United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1994] UKEAT 974_93_1011

Appeal No. EAT/974/93

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 10 November 1994

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PILL

MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP

MR G H WRIGHT MBE

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MRS D SINGH          APPELLANT

BARCLAYS BANK PLC          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MR G SYRIL

(Of Counsel)

Messrs G H Gelberg & Co

188 Upper Street

London

N1 1RQ


 


MR JUSTICE PILL: This is an Appeal against the Decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at Bedford on three days in September 1993. The Tribunal decided unanimously that the Applicant, Mrs Dhanraji Singh, had not been discriminated against on the grounds of race.

The Respondents to the Application were her employers, Barclays Bank plc. We should first say that there has been an application this morning to adjourn the case. The reason given, by Mr Syril of Counsel, was that Mrs Singh unfortunately is unwell and unable to give instructions. We refused the application.

The case has been listed on two previous occasions and adjourned at the request of Mrs Singh's Solicitors who had instructed Mr Syril. On the second of those occasions, one of the reasons given was her ill health. This is now a stale case and the Solicitors have had opportunity during the long period since the Appeal was initiated to take instructions from their client. Furthermore, the Appeal to this Tribunal is upon points of law only and there could be no question of Mrs Singh giving any evidence to the Tribunal, a possibility which Mr Syril raised with us. The only Appeal is upon points of law and we had no hesitation in refusing the application to adjourn. Mr Syril did have the opportunity, because the case was put back, to prepare himself. He appeared before the Industrial Tribunal on Mrs Singh's behalf, and we have heard submissions from him.

Mrs Singh had been employed by Barclays Bank since 1985, first on temporary basis and then on a full-time appointment. The dismissal occurred in July 1988. The Tribunal set out at some length the evidence which they heard and set out in detail the complaints which Mrs Singh made under the Race Relations Act. Their conclusions are stated in a single paragraph. They first reminded themselves of the burden of proof and the guidelines in the case of King v The Great Britain-China Centre [1991] IRLR 513, and stated that:

"We have therefore been prepared to draw such inferences as are proper from our findings of primary fact. Once the applicant had raised her allegations we looked to the employers for an explanation. We are entirely satisfied with the explanation given by the employers. Indeed, the facts do not disclose to us that the applicant was treated any differently from other employees in the respondents' employ. It is clear that when the applicant raised her complaints those complaints were taken seriously by the respondents who sought to redress the grievance which she felt. When the applicant complained that she had received inadequate training she was given a retraining programme, coupled with monthly reviews and counselling. Her perceptions of the actions of her colleagues and those of her superiors are the perceptions of someone who finds it difficult to accept criticism, even when that criticism is constructive, as the criticism in this case clearly was. We have to say that we can find no evidence of a disparity of treatment of the applicant on the grounds of her race and in those circumstances it follows that her claim must fail".

The Industrial Tribunal are of course the tribunal of fact. They heard evidence and submissions over a three-day period and no complaint is made about the way in which they have set out the evidence.

We have to say that, in essence Mr Syril's complaint is that his client has, as he puts it, a bone of contention with the Industrial Tribunal. Clearly, she does not find the findings of fact or the conclusion of the Tribunal acceptable. There can be an Appeal to this Tribunal, however, as we have already noted, only on a point of law.

In his Notice of Appeal Mr Syril has raised three points. The first is in relation to the suspension from work on 20 July 1988, an episode dealt with by the Tribunal at paragraph (xxii) of their decision. He particularly complains that the suspension was described to her as "not being a disciplinary sanction" whereas Mr Syril submits any reasonable employee would inevitably regard a suspension as a disciplinary sanction.

The Tribunal conclude the paragraph by accepting that in the light of the events which preceded the suspension, the employers could not "risk the total disruption of the entire section". Whatever the merits of the particular wording adopted by the Tribunal, it is clear from that paragraph and from their general conclusion, that they could find no racial element in the action of the employers in suspending or in calling what Mrs Singh says she regarded as a disciplinary matter, a non-disciplinary sanction.

Mr Syril's second point is in relation to the so-called paint incident which had occurred two days before the suspension. That is dealt with at paragraph (xxi) and (xxii) of the Decision. The Tribunal concluded by stating:

"....this was not a case of the applicant being treated differently from Mrs Gooch".

The allegation had been that Mrs Gooch was given more favourable treatment in relation to the smell of paint at the premises than was Mrs Singh. Again, the Tribunal found no racial criterion in operation in relation to the paint incident and that is clear from their findings in that paragraph and in their general conclusion.

Mr Syril has also referred to what might be called "the clock incident" with which the Tribunal deal at paragraph (viii) and in relation to that the Tribunal did conclude that the action of a fellow employee may have been somewhat insensitive. The Tribunal nevertheless conclude in terms that the action taken by placing the clock on Mrs Singh's desk "was not connected with the applicant's race".

Mr Syril's third submission is that the conclusion of the Tribunal is perverse upon the evidence. We reject that submission. The conclusion of the Tribunal was one which they were entitled to reach upon the material before them and upon the findings which they make

in the narrative description. There is no merit in these grounds of Appeal and the Appeal must be dismissed.