Appeal No. UKEAT/0504/10/RN
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
At the Tribunal
On 7 September 2011
Before
HIS
HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC
MS K BILGAN
MR P GAMMON MBE
MRS
B JONES APPELLANT
MRS
ANN CORBIN T/A BOO RESPONDENT
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
SUMMARY
PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE – Bias, misconduct and procedural irregularity
The Employment Judge did not consult
the members before refusing the Claimant’s application for an adjournment so
she could read and give instructions on the Respondent’s witness statements
produced on the day and in breach of the directions. There was evidence from
one member that such a decision had been pre‑determined. Magenta
applied. The Respondent was debarred. Remitted to fresh Employment Tribunal.
No order on the other grounds advanced albeit they had substance.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN
QC
1.
This case is about procedural fairness primarily; there are other
points, but we will focus on that. It is the Judgment of the court to which
all members appointed by statute for their diverse specialist experience have
contributed. We will refer to the parties as the Claimant and the Respondent.
Introduction
2.
It is an appeal by the Claimant in those proceedings against a Judgment
of an Employment Tribunal chaired by Employment Judge John Warren
sitting for one day at Reading, registered with Reasons on
21 January 2010. The Claimant was represented by her husband, who is
a practicing solicitor, and the Respondent appeared in person. The Employment
Tribunal upheld the Claimant’s claim of wrongful dismissal and ordered the
Respondent to pay £45, being a week’s pay. Her claim of unfair dismissal was
dismissed, and the Tribunal made no award under section 38 of the Employment Act 2002.
3.
The Claimant appealed against that decision. Procedural Judges
including myself have dealt with this matter by seeking the comments of the
Judge and the wing members on the contentions in the Notice of Appeal, and we
are grateful to them for their responses. The matter was set therefore for a full
hearing before us by order of Silber J, and issues were identified.
4.
This case can be dealt with very quickly because the procedural point is
at the heart of the appeal. Although four grounds of appeal are weighed by
Mr Jones, he accepts that if he succeeds on the first point, the only
conclusion would be for the Judgment to be set aside and for remission, and in
his contention remission should only be made to a different Tribunal. He
accepts that the finding in his wife’s favour on the wrongful dismissal point
would be set aside for any procedural irregularity, but that can be discussed
at a later stage.
The facts and the law
5.
The short facts relating to the major point in the appeal can be
summarised from the skeleton argument that Mr Jones has prepared. Case
management orders were made for the hearing of the case before the Employment
Tribunal, which the Respondent failed to comply with. She has also failed to
comply with procedural orders in this court, and is debarred from attending.
The Respondent produced witness statements from two witnesses and a bundle of
documents; these were provided on the day. The Claimant herself is Hungarian,
and English is not her first language.
6.
The legislation relevant in this case is section 104 of the Employment Rights Act,
which is the protection of persons who bring proceedings or allege an
infringement of a right. That was what the case was about.
7.
The requirement for a case management decision to be made by a Tribunal
of three when it is constituted at a full hearing is set out in Magenta Security Services v Wilkinson
UKEAT/0385/06.
Discussion
8.
Since we have decided to uphold ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal,
we can focus on the specific points made. At the start of the hearing
Mr Jones applied for an adjournment so that he could consider and take
instructions upon the witness statements. Employment Judge Warren
rejected the application without consulting the wing members; this is confirmed
by one of them. The failure to provide an opportunity to consider that
application with the members is a breach of Magenta, and we
consider Mr Jones is correct when he relies upon the passage of
Elias P (as he then was) in the following way:
“Accordingly, although a Chairman has very wide powers to make
case management decisions, where a full Tribunal has been convened (and that is
whether it is pre-hearing review or a full hearing) then the full Tribunal must
make the relevant decision in relation to any case management issues that
arise. The power conferred by rule 10, allowing a Chairman to make an order
‘at any time’ does not mean that the Chairman can, in the course of proceedings
where a full panel has been convened simply take decisions independently of the
lay members.”
9.
Interestingly, one of the wing members, Mrs Burns, said that in advance
of the hearing if there were to be an application for an adjournment, it would
be rejected. That is not supported by the Judge or the other member, who
cannot recall any such matter, but it does in our judgement indicate a pre‑determination
recalled by one of them to get on with the case at the expense of any
application that might be made. The failure to allow the adjournment was
therefore rejected by the Judge, relying on this account anyway, on a pre‑determination
not to allow any application made in advance of it being made.
Conclusion
10.
In our judgment, the decision itself is flawed, even if made with proper
consideration of all three members of the bench, because of the way in which
this matter erupted on the day, unfairly placing burdens upon the Claimant and
her representative. It should be appreciated that directions were given in
advance of the hearing for the presentation of witness statements, as is now
common. This failure to allow the adjournment or a proper opportunity to
Mr Jones to prepare to deal with the evidence was unfair. It follows that
the Judgment must be set aside.
11.
Since this is a simple one‑day case there is no utility in
referring it back to the same Employment Tribunal. It is unnecessary for us to
form a clear decision on grounds 2‑4, but we do say that the
Tribunal misunderstood the nature of the contention under section 104 and
misdirected itself, and with respect to it we agree with Mr Jones that
there are a number of other inaccuracies in the Judgment. So, applying the
principles in Sinclair Roche & Temperley v Heard [2004] IRLR 763, we do not consider it correct to send this matter back to the Tribunal as
then constituted. The matter will be dealt with more expeditiously if the case
is dealt with by a different constitution. The normal remedy for a failure to
provide a fair hearing is to set aside the whole of the decision, so logically
Mr Jones, consistently with his argument on fairness, accepts that all of
the order will go. So this decision will be set aside; it will be remitted to
a differently constituted Employment Tribunal for a fresh hearing of one day,
and the Tribunal’s directions for witness statements and documentation must be
complied with.