THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
CASE REF: 5749/18IT	

CLAIMANT:			Danny Loughran

RESPONDENT:		Concentrix CVG Intelligent Contact Limited

DECISION ON REVIEW

The decision of the tribunal is that:-

The tribunal in the interests of justice sets aside its order of 19 December 2018, dismissing the claimant’s claim of disability discrimination, which was issued to the parties and recorded in the register on 28 December 2018.

CONSTITUTION OF TRIBUNAL

Employment Judge (sitting alone):	Employment Judge Gamble

APPEARANCES:

The claimant represented himself.

The respondent was represented by Mr C Hamill, Barrister-at-Law, instructed by Carson McDowell LLP Solicitors.

BACKGROUND

1.	The claimant presented a claim to the industrial tribunal, claiming unfair dismissal and disability discrimination, which was received on 29 April 2018.  His claim form did not name a representative, but he gave evidence that his then representative, Mr Aidan Hanna, assisted him with the completion of the claim form.  The respondent presented its response on 22 June 2018 refuting all of the claimant’s claims.

2.	On 29 June 2018 Mr Hanna came on record as the representative for the claimant in this case. 

3.	The matter was subject to Case Management on 13 September 2018.  The claimant’s interests were represented by Mr Hanna at this hearing.  An agreed statement of legal and factual issues relating to the claims of disability discrimination and unfair dismissal was attached to the record of proceedings. 

4.	At that case management discussion the parties were ordered to serve any Notices for Discovery and/or Additional Information by 27 September 2018 and to serve replies to any such Notices received by 15 October 2018.  The claimant’s witness statements were to be served by 12 November 2018. The respondent’s witness statements were to be served by 17 December 2018.  The case was originally listed for hearing on 28-31 January 2019.

5.	On 19 November 2018 the respondent’s representative wrote to the Industrial Tribunal, copied to Mr Hanna, advising of the claimant’s failure to comply with the Orders of the tribunal.  On 21 November 2018 the tribunal was copied into an email from Mr Hanna to the respondent’s representative, confirming that the claimant was waiting on his GP notes and records which were to be collected that day.  He further advised that this would complete his outstanding notices, and that he expected to have them that evening and would scan and email them to the respondent’s representative upon receipt.

6.	A further case management discussion was convened on 29 November 2018 to deal with the outstanding issues.  Mr Hanna and the respondent’s representative were notified of the Case Management Discussion by email on the morning of 27 November 2018.  On 29 November 2018 at 08:31 Mr Hanna emailed the tribunal to advise that he was unable to get time off work to attend the Case Management Discussion. The email further advised that the claimant had not provided all the documents and additional information requested by the respondent.  Further, the email advised that the GP records had only arrived the previous day. Mr Hanna indicated that he would scan all the documents and email them to the respondent by 3 pm on Monday, 3 December 2018. Mr Hanna was advised that the Case Management Discussion would proceed in any event.

7.	At the case management discussion on 29 November 2018 an Unless Order issued to the claimant requiring him to provide:

a.	full and complete Replies to the respondent’s notice for additional information;

b.	full and complete discovery of documents as requested by the respondent; and

c.	his witness statement and the witness statement of any witnesses who will attend in support of his case

to the respondent’s representative by 10 December 2018, with a warning regarding the claim being struck out without further notice in the event of non-compliance.

8.	On 10 December 2018 at 13:22 Mr Hanna emailed the tribunal (copied to the respondent) as follows:

“Dear Secretary, the claimant has instructed me to withdraw the disability discrimination part of his claim.  The claimant does not feel he has a reasonable prospect of success with this part of his claim.

The claimant will today be sending the respondent the outstanding notices and a copy of his witness statement.”

9.	On 10 December 2018 at 15:23 Mr Hanna emailed the tribunal as follows:

“Dear Secretary, the claimant in this case has been unable to complete the notices and requests within the timetable set by the tribunal.

The claimant has not been returning my calls and contacts.

I am attempting to complete the Unless Order issued by the tribunal by the end of today.

All discovery has been sent to the respondent today including all medical records. I am waiting for a copy of the claimant’s witness statement which I hope to have sight of by 5 pm.”

The email further referenced serious health difficulties which the claimant had been experiencing in the previous two months and an extract from the GP notes and records vouching this was attached.  The email further advised that the claimant was to attend his GP the following week to determine his fitness to attend the hearing.

10.	On 11 December 2018 the respondent’s representative updated the tribunal on the failure by the claimant to fully comply with the Unless Order. A further case management discussion was convened to consider the matter further.

11.	On 28 December 2018 a decision dated 19 December 2018 was issued to the parties which stated:

“The claimant has withdrawn his complaint of disability discrimination by email dated 10 December 2018 and it is dismissed from the claim.  The remaining complaints of unfair dismissal and right to be accompanied at disciplinary/grievance will proceed to hearing.” 

This decision was sent to the claimant, Mr Hanna and the respondent representative. The letter to Mr Hanna also confirmed the arrangements for the further case management discussion at 9:30 am on 9 January 2019.

12.	On 9 January 2019 at 08:09 Mr Hanna emailed the tribunal office as follows:

“Dear Secretary, The claimant is now mentally well to engage with the tribunal ... The tribunal has been furnished with medical evidence in relation to the serious mental health episode.  The tribunal will be aware that the respondent in this case is now the claimant’s employer and this has caused great worry and stress for the claimant.  The claimant will submit all outstanding information including witness statement to the respondent by Friday 11 January.”

13.	On 9 January 2019 at 08:43 Mr Hanna emailed the tribunal office as follows:

“Dear Secretary, The claimant is in a position to be able to furnish the respondent all outstanding documentation by Friday 11 January.  The claimant apologises for the slippage in the timetable.”

14.	On 9 January 2019 at 08:52 Mr Hanna sent a further email to the tribunal office as follows:

“Dear Secretary, I wish to notify the judge that due to unforeseen circumstances I cannot attend the case management discussions listed for this morning.  The unforeseen circumstances are in relation to my role as a carer. I have submitted written representations in separate communications for each case listed this morning.”

15.	The case management discussion took place as scheduled on 9 January 2019.  The respondent’s representative updated the tribunal on the position at that time. The previous Unless Order was revoked and a further unless order was issued requiring the provision of replies and the provision of witness statements to the respondent’s representative by 11 January 2019.  A further case management discussion was convened for 16 January 2019.

16.	The claimant emailed the tribunal office directly on 9 January 2019 at 12:35.  He stated:

“Morning, I am writing to flag some concerns/provide some clarification around my pending case referenced above.  My understanding is that there was a case review scheduled last week however the correspondence went to my rep who did not inform me until after the meeting had been missed.  I was told last night by text message that the meeting had been rescheduled for this morning at 9:30 AM and made arrangements to take the day off and attend.  I was on the way into city centre this morning to attend the meeting when I received another txt from my rep saying the meeting had been cancelled.  It did not say why or by whom. I have since established that my rep cancelled the meeting due to a personal situation he was having at home.  This was done without my knowledge or consent and had I known the rep was cancelling the meeting I would have attended in his absence.  I am concerned that the potential impact on my case in that I am being perceived as missing meetings/deadlines.  I am not a member of any union and have paid this guy to represent me privately however, I am not being kept informed of how things are progressing and having nominated the guy as my rep all the correspondence going to him.  I would appreciate your advice in terms of how I should proceed.  Financially I do not have the means to hire a solicitor at this late stage and just want some advice.”

17.	On 11 January 2019 the respondent’s representative confirmed that the claimant’s witness statement had been served, but Replies remained outstanding.

18.	A further Case Management Discussion took place on 16 January 2019.  The claimant appeared in person.  Mr Hanna did not appear.  An email was received from Mr Hanna at 08:45 on 16 January 2019.  It stated:

“Dear Secretary, The claimant in this case has informed me that he is seeking legal representation for his claim. The claimant has furnished his witness statement and medical records to the Respondent.  I am no longer on record as a representative in this case.”

19.	At that Case Management Discussion the claimant advised the tribunal that his disability discrimination claim had been withdrawn without his knowledge. The claimant was informed of his right to seek a Review of the decision striking out his claim for disability discrimination.  The claimant was also signposted to sources of information and advice. The claimant was informed that the time for making an application had already expired and that if he wished to pursue an application for Review he must apply to the tribunal in writing by 30 January 2019.

20.	The claimant duly applied for a Review of the decision on 29 January 2019 on the grounds set out at rule 34(3)(b), (c) and (e); namely that a party did not receive notice of the proceedings leading to the decision, that the decision was made in the absence of a party and that the interests of justice require such a review. The claimant apologised for the delay in bringing his case forward and the need to have the case rescheduled and confirmed that he had now received all documentation from the respondent’s representative.

21.	The tribunal extended the time limit set out at rule 35(1) on the basis that it is just and equitable to do so in all of the circumstances outlined above.

EVIDENCE

22.	The tribunal heard evidence from the claimant, and his wife, Mrs Lena Loughran, who were both cross examined by the respondent representative.  Neither party sought a witness order securing the attendance of Mr Hanna.  The tribunal also considered a bundle of documentation which was provided by the claimant.  This included a number of previous decisions of the Industrial Tribunal which the claimant asserted were evidence of similar behaviours by his former representative in the past. The bundle of documents also included email correspondence between the claimant and the conciliation officer for this case within the Labour Relations Agency over the period 8-9 January 2019. Further, the bundle included email correspondence between the claimant and his former representative in the period 7–8 November 2018. The bundle also included WhatsApp messages between the claimant and his former representative from the end of 2018 through to 7 February 2019.  The bundle included WhatsApp messages with his wife as well as GP notes and records, save and except for an extract covering the period November 2018.  The tribunal already held this extract which had been provided to it in the circumstances described in paragraph 9 above. This extract was copied and provided to the parties and considered as part of the evidence in this Review.  The GP notes and records also confirmed the condition which the claimant had previously identified as the condition he intends to rely upon for the purposes of his disability discrimination claim, if the Dismissal is set aside.

23.	The claimant’s allegation that his disability discrimination claim was withdrawn without his knowledge or consent was recorded in an email from the claimant to the Labour Relations Agency dated 9 January 2019. Further, it was recorded in the WhatsApp messages between the claimant and his wife.

24.	The tribunal accepts that one of the WhatsApp messages between the claimant and his wife does not disclose when it was sent. However, this lack of information is not sufficient for the tribunal to disregard what is, in effect, the uncontroverted evidence of the claimant and his wife regarding the claim having been withdrawn without his authority.

RELEVANT LAW

25.	The Rules of Procedure, insofar as relevant in relation to this application, provide as follows:-

“Rule 25 – Right to withdraw proceedings

(4) Where the whole or part of the claim is withdrawn, the proceedings or the relevant part of the proceedings so withdrawn are brought to an end against the respondent on that date and the tribunal or chairman shall dismiss the proceedings or the relevant part of the proceedings so withdrawn. [The claimant may not commence a further claim against the respondent for the same, or substantially the same, cause of action in the tribunal (unless the decision to dismiss is successfully reviewed or appealed).]

Rule 34 – Review of Other Decisions

(i)	Parties may apply to have certain decisions made by a tribunal or a chairman reviewed under this Rule and Rules 35 and 36.  Those decisions are – 

….

(b)	a decision which is a final determination of the proceedings or a particular issue in those proceedings …..

…. 

(iii)	…. Decisions may be reviewed on the following grounds only.

(e)	The interests of justice require a review.
	
	Rule 35 – Preliminary Consideration of Application for Review

	(i)	An application under Rule 34 to have a decision reviewed must be made to the Offices of the Tribunal within 14 days of the date in which the decision was sent to the parties.   The 14 day time limit may be extended by a chairman if he considers that it is just and equitable to do so.  

	(ii)	The application must be in writing and must identify the grounds of the Rule.

	35 – Preliminary Consideration of Application for Review

	(i)	An application under Rule 34 to have a decision reviewed must be made to the Offices of the Tribunal within 14 days of the date in which the decision was sent to the parties.   The 14 day time limit may be extended by a chairman if he considers that it is just and equitable to do so.  

	(ii)	The application must be in writing and must identify the grounds of the application in accordance with Rule 34(3) and provide the details of the grounds so identified.

THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS

26.	The claimant gave oral submissions at the conclusion of the evidence.  Counsel for the respondent delivered oral submissions and helpfully provided further written submissions. The claimant also provided written legal submissions. For the avoidance of doubt, and as confirmed at the Hearing, the tribunal was only considering the issue of whether the interests of justice required a review and setting aside of the Decision dated 10 December 2018. To this end, insofar as submissions related to issues for the main hearing, the tribunal has not had regard to them.

27.	The claimant’s submissions referenced the evidence surrounding his difficulties with Mr Hanna generally. The claimant submitted that in light of his ongoing health issues, he should have been advised of/invited to the hearing which led to the Decision. However, no hearing was convened without the claimant’s knowledge. Rather, his complaint was dismissed, following its withdrawal, pursuant to Rule 25(4), set out above at paragraph 25.

28.	The claimant further noted that he had brought this matter to the attention of the tribunal at the earliest opportunity, namely the Case management Discussion of the 16 January 2019, following Mr Hanna having advised him that the Case Management Discussion on 9 January 2019 was cancelled. The claimant largely rehearsed the same authorities referred to by the respondent, and considered below. The claimant also contended that Mr Hanna’s alleged unilateral act was in all of the circumstances manifestly inexplicable and irrational and that the consequences of same would be to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case. The claimant further referred to Spectrum Property Ltd v Way [2015] EWCA Civ 381. This case did not assist the tribunal in its deliberations in relation to the issue before it.

29.	Counsel for the respondent directed the tribunal to Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, division PI, section 1, part ZF at paragraphs 1148.01 and following.

30.	At paragraph 1147, Harvey states:

“Under previous rules, the interests of justice ground was described as 'a residual category of case, designed to confer a wide discretion on [employment] tribunals' (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395 at 401, per Phillips J).  But whilst the discretion is undoubtedly wide, it was held not to be boundless; it must be exercised judicially and with regard, not just to the interests of the party seeking the review, but also to the interests of the other party and to the public interest requirement that there should, as far as possible, be finality of litigation (see Flint, above, at 404).  Moreover, as with the exercise of any other power under the Rules, tribunals and employment judges must seek to give effect to the overriding objective…

As the interests of justice was the ground on which most applications for review were made, this has inevitably, over the years, resulted in extensive case law on the scope of the paragraph and the type of problem that is suitable for review (or reconsideration) under it.  One consequence of this, according to Underhill J, the former President of the EAT, is that the broad statutory discretion has 'become gradually so encrusted with case-law that decisions are made by resort to phrases or labels drawn from the authorities rather than on a careful assessment of what justice requires in the particular case.  Thus a periodic scraping of the keel is desirable' (Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] ICR 743, at para 16).”

31.	Counsel for the respondent drew the tribunal’s attention to a number of authorities.

32.	In particular, he relied upon the Court of Appeal decision in Ministry of Justice v Burton [2016] EWCA Civ 714, [2016] ICR 1128.  In that case, Elias LJ warned against judgements being reconsidered because of a failure by a party’s representative to draw attention to a particular argument, stating that such a failure ‘will not generally justify granting a review’.  (Emphasis added.) The tribunal did not derive particular assistance from this authority which involved the failure by counsel to raise a point regarding the alleged overcompensation of fee paid judges at the original hearing.

33.	Counsel for the respondent also relied upon Lindsay v Ironsides Ray & Vials [1994] ICR 384 where the EAT held that a tribunal had wrongly granted the application for a review on the ground that the claimant’s representative had not addressed the tribunal on their discretion to extend time.  The decision stated:

“The fact that the tribunal thought it necessary, in its review decision, to make criticisms of Mrs Grenham's ability indicated that the reason for granting a review was that, in the view of the industrial tribunal, the applicant's case was not properly argued as a result of Mrs Grenham's shortcomings.  Failings of a party's representatives, professional or otherwise, will not generally constitute a ground for review.  That is a dangerous path to follow.  It involves the risk of encouraging a disappointed applicant to seek to reargue his case by blaming his representative for the failure of his claim. That may involve the tribunal in inappropriate investigations into the competence of the representative who is not present at or represented at the review.  If there is a justified complaint against the representative, that may be the subject of other proceedings and procedure.  It is thus our view that the industrial tribunal erred in law in granting a review under rule 10(1)(e ) of the Rules of Procedure of 1985.” Emphasis added.)

34.	Counsel for the respondent noted that in Lindsay the claimant was represented by “a non-legally qualified officer of the Commission for Racial Equality.” It is clear from the judgement that the claimant was indeed represented by the Commission for Racial Equality.  The tribunal was unable to discern from the judgement any record of whether the representative was legally qualified.  Counsel for the respondent relied upon the section underlined above.

35.	Counsel for the respondent also drew the attention of the tribunal to the Court of Appeal decision in Drysdale v Department of Transport (the Maritime and Coastguard Agency) [2014] EWCA Civ 1083 [2014] IRLR 892.  In that case, the claimant was represented by his wife. That case reviewed the extent of the tribunal’s duty towards litigants who do not have legal representation, both generally and specifically in the context of the withdrawal of a claim at a hearing. Permission to appeal was granted on the following ground: 

"whether having regard in particular to the overriding objective and the fact that neither the claimant nor his representative were legally qualified, the Employment Tribunal erred in law in failing to take adequate steps to ensure that the claimant had taken a properly considered decision to withdraw the claim." 

36.	Paragraph 12 of the decision records a finding that:

“Mrs Drysdale impresses one as a highly intelligent and very articulate person who, although not legally qualified, has a better understanding of court procedures and substantive rules than many, indeed than most litigants in person or McKenzie friends.”

37.	A summary of relevant legal principles derived from the case law is set out at paragraph 49 of the judgment:

“…(1) It is a long-established and obviously desirable practice of courts generally, and employment tribunals in particular, that they will provide such assistance to litigants as may be appropriate in the formulation and presentation of their case.

(2) 	What level of assistance or intervention is "appropriate" depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.

(3) 	Such circumstances are too numerous to list exhaustively, but are likely to include: whether the litigant is representing himself or is represented; if represented, whether the representative is legally qualified or not; and in any case, the apparent level of competence and understanding of the litigant and/or his representative. (Emphasis added.)

(4) 	The appropriate level of assistance or intervention is constrained by the overriding requirement that the tribunal must at all time be, and be seen to be, impartial as between the parties, and that injustice to either side must be avoided.

(5) 	The determination of the appropriate level of assistance or intervention is properly a matter for the judgment of the tribunal hearing the case, and the creation of rigid obligations or rules of law in this regard is to be avoided, as much will depend on the tribunal's assessment and "feel" for what is fair in all the circumstances of the specific case.

(6) 	There is, therefore, a wide margin of appreciation available to a tribunal in assessing such matters, and an appeal court will not normally interfere with the tribunal's exercise of its judgment in the absence of an act or omission on the part of the tribunal which no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself on the basis of the overriding objective, would have done/omitted to do, and which amounts to unfair treatment of a litigant.”

38.	At paragraph 58 of the decision it states:

“Only where there is some clear indication of a dispute or failure of communication between a party and his or her chosen representative, or, perhaps, in the event a manifestly inexplicable and irrational decision by a representative, should a tribunal feel obliged to seek confirmation directly from a litigant. There was nothing of the kind here.” 

Whether a tribunal should do so in a particular case was described as “a question of judgement falling squarely within the margin of discretion of the tribunal”.  In the present case, there is clearly a dispute and an alleged failure of communication between the claimant and his former representative over the issue of whether the withdrawal was with the claimant’s authority.

39.	The Court of Appeal also considered that the fact that a representative was not legally qualified as potentially a relevant factor, as noted in the underlined section of paragraph 49 (3) above.  Later in the judgment, on the particular facts, the Court of Appeal concluded: “Also, the fact that Mrs Drysdale was not legally qualified would have been lower down the scale of significance in this case than in many others where there is no professional representation, given Mrs Drysdale's evident intelligence, clarity of thought and speech, and strength of purpose – qualities we have been able to observe ourselves in the course of this appeal.”   This case involved a withdrawal during the course of a hearing, rather than a purported withdrawal by a representative by writing.

40.	In Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] ICR 743 the claimant was advised by his counsel that it was not necessary for him to attend a Pre Hearing Review to determine whether he was disabled for the purposes of the disability discrimination legislation.  The Employment Judge who was not told of this advice, dismissed the claim.  On a review application, the Employment Judge revoked his decision.  The appeal to the EAT was unsuccessful.  In the decision Underhill J stated:

“It is clear that he attached decisive weight to the (related) facts (a) that the claimant’s counsel misled the tribunal and (b) that by doing so he deprived him of the opportunity of an adjournment which would otherwise have been granted: see para 12(2) above. Those are an exceptional circumstance. They take the case outside the straightforward “fresh evidence” category which, as Phillips J accepted in Flint, falls to be dealt with under head (d).  They also take it outside the ordinary run of cases where a party suffers from the wrong, or indeed incompetent, advice of his representative.” (Emphasis added.)

41.	Counsel for the respondent also argued on the basis of Lindsay that even if the claimant’s arguments were accepted that the claimant’s remedy against his former representative should lie in another court. Lindsay stated: “If there is a justified complaint against the representative, that may be the subject of other proceedings and procedure.”

42.	Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the withdrawal of 10 December 2018 was clear and unambiguous and therefore ought to be final.  In Segor v Goodrich Actuation Systems Ltd UKEAT/0145/11 (10 February 2012, unreported) Langstaff J stated: “As a matter of principle we consider that a concession or withdrawal cannot properly be accepted as such unless it is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous.” The tribunal did not derive much assistance from this authority which dealt with a concession at a hearing, which was held not to be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. This authority does not easily sit with the factual matrix before the tribunal of an alleged unauthorised withdrawal by a representative. Further, the commentary on Segor at paragraph 627.05 of Harvey merely confirms that in such a case, the concession or withdrawal will not ordinarily be re-opened. (Emphasis added.)

43.	Flint requires the discretion to be exercised “judicially and with regard, not just to the interests of the party seeking the review, but also to the interests of the other party and to the public interest requirement that there should, as far as possible, be finality of litigation.”

FINDINGS OF FACT

44.	On the basis of the evidence before it, the tribunal finds on the balance of probabilities that Mr Hanna did not act with the authority of the claimant when he withdrew the disability discrimination claim. This finding of fact is based on the witness evidence of the claimant and his wife, which was the only evidence before the tribunal.

45.	As a direct and necessary consequence of this, the tribunal finds that the representation by Mr Hanna on 10 December 2018 to the effect that the claimant wished to withdraw the disability discrimination aspect of his claim, misled the tribunal.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
46.	The tribunal, in accordance with Marsden, holds that the finding at paragraph 45 is a wholly exceptional circumstance which does warrant the exercise of the tribunal’s discretion under Rule 34(3)(e), leading it to set aside the decision of 19 December 2018. The tribunal is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so. The consequence of this decision is that the claimant’s claim of disability discrimination remains before the tribunal and the purported withdrawal by the claimant’s former representative is disregarded.

47.	The tribunal accepts the principle in Flint that as far as possible there should be finality in litigation.  (Emphasis added.)  However, this is a circumstance where that finality is not possible, as the interests of justice require the dismissal decision dated 19 December 2019 to be set aside.

48.	The tribunal does not accept the submission of the Counsel for the respondent that the claimant’s redress is found in another forum.  The tribunal does not accept that the possibility of another remedy automatically disbars a claimant from seeking a remedy on a review application.  If this was the case, the claimant in Marsden would have been denied a remedy on review on the basis that an action could have been brought against his representative in another court.  Moreover, whilst the claimant appears to have paid Mr Hanna for his services, Mr Hanna is not regulated like solicitors and members of the bar, and is not therefore required as a condition of practice to carry professional indemnity insurance.  In these circumstances, it is by no means clear that the claimant would have an adequate remedy following action in another forum.

49.	The tribunal distinguishes Lindsay on the ground that the present case did not involve a failing by a representative at a hearing.  Moreover, Lindsay did not preclude failings by a representative ever being a ground for a successful review. It merely stated that it would “not generally constitute a ground for review.” (Emphasis added.)

50.	In setting aside the decision of 19 December 2018, the tribunal has been mindful of its obligation to give effect to the overriding objective, in this case dealing with the case fairly. The tribunal has also considered the question of saving expense. The tribunal accepts that the hearing length will not be reduced as a result of this decision. However, much of the same evidence would have been adduced in the unfair dismissal claim, as in the disability discrimination claim.  Further, the tribunal is aware that as at the Case Management Discussion of 16 January 2019 the respondent had not served statements on behalf of its witnesses and therefore its case preparation remained at a preliminary stage.  

51.	The case will require further case management and will be relisted in due course.

Employment Judge:

Date and place of hearing:  6 March 2019, Belfast.

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: