United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Ms G J Young (In person)


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK:

1. The Appellant Ms Young, commenced these proceedings by originating application presented to the Reading Employment Tribunal on the 19 January 1999. She complained of unfair dismissal, sex discrimination, breach of contract, exercise of statutory rights and written statement of employment particulars against the respondent Timbnet Ltd and Mr Sumner, the Company's Purchasing Director, she having been employed by the company as a shipping clerk/typist from 19 October 1998 until the 11 January 1999, a period of 12 weeks.
2. Her employment was then terminated, she tells us, with one week's pay in lieu of notice. Her letter of appointment dated 15 October 1998 set out certain of her terms and conditions of employment but not all those required by section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, as the Respondent conceded in evidence before an Employment Tribunal sitting on the 29 March 1999 to hear this case. For example, the letter of appointment makes no reference to the arrangements for sick pay, or for notice of termination by either party or for any grievance procedure or disciplinary procedure in force. No further statement of particulars of employment was given to the Appellant during her employment. Section 1 of the Act provides that such a statement be provided within 2 months of the employee commencing employment.
3. By a decision with extended reasons promulgated on the 7 April 1999 the Tribunal dismissed all her complaints save for that her complaint of "ordinary unfair dismissal", that is as opposed to dismissal for an inadmissible reason, was stayed pending the outcome of the Seymour-Smith litigation, and as to her claim for written particulars the Tribunal held that her complaint was well founded but that because her employment had terminated they made no other determination in that respect. The first point taken by the appellant in this appeal is that she was entitled to a determination by the Employment Tribunal as to what particulars ought to have been included in the statement complying with Section 1. The fact that her employment had terminated she submits is no reason for the Tribunal to fail to go on and make that determination.
4. We think that that point is arguable as a matter of law. Indeed looking at Section 11 (4) of the Act, the limitation provisions, it is there specifically envisaged that a section 11 reference be made within three months of the termination of employment. On this point we shall allow the matter to proceed to a full appeal hearing.
5. Ms Young has taken other points. First she submits that there was perjury by certain of the witnesses called on behalf of the respondent before the Employment Tribunal. We have endeavoured to explain to her the limits of our jurisdiction. We can interfere only where an error of law is made out. It is not our function to decide questions of fact. Accordingly that ground of appeal will not proceed.
6. Ms Young faintly raised a complaint of bias against the Tribunal, the particular grounds for that allegation were first that the walls in the ladies lavatories at the Reading Employment Tribunal are painted pink and that is demoralising for an applicant who is claiming sex discrimination. Further she told us that she felt demoralised by loud comments made by the respondent's team in the waiting room, which is from my knowledge separated by a thin partition from the Applicants' room at the Reading Tribunal. These grounds do not impress us as founding any arguable case on bias.
7. The other points are these; that she should have been permitted to complete the probationary period of 6 months mentioned in her appointment letter. It seems to us that there was no fixed term contract for 6 months employment. This question depends upon what was the proper notice entitlement under the contract and that goes back to the first point which we have allowed to proceed. She also complains that the respondent did not give her the type of work which she was employed to do. Again we think that that matter will go if anything to the Ordinary Unfair Dismissal claim which has been stayed. In these circumstances, save for the first point which we have identified, we have reached the conclusion that this appeal raises no further arguable points of law and therefore the remaining grounds are dismissed.
8. For the purpose of the full appeal hearing we shall list the case for 1½ hours, category C. There will be an exchange of skeleton arguments between the parties not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full appeal hearing. Copies of those skeleton arguments to be lodged at the same time with this Tribunal. There is no requirement for Chairman's notes of evidence.