United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Appellant in Person


 


JUDGE CLARK

1. This is an appeal by Miss Grant, the Applicant before an Employment Tribunal sitting at London (North) (Chairman: Mrs J R Hill) sitting on 4 and 5 January 2000, against that Employment Tribunals decision, promulgated with extended reasons on 9 February, dismissing her complaints of race and sex discrimination brought against her former employer, the Respondent Disability Law Service. A further claim of breach of contract was settled between the parties and as a result withdrawn by the Appellant.
2. The Appellant is black and of African – Caribbean racial origin. She was admitted as a solicitor in 1992. She worked as a Government Lawyer from May 1992 until June 1997. Between June 1997 and February 1999 she worked for the Independent Panel for Special Education Advice. On 1 February 1999 she joined the Respondent, a non-profit making organisation specialising in providing free legal advice to the disabled, their families and carers. She was summarily dismissed by the Respondent on 4 May 1999.
3. The Appellant's employment history is set out in some detail in the Employment Tribunal's reasons. It is perhaps sufficient for the purposes of this appeal to summarise the Employment Tribunal's main findings. They were satisfied, on evidence which they accepted, that during the employment the Appellant fell below the expected professional standards of a solicitor in that:

(1) she wrote an aggressive and confrontational letter to a solicitor in private practice, leading to a complaint by him which required an apology from the Respondent.

(2) She did not maintain her files properly

(3) She was a poor time-keeper, being persistently late for work with, as the Tribunal put it, no sign of remorse.

(4) She kept personal notes on her computer disk at work, including a running diary which contained her sexual fantasies.

4. Against that background the Employment Tribunal found not simply that the Appellant was dismissed for justifiable reasons, but more to the point, that an employee of a different race and/or sex would have been similarly treated. The complaints of race and sex discrimination were not made out.
5. In this appeal Mr Grant has essentially repeated many of the submissions which she made before the Employment Tribunal. She seeks to argue on appeal first, that the Tribunal did not apply the correct statutory test in considering, whether the Appellant was subjected to less favourable treatment than another employee would have been and that that less favourable treatment was on the grounds of her sex and/or race.
6. Secondly, she submits that the Tribunal ignored evidence that amongst the reasons for dismissal there may have been at least one discriminatory reason, in particular the finding in relation to the correspondence with a solicitor. She submits that it is plain that the judgment made by the Respondent thought that correspondence was based on a stereotypical view of the Appellant by reference to her race and sex. That is not how we read the Tribunals finding at paragraph 16(a) of their reasons. They accepted the Respondents case that the correspondence was in itself, aggressive and confrontational rather than that the Appellant herself was aggressive.
7. As to her first submission that the Tribunal failed to consider the correct statutory questions, again we cannot accept that submission. At paragraph 18 of their reasons the Tribunal find that her treatment as an employee would have been no different if she had been a man or of a different ethnic origin. It seems to us that they ask and answered the correct question.
8. The final question for us is whether it can be said that the decision is perverse in the legal sense. Miss Grant submits that the decision flies in the face of the evidence. Again we are unable to accept that submission. It seems to us that the Tribunal, on the facts as found were perfectly entitled to find first, that the Appellant was an unsatisfactory employee for the reasons given. Secondly, that any employee with that sort of record would have received the same treatment, that is dismissal. In these circumstances we find ourselves unable to discern any arguable point of law in this appeal. Accordingly it must be dismissed.