I N T E R N A L
At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON
MR A C BLYGHTON
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP
(2) MR D A BOWEN (3) MRS J A BOWEN (4) MRS S J BOWEN
(2) DOVEY YACHT SERVICES LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellants NO APPEARANCE BY OR
REPRESENTATION ON
BEHALF OF THE
APPELLANTS
MR JUSTICE MORISON: This is a Preliminary Hearing in relation to a prospective appeal being brought by Mr A E Bowen, Mr D A Bowen, Mrs J A Bowen and Mrs S J Bowen, all of whom made a complaint to an Industrial Tribunal against the Secretary of State for Employment and their Company of which they had been directors called Dovey Yacht Services Ltd which is now in liquidation and has been since it ceased trading on 12 February 1992.
The application was for arrears of pay and redundancy payments which in effect they were saying the Secretary of State was liable under the various statutory provisions which we do not need to refer to. The Tribunal had to consider their complaint and in their Decision, which was entered in the register on 13 April 1993, they unanimously decided that all four applications should be dismissed. In the course of their decision they made findings of fact that the Respondent Company was in liquidation; that each of the four Applicants being father and son and their respective spouses, were directors and equal shareholders in the Company; that no Applicant had a written contract of employment, nor were there any Minutes of meetings authorising the payment of salaries and confirming holiday entitlement and that these alleged salaries were never paid in full but only such part as the Company could afford at any one time and importantly no PAYE or National Insurance Contributions were deducted when any payment was made.
In those circumstances they had to ask themselves whether on the material before them they were satisfied on a balance of probabilities, that the prospective Appellants were employees of the Company. They unanimously concluded that they were not employees having themselves heard the evidence and read the documents. This Employment Appeal Tribunal can only hear appeals from decisions of Industrial Tribunals on points of law. We have looked at the papers in this case and read with care the submissions made as to why it is said that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal was wrong.
Having read those papers and those submissions we are satisfied that there is no point of law demonstrated by the prospective Appellants in this case. They simply wish to re-argue the case on the facts. That is not the function of this Employment Appeal Tribunal. There is no point of law in this case. There are no grounds for believing that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in law and therefore there are no grounds for challenging in this Employment Appeal Tribunal their decision.
Accordingly we rule that there is no point of law demonstrated by the Appellants in this case and that their appeal must be dismissed.