No 144.

farther insisted; so that, not having prevailed, he can never farther be heard in this action, to propone a defence to take away the debt.—It was duplied, That, albeit in our law, as to all titles and executions, produced for instructing a process, exceptio falsi est omnium ultima, and the defender cannot recur to any new defence, yet where the improbation was intented via actionis, it did not hinder the debtor, when he is pursued for payment, to propone all other defences, to take away that bond, and debt therein contained.—The Lords did consider this as a general case, and sustained the defence of compensation founded upon, notwithstanding of the action of improbation, upon these reasons, that exceptio falsi est omnium ultima, and did exclude all other defences, but that was not to be extended to a prior action of improbation; 2do, That in that prior action, there was no decreet, condemnator nor absolvitor, but the action passed from; yet, if there had been a decreet, the case had been a little harder.

Gosford, MS. No 978. p. 658.

**** Dirleton also reports this case:

THE LORDS found, That a party, being pursued as representing his predecessor, for payment of the sum due by a bond, might propone a defence of payment, notwithstanding that he had, before, pursued an improbation of the said bond; in respect the bond being ancient, and not granted by himself, he was in bona fide to pursue improbation of the same; and thereafter it appearing to be a true bond, he may also allege payment; giving his oath of calumny upon the defence.

Dirleton, No 456. p. 221.

No 145.

1681. June. George Wilson against Mr Alexander Hay.

ONE being pursued before an inferior court for a debt he had before suspended, and having proponed defences, upon which litiscontestation was made, and thereafter raised advocation upon incompetency and iniquity, in so far as the defence of *lis pendens* before the Lords was unjustly repelled;

THE LORDS found, that such a defence might be repelled, not being proponed before litiscontestation, seeing primus actus judicii est judicis approbatorius.

Fol. Dic. v. 2. p. 186. Harcarse, (Advocations, &c.) No 12. p. 4.

1688. July 13. Burnside against Crawfurd.

No 146.

In a reduction and improbation at the instance of a posterior against a prior appriser;