United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	No Appearance or Representation By or on Behalf of The Appellants


 


JUDGE CLARK

1. This is an appeal by Mr John Stokoe, the Appellant before the Newcastle Upon Tyne Employment Tribunal, against that Employment Tribunal's decision, promulgated with extended reasons on 30 November 1999, that he was not dismissed by the Respondent Social Club so as to found his complaint of unfair dismissal.
2. The Appellant was employed as steward of the club commencing on 21 February 1995. His wife was employed as "wife to assist".
3. The Appellant had sought to improve his Terms & Conditions of employment. No resolution had been reached. On 9 May 1999 he was on duty in the club bar. That evening a former committee man, Michael Stead, when given his pint of beer, commented to the Appellant "what the fucking hell is this…no wonder you are going to get the fucking sack from the committee."
4. A little later the Appellant said to the Club Treasurer; "George, this is the last straw I can't take any more of the innuendoes and hassle." Mr Young replied "OK John" and the Appellant said "George I am going to leave the club now." He did so and never worked at the club again; presenting his Origination Application to the Employment Tribunal on 4 June 1999.
5. It was argued on behalf of the Appellant before the Employment Tribunal that Mr Young's failure to rectify what had been said by Mr Stead amounted to a fundamental breach of the implied term of mutual Trust and Confidence entitling the Appellant to treat himself as constructively dismissed. The Employment Tribunal disagreed. They held that there was no conduct on the part of the Club's ruling body, its committee or any member of that committee, which justified the Appellant in quitting the employment. The claim failed.
6. Against that decision Mr Stokoe appealed by a notice dated 10 December 1999, signed on his behalf by his representative, Northern Employment Law Consultants. The grounds of appeal signed by Mr Tom Newton of that organisation read as follows:

"Whereas the Employment Tribunal found the Appellant had not been dismissed, it erred in law in that it failed to:

(a) record the key findings of fact in relation to the circumstances alleged by the Appellant to amount to a dismissal;

(b) to consider the contention the Appellant that the circumstances described by him and witnesses for the Respondent could have amounted to an express dismissal."

7. This case was listed for preliminary hearing today. There was no attendance at 10.30am, and the case was put back. During the course of the morning a letter was faxed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal by Mr Newton in which he said:

"please note that I am no longer instructed by the Appellant in this case. I am afraid that I do not know whether the Appellant intends to appear in person although I can inform that he has not advised me that he intends to do so."

8. Mr Newton's address and telephone number appears on all the documentation. Accordingly it is not possible for this Employment Tribunal to contact the Appellant himself. It is not clear from Mr Newton's letter when he was dis-instructed by the Appellant. This is the first notification of that fact. It seems to us that it is incumbent on the Appellant in these circumstances to at the very least make some contact with the Employment Appeal Tribunal. He has failed to do so; in these circumstances we have considered the case on the papers.
9. We return to the grounds of appeal. It seems to us that the Employment Tribunal has made all necessary findings of fact. Based on those findings of fact they were in our view perfectly entitled to conclude that no fundamental breach of any term of the contract of employment was made out. There is nothing in the Employment Tribunal's findings which could give rise to the argument that the Appellant was actually dismissed under section 95(1)(a), of Employment Rights Act 1996, as opposed to being constructively dismissed under section 95(1)(c).
10. In these circumstances we have concluded that this appeal raises no arguable point or points of law to go forward to a full appeal hearing.
11. Accordingly the appeal must be dismissed at this stage.