United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1995] UKEAT 682_95_1411

Appeal No. EAT/682/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 14th November 1995

HIS HONOUR JUDGE P CLARK

MRS T MARSLAND

MR J A SCOULLER

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MR P D YATES          APPELLANT

UEC INDUSTRIES LTD          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


JUDGE CLARK: The appellant Mr Peter Yates commenced employment with the respondent employer on 19th July 1993. He gave notice of termination of that employment on about 27th June 1994 and left on 12th August 1994.

By an origination application dated 19th September 1994 he made a complaint under Section 11 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 as to a statement of terms and conditions of employment, and under Section 131 brought a claim for damages for breach of contract.

The matter came before a Chairman sitting alone at the Liverpool Industrial Tribunal on 5th April 1995. The Chairman heard evidence from the appellant and from Mr Wilson, the managing director of the respondent, and considered documentary evidence put before him. Based on that evidence and findings of fact made on the evidence, he concluded that no breach of contract was made out. In particular he considered three heads of claim; the first related to the employers profit sharing scheme. The Chairman concluded that even if the scheme was obligatory under the contract, and not discretionary as the employers had claimed, he was satisfied that the appellant had received his full entitlement under the scheme. Secondly, in relation to the fact that the appellant was not provided with a company car, the Chairman concluded that there was no contractual obligation on the employer to provide a car, or payment in lieu of its value to the appellant. Thirdly, he found that there was no contractual obligation on the employer to carry out a salary review in July 1994, as the appellant had contended.

Against that decision the appellant now appeals. We have considered the grounds of appeal set forth in his Notice of Appeal, and his skeleton argument.

Although the appellant indicated that he wished to attend this preliminary hearing, held to decide whether there is an arguable point of law to go to a full hearing before this Tribunal, he has failed to attend today, without explanation. We have granted him one hour beyond the listed time 2 p.m. for this case, but in his continued absence have decided that we shall deal with the matter on the papers.

The Notice of Appeal raises two broad complaints. The first is that he did not receive proper notice of the Industrial Tribunal hearing; however, he attended that hearing and took part in the proceedings. We do not think that any point of law is raised in this ground of appeal, and that is borne out by the appellant's skeleton argument, which does not mention the point.

Secondly, it is said that new evidence has become available since the Industrial Tribunal hearing which requires a review. As to that, if it is a review which the appellant seeks the proper application to be made is to the Industrial Tribunal, and not this Appeal Tribunal. Further, and on the substance of the point, we have considered de bene esse the further material consisting of a letter to the appellant from the Inland Revenue dated 20th June 1995 about profit share schemes, and whether such a scheme has been approved in this employer's case. We cannot see what this has to do with the question of whether or not the employer was in breach of such a scheme under any agreement with the employee.

In conclusion, we are satisfied that this appeal has no arguable prospect of success. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.