofcom had argued that the names of Mobile Network Operators were not environmental information as they did not constitute information 'about either the state of the elements of the environment....or the factors.....that may affect those elements.'
43. The Tribunal disagreed, stating at para 31 that:

'The name of a person or organisation responsible for an installation that emits electromagnetic waves falls comfortably within the meaning of the words "any information...on....radiation". In our view it would create unacceptable artificiality to interpret those words as referring to the nature and effect of radiation, but not to its producer. Such an interpretation would also be inconsistent with the purpose of the Directive, as expressed in the first recital, to achieve "... a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free exchange of views [and] more effective participation by the public in

environmental decision making...". It is difficult to see how, in particular, the public might participate if information on those creating emissions does not fall within the environmental information regime.'

44. The Commissioner has reviewed the information falling within the scope of request 7 and has concluded that some of this information constitutes environmental information because it falls within the scope of the definition in regulation 2(1) of the EIR. Therefore this information must be dealt with under the EIR rather than under the Act.
45. However, the Commissioner is not able to explain which sections of the withheld information he considers to be environmental, and why, in the body of this Notice without potentially revealing the content of this information. Therefore the Commissioner has included in the confidential annex, which will be provided to the DfT but not to the complainant, an explanation as to which parts of the withheld information he has concluded is environmental information and why.
46. In reaching this conclusion the Commissioner has taken into account the following arguments advanced by the DfT to support its position that none of the withheld information constitutes environmental information:
 47. Firstly, the DfT argued that environmental information for the purposes of the EIR comprises information on the elements, factors and measures, etc set out in regulation 2(1). It does not extend to, for example, expressions of public opinion, questions or information which records aspirations covering the subject matter under discussion.
 48. Secondly, the DfT noted that the European Court of Justice made it clear in the *Glawischnig* case that the intention of the previous Directive on environmental information was not to give a general and unlimited right of access to all information held which has a connection, however minimal, with one of the specified environmental factors.¹ The DfT argued that the judgment remained accurate in relation to the current Directive.
49. In relation to the first point advanced by the DfT, in the Commissioner's opinion the key to determining whether information is environmental information for the purposes of the EIR is whether that information can be said to be 'information... on' one of the elements, factors, etc listed in 2(1) – remembering of course the broad

¹ *Glawischnig v Bundesminister für soziale Sicherheit und Generationen* [C- 316/01]

interpretation of this phrase. In other words, it is the content of information that determines whether it is environmental information and not the format in which that information is recorded or expressed. For example the Commissioner accepts that a comment in which a particular individual stated 'that climate change was irreversible' will not constitute environmental information because it cannot be sufficiently linked back to the definition in regulation 2(1). However, a comment attributed to an individual which read 'that climate change was irreversible but I believe that policy X can slow down the effects of change' could be environmental information if policy X could be linked to the definition in regulation 2(1).

50. In relation to the second point advanced by the DfT, the Commissioner notes that as the *Glawischnig* case related to the previous Directive in 1990 this decision is not binding in relation to the current Directive. Moreover as the judgement actually notes at paragraph 5 the current Directive 'contains a definition of environmental information which is wider and more detailed' than in the previous Directive. Therefore the Commissioner does not believe that it is necessarily useful to rely on the *Glawischnig* case to interpret how the current Directive and thus the EIR should be interpreted.

Exemptions

51. Given that the Commissioner has found that some of the withheld information is environmental information and some is not, the Commissioner must consider both the exceptions provided by the EIR and the exemptions provided by the Act.
52. The Commissioner has considered the non-environmental information first, albeit that there is inevitably some cross over between the reasoning as to why the exemptions in the Act and the exceptions in the EIR may apply to the withheld information.

Request 7

Section 41 – information provided in confidence

53. The Commissioner has been provided with detailed submissions to support the DfT's position that any correspondence exchanged with The Prince of Wales is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41 of the Act. (This is without prejudice to the DfT's position that any such correspondence does not in fact fall within the scope of any of the complainant's requests.)
54. This section states that:

'41-(1) Information is exempt information if -

- (a) it was obtained by the public authority from any other person (including another public authority), and
- (b) the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise than under this Act) by the public authority holding it would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that or any other person.'

55. Therefore for this exemption to be engaged two criteria have to be met: the public authority has to have obtained the information from a third party **and** the disclosure of that information has to constitute an actionable breach of confidence.

Section 41(1)(a)

56. The DfT has argued that any correspondence sent to it by The Prince of Wales meets the first limb of section 41 because it is clearly information it received from another person. On this basis the Commissioner accepts that such correspondence, along with correspondence received by the DfT from representatives of The Prince of Wales, meets the requirements of section 41(1)(a).

57. However, the DfT has also argued that the requirement of section 41(1)(a) that information be 'obtained from another person' is sufficiently broad to include information about a person, as well as information actually provided by a person. To support this approach the DfT made the point that the modern law of breach of confidence (which is discussed in detail below) covers information not only obtained from a person, but also information about a person, for example a photograph.² On this basis the DfT has argued that correspondence to The Prince of Wales from the DfT also falls within the scope of section 41(1)(a) because the content of the correspondence clearly indicates what matters His Royal Highness has raised with Ministers.

58. The Commissioner recognises that deciding whether information has been 'obtained from any other person' requires an assessment of the content of information, not simply of the mechanism by which it was imparted and recorded.³ However, the Commissioner does not agree

² The DfT referenced the case of *Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457* in which a claim was brought by Ms Campbell under the tort of breach of confidence in respect of details of drug addiction treatment and covertly taken photographs.

³ The Tribunal confirmed that such an approach was correct in *DBERR v Information Commissioner and FoE (EA/2007/0072)* – see para 78.

with the DfT's assertion that simply because information it holds is about an identifiable individual it constitutes information obtained from that person. In the Commissioner's view such an interpretation of section 41(1)(a) is too broad for two reasons.

59. Firstly, although the Commissioner accepts – for the reasons set out below – that the modern law of breach of confidence needs to be taken into account when considering whether disclosure of information would constitute an actionable breach and thus engage section 41(1)(b), he does not believe that the case law referenced by the DfT is directly relevant to the engagement of section 41(1)(a). This is because the way in which section 41 of the Act is drafted means that information is not exempt simply if its disclosure would constitute an actionable breach of confidence as in common law. Rather the inclusion of section 41(1)(a) means that the public authority also has to have received that information from a third party. In effect section 41 of the Act creates an additional requirement for withholding information which is confidential under the common law and it would be inappropriate simply to apply the common law test to lower the threshold of engaging section 41 of the Act.
60. Secondly, the Commissioner believes that the approach suggested by the DfT effectively represents an attempt to broaden out the basis upon which section 41 is engaged to also ensure that it offers protection to an individual's privacy regardless of whether a public authority had 'obtained' information about that individual from a third party. However, in the Commissioner's view such an interpretation of section 41 is not necessary. Whilst this exemption may not always protect an individual's privacy in the way in which the DfT is arguing that it should, the Act clearly offers weighty protection to an individual's privacy in the form of the exemption contained at section 40 of the Act.
61. Therefore although the Commissioner accepts that it is possible for correspondence which was created by the DfT and sent to The Prince of Wales and his representatives to still be meet the requirements of section 41(1)(a), whether it does in any particular case will depend upon the content of the information which was communicated.
62. In the Commissioner's opinion there has to be a significant degree of similarity to the information which the DfT is sending to The Prince of Wales or his representatives and the information which His Royal Highness or those who represent him originally provided to the DfT. In the Commissioner's opinion it is not sufficient that the information is simply on the same topic. The correspondence being sent to The Prince of Wales or his representatives has to reflect the actual views or

opinions His Royal Highness, or those who represent him, raised on a particular topic.

63. Having looked at the content of the non-environmental information falling within the scope of request 7 that the DfT sent to The Prince of Wales and/or his representatives, the Commissioner accepts that **all** of this information reflects the views of The Prince of Wales and/or his representatives sufficiently closely that it meets the requirements of section 41(1)(a).

Section 41(1)(b)

The DfT's position on an actionable breach of confidence

64. The DfT has provided the Commissioner with detailed submissions to support its position that the disclosure of any correspondence between it and The Prince of Wales would constitute an actionable breach and thus meet the requirements of section 41(1)(b). The Commissioner has summarised these submissions below and then gone on to explain his view as to whether they apply to the information which has been withheld in this case.
65. In most cases involving the application of section 41 which the Commissioner has previously considered, the requested information has been of a commercial nature rather than the more personal information which is the focus of this case. The approach usually adopted by the Commissioner in assessing whether the disclosure of commercial information would constitute an actionable breach is to follow the test of confidence set out in *Coco v A N Clark (Engineering) Ltd* [1968] FSR 415 (the *Coco* test).
66. This judgment suggested that the following three limbed test should be considered in order to determine if information was confidential:
- Whether the information had the necessary quality of confidence;
 - Whether the information was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and
 - Whether an unauthorised use of the information would result in detriment to the confider.
67. In submissions to the Commissioner the DfT explained why the *Coco* test no longer represented the law in respect of information such as The Prince of Wales' correspondence sought by the complainant in this case. These submissions are summarised below.

68. The DfT noted that the *Coco* test involved a claim in relation to commercially confidential information whereas the information which was the focus of this case, The Prince of Wales' correspondence, was essentially personal information. The DfT explained that more recent cases than *Coco v Clark* had considered the law of confidence and/or misuse of personal or private information in the context of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Such cases included *Campbell v MGN* and *HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd*.⁴ The DfT argued that it was the approach to the law of confidence set out in these cases, rather than in *Coco* that should be considered in the circumstances of this case.
69. In support of this approach the DfT referenced the only High Court case to date to deal with the application of section 41 of the Act. This case involved a request submitted to the Home Office by the British Union for Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV) for applications for licences to conduct animal experimentation.
70. The DfT highlighted the fact that in his judgment in this case Eady J confirmed that the *Coco* test was not the only test of confidence that existed and that recognition had to be given to how misuse of private information may give rise to an actionable breach of confidence and furthermore any assessment of confidence had to take into account the impact of the Human Rights Act.⁵
71. The DfT drew the Commissioner's attention to a number of sections of Eady J's judgment, including:

'[28] It is clear, for example, that the law of confidence is not confined to the principles governing the circumstances in which an equitable duty of confidence will arise; nor to the specialist field of commercial secrets. An obligation of confidence can arise by reason of an agreement, express or implied, and presumably also by the imposition of a statutory duty. Nowadays, in addition, it is recognized that there is a distinction to be drawn between "old-fashioned breach of confidence" and the tort law now characterized as "misuse of private information": see e.g. per Lord Nicholls in *Campbell v MGN Ltd* [2004] 2 AC 457 at [14] and the discussion by Buxton LJ in *McKennitt v Ash* [2008] QB 73, at 80 et seq., under the heading "A taxonomy of the law of privacy and confidence".

⁴ Full citation: *HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd* [2006] EWHC 522 (Ch), [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 [2008] Ch 57.

⁵ *The Home Office v British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection and Information Commissioner* [2008] EWCH 892 (QB) 25 April 2008.

[29] [Counsel for the requester] described *Coco v Clark* as being "then and now the leading authority on breach of confidence". But there would seem to be traps for the unwary in placing unqualified reliance upon the case without paying due regard to what Lord Nicholls had to say about it in *Campbell v MGN Ltd* in the section of his speech entitled "Breach of confidence: misuse of private information".

72. And:

'[32]It is thus important to bear in mind, for the present case, the broad principle, stated by Buxton LJ in *McKennitt* at [11], that "...in order to find the rule of the English law of breach of confidence we now have to look in the jurisprudence of articles 8 and 10." The Tribunal did not address these developments at all and thus proceeded on the basis of an incomplete understanding of the present law.'

73. The DfT also noted the fact that Eady J doubted that the first bullet point of the *Coco* test was still applicable to the modern of law of confidence:

'[33]It is also beyond question that some information, especially in the context of personal matters, may be treated as private, even though it is quite trivial in nature and not such as to have about it any inherent "quality of confidence": see e.g. *Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd* [2008] QB 103, 113-114...*McKennitt v Ash*...and the remarks of Lord Nicholls in *Campbell v MGN Ltd*...Thus, an obligation of confidentiality may sometimes arise in respect of such information merely because it is imparted as being confidential, either expressly or impliedly. Also, the law may imply an obligation on the basis that a communication has taken place in the context of an established relationship, which would itself give rise to such a duty.'

74. Indeed the DfT highlighted the fact that in his conclusion Eady J suggested that the only limb of the *Coco* test that may relevant was the second:

'[35] Another way of putting the point would be to say that the law will afford protection, sometimes, where only the second of the *Coco v Clark* tests is satisfied: that is to say, the right to protection arises because it is clear to those concerned that the circumstances in which the information was imparted themselves give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. I would prefer, however, not to be tied to *Coco v Clark* where it simply has no

application. (It was not even cited in the Court of Appeal in *McKennitt, Browne* or *HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd* [2008] Ch 57).

[36]...in the light of the modern authorities there is no reason to suppose that even an "actionable" breach of confidence, where sued upon, must inevitably be founded on the formulation of Sir Robert Megarry.'

75. In light of this, the DfT explained that the test of confidence not only included the traditional breach as described in *Coco v Clark* but also claims to prevent the misuse of information entitled to protection under Article 8 ECHR.

76. Article 8 provides that:

'1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society for the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.'

77. The DfT highlighted the fact that the concept of 'private life' within Article 8(1) is a broad one, based upon the need to protect a person's autonomy and relationships with others from outside interference. The DfT argued that the right is not confined to activities which are personal in the sense of being intimate or domestic but can be extended to business or professional activities. To support this broad interpretation the DfT quoted the European Court of Human Rights case of *Niemietz v Germany* and also noted that this judgment confirmed that Article 8(1) was intended to protect correspondence, (i.e. the type of information which is the focus of this case):

'[29]The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of "private life". However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in which an individual may choose to live his personal life as he chooses at to exclude entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.

There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of “private life” should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world...’

78. And:

‘[32] In this connection, it is sufficient to note that the provision does not use, as it does for the word “life”, any adjective to qualify the word “correspondence”. And, indeed, the Court has already held that, in the context of correspondence in the form of telephone calls, no such qualification is to be made...in a number of cases relating to correspondence with a lawyer...the Court did not even advert to the possibility that Article 8 might be inapplicable on the ground that the correspondence was of a professional nature.’⁶

79. Consequently, the DfT suggested that a number of different circumstances may arise in which a breach of confidence could exist:

- Some claims for the misuse of private information will cover information which has the quality of confidence, and which was imparted in circumstances inconsistent with a pre-existing relationship of confidence, but which is not entitled to protection under Article 8, e.g. trade secrets. Such claims would fall within the ambit of the traditional test set out in *Coco v Clark*.
- Some claims will cover private information which is disclosed in breach of Article 8 ECHR, but which was not imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.
- Further claims will concern information which was both confidential information in the sense that it was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and information entitled to protection under Article 8 ECHR, e.g. many claims in respect of private letters such as the information which was the focus of this present case.

80. In consideration of each of these circumstances the DfT noted that it was not necessary for any particular detriment to be demonstrated in order for a duty of confidence to be actionable. The DfT explained that this position was supported by the judge in *Coco v Clark* who questioned whether in fact detriment would always be a necessary ingredient of an actionable breach (para 421) and furthermore by the

⁶ *Niemietz v Germany* (1993) 16 EHRR 97

fact that in order for Article 8(1) to be engaged it was not necessary to demonstrate any detriment.

81. The DfT explained that in its view the withheld information in this case was confidential information within the sense of the traditional *Coco* test (albeit that for the reasons set out above it believed that this was incorrect test to apply) and also constituted confidential information because it attracted the protection of Article 8(1).
82. With regard to why the information met the three limbs of the *Coco* test the DfT emphasised the significance of the constitutional convention that The Prince of Wales should be educated in, and about, the business of government in order to prepare him for the time when he will be the Sovereign, without that process putting at risk the political neutrality which is essential to the role and functions of the Sovereign. It is essential to the operation of the convention that His Royal Highness should be able to express views to Ministers on important issues of government and moreover should receive their views in response. This also ensures that The Prince of Wales can carry out his role as Privy Councillor, as a Counsellor of State and as next in line to the throne, whereby he also has a statutory duty under the Regency Act 1937 to act for The Queen during her absence or incapacitation. The DfT argued that convention that The Prince of Wales will be informed about the business of government in order to prepare for being Sovereign can only be maintained if both His Royal Highness and government Ministers who advise and inform him about the business of government can be assured that their communications with each other remain confidential.
83. The DfT explained that this convention is inextricably tied to the role of the Sovereign in the British constitution and the separate constitutional right of the Sovereign, by convention, to counsel, encourage and warn the Government and thus to have opinions on government policy and to express those opinions to her Ministers. However, whatever personal opinions the Sovereign may hold She is bound to accept and act on the advice of her Ministers and is obliged to treat her communications with them as absolutely confidential. Such confidentiality is necessary in order to ensure that the Sovereign's political neutrality is not compromised in case Her Majesty has to exercise her executive powers, e.g. initiating discussions with political parties in the scenario of a hung Parliament in order to ensure that a government can be formed. Consequently, The Prince of Wales must not be in a position where his position of political neutrality is compromised (or appear to be compromised) because it cannot be restored on accession to the throne. The DfT argued that if correspondence between The Prince of

Wales and government Ministers was routinely disclosed His Royal Highness' position of political neutrality would be put at risk.

84. In light of the constitutional convention relating to the Heir to the Throne, the DfT argued that it was clear that correspondence exchanged between the Prince of Wales and government departments had the quality of confidence. The content of such information was clearly not of a trivial nature but rather focused on the business of government. The information was clearly imparted in circumstances which had given rise to the obligation of confidence. All parties understood, because of the operation of the convention, the need to keep such communications private. Finally, the DfT argued that even if detriment needed to be identified, the harm which would occur to the operation of the convention, and the potential undermining of The Prince of Wales' political neutrality following disclosure of such information would constitute sufficient detriment to meet the third limb of the *Coco* test.
85. In relation to why the correspondence exchanged between the Prince of Wales and government departments constituted confidential information under the modern law of confidence, the DfT explained that it was clear that such correspondence engaged Article 8(1) where the topic of the correspondence was of a particularly private nature of topic, but also, in light of the quoted case law above, where the correspondence reflects The Prince of Wales' opinions on matters of government business. Therefore disclosure of the correspondence would lead to a clear infringement of The Prince of Wales' right of privacy and thus constitute a breach of confidence.
86. Although section 41 of the Act is an absolute exemption and thus not subject to the public interest test contained at section 2 of the Act, the common law concept of confidence suggests that a breach of confidence will not be actionable in circumstances where a public authority can rely on public interest defence.
87. The DfT argued that in the circumstances of this case there was no effective public interest defence. In support of this position the DfT made the following arguments:
88. Firstly, there is an inherent public interest in the preservation of confidences and their protection by law, which in itself is a weighty factor in favour of maintaining confidentiality.
89. Secondly, in the circumstances of cases which involved correspondence between The Prince of Wales and the government there was a specific public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such

correspondence in order to preserve the conventions discussed above, and specifically His Royal Highness' political neutrality. It was strongly in the public interest to ensure the preservation of conventions in order to ensure the constitution was not undermined.

90. Thirdly, it is not simply a question of whether the information is a matter of public interest, but rather whether in all of the circumstances of the case, it is in the public interest that the duty of confidence should be breached. The DfT highlighted the Court of Appeal in *Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH The Prince of Wales* to illustrate this point:

'[68] But a significant element to be weighed in the balance is the importance in a democratic society of upholding duties of confidence that are created between individuals. It is not enough to justify publication that the information in question is a matter of public interest. To take an extreme example, the content of a budget speech is a matter of great public interest. But if a disloyal typist were to sell as copy to a newspaper in advance of the delivery of the speech in Parliament, there can surely be no doubt that the newspaper would be in breach of duty if it purchased and published the speech.'

91. Fourthly, to justify disclosure of confidential information on the grounds of public interest, it is not sufficient that the information is simply interesting to the public. Rather, the public interest in overriding confidentiality must be of very considerable significance, whether that be related to, for example, the proper conduct of public affairs, public health, prevention of crime etc. Disclosure must in fact be 'necessary' in order to override obligations of confidentiality with the test of necessity reflecting both the traditional test of confidence and the test for justification with Article 8 rights under the ECHR. The DfT referenced the Court of Appeal in *McKennitt v Ash* which involved a confidence being overridden on the basis of allegations of misconduct:

'I would nevertheless accept that Mr Browne is broadly correct when he submits that for a claimant's conduct to "trigger the public interest defence" a very high degree of misbehaviour must be demonstrated'.

92. The DfT argued that it was clear from the content of the correspondence – both that sent to and that received by The Prince of Wales – no such level of significance was present to meet this high threshold.

93. Fifthly, it was important not to confuse the public interest with information which the public may be interested in. To illustrate this point the DfT referenced Blackburne J in his judgment at first instance in *HRH The Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers*:

'[118]...it is important not to overlook the fact that what may be in the public interest to know and thus for the media to publicise in exercise of their freedom of speech is not to be confused with what is interesting to the public and therefore in a newspaper's commercial interest to publish. This is particularly so in the case of someone like the claimant whose every thought and action is, in some quarters at least, a matter of endless fascination.'

94. And noted that this point was subsequently accepted by the Court of Appeal at [70]:

'As heir to the throne, Prince Charles is an important public figure. In respect of such persons the public takes an interest in information about them that is relatively trivial. For this reason public disclosure of such information can be particularly intrusive. The judge rightly had regard to this factor...'

95. Finally, the DfT suggested that whatever public interest which may exist in disclosure of correspondence between the Prince of Wales and government departments could be best described as a public interest in knowing what matters of public importance The Prince of Wales raises with Ministers, and how they respond to him, in light of the access which his constitutional position affords him. However, the DfT suggested that disclosure of some of the correspondence would not serve this public interest at all because it related to purely administrative issues or focused solely on purely private matters.

The Commissioner's position on an actionable breach of confidence

96. At this stage the Commissioner wishes to highlight the fact that the DfT's submissions on the application of section 41 focus solely on correspondence exchanged between The Prince of Wales and government departments, in particular Ministers within those departments. However, in the Commissioner's opinion the information which potentially falls within the scope of request 7 includes correspondence which the DfT may have exchanged with The Prince of Wales but also correspondence exchanged with His Royal Highness' representatives. The Commissioner has decided to consider the application of section 41 submissions both to correspondence the DfT may have exchanged with The Prince of Wales and also to correspondence with His Royal Highness' representatives. This is

because, given the way in which request 7 is phrased if the Commissioner only analysed the submissions for one such class of information he would, in effect, be indicating that the other class was not held by the DfT.

Correspondence between The Prince of Wales and government departments

97. The Commissioner agrees with the DfT that a strict and rigid following of the *Coco* test is not an appropriate approach to the test of confidence for the correspondence exchanged between The Prince of Wales and government departments. The Commissioner's reasoning for this mirrors the arguments highlighted by the DfT namely the recent case law which has been referenced, most notably *BUAV*, and also the impact of the ECHR. Therefore when considering whether personal and private information is confidential the Commissioner agrees that consideration of Article 8 ECHR as well a consideration of Article 10 ECHR (the right to freedom of expression) in the context of the public interest defence is necessary.
98. However, the Commissioner does not believe that some of the concepts raised in *Coco v Clark* should be abandoned completely as they can still be useful in determining whether information of a personal and private nature is confidential. Indeed as Eady J noted in his conclusion at [35] whether information was imparted in circumstances where there was an expectation of confidence can be relevant to determining whether there would be an actionable breach if information of a private and personal nature were disclosed.
99. Therefore for information which is of personal and private nature, such as correspondence between The Prince of Wales and government departments, rather than use the three limbed test employed by *Coco v Clark*, the Commissioner will consider:
- Whether information was imparted with an expectation that it would be kept confidential (be that an explicit or implicit expectation); and
 - Whether disclosure of the information would infringe the confider's right of privacy as protected by Article 8(1) ECHR.
100. In relation to the first criterion the Commissioner accepts that the constitutional convention which provides that the Heir to the Throne should be educated in the ways and workings of government means that both The Prince of Wales and those he corresponded with will have had an explicit (and weighty) expectation that such communications would be confidential.

101. In reaching this conclusion the Commissioner wishes to clarify his position with regard to the scope of the constitutional convention relating to the Heir to the Throne. In the Commissioner's opinion given that the purpose of this convention is to allow the Heir to the Throne to be educated in the ways and workings of government, the only information which will attract the protective confidentiality of this convention is information which relates to The Prince of Wales being educated in the ways and workings of government. In the Commissioner's opinion this convention cannot be interpreted so widely as to encompass **all** of The Prince of Wales' communications with the government; for example it does not cover correspondence in which His Royal Highness may be discussing his charitable work or indeed information of a particularly personal nature. (This is not to say of course that the withheld information in this case includes examples of either class of information.)
102. Nevertheless, the Commissioner accepts that for communications between the parties that do not fall within his interpretation of the convention, there is still a weighty expectation that such correspondence will be kept confidential. The Commissioner finds support for such a conclusion given the established practice that communications between The Prince of Wales and government Ministers have not been disclosed or commented on by either party, regardless of the content of the correspondence. Moreover, it is the Commissioner's understanding that the DfT's position is that all correspondence the Prince of Wales exchanges with government Ministers falls within the scope of the convention and thus the individuals involved in exchanging this correspondence will have had a weighty and explicit expectation that such information will not be disclosed.
103. In relation to the second criterion, the Commissioner agrees with the DfT that in respect of Article 8(1) the term 'private' should be interpreted broadly to ensure that a person's relationships with others are free from interference. The Commissioner also accepts that matters of a business and professional nature are covered by the protection afforded by Article 8(1). Furthermore, in the quoted case reference to 'correspondence' confirms that Article 8(1) can apply to information contained within the format which is the focus of this request.
104. In light of this broad reading of Article 8(1) the Commissioner accepts that disclosure of correspondence exchanged between The Prince of Wales and government departments would place in the public domain details of His Royal Highness' views and opinions on a number of issues and such an action would amount to an invasion of his privacy. Thus the Commissioner accepts that disclosure of this information would

constitute an infringement of Article 8(1) and would constitute an actionable breach of confidence.

105. For these reasons the Commissioner accepts that disclosure of such correspondence would constitute an actionable breach of confidence.
106. However, before he can conclude that such correspondence is exempt from disclosure by virtue of section 41, the Commissioner has to consider whether there is a public interest defence to disclosing the information, which includes an assessment of the weight that should be attributed to Article 10 ECHR.
107. As explained above the DfT identified only a very general and limited public interest in disclosure of The Prince of Wales' correspondence. In the Commissioner's opinion there are a number of further public interest arguments in favour of disclosing such correspondence that have not been identified by the DfT and he has set out below what he believes these interests are. The Commissioner has then gone on to consider whether such arguments provide a sufficient public interest defence.

Additional arguments in favour of disclosing correspondence with The Prince of Wales

108. There is a public interest in disclosure of information to ensure that the government is accountable for, and transparent in, its decision making processes.
109. Moreover, there is a specific public interest in disclosure of information that would increase the public's understanding of how the government engages with the Royal Family and the Royal Household, and in particular in the circumstances of this case, the Heir to the Throne. This is because the Monarchy has a central role in the British constitution and the public is entitled to know how the various mechanisms of the constitution operate. This includes, in the Commissioner's opinion, how the Heir to the Throne is educated in the ways of government in preparation for his role as Sovereign. In the Commissioner's opinion such an interest is clearly distinct from the prurient public interest alluded to by the DfT.
110. Disclosure of correspondence may allow the public to understand the influence (if any) exerted by The Prince of Wales on matters of public policy. If the withheld information demonstrated that the DfT or government in general had placed undue weight on the preferences of The Prince of Wales then it could add to the public interest in disclosing the information.

111. Conversely, if the withheld information actually revealed that The Prince of Wales did not have undue influence on the direction of public policy, then there would be a public interest in disclosing the information in order to reassure the public that no inappropriate weight had been placed on the views and preferences of The Heir to Throne. In essence disclosure could enhance public confidence in respect of how the government engages with The Prince of Wales.
112. These two arguments could be seen as particularly relevant in light of media stories which focus on The Prince of Wales' alleged inappropriate interference in matters of government and political lobbying.
113. Linked to this argument, is the fact that disclosure of this correspondence could further public debate regarding the role of the Monarchy and particularly the Heir to the Throne. Similarly, disclosure of this correspondence could inform the broader debate surrounding constitutional reform.

Can disclosure of the correspondence with The Prince of Wales be justified on public interest grounds?

114. Before turning to the balance of the public interest the Commissioner wishes to highlight that the public interest test inherent within section 41 differs from the public interest test contained in the qualified exemptions contained within the Act; the default position for the public interest test in the qualified exemptions is that the information should be disclosed unless the public interest in withholding the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. With regard to the public interest test inherent within section 41, this position is reversed; the default position being that information should not be disclosed unless the public interest in disclosure outweighs the interest in upholding the duty of confidence and therefore withholding the information.
115. In the Commissioner's opinion the introduction of the concept of privacy and the impact of ECHR into the law of confidence has not affected this balancing exercise; Sedley L J expressed such a view in *LRT v Mayor of London*: 'the human rights highway leads to exactly the same outcome as the older road of equity and common law'.⁷

⁷ Quoted by the Information Tribunal in *Derry City Council v Information Commissioner*, (EA/2006/0014).

116. Therefore in conducting this balancing exercise as well as taking into account the protection afforded by Article 8(1), consideration must also be given to Article 10 ECHR which provides that:

‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’

117. The Commissioner notes that recent European Court of Human Rights judgments have highlighted the relationship between Article 10 and access to public information. In particular, the Court has recognised that individuals involved in the legitimate process of gathering information on a matter of public importance can rely on Article 10(1) as a basis upon which to argue that public authorities interfered with this process by restricting access to information.⁸

118. Turning to the various factors identified by the DfT the Commissioner does not entirely accept the argument that for there to be a successful public interest defence against a breach of confidence there would always have to be an exceptional public interest in disclosure. The Commissioner’s reasoning is as follows: The Information Tribunal in *Derry City Council v Information Commissioner* in discussing the case of *LRT v The Mayor of London* noted that in the first instance the judge said that an exceptional case had to be shown to justify a disclosure which would otherwise breach a contractual obligation of confidence. When hearing the case, the Court of Appeal although not expressly overturning this view, did leave this question open and its final decision was that the information should be disclosed. The Tribunal in *Derry* interpreted this to mean that:

- No exceptional case has to be made to override the duty of confidence that would otherwise exist;

⁸ See *Kenedi v Hungary* 37374/05.

- All that was required is balancing of the public interest in putting the information into the public domain and the public interest in maintaining the confidence.
119. Consequently in cases where the information is of a commercial nature, the Commissioner's approach is to follow the lead of the Tribunal in that no exceptional case has to be made for disclosure, albeit the balancing exercise will still be of an inverse nature.
120. However, in cases where the information is of a private and personal nature, the Commissioner accepts that in light of the case law referenced by the DfT, disclosure of such information require a very strong set of public interest arguments. The difference in the Commissioner's approach to such cases can be explained by the weighty protection that Article 8 offers to private information; in other words the Commissioner accepts that there will always be an inherent and strong public interest in protecting an individual's privacy. The Commissioner believes that a potential deviation to this approach may be appropriate where the personal information relates to the individual's public and professional life, as opposed to their intimate personal or family life, and in such a scenario such a strong set of public interest arguments may not be needed because the interests of the individual may not be paramount.
121. In determining whether the correspondence which the DfT holds which has been exchanged directly with The Prince of Wales relates more to His Royal Highness' professional or public life, rather than his private life, the Commissioner faces a particularly difficult dilemma given the unique position which His Royal Highness occupies. There is clearly significant overlap between the Prince of Wales' public role as Heir to the Throne and a senior member of the Royal Family and his private life; he only occupies such positions because of the family into which he was born. In the Commissioner's opinion The Prince of Wales' public and private lives can be said to be inextricably linked. Therefore for the purposes of this case, and the consideration of Article 8, the Commissioner believes that he has to adopt the position that the information which is the focus of this case can be said to more private in nature than public and thus a very strong set of public interest arguments would need to be cited in order for there to be a valid public interest defence.
122. Before turning to whether the arguments in this case can meet such a threshold, the Commissioner wishes to make a number of comments in relation to the weight that should be attributed to the additional arguments identified by the DfT in favour of non-disclosure.

123. As implied by the comments above, the Commissioner accepts the argument that there is weighty public interest in maintaining confidences. Furthermore, the Commissioner agrees that there is a significant public interest in the ensuring the convention that the Heir to the Throne can be instructed in the business of government is not undermined; it would clearly not be in the public interest if the Heir to Throne and future Monarch appeared to be politically partisan. The Commissioner of course also agrees that there is a clear and important distinction between disclosure of information which the public would be interested in and disclosure of information which is genuinely in the public interest.
124. However, given the number of public interest arguments in favour of disclosure that the Commissioner has identified, he is of the perhaps unsurprising opinion that the benefit of disclosing correspondence the DfT holds with The Prince of Wales should not be summarily dismissed in the fashion implied by the DfT. Rather the arguments identified by the Commissioner touch directly on many, if not all, of the central public interest arguments underpinning the Act, namely ensuring that public authorities are accountable for and transparent in their actions; furthering public debate; improving confidence in decisions taken by public authorities. Furthermore, the specific arguments relevant to this case in relation to The Prince of Wales' relationship with government Ministers deserves to be given particular weight.
125. Nevertheless, the Commissioner has to remember that disclosure of such information would require an exceptional set of public interest arguments and disclosure would have to be justified by the content of the withheld information itself not simply on the basis of generic or abstract public interest arguments.
126. The Commissioner has applied the above analysis to the information falling within this part of the request and he has reached the conclusion that despite the weight of the public interest arguments in favour of disclosure, the content does not present an exceptional reason or reasons for this correspondence to be disclosed. Consequently, the Commissioner has concluded that there would not be a public interest defence if the correspondence that falls within the scope of section 41 were disclosed.

Correspondence with representatives of The Prince of Wales and the DfT

127. The Commissioner recognises that the nature of correspondence exchanged by government departments with The Prince of Wales clearly differs from the nature of correspondence exchanged with His Royal Highness' representatives in some key ways: correspondence in

the first category is exchanged between the Heir to the Throne and government Ministers; correspondence falling within the second category cannot necessarily be said to have been exchanged at such a high level of government or with actual members of The Royal Family.

128. However in terms of the application of section 41(1)(b) the Commissioner has established that a significant number of documents that the DfT exchanged with representatives of The Prince of Wales include references, either directly or indirectly, to the views and opinions of His Royal Highness. Furthermore, the Commissioner understands that The Prince of Wales' Household is, in essence, taken to be an extension of His Royal Highness; when a member of the Household sends a letter to a government department it is understood that such a letter is essentially being sent on behalf of The Prince of Wales. In the Commissioner's opinion such a position is also supported by the wording of the exemption contained at section 37(1)(a) of the Act: this exemption covers communications not only with the Royal Family but also with the Royal Household.
129. Therefore on the basis of these two factors, for such pieces of correspondence, even although they are not sent directly by or to The Prince of Wales, the Commissioner believes that it is correct to treat such information as personal and private in nature. That is to say, such correspondence is personal and private to The Prince of Wales. Consequently for such information the, the Commissioner believes that the following test should again be considered:
- Whether information was imparted with an expectation that it would be kept confidential (be that an explicit or implicit expectation); and
 - Whether disclosure of the information would infringe the confider's right of privacy as protected by Article 8(1) ECHR.
130. The Commissioner accepts that information exchanged between representatives of The Prince of Wales and government departments is exchanged by both parties with an understanding that this information will be kept confidential. The Commissioner finds support for such a conclusion in the fact that The Prince of Wales and His Royal Highness' Household are said to be indistinguishable and as set out above it is established practice that correspondence between The Prince of Wales and government departments is not disclosed or commented on.
131. Given that this correspondence includes The Prince of Wales' views and opinions, the Commissioner believes that it is relevant to consider the His Royal Highness' right of privacy. For the reasons set out above the Commissioner believes that disclosure of correspondence containing

such information would infringe His Royal Highness' right of privacy and thus would constitute an actionable breach of confidence. Similarly for the reasons set out above the Commissioner believes that there would not be a public interest defence if such information were disclosed.

132. However, the Commissioner has established that not all of the correspondence exchanged between the DfT and The Prince of Wales' representatives includes the views and opinions of His Royal Highness and thus not all of the information contained in such correspondence is of a strictly personal and private nature. For example, the DfT holds correspondence exchanged with representatives of The Prince of Wales that although discussing matters of substance are of an administrative nature. For such information the Commissioner believes that the test of confidence which should be applied is the first two limbs of the *Coco* test:
- Whether the information had the necessary quality of confidence; and
 - Whether the information was imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.
133. The Commissioner believes that information will have the necessary quality of confidence if it is not otherwise accessible and it is more than trivial. Information which is known only a limited number of individuals will not be regarded as being generally accessible, though it will be if it has been disseminated to the general public. Information which is of importance to the confider should not be considered as trivial.
134. The Commissioner has reviewed the remaining correspondence in this case and accepts that all of this information has the quality of confidence; it is clearly correspondence which focuses on matters of substance, is not generally available and is of importance to the confider.
135. For the reasons set out above, the Commissioner is satisfied that the correspondence the DfT exchanged with the representatives of The Prince of Wales was provided in circumstances in which the confider expected it to be kept confidential.
136. Consequently, for these reasons the Commissioner accepts that disclosure of the remaining correspondence between representatives of The Prince of Wales and the DfT would constitute an actionable breach of confidence.

137. However, before he can conclude that such correspondence is exempt from disclosure by virtue of section 41, the Commissioner must again consider whether there is a public interest defence to disclosing this information. Given the different nature of this information to the correspondence of a more private and personal nature, the Commissioner believes that the balance of public interest is slightly different from that considered above.
138. The public interest arguments in favour of disclosing this information still focus on issues identified above which are central to the Act, namely accountability and transparency of public authorities, furthering public debate and improving confidence in public authorities. However, the emphasis on these arguments in this context is less on how the DfT engaged with The Prince of Wales and actions it may have taken following such correspondence, and more on how the DfT engaged with His Royal Highness' representatives and actions its may have taken following such correspondence.
139. Similarly, whilst the public interest arguments at the heart of maintaining the confidence remain relevant, e.g. the strong public interest in protecting confidences, there is less emphasis on the public interest in protecting The Prince of Wales' ability to correspond privately with Ministers. The focus is more on the public interest in protecting his representatives' ability to correspond confidentially with government departments. In the Commissioner's opinion it is in the public interest that members of the Heir to the Throne's Household can correspond confidentially with government departments in order to ensure the efficient and effective interaction between the government of the day and a key part of The Royal Household.
140. Nevertheless, the Commissioner has to remember that disclosure of such information would require a strong set of public interest arguments and disclosure would have to be justified by the content of the withheld information itself, not simply on the basis of generic or abstract public interest arguments.
141. The Commissioner has reviewed the content of the relevant correspondence carefully and he has reached the conclusion that despite the weight of the public interest arguments in favour of disclosure, the content does not indicate a sufficiently strong reason for this correspondence to be disclosed. Consequently, the Commissioner has concluded that there would not be a public interest defence if the remaining correspondence were disclosed.

Regulation 12(5)(f) – interests of the person who provided the information

142. The DfT has argued that if the Commissioner finds that any of the withheld information constitutes 'environmental' information as defined by the EIR, it would seek to rely on the exceptions contained at regulations 12(5)(d), 12(5)(f) and 13(1).

143. As the Commissioner has concluded that some of the information falling within the scope of request 7 is environmental information, he has considered the application of these exceptions, starting with 12(5)(f).

144. Regulation 12(5)(f) states:

'a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that its disclosure would adversely affect –

(f) the interests of the person who provided the information where that person –

- (i) was not under, and could not have been put under, any legal obligation to supply it to that or any other public authority;
- (ii) did not supply it in circumstances such that that or any other public authority is entitled apart from these Regulations to disclose it; and
- (iii) has not consented to its disclosure;'

145. The Commissioner is conscious that the threshold to engage an exception under regulation 12(5) of the EIR is a high one compared to the threshold needed to engage a prejudiced based exemption under the Act:

- Under regulation 12(5) for information to be exempt it is not enough that disclosure of information will have an effect, that effect must be 'adverse'.
- Refusal to disclose information is only permitted to the extent of that adverse effect – i.e. if an adverse effect would not result from disclosure of part of a particular document or piece of information, then that information should be disclosed.
- It is necessary for the public authority to show that disclosure 'would' have an adverse effect, not that it may or simply could have an effect. With regard to the interpretation of the phrase 'would' the Commissioner has been influenced by the Tribunal's comments in the case *Hogan v Oxford City Council*

& Information Commissioner (EA/2005/0026 & 0030) in which the Tribunal suggested that although it was not necessary for the public authority to prove that prejudice would occur beyond any doubt whatsoever, prejudice must be at least more probable than not.⁹

146. Furthermore, the wording of the exception at regulation 12(5)(f) makes it clear that the adverse effect has to be on the person who provided the information rather than the public authority that holds the information.
147. As with section 41, correspondence sent to the public authority clearly falls within the scope of regulation 12(5)(f) because it was information 'provided' to it by a third party, i.e. The Prince of Wales or one of his representatives. Again, as with section 41, the Commissioner accepts that correspondence which the public authority sends to The Prince of Wales or his representatives can potentially fall within the scope of the regulation 12(5)(f) if it sufficiently closely replicates the content of the information originally provided to it.
148. The Commissioner has carefully considered the environmental information which falls within the scope of this request and he is satisfied that it is contained within communications sent to the DfT by The Prince of Wales (or his representatives) and/or is contained within correspondence sent by the DfT and is sufficiently focused on information it originally received from His Royal Highness (or his representatives).
149. Before considering the nature of the adverse effect, the Commissioner has considered whether the three limbs of 12(5)(f) are met. With regard to the first limb, the Commissioner accepts neither The Prince of Wales nor his representatives were under any legal obligation to supply the information; although it is an established tradition, and one protected by the convention discussed above, that the Heir to the Throne will communicate with government Ministers, he is under no legally binding obligation to do so. The Commissioner believes that the second limb will be met where there is no specific statutory power to disclose the information in question. It is clear that there is no such power in this case and thus the second limb is met. Finally, with regard to the third limb, the Commissioner understands that neither The Prince of Wales nor his representatives have consented to disclosure of the withheld information.

⁹ These guiding principles in relation the engagement of exceptions contained at regulation 12(5) were set out in Tribunal case *Archer v Information Commissioner & Salisbury District Council* (EA/2006/0037)

150. The nature of the adverse effect which the DfT has argued would occur if the withheld information were disclosed effectively mirrors that discussed above in relation to the application of section 41. In essence, if the information were disclosed this would adversely affect The Prince of Wales because not only could it appear to undermine his political neutrality but it could also impinge upon His Royal Highness' privacy. For the reasons set out above the Commissioner accepts that disclosure of the withheld information could potentially have these effects.
151. Additionally, the DfT argued that disclosure of the correspondence would have a chilling effect on the way in which The Prince of Wales corresponds with government Ministers, for example by The Prince of Wales no longer recording particular comments or the nature in which His Royal Highness' views and opinions are recorded being less free and frank nature. The DfT argued that such a chilling effect would directly impinge upon the established convention that The Prince of Wales is able to correspond confidentially with government Ministers.
152. In relation to this argument the Commissioner believes that it is difficult to make an assessment of such an argument given the unique nature of this relationship and thus the lack of any clear precedents, e.g. previous disclosures under the Act of similar information.
153. However, the Commissioner is aware of the authorised biography of The Prince of Wales by Jonathan Dimbleby which was published in 1994.¹⁰ In his introduction to this publication, Dimbleby explains that The Prince of Wales provided him with access to His Royal Highness' archives at St James's Place and Windsor Castle. Dimbleby therefore had access to The Prince of Wales' journals, papers and correspondence between with Whitehall. In relation to the inclusion of such information in his book Dimbleby explains that:

'I have been persuaded that the verbatim publication of the material might have a deleterious effect either on the conduct of British diplomacy or on the confidential nature of communications between the monarchy and Whitehall or Westminster; in these cases I have either withheld information or paraphrased the relevant documents or correspondence. However, when it was obvious that only the culture of secrecy which pervades Whitehall was under threat and not the conduct of good governance, I have not complied with requests to delete pertinent material'.

¹⁰ J Dimbleby, *The Prince of Wales: A Biography*, (Bath: Chivers Press, 1994)

154. Therefore, it would clearly be incorrect to argue that details of Prince of Wales' communications with government have **never** been placed in the public domain. To take but two examples from *The Prince of Wales: A Biography*, at page 582 Dimbleby quotes from a letter sent by His Royal Highness in 1985 to the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in addition to quoting from a draft section of the letter which did not make the final version. And at page 809 Dimbleby notes that The Prince of Wales wrote to the then Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, about the implications of cutting the Army's manpower and quotes from the this letter. Although the quote is not particularly lengthy in nature it clearly shows The Prince of Wales' strong views on this issue. The Commissioner has not been provided with any evidence by the DfT that the inclusion of details of The Prince of Wales' correspondence in this book has resulted in any sort of the chilling effect.
155. However, the Commissioner accepts that a direct parallel cannot be drawn between the disclosure of the withheld information which is the focus of this case and the previous disclosures such as the Dimbleby biography. To some extent, as Dimbleby himself acknowledges, his book was been 'self-censored': extracts have not been included that would undermine the confidential nature of communications between the monarchy. In contrast, disclosure of the withheld information in this case would be without the consent of The Prince of Wales and would result in complete copies, as opposed to extracts or paraphrased sections, of correspondence being revealed.
156. Furthermore the Commissioner believes that an inherent part of the convention is the ability of both the Heir to the Throne and government Ministers to be free and frank when discussing matters of government business. This is to ensure that the Heir to the Throne is instructed in the business of government in the most effective and efficient way possible. In the Commissioner's opinion, disclosure of information falling within the scope of convention could lead The Prince of Wales to feel constrained or more reluctant to take part in the process of being educated about the business of government.
157. In relation to the likelihood of such effects actually occurring, the Commissioner believes that the higher threshold of 'would occur' is met. This is because there a number of ways in which the adverse effect could manifest itself: it could be to his privacy, dignity, political neutrality and/or the practical way in which he actually corresponds with government Ministers. Furthermore, it is clear that The Prince of Wales communicates with Ministers across government, rather than simply to one or two departments, thus the likelihood of the adverse effects occurring is increased. Moreover, the disclosure of the

information may not just affect the way in which the Prince of Wales communicates with government departments but also those within his Household.

158. Vitally, the Commissioner believes that arguments concerning political neutrality are still relevant, and indeed attract similar weight, even when the information being withheld does not fall within the scope of the constitutional convention relating to the Heir to the Throne. In other words disclosure of correspondence not strictly on issues related to the business of government could still lead to The Prince of Wales being perceived as having particular political views or preferences and thus could undermine his political neutrality. Similarly the Commissioner accepts that a chilling effect on the nature of correspondence falling within the convention could occur even if the withheld information does fall within the scope of the convention. That is to say, disclosure of information on topics not associated with the business of government, would still be likely to affect future correspondence not simply on similar topics but also on topics falling within the scope of the convention.
159. The Commissioner therefore accepts that regulation 12(5)(f) is engaged.

Public interest test

160. However all exceptions in regulation 12 are qualified and therefore the Commissioner must consider the public interest test set out at regulation 12(1)(b) which states that information will only be exempt if the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. As noted above at paragraph 114 this test differs from the public interest test considered under section 41(1) of the Act. Furthermore regulation 12(2) states explicitly that a public authority must apply a presumption in favour of disclosure

Public interest arguments in favour of disclosing the information

161. The Commissioner believes that the arguments in favour of disclosing the information which is exempt under regulation 12(5)(f) mirror the arguments in favour of disclosing the information withheld under section 41(1), which are set out above and therefore he has not repeated them here.

Public interest arguments in favour of maintaining the exception

162. The public interest arguments in favour of maintaining the exception inevitably focus on the need to ensure that the adverse effects described above do not occur.
163. It is clearly in the public interest to preserve the political neutrality of the Royal Family as this is essential to ensuring the stability of the constitutional monarchy.
164. It would not be in the public interest for The Prince of Wales to alter the way in which he corresponds with the government Ministers. Such a chilling effect would result in The Prince of Wales being less prepared for the business of government when he is Monarch and furthermore may undermine His Royal Highness' ability to carry out his role as a Privy Councillor, as a Counsellor of State and to fulfil any duties he may be called upon to undertake in line with the Regency Act 1937.
165. There is a clear public interest in protecting the privacy, and by implication, the dignity of the Royal Family so as to preserve their position and ability to fulfil their constitutional role as a unifying symbol for the nation.

Balance of public interest arguments

166. As discussed in relation to the public interest test under section 41, the Commissioner believes that significant weight should be attributed to the argument that disclosure would undermine The Prince of Wales' political neutrality. It is clearly in the public interest that The Prince of Wales, either as Heir to the Throne or when Monarch, is not perceived to be politically biased in order to protect his position as Sovereign in a constitutional democracy. Vitally, as noted the Commissioner believes that arguments concerning political neutrality are still relevant, and indeed attract similar weight, even when the information being withheld does not fall within the scope of the convention relating to the Heir to the Throne.
167. Furthermore, as noted, the Commissioner agrees that it is clearly in the public interest that the Heir to the Throne and government Ministers can be free and frank when discussing matters of government business. This is to ensure that the Heir to the Throne is instructed in the business of government in the most effective and efficient way possible. Again, as noted above, the Commissioner accepts that the chilling effect arguments are still relevant even when the correspondence itself may not fall within the convention and some weight should be given to them.

168. Again, as acknowledged above, the Commissioner accepts that there is a clear public interest in protecting the dignity of the Royal Family so as to preserve their position and ability to fulfil their constitutional role as a unifying symbol for the nation. To the extent that disclosure of the withheld information would undermine His Royal Highness' dignity by invasion of his privacy, the Commissioner accepts that this adds further weight to maintaining the exemption.
169. Nevertheless as with the consideration under section 41, the various arguments in favour of disclosure should not be dismissed lightly and deciding where the balance ultimately lies will depend upon the content of the withheld information.
170. Having considered the information that has been withheld on the basis of regulation 12(5)(f) the Commissioner has concluded that the public interest in favour of maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosure. He does not believe that disclosing this particular information would fulfil the public interest arguments in favour of disclosure to any great extent.

Regulation 13(1)

171. As set out above the Commissioner has concluded that not only is some of the withheld material environmental information it is also information 'on emissions'.
172. Regulation 12(9) states that:
- 'To the extent that the environmental information to be disclosed relates to information on emissions, a public authority shall not be entitled to refuse to disclose that information under an exception referred to in paragraphs 5(d) to (g).'
173. Therefore for the information which is on emissions, the DfT cannot rely on regulation 12(5)(f) or regulation 12(5)(d) to withhold the information. The Commissioner has therefore considered whether this information is exempt by virtue of regulation 13(1). This states that:
- 'To the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject and as respects which either the first or second condition below is satisfied, a public authority shall not disclose the personal data.'
174. The elements of regulation 13 relevant to this request are as follows:

'13(2) The first condition is –

(a) in a case where the information falls within any paragraphs (a) to (d) of the definition of “data” in section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations would contravene –

(i) any of the data protection principles'

175. Section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) defines personal data as:

'data which relate to a living individual who can be identified –

- (a) from those data, or
- (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller,

and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intention of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual.'

176. The DfT has argued that the withheld information constitutes The Prince of Wales' personal data because it sets out his opinions and views on the various matters discussed in the correspondence.

177. The Commissioner has reviewed remaining withheld information and is prepared to accept that it falls within the definition of personal data as defined by the DPA for the reason set out above.

178. The DfT has also argued that disclosure of this information would breach the first data protection principle which states that:

1. Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully; and
2. Personal data shall not be processed unless at least one of the conditions in DPA schedule 2 is met.

179. The DfT has argued that disclosure would breach the first data protection principle for reasons which overlap and buttress the reasoning why the withheld information is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41 of the Act and regulation 12(5)(f) of the EIR. Disclosure would be unfair because:

- The parties exchanged the correspondence with the clear expectation that the contents would not be disclosed;
 - For information of a particularly personal nature, this would infringe The Prince of Wales' right to private life under Article 8 ECHR; and
 - More widely, disclosure would harm The Prince of Wales' ability to carry out his public duties and would detract from His Royal Highness' political neutrality and the appearance of such neutrality.
180. In assessing whether disclosure of personal data would be unfair the Commissioner takes into account a range of factors including:
- The consequences of disclosing the information, i.e. what damage or distress would the individual suffer if the information was disclosed? In consideration of this factor the Commissioner may take into account:
 - whether information of the nature requested is already in the public domain;
 - if so the source of such a disclosure; and
 - even if the information has previously been in the public domain does the passage of time mean that disclosure now could still cause damage or distress?
 - The reasonable expectations of the individual in terms of what would happen to their personal data. Such expectations could be shaped by:
 - what the public authority may have told them about what would happen to their personal data;
 - their general expectations of privacy, including the effect of Article 8 ECHR;
 - the nature or content of the information itself;
 - the circumstances in which the personal data was obtained;
 - particular circumstances of the case, e.g. established custom or practice within the public authority; and
 - whether the individual consented to their personal data being disclosed or conversely whether they explicitly refused.
181. With regard to the reasonable expectations of The Prince of Wales, as discussed above in relation to section 41(1)(b), the Commissioner accepts that the correspondence which is the focus of this case was clearly exchanged on the basis that all parties believed that it should be kept private. Both the operation of the convention to educate the Heir to the Throne and the general way in which correspondence between the Royal Family and government has been historically handled give rise to this expectation. Given the respect and recognition that the Commissioner has accepted should be attributed to this constitutional convention, he believes that the expectations of the

Prince of Wales when shaped by the convention are ones that are objectively reasonable. That is to say, the DfT has not created an unrealistic or unreasonable expectation under which The Prince of Wales may assume his personal data will not be disclosed.

182. With regard to the consequences of disclosure, the Commissioner accepts that disclosure of the correspondence has the potential to harm The Prince of Wales in a more than one way. It could impact on The Prince of Wales's position of political neutrality and thus his ability to carry out his public duties both as Heir to the Throne and when he becomes Monarch. Furthermore, it could harm The Prince of Wales' privacy and dignity as protected by Article 8 ECHR.
183. Consequently, in light of the weighty expectations and the likely impact on The Prince of Wales if the correspondence were disclosed, the Commissioner accepts that such a disclosure would be unfair and therefore the Commissioner is satisfied that the DfT can rely on regulation 13(1) to withhold the environmental information which is on emissions.

Requests 1 to 5

184. In addition to asking for copies of correspondence and internal documentation, the complainant also sought a list of approaches, along with the number of approaches made by The Prince of Wales or other individuals representing His Royal Highness to the DfT. The complainant specified that such a list should include 'details of the nature of the approach and the issues involved'.
185. The DfT has argued that disclosure of such a list, and by implication the number of approaches, is exempt from disclosure on the basis of sections 37(1)(a), 40(2) and 41(1).
186. In relation to section 41, the DfT argued that disclosure of the details of the approaches made to DfT clearly constituted information which was provided to it by a third party and thus met the requirements of section 41(1)(a). As to why disclosure of this would constitute an actionable breach, the DfT referred to the arguments set out above in relation to the application of section 41(1)(b) to copies of the letters sent by The Prince of Wales to the DfT.
187. In relation to the application of section 37(1)(a), the DfT explained that whilst it is publicly acknowledged that The Prince of Wales corresponds on occasion with government, it is not generally known when and with whom he corresponds. Disclosure of such information, i.e. by providing a list of approaches and/or the number of such approaches would not

- be in the public interest because disclosure of the details of when and with whom His Royal Highness corresponds, even in the absence of disclosure of the subject matter of the correspondence would lead to damaging speculation about the nature of that correspondence. Inferences would be drawn, whether warranted or not, from the knowledge that The Prince of Wales had written a certain number of times to a government department within a particular period, that he had written on particular topics or had expressed particular views. That in turn would inhibit His Royal Highness and Ministers from exchanging views on governmental matters which would inhibit the convention that the Heir to the Throne should be instructed in business of government. Again the DfT noted that the reasons for the application of section 41(1) overlap and support the application of section 37(1)(a).
188. The DfT argued that these public interest concerns should be given particular weight even without the need to demonstrate particular prejudice arising from these particular lists; section 37(1)(a) applied without proof of damage. To support this point the DfT suggested that there was a strong parallel to be drawn between this case and *HM Treasury v Information Commissioner and Evan Owen [2009] EWHC 1811*. That case, like the present case, concerned a narrow and specific exemption: in that case, the exemption related to the advice of Law Officers under section 35(1)(c). The DfT highlighted the fact that Blake J held that the general public interest considerations behind non-disclosure, which are reflected in section 35(1)(c), should be taken into account in the absence of proof of damage. This was why Parliament had enacted the specific exemption for Law Officers' advice under section 35(1)(c) without requiring proof of damage. The DfT argued that the same considerations applied in the context of this case.
189. In addition to this point the DfT highlighted to the Commissioner a particular instance where a particular public authority had disclosed the number of times The Prince of Wales had contacted it and the harm this had caused to His Royal Highness' position, and in particular his political neutrality. (The Commissioner does not consider it appropriate to include details of this in the main body of the Notice.)
190. Having considered the arguments advanced by the DfT very carefully the Commissioner has concluded that a list of approaches, along with the number of approaches made by The Prince of Wales and/or His Royal Highness' representatives, is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41(1). The Commissioner accepts that disclosure of this information would constitute an actionable breach of confidence broadly for the reasons the Commissioner has set out above with regard to the application of section 41(1) to the correspondence itself. Although the Commissioner acknowledges that disclosure simply of a

list of approaches and/or details of the number of such approaches would result in less information being placed into the public domain, the Commissioner still believes that this would constitute an infringement of The Prince of Wales' right of privacy under Article 8 ECHR. For the reasons set out above the Commissioner does not believe that there is a sufficient public interest defence to warrant disclosure of this information.

191. In reaching this conclusion the Commissioner notes that the time period covered by the scope of the requests is four years (the DfT only came into existence in 2002). The Commissioner accepts that this is a relatively broad time period compared to other similar requests previously considered by the Commissioner. For example in case reference FS50114757 the complainant sought a list and schedule of correspondence exchanged with The Prince of Wales for a period of eight months and the Commissioner concluded that such information was exempt from disclosure on the same basis as discussed in the preceding paragraph. In case FS50114757 the Commissioner noted that one reason for this decision was the narrow time period of the request and the fact that the request sought details of correspondence between The Prince of Wales and Ministers – as opposed to a broader request seeking, for example, correspondence between any individuals acting on behalf of His Royal Highness and any individual at the public authority.
192. Nevertheless the Commissioner is conscious of the fact that disclosure of the number of approaches in this case could be used, along with disclosure of similar information by other government departments in the future, to build up a relatively complete picture of which departments The Prince of Wales corresponds most frequently with.
193. The Commissioner notes that with regard to information sought by the complainant in requests 1 and 2 regarding the nature of any approach, if the documents contained environmental information, as some of the correspondence in this case does, any description of the environmental information (e.g. the nature of the approach) contained within the documents would in itself constitute environmental information. However, the Commissioner believes that those parts of such a schedule would be exempt from disclosure either on the basis of regulation 12(5)(f) or 13(2) for the reasons set out above.

Procedural Requirements

194. Both the Act and the EIR require a public authority to respond to an information request within 20 working days following receipt and either

provide the information that was requested or issue a refusal notice citing the exemptions or exceptions that are being relied upon.

195. In handling this request the DfT did issue a refusal notice within 20 working days which cited the exemptions within the Act which it was seeking to rely on.
196. However, as explained above, the Commissioner has concluded that some of the information falling within the scope of these requests constitutes environmental information and thus disclosure of such information should be considered under the EIR rather than the Act. Although the Commissioner has concluded that such information is exempt from disclosure on the basis of a number of exceptions contained within the EIR, the DfT did not issue the complainant with a refusal notice citing these exceptions. (The Commissioner acknowledges that the DfT maintains that such information is not environmental information.)
197. The failure to provide such a notice constitutes a breach of regulations 14(1), 14(2) and 14(3).

The Decision

198. The Commissioner's decision is that the following elements of the request were not dealt with in accordance with the Act:
 - The DfT does hold correspondence falling within the scope of request 7.
 - Some of this correspondence constitutes environmental information as defined by EIR.
 - The DfT breached regulations 14(1), 14(2) and 14(3) by failing to issues a refusal notice citing the exceptions within the EIR.
199. However, the Commissioner has also decided that the public authority dealt with the following elements of the request in accordance with the requirements of the Act:
 - The correspondence falling with the scope of the request 7 is either exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41(1) of the Act or regulations 12(5)(f) or 13(2) of the EIR.

- The information the DfT holds which would fulfil requests 1 to 5 is exempt from disclosure on the basis of section 41(1) or to the extent that such information would constitute environmental information, regulations 12(5)(f) or 13(2).
- The DfT does not hold any information falling within the scope of request 6.

Steps Required

200. The Commissioner requires no steps to be taken.

Right of Appeal

201. Either party has the right to appeal against this Decision Notice to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights). Information about the appeals process may be obtained from:

First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights)
GRC & GRP Tribunals,
PO Box 9300,
Arnhem House,
31, Waterloo Way,
LEICESTER,
LE1 8DJ

Tel: 0845 600 0877

Fax: 0116 249 4253

Email: informationtribunal@tribunals.gsi.gov.uk.

Website: www.informationtribunal.gov.uk

If you wish to appeal against a decision notice, you can obtain information on how to appeal along with the relevant forms from the Information Tribunal website.

Any Notice of Appeal should be served on the Tribunal within 28 calendar days of the date on which this Decision Notice is served.

Dated the 30th day of March 2010

Signed

**Graham Smith
Deputy Commissioner**

**Information Commissioner's Office
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF**

Annex – text of request

The complainant sent the following request to the DfT on 22 February 2006:

1. A list of all approaches made by HRH the Prince of Wales to the DfT. This should include the date the Prince contacted the Department (for whatever reason) as well as the nature of the matter under discussion. These approaches could have been made by the Prince in person, by email, by telephone or by post.
2. A list of all approaches made by representatives of HRH the Prince of Wales to the DfT. This should include the date the representatives/employees contacted the Department as well as details about the nature of the approach and the issues involved. These approaches could have been made in person, by email, by telephone or by post.
3. How many times has HRH the Prince of Wales contacted any civil servant in the employ of the Department for Transport or any member of the Department's ministerial team? Please provide details of these approaches, the date they occurred and the issues concerned.
4. How many times have employees or representatives acting on behalf of HRH the Prince of Wales contacted any civil servant in the employ of the DfT or any member of the department's ministerial team? Please provide details of these approaches, the dates they happened and the issues concerned.
5. How many times has HRH the Prince of Wales met with a senior member of staff from the DfT or a member of the Department's ministerial team. Could you please provide details of these meetings, including the dates they took place, the venue they were held and the nature of the topics under discussion.
6. Please provide all internal documents held by the DfT which relate in any way whatsoever to approaches from the Prince of Wales and or employees or representatives acting on his behalf. These documents should include, among other things, all departmental minutes, memos, emails, telephone transcripts, letters and reports which touch upon this matter.
7. Please provide all correspondence between the DfT and any outside organisation or individual (including other government departments) which relates to approaches from HRH the Prince of Wales and or employees/representatives acting on his behalf'.

Legal Annex

Freedom of Information Act 2000

General Right of Access

Section 1(1) provides that -

“Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled –

(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and

(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.”

Section 1(2) provides that -

“Subsection (1) has the effect subject to the following provisions of this section and to the provisions of sections 2, 9, 12 and 14.”

Section 1(3) provides that –

“Where a public authority –

(a) reasonably requires further information in order to identify and locate the information requested, and

(b) has informed the applicant of that requirement,

the authority is not obliged to comply with subsection (1) unless it is supplied with that further information.”

Effect of Exemptions

Section 2(1) provides that –

“Where any provision of Part II states that the duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to any information, the effect of the provision is that either –

(a) the provision confers absolute exemption, or

- (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exclusion of the duty to confirm or deny outweighs the public interest in disclosing whether the public authority holds the information

section 1(1)(a) does not apply.”

Section 2(2) provides that –

“In respect of any information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that –

- (a) the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption, or
- (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information”

Time for Compliance

Section 10(1) provides that –

“Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a public authority must comply with section 1(1) promptly and in any event not later than the twentieth working day following the date of receipt.”

Section 10(3) provides that –

“If, and to the extent that –

- (a) section 1(1)(a) would not apply if the condition in section 2(1)(b) were satisfied, or
- (b) section 1(1)(b) would not apply if the condition in section 2(2)(b) were satisfied,

the public authority need not comply with section 1(1)(a) or (b) until such time as is reasonable in the circumstances; but this subsection does not affect the time by which any notice under section 17(1) must be given.”

Communications with Her Majesty

Section 37(1) provides that –

"Information is exempt information if it relates to-

- (a) communications with Her Majesty, with other members of the Royal Family or with the Royal Household, or
- (b) the conferring by the Crown of any honour or dignity."

Section 37(2) provides that –

"The duty to confirm or deny does not arise in relation to information which is (or if it were held by the public authority would be) exempt information by virtue of subsection (1)."

Personal information

Section 40(2) provides that –

"Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if-

- (a) it constitutes personal data which do not fall within subsection (1), and
- (b) either the first or the second condition below is satisfied."

Section 40(3) provides that –

"The first condition is-

- (a) in a case where the information falls within any of paragraphs (a) to (d) of the definition of "data" in section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene-
 - (i) any of the data protection principles, or
 - (ii) section 10 of that Act (right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress), and
- (b) in any other case, that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act would contravene any of the data protection principles if the exemptions in section 33A(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (which relate to manual data held by public authorities) were disregarded."

Information provided in confidence.

Section 41(1) provides that –

“Information is exempt information if-

- (a) it was obtained by the public authority from any other person (including another public authority), and
- (b) the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise than under this Act) by the public authority holding it would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that or any other person.”

Section 41(2) provides that –

“The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, the confirmation or denial that would have to be given to comply with section 1(1)(a) would (apart from this Act) constitute an actionable breach of confidence.”

Environmental Information Regulations 2004

Regulation 12 - Exceptions to the duty to disclose environmental information

Regulation 12(1)

Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if –

- (a) an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and
- (b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

Regulation 12(2)

A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.

Regulation 12(3)

To the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject, the personal data shall not be disclosed otherwise than in accordance with regulation 13.

Regulation 12(5)

For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that its disclosure would adversely affect –

- (a) international relations, defence, national security or public safety;
- (b) the course of justice, the ability of a person to receive a fair trial or the ability of a public authority to conduct an inquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature;
- (c) intellectual property rights;
- (d) the confidentiality of the proceedings of that or any other public authority where such confidentiality is provided by law;
- (e) the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided by law to protect a legitimate economic interest;
- (f) the interests of the person who provided the information where that person –
 - (i) was not under, and could not have been put under, any legal obligation to supply it to that or any other public authority;
 - (ii) did not supply it in circumstances such that that or any other public authority is entitled apart from these Regulations to disclose it; and
 - (iii) has not consented to its disclosure; or
- (g) the protection of the environment to which the information relates.

Regulation 12(9)

To the extent that the environmental information to be disclosed relates to information on emissions, a public authority shall not be entitled to refuse to disclose that information under an exception referred to in paragraphs (5)(d) to (g).

Regulation 13 - Personal data

Regulation 13(1)

To the extent that the information requested includes personal data of which the applicant is not the data subject and as respects which either the first or second condition below is satisfied, a public authority shall not disclose the personal data.

Regulation 13(2) The first condition is –

- (b) in a case where the information falls within any paragraphs (a) to (d) of the definition of “data” in section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations would contravene –
 - (i) any of the data protection principles; or
 - (ii) section 10 of the Act (right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress) and in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in not disclosing the information outweighs the public interest in disclosing it; and
- (c) in any other case, that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under these Regulations would contravene any of the data protection principles if the exemptions in section 33A(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998(a) (which relates to manual data held by public authorities) were disregarded.

Regulation 14 - Refusal to disclose information

Regulation 14(1) If a request for environmental information is refused by a public authority under regulations 12(1) or 13(1), the refusal shall be made in writing and comply with the following provisions of this regulation.

Regulation 14(2) The refusal shall be made as soon as possible and no later than 20 working days after the date of receipt of the request.

Data Protection Act 1998

Part I

1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

“personal data” means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified—

(a)
from those data, or

(b)
from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller,

and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual;

Schedule 1

The first principle states that:

Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless –

- (a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and
- (b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met.

Schedule 2

Conditions relevant for purposes of the first principle: processing of any personal data

1. The data subject has given his consent to the processing.
2. The processing is necessary— (a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or (b) for the taking of steps at the request of the data subject with a view to entering into a contract.
3. The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract.
4. The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.
5. The processing is necessary—
 - (a) for the administration of justice
 - (b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under any enactment
 - (c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department
 - (d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.
6. — (1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.

(2) The Secretary of State may by order specify particular circumstances in which this condition is, or is not, to be taken to be satisfied.