United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR DAVID BEAN QC (Appearing under the Employment Appeal Advice Scheme)


 


MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal against a decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North) on 7th March 1997. The essence of that decision was that the appellant had not been unfairly dismissed but that she had been fairly dismissed by reason of redundancy.

The original Notice of Appeal set out a number of matters. When the members of this tribunal first read them and discussed them, they were matters which struck us as being entirely factual matters giving rise to no point of law. However, this morning, Mr Bean QC has represented the appellant and immediately sought to make submissions on the basis of an amended Notice of Appeal. It is in three paragraphs. The first two are inter-related and proceed on the basis that in law there was no redundancy or anything capable of being found to be a redundancy. The third paragraph asserts that the tribunal ought to have held the dismissal to be unfair in any event, because of a failure to consult, to offer full-time employment, or to make any attempt to find alternative part-time employment.

We are most grateful to Mr Bean for his assistance. He has persuaded us that the point of law raised by paragraphs 1 and 2 in his amended Notice are arguable and ought to go to a final hearing. So far as paragraph 3 is concerned, we take a different view. It does seem to us that the decision of the tribunal did address the matters there referred to, and came to a permissible conclusion that by reason of the size of the respondents' organisation, and the administrative resources available to it, the tribunal would not expect too much of it in relation to the matters raised by paragraph 3. In addition, there is a finding and we find it impossible to accept that it was figment of the tribunal's imagination, that at least at some stage the appellant refused to consider a offer of work as a part-time secretary for others in the firm.

In all those circumstances therefore, our decision is that the appellant may have leave to lodge an amended Notice of Appeal within 14 days, containing paragraphs 1 and 2 of Mr Bean's amendment, and that she be permitted to take her appeal under those two paragraphs to a final hearing. We do not permit an amendment to embrace paragraph 3.