Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons

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Cite as: [1998] ScotHC 10

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THOMAS COOPER CRAWFORD v. PROCURATOR FISCAL, AYR [1998] ScotHC 10 (12th November, 1998)

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD MARNOCH

in

STATED CASE

in causa

THOMAS COOPER CRAWFORD

Appellant;

against

J.T. O'DONNELL, Procurator Fiscal, Ayr

Respondent:

_______

12 November 1998

In this stated case the appellant was charged with careless driving of a bus, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988 section 3, as amended. The findings-in-fact are sparse and are to the effect, no more and no less, that the bus skidded on a wet road surface after a vehicle travelling in front of it had for some reason or another applied its brakes.

The sheriff convicted the appellant and the questions for the Opinion of this Court are:

"1. Did I err in repelling the Appellant's submission of no case to answer?

2. Did I err in holding that the Crown evidence, taken at its highest, disclosed a prima facie case of careless driving which in the absence of evidence from the Appellant to the contrary entitled me to convict the Appellant?".

Since no evidence was led from or for the appellant the findings to which I have referred are findings made solely on evidence led by the Crown and, having regard to the particular phraseology of the questions asked, it seems to us that in practical terms they raise precisely the same issue.

In his Note the sheriff expresses the view - which presumably formed the basis of the conviction - that "judging the driving of the Appellant objectively, the unchallenged evidence that the bus skidded, unless otherwise explained, is prima facie evidence of careless driving".

This reasoning was attacked as unsound by counsel for the appellant and in the event the advocate depute was constrained to concede that the sheriff's own reasoning could not be supported and that a skid, of itself, is simply a "neutral" circumstance.

However, the advocate depute sought to uphold the conviction on the somewhat different ground that on the sheriff's findings this was not simply a case of a vehicle skidding but of a skid having occurred after the motor vehicle travelling in front of the bus had itself braked and, moreover, with the result that the back end of the bus had slewed round and struck a pedestrian. In our opinion, however, the latter circumstance is also entirely neutral and, for the rest, the fact that the vehicle travelling in front of the bus had braked, far from making out the case for the Crown, if anything provides, or is capable of providing, an innocent explanation for the skid. As we have pointed out, the Stated Case contains nothing about the distance between the vehicles or about the speed at which the appellant was driving.

In the result we shall allow the appeal and answer the two questions in the case in the affirmative.