United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1994] UKEAT 203_94_2707

Appeal No. EAT/203/94

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 27 July 1994

HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HULL QC

MR J H GALBRAITH CB

MR P M SMITH

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MISS V SNAITH          APPELLANT

MELVYN D CODD & IAN W ROBERTSON T/A APEX INSURANCE          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON

BEHALF OF APPELLANT


 


JUDGE HULL QC: This case is in our list under our practice direction for a preliminary hearing to see whether we can discover any point of law in the appeal. Very shortly, Miss Snaith was employed by the respondent employers, an insurance broker, and she was first employed in August 1990 according to her, although the employers said that it was 1 April 1991 when she ceased to be under youth training and became an employee properly so called. Her employment ended on 29 April 1993.

I will not go into the circumstances at all but, having consulted Mr Dawson, who describes himself as leading in advice, support and representation and undertakes cases, among other things, for people who wish to make complaints to the Industrial Tribunal, Miss Snaith wanted to complain of unfair dismissal and she said, apparently, with Mr Dawson's assistance, that she had been constructively dismissed.

Her employment had ended on 29 April 1993 but the application to the Tribunal, instead of being presented within the three months which section 67 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 required, was not in fact presented (with Mr Dawson's assistance) until 24 September 1993. So it was late and the Industrial Tribunal, under the chairmanship of Mr Wolstenholme with his two industrial Members, sat at Hull to consider that as a preliminary matter on 21 December 1993 and the decision of Mr Wolstenholme and his colleagues is with our papers.

They had to consider under section 67 of the Act whether, in fact, they were satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of the period of three months. It appeared to the Tribunal that Mr Dawson, who gave evidence, was in negotiation with the respondents' solicitors, not very satisfactory negotiations, and he said he had also been told by, apparently, an official, that he need not present it for another month because the complainant had not got through the money which was apparently given to her at the end of her employment.

That was quite wrong. The Industrial Tribunal found that there was nothing in it. They said that there was fault here. It was the fault, they thought, of Mr Dawson, as the representative. He was responsible for knowing the law. They were quite clear that there was nothing whatever to prevent the complaint being presented in time. Negotiations made no difference and, of course, if Mr Dawson did not know the law he should have found out what the law was on the subject, so they took a very short line with it.

These are, of course, entirely matters for them but so far as we can see from the decision of the Tribunal there was nothing which was conceivably laid before them which could have led to any other conclusion. Unless they can conclude that it was not reasonably practicable to present the complaint in time, then they are simply without jurisdiction and are obliged to dismiss the application and that is exactly what they did. They heard Mr Dawson. They heard the applicant. It is suggested that they should have heard the applicant's mother, who conducted a telephone call at some stage or other. They did not do that. Mr Dawson says that it was very irregular that they should have heard any evidence at all. That appears to us to show the most extraordinary attitude. Of course, the Industrial Tribunal carrying out a preliminary hearing like this was under a duty to make proper enquiries, which included hearing evidence in the matter.

Mr Dawson has appealed. We can only say - he not appearing today to support the appeal - that nothing is said by him in the documents which he sent to us which can possibly support the appeal as a matter of law. We can only entertain appeals on points of law and the point of it being in our list is to see whether we can discern any point of law, any point on which the appeal could succeed. We, doing our best, cannot find any point here on which this appeal could succeed and, in those circumstances, I do not propose to go through all that is said by Mr Dawson. Whatever one can say about it one cannot say that it discloses a point of law on which we could, in due course, act in allowing an appeal.

Therefore, the appeal must now be dismissed and we so order.