PS (Ltte – Internal Flight – Sufficiency of protection) Sri Lanka CG [2004] UKIAT 00297
Date of hearing: 4 October 2004
Date Determination notified: 28 October 2004
Secretary of State for the Home Department | APPELLANT |
and | |
PS | RESPONDENT |
'41. Having noted all these information [sic] this reinforces my findings that the appellant faces a serious risk of being targeted and persecuted and even made 'to disappear' by the LTTE for being a traitor. I have noted that they do have informants and what happened to his cousin's brother could happen to the appellant. I believe that they would have long memories and it only be a matter of time for the appellant to be tracked down [sic]. His identity would be known, I also find that the appellant could not avail himself of the opportunity and the obligation of internal flight because the LTTE now have "a free run" of the island.
42. I have also considered whether they will be agents of persecution. I have to consider whether the Sri Lankan authorities can afford effective and sufficient protection for the appellant but it seems to me by the nature of the ruthlessness which the LTTE are still capable of, the appellant would not be treated as an average Sri Lankan citizen from whom he could receive the protection for ordinary crime. The LTTE have shown themselves capable of terrorist activities, they still are capable of carrying arms and explosives and also have, as I pointed out, an effective network of informants. The appellant therefore is over and above average risk and can therefore not count on any sufficient or effective from the Sri Lankan authorities. [sic]'
'The Adjudicator erred in law by allowing the appeal on asylum grounds and under human rights Articles 2 and 3 in particular:
(i) He erred in law in finding that the respondent would not be able to seek protection from the Sri Lankan authorities as he failed to consider Hovath [2000] ImmAR 552 [sic] in deciding whether there was effective protection of the respondent. There is no assessment of whether there is a functioning judicial system or a system in place that the respondent could avail himself of. The Secretary of State submits that following Hovath there is a sufficiency of protection for the respondent.
(ii) Furthermore, the Adjudicator's finding that the Sri Lankan authorities could not protect the respondent, is unreasonable and amounts to an error in law. The Adjudicator states "... It seems to me by the nature of the ruthlessness which the LTTE are still capable of, the appellant would not be treated as an average Sri Lankan citizen from whom he could receive the protection of ordinary crime" (paragraph 42). However, the Adjudicator does not give any reasons as to why the LTTE's "ruthlessness" would stop the Sri Lankan authorities from offering the respondent protection. The Adjudicator concluded that the respondent is not an "exceptional case" (paragraph 31) and is not wanted by the Sri Lankan authorities, therefore the Secretary of State submits that the Sri Lankan authorities would offer the respondent protection.
(iii) The Adjudicator erred in law as he has not made a credibility finding of the respondent [sic] or clearly stated which parts of the evidence he accepts or rejects as he is obliged to do following the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran [2000] ImmAR 271 25 January 2000. The Adjudicator has stated he accepts the respondent's evidence (paragraph 36) but has given no reason why he believes the respondent despite the challenges to the credibility in the refusal letter.'
(a) UNHCR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Sri Lanka issued in April 2004;
(b) The Home Office CIPU Country Report of April 2004;
(c) US State Department Report for 2003 published in February 2004
(d) Information Bulletins 32 and 36 from the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) of 2 May 2003 and 29 May 2004 respectively;
(e) Human Rights Watch Report of 7 August 2003 concerning political killings during the ceasefire;
(f) Amnesty International Open Letter of 12 August 2003 concerning recent politically motivated killings and abductions in Sri Lanka;
(g) Professor Good's general report on his visit between 2 and 15 August 2003 published on 29 August 2003;
(h) A further report from Professor Good dated 27 March 2004 expanding on his own visit report by reference to what was said in R (Oppilamani) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 348 (Admin) and a further report dated 21 September 2004 prepared specifically in relation to the present respondent;
(i) The Asian Human Rights Commission Report of 4 February 2004;
(j) Various newspaper reports up to and including 23 September 2004 as supplied by both parties.
'2.11 Since the ceasefire agreement came into force, most checkpoints between the government and LTTE controlled areas have been removed. The checkpoints that were approved after the MoU [the Memorandum of Understanding which led to the ceasefire] between the government and the LTTE are listed in the ceasefire agreement and generally adhered to. However, although it is occasionally possible for high ranking members of the LTTE to seek national protection when fleeing the LTTE, there are numerous reports of suspicious deaths of former LTTE cadres, including persons who have sought national protection, occurring in government controlled areas. In cases where inter-Tamil fighting occurs, the government stand has been to not intervene as any such intervention would be a violation of the ceasefire.
2.12 In general it is no longer possible to use the internal flight option for Tamils fleeing the LTTE as the organisation is present in every part of the country and has a well developed information/ intelligence network.'
The difficulty with that passage is that it is not sourced and its generalisations do not appear to be borne out by what is contained earlier in the paper.
'Since the signing of the agreement there have been tens of killings, abductions and other human rights abuses against civilians in Sri Lanka.'
It is clear from the context that these are identified as politically motivated acts against prominent members or former members of pro-government Tamil groups but it is not suggested that the total number of killings exceeds twenty-two on this information. Although the LTTE are claimed to be responsible, it is also noted that they have consistently denied responsibility.
'151. Before the ceasefire agreement civilians deaths and injuries on the Jaffna Peninsula were reported in the hundreds, but casualty figures could not be confirmed because relief agencies and journalists were barred from the hardest hit areas. On the Peninsula, and also in eastern Sri Lanka, many conflict related deaths were the result of errant shells and gunshots.
152. Since the ceasefire agreement some paramilitary actors, as well as the LTTE, have continued the traditional political killings and disappearance. The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) issued a press statement in May 2003 stating that the continuing attacks and killings of members of political parties and locally elected representatives pose a serious threat to the ceasefire. SLMM further stated that various political parties operating in the north and east have formally complained to SLMM due to repeated threats and attacks on their offices, individual members and their families and elected representatives.
153. Although LTTE was pointed out as a main perpetrator in the majority, but not all of the attacks, police investigations rarely led to the accusations being proven. The SLMM stated that the police seem to have had difficulties in arresting the perpetrators and that available witnesses to the crimes are too afraid to come forward as fear of repercussions seems to be an everyday concern for some people in the north and east.
154. In addition, in the autumn of 2003, international human rights groups publicly appealed to actors in Sri Lanka, including the police forces and the LTTE, after having received confirmation that the political killings continued with impunity. UNHCR field officers who continue to report on disappearances and killings in 2003 confirm these findings. More than forty cases of suspected political killings after the ceasefire have been reported to the UNHCR field office.'
What seems to us noteworthy about this passage is that the first three paragraphs are clearly concerned with the situation in north and east Sri Lanka. The reference in paragraph 154 is again to the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International documents previously referred to. It is again instructive to look at what these documents actually say.
'... It has also given the LTTE free access to towns like Batticaloa, Jaffna, and Trincomalee, previously under army control, for the purpose of opening political offices. Although the pact prohibits LTTE cadres from carrying arms in these areas, prohibition is not well enforced. According to critics, the LTTE's new political offices have become useful points from which to coordinate surveillance, recruitment, and extortion and, when necessary, the assault, abduction and assassination of rivals.'
'The police remain primarily responsible for investigations, but they have often failed to undertake them. With the current ceasefire in place and the military confined to barracks, police are once again the main security force active in the north and east. But they are relative strangers to the areas they police and are vulnerable to attacks should hostilities resume. The result is that they either forge relationships with the more powerful and locally influential LTTE, or try to stay out of the way. Police officers are well aware that when the LTTE broke the fifteen month ceasefire in 1990, LTTE forces overran police stations throughout the north and east, abducting and killing hundreds of police officers.'
'Amnesty International recognises the difficulties that the SLMM and the police face in investigating these cases, particularly in regard to securing the testimony of witnesses'
But it says in cases where witnesses who claim to be able to identify those responsible are willing to give evidence: ' ... both the police and SLMM should, if they have not already done so, initiate investigations'. It goes on to say that cooperation of witnesses 'can only be achieved in the majority of cases by creating a secure environment free from the fear of reprisals' and complains that :
'The SLMM and police need to ensure at the earliest opportunity the systematic protection of witnesses involved in these investigations in order to guarantee their safety and facilitate the collection of evidence. In addition, police should provide protection to those who request it. ...'
'12. A senior officer in the police department said a few months ago that the police believed several LTTE groups to be operating in Colombo. The Freedom of Movement consequent upon the ceasefire has facilitated Colombo's penetration by the LTTE. They extort money from Tamil businesses in the city, and there has been a recent series of killings by the LTTE in Colombo and elsewhere for people whom they see as enemies, particularly those they believe have been informing on them. There are however no effective police investigations into political murders by the LTTE at present. The authorities do not wish to arrest LTTE members committing political assassinations in Colombo, because they are anxious to do nothing which might disrupt the peace process.
13. In recent weeks, however, the police and army have been carrying out numerous roundups in Colombo, especially after the killing of a senior CID intelligence officer in Mount Lavinia by an LTTE operative who had won the officer's trust by working for him as an ostensible informant. In one round-up alone about 600 Tamils were detained. These round-ups were carried out by the police and army jointly, and those detained were released after questioning. Raids and round-ups focussing on Tamil single "lodges" in the city are weekly events at present, with the result that Tamils are not safe in certain areas of Colombo, such as Maradana, Grand Pass and Wellawatte. ...
15. There have been about one hundred murders by the LTTE since the ceasefire, including about fifty murders of informants. The fact that so many killings have occurred in Colombo and other government controlled areas, indicates that the dangers of those regarded as enemies by the LTTE is not confined to LTTE controlled areas.'
'43. At the heart of the reasoning of the Secretary of State, and the submissions made on his behalf, is the point that the information and evidence as to specific attacks, killings or persecution in the Colombo area are extremely limited and that the more generalised statements in Dr Good's reports have to be read against that background.
44. The generalised statements if taken in isolation and thus without that background would, it seems to me, found the first stage of the claimant's position, namely that it cannot be said that no Adjudicator would by reference to those paragraphs find that there was an insufficiency of state protection.
45. However, it seems to me that when those passages are read against the source of the information contained and identified in Dr Good's report and the very limited number of incidents in Colombo that can be pointed to specifically, namely (i) the two I have identified [which were both derived from the Human Rights Watch report we have considered above] and (ii) the additional unspecific incident in the footnote to paragraph 12 of Dr Good's report [which refers to examples of reports on LTTE political killings in Colombo which could not be identified by any source reference before Charles J and reports as to 'thirty-six known political killings by the LTTE across the country since the MOU came into effect'] (that counsel for the Secretary of State has not been able to track down), I have reached the conclusion that an application of the test set out by Lords Clyde and Hope [in Horvath], which is based on a system, leads to the result that no Adjudicator could properly, on the basis of the information presently before me, conclude that there was an insufficiency of state protection.'
'28. What is beyond doubt is that the ceasefire and lifting of the ban have increased the LTTE's freedom of manoeuvre significantly. The greater the progress in any future peace talks, the greater would be the single 'legitimacy' accorded to the LTTE and its activities, and the greater its ability to strengthen its presence in Colombo.
29. Taking into account all the above evidence, it is clear that opportunities for the LTTE to intimidate, abduct, and even kill those it perceives as enemies or traitors have been significantly enhanced by the ceasefire, in Colombo as well as in areas in the north and east ostensibly under government control.
30. If the court accepts that [the subject of the specific report] does have reason to fear the LTTE (and I repeat that I do not know the circumstances of his case) the objective evidence summarised above indicates that he would be at risk in Colombo as well as elsewhere in Sri Lanka. It is clear that the government can offer him no protection at all in LTTE controlled areas, and that even in Colombo the LTTE has targeted and executed a number of persons.'
'... In my opinion, however, any debate over just how many killings the LTTE has carried out in Colombo is largely a red herring. The fact that there have been any at all shows they have the capacity and willingness out carry them out, and the question then becomes whether there is anything in appellants' backgrounds to differentiate them as particular targets.'
'In sum, the LTTE has always taken very strong action, including assassination against those it regards as traitors. This applies above all to those suspected of revealing information to the authorities, and even more forcibly, now, to those belonging to the Karuna faction. Any such risk would of course be most acute in LTTE-controlled territory, in the Vanni and Jaffna Peninsula, and in east coast regions where both factions are present, but as the above evidence demonstrates, those seen as informers, traitors and deserters, are at risk in Colombo too should the LTTE wish to target them. What is true of Colombo is also true, in my opinion, of all other parts of Sri Lanka, and in this connection I draw attention again to paragraph 2.12 of the UNHCR's April 2004 Assessment, quoted above [it is set out by us earlier in this determination at paragraph 16], which appears to me wholly consistent with the available evidence and with which I agree.'
'I am, with respect, in broad agreement with the Adjudicator's assessment of the LTTE at paragraphs 39-42 of the determination. [Paragraphs 41 and 42 are set out at paragraph 4 of this determination and paragraphs 39 and 40 set out the Adjudicator's analysis of the objective evidence as to the behaviour of the LTTE which we have not thought it necessary to reproduce.] His analysis accorded with the evidence available at the time, and is confirmed by more recent evidence, as explained above. In particular the LTTE takes very great interest in anyone who has been detained by the security forces, particularly those held for long periods. This is mainly because it assumes they would have been tortured to obtain information, but they may have been used as masked informers to pick out LTTE members at checkpoints, and that they may have been released on condition that they act as informers in the future. I think it is certain that, at the very least, the LTTE would indeed have wished to interrogate [the respondent] about his own very lengthy detention [we note it was for some two months only], all the more so in view of the detention of two of their members under circumstances which pointed to him as a likely source of information.'
'The suicide bombing apparently aimed at Douglas Devananda [this is the incident in early July 2004 when four police officers were killed following arousal of suspicion of the intentions of the suicide bomber]; the mass murder of eight Karuna supporters in Colombo [this is the incident of 8 July 2004 already noted]; the assassination of the intelligence source known as PLOTE Mohan [the incident of 31 July 2004 already noted]; and the killing of the EPDP leader K Bala Nadarajah [the incident of 23 September 2004], all of which have occurred in the past few months, confirm how much freedom the LTTE has to operate outside the law in Colombo ... The Karuna supporters were indeed placed in a supposedly 'safe house and one of the dead was (according to the LTTE, though the government denies this) a 'minder' from military intelligence. Clearly the authorities could not provide sufficiency of protection in this instance, even when they had specifically set out to do so. [This appears to be derived from the article in the Daily News of 26 July 2004 which is the only objective evidence before the Tribunal in this respect. That referred to the safe house being one 'supposed to be managed by the Karuna faction' and the information provided by the police was that those killed were from the Karuna faction. The only reference to a Sri Lanka military intelligence operative being among those killed comes from the Tamil net website said to be quoting sources in Batticoloa and therefore clearly reflecting opposition LTTE views, but the suggestion is reported as being categorically denied by the Director of Military Intelligence, so that it is difficult to see on what basis Professor Good concludes that the authorities had 'explicitly set out' to provide protection to those who were killed when general reports make it clear that the police are, as previously noted, seriously seeking to trace and arrest members of both LTTE warring factions.]'
'The discovery resulted in a decision to beef up security by sending hundreds of extra police and army personnel to key points around Colombo. On 21 June 2004 the LTTE renewed its allegation that Karuna was being aided by the army, although it is still officially denied ...'
'One consequence has, naturally, been a stepping up of security in Colombo. On 28 July 2004, news agencies reported that the government "has decided to strengthen the security measures to prevent smuggled weapons to enter the city". Following a meeting between police and the heads of security forces, a spokesman said "We discussed the matter and decided to put some special measures to prevent smuggling of weapons into the city. The efforts are being made that the general public don't suffer because of the security checks."'
'Asylum claims ...
4) Sufficiency of state protection, whether from state agents or non-state actors, means a willingness and ability on the part of the receiving state to provide through its legal system a reasonable level of protection from ill-treatment of which the claimant for asylum has a well-founded fear; Osman, Horvath, Dhima.
5) The effectiveness of the system provided is to be judged normally by its systemic ability to deter and/or to prevent the form of persecution of which there is a risk, not just punishment of it after the event; Horvath, Banomova, McPherson and Kinuthia.
6) Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if he can show that the authorities know or ought to know circumstances particular to his case giving rise to his fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection his particular circumstances reasonably require; Osman.
Article 3 claims ...
10) The threshold of risk required to engage Article 3 depends on the circumstances of each case, including the magnitude of the risk, the nature and severity of the ill-treatment risked, and whether the risk emanates from a state agency or non-state actor; Horvath.
11) In most, but not necessarily all, cases of ill-treatment which, but for state protection, would engage Article 3, a risk of such ill-treatment will be more readily established in state agency cases than in non-state actor cases – there is a spectrum of circumstances giving rise to such risks banning the two categories, ranging from breach of a duty by the state of a negative duty not to inflict Article 3 ill-treatment to a breach of a duty to take positive protective action against such ill-treatment by non-state actors; Svazas.
12) An assessment of the threshold of risk applicable in the circumstances to engage Article 3 necessarily involves an assessment of the sufficiency of state protection to meet the threat of which there is such a risk – one cannot be considered without the other whether or not the exercise is regarded as 'holistic' or to be conducted in two stages; Dhima, Krepel, Svazas.
13) Sufficiency of state protection is not necessarily a guarantee of protection from Article 3 ill-treatment any more than it is a guarantee of protection from an otherwise well-founded fear of persecution in asylum cases – nor, if and to the extent that there is any difference, is it eradication or removal of risk of exposure to Article 3 ill-treatment; Dhima, McPherson, Krepel.
14) Where the risk falls to be judged by the sufficiency of state protection, that sufficiency is judged, not according to whether it would eradicate the real risk of the relevant harm, but according to whether it is a reasonable provision in the circumstances; Osman.
15) Notwithstanding such systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still be able to establish an Article 3 claim if he can show that the authorities there know or ought to know particular circumstances likely to expose him to risk of Article 3 ill-treatment; Osman.
16) The approach is the same whether the receiving country is or is not a party to the ECHR, but in determining whether it would be contrary to Article 3 to remove a person to that country, our courts should decide the factual issue as to risk as if ECHR standards apply there – and the same applies to the certification process under Section 115(1) and/or (2) of the 2002 Act.'
'It seems to me that the formulation presented by Stewart Smith LJ in the Court of Appeal may well serve as a useful description of what is intended, where he said ... :
"In my judgment there must be in force in the country in question a criminal law which makes the violent attacks by the persecutors punishable by sentences commensurate with the gravity of the crimes. The victims as a class must not be exempt from the protection of the law. There must be a reasonable willingness by the law enforcement agencies, that is to say the police and courts, to detect, prosecute and punish offenders."
And in relation to the matter of unwillingness, he pointed out that inefficiency and incompetence are not the same as unwillingness, that there may be various sound reasons why criminals may not be brought to justice, and that the corruption, sympathy or weakness of some individuals in the system of justice does not mean that the state is unwilling to afford protection. "It will require cogent evidence that the state which is able to afford protection is unwilling to do so, especially in the case of a democracy." The formulation does not claim to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but it seems to me to give helpful guidance.'