At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR L D COWAN
MRS T A MARSLAND
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT |
JUDGE CLARK: Miss Alexander was employed by the Respondent Trust from 4 January 1989 as a Grade G Community Nursing Sister. She was dismissed on the grounds of misconduct on 5 July 1995. Thereafter she presented a complaint of unfair dismissal/victimisation to the Industrial Tribunal on 15 September 1995. That complaint was heard by an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North) on 17 and 19 November 1996. It was dismissed by a reserved decision with extended reasons dated 5 December 1996. Against that decision the Appellant now appeals.
The background to the dismissal so the Tribunal found was as follows. On 3 October 1994 the Respondent received a complaint from the daughter of an elderly patient who had died concerning the care which he had received from, among others, the Appellant, prior to his death. Following that complaint a meeting took place on 31 October between the Appellant and her Line Manager, Ms Healey, during which Ms Healey expressed concern about the standard of the Appellant's record keeping. It was agreed that the Appellant would review and update clear plans for approximately ten patients on the personal care scheme by 25 November 1994. On that date there was a further meeting between the Appellant and Ms Healey but it did not appear that the Appellant had performed any work on the care plan. She was then on sick leave from 13 December 1994 until 3 January 1995.
On 23 January a second complaint was received concerning the failure to give an insulin injection to a patient. That complaint was discussed, again between the Appellant and Ms Healey, on 27 January 1995. On that occasion Ms Healey told the Appellant that she should attend a meeting on 1 February to discuss the matter and advised her to be represented. She told the Appellant that she was invoking the disciplinary procedure. On 30 January the Appellant went sick and never returned to work. Shortly before that date the Appellant had invoked the grievance procedure but that was not pursued pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings.
On 1 February a disciplinary hearing was held which the Appellant failed to attend. On 17 March she was asked to attend a disciplinary meeting on 24 March; she refused to attend because of illness. On 24 March she was asked to attend a disciplinary meeting on 30 March. She failed to attend that meeting and was told that an investigation was to take place in her absence. On 14 June she was told of a further disciplinary hearing to be held on 22 June. It was postponed at the Appellant's representative's request.
Finally, on 6 July a disciplinary hearing took place and the Appellant's representative attended but the Appellant herself did not attend on the grounds of illness. The hearing nevertheless went ahead and the Appellant was dismissed for reasons set out, numbering seven in all, in a letter of dismissal.
An appeal was lodged and an appeal hearing was arranged for 3 November; the Appellant having attended on that occasion. The appeal was finally due to take place on 1 December. The Appellant did not attend that hearing. The appeal was dismissed and finally a further appeal was heard on 3 May 1996 and the original decision to dismiss was again upheld.
The Industrial Tribunal concluded that the Respondent honestly believed, on reasonable grounds following a full investigation, that the Appellant was guilty of the misconduct set out in the dismissal letter. A fair disciplinary procedure had been conducted at all stages. Dismissal fell within the range of reasonable responses open to the Respondent employer, bearing in mind the position of responsibility held by the Appellant in dealing with vulnerable patients. It was fair.
A Notice of Appeal was lodged against the Tribunal's decision with this Tribunal on 8 January 1997 (or shortly thereafter). The grounds which appear to have been drafted by a representative, Mr Z Jeho, are as follows:
"1 The Tribunal erred in law in that it accepted and decided upon uncorroborated evidences, documentary statements which were not evidence contrary to the rules of evidence.
2 The applicant was denied her legal rights protected by the laws of evidence to have the allegation tested in the hearing by the way of cross examination. As a result she was denied a fair hearing.
3 The importance of exhibits was not used to corroborate allegations of incompetence.
4 The tribunal acted unfairly in relying on uncorroborated evidence and allegations to found in favour of the trust and that the trust behave in the same manner to find Ms Alexander guilty and the reason for their dismissing of her.
5 The tribunal failed to give due consideration to the applicant evidence although it was corroborated."
This is a Preliminary hearing held to determine whether or not the appeal raises any arguable point or points of law which ought to go forward to a full appeal hearing.
This morning, without explanation, the Appellant does not appear and is not represented. In these circumstances and particularly in view of the history demonstrated by the Industrial Tribunal's reasons, we think it right to proceed on the basis of the papers.
Having considered the grounds of appeal which we have set out in extenso, and the approach of the Industrial Tribunal based on its findings of fact, we can discern no possible arguable point of law in this case and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.