At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE P CLARK
MR K M HACK JP
MR N D WILLIS
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MISS S ELLIS
(of Counsel)
Messrs Cotman & Jameson
Solicitors
69 Friarsgate
Preston
PR1 2LD
JUDGE CLARK: This appeal is brought by the employee, Mr Mahmood, against the unanimous decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Leeds on 3rd July 1995, dismissing his complaint of unfair dismissal.
The brief facts are that Mr Mahmood was employed by the respondent as a bus driver. After 14 years service he was dismissed for gross misconduct, namely dishonesty on 16th August 1994.
A customer, Mr Howard had reported to the company that on 10th August 1994 he had boarded the appellant's bus, tendered 25p for his fare and been issued with a 10p ticket.
The company investigated this report. They made a comparison of the ticket sales made by the appellant and sales made by other drivers. This comparison revealed that statistically Mr Mahmood had issued 11.8% of his total tickets sold at the Old Age Pension rate of 10p. The corresponding figure for other drivers was 2.26%.
A disciplinary hearing was held before Mr Kay, the operations manager on 15th August 1994, when the appellant was represented by two union officials. Mr Kay concluded that the appellant was guilty of gross misconduct and summarily dismissed him.
The appellant then invoked the appeal procedure. He appealed first to Mr Graham, the general manager and then to Mr Buchan, who subsequently became Managing Director of the company. Both appeals failed.
In their extended reasons dated 11th September 1995 the tribunal expressed the view that the employers passed the threefold Burchell test; that they had followed a proper procedure and that the penalty of dismissal fell within the range of reasonable responses open to a reasonable employer.
In support of this appeal Miss Ellis wishes to argue the ground of perversity. She submits that a combination of a report by Mr Howard that that he had been issued with the wrong ticket, given that in his second statement he proffered the opinion that it had been a mistake, and statistics which were plainly unreliable, could not amount to reasonable grounds for the employers belief in misconduct, nor could it be said to amount to reasonable investigation.
In our judgment these were matters considered by the Industrial Tribunal in reaching their overall conclusion. This was classically an Industrial Jury case. We can see no grounds for interfering with their decision. Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed.