United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR A ELESINNLA (Of Counsel) Instructed by: Quantum Employment Law Consultants 45 Laleham Road London SE6 2HS


 


JUDGE PROPHET

1. This is a Preliminary Hearing of an appeal by Prince Godfrey Doku in respect of a decision by an Employment Tribunal sitting at London South under the chairmanship of Ms Wade. At a hearing on 6 August 2002 the Tribunal found unanimously that the Appellant was not unfairly dismissed nor had there been any unlawful deduction from his wages.
2. The Notice of Appeal is in respect only of the finding of there being no unfair dismissal. Mr Elesinnla of Counsel appears on behalf of the Appellant. The Tribunal following its hearing gave summary reasons for its decision. Those were sent to the parties on 16 September 2002. Mr Elesinnla has acknowledged that, as far as he is aware, those reasons were accompanied by the usual document from the Employment Tribunal which advises parties in some considerable detail how they may go about an appeal and what is required of them if an appeal is pursued to this Tribunal. In particular that document mentions the importance of time limits, and it is difficult therefore to accept that the Appellant was unaware of these.
3. Prince Godfrey first instructed Employment Law Consultants about the possibility of an appeal on 23 October 2002. The following day an application was made by them to the Employment Tribunal for Extended Reasons. That request was considered by the Employment Tribunal Chairman who refused the request as it was out of time. (See the Employment Tribunals (Consultation and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2001 Schedule 1, Rule 12(4)(c)(ii).)
4. Nevertheless, a Notice of Appeal was put to this Tribunal and that was lodged within the time limits in the rules. What Mr Elesinnla has asked us to do today by the application of Rule 39(2) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 is for us to deal with the appeal matters which he wishes to submit on the basis of the summary reasons only.
5. We therefore have to tackle the question, as a preliminary issue - 'Is it appropriate for us to proceed on the summary reasons?' To decide that we have to consider what is the thrust of Mr Elesinnla's submissions as to how the Employment Tribunal is alleged to have made errors of law. What he says is that the Employment Tribunal did not have proper regard to the contents of a report. We have seen some poor copies of that report which it is difficult if not impossible for us to interpret. However, more importantly Mr Elesinnla's submission goes much further, because he seeks to challenge the Tribunal's decision on the basis that they failed to apply all the three tests in the well-known case of Burchell [1980] ICR 303.
6. Although the summary reasons are more extensive than many summary reasons which we have seen, it is really quite impossible for us to deal with Mr Elessinla's wide ranging submissions in the absence of full reasons, and we are not able to do so. There has been a late application by him today to amend a Notice of Appeal for this Tribunal to order full reasons to be produced by the Employment Tribunal Chairman but we are not able to accept that. There is no compelling argument in this case that the interests of justice require such a late application to be granted. (see William Hill Organisation Ltd v Gavas [1990] IRLR 488 CA). Accordingly we have decided to dismiss this appeal.