Industrial Tribunals Northern Ireland Decisions

THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS

 

CASE REF:   1741/14

 

 

 

CLAIMANT:                      Muhammad Umair Sharif

 

 

RESPONDENT:                Belfast Health & Social Care Trust

 

DECISION ON A PRE-HEARING REVIEW

The decision of the tribunal is that:-

The claimant’s claim is out of time; and the tribunal decided that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have presented his claim in time.  The tribunal therefore does not have jurisdiction to consider and determine the claimant’s claim and the claim must be dismissed.

 

 

Constitution of Tribunal:

Employment Judge (sitting alone):      Employment Judge N Drennan QC

 

Appearances:

The claimant did not appear and was not represented.

The respondent was represented by Mrs E Ward, Solicitor, of Directorate of Legal Services, Business Services Organisation.

 

Reasons

 

1.1     The claimant presented a claim to the tribunal on 19 September 2014 in which he made a claim for arrears of pay arising from his employment with the respondent as a doctor, and which said employment had ended on 4 February 2014.  The claimant, on his claim form, had named the respondents to the said claim as Ms O Burns, Senior Manager, Human Resources of the Employment Law & Medical HR, and Employment Law & Medical HR.  It was not disputed by the respondent’s representative that the claimant’s claim was a claim for unauthorised deduction from wages, pursuant to Article 45 of the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (‘the 1996 Order’) and/or a claim for breach of contract pursuant to the tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Industrial Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction Order (Northern Ireland) 1994 (‘the 1994 Order’).  Any such claim made by the claimant under the above legislation has to be against the claimant’s employer at the relevant time and cannot be against a senior manager of the employer.  In those circumstances, I made an Order dismissing Ms O Burns, as a respondent to these proceedings, pursuant to Rule 10(2)(k) of the Industrial Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2005 (the Rules of Procedure).  I further ordered that the title of the respondent be amended to Belfast Health & Social Care Trust, as set out above, in substitution for Employment Law & Medical HR, which I am satisfied is part of the said Trust but it was not the relevant employer of the claimant at the material time.

 

1.2     The claimant did not attend the hearing.  However, I am satisfied that he was aware of the hearing and had received the Notice of Hearing dated 7 November 2014. 

 

          Under Rule 14(5) of the Rules of Procedure, it is provided:-

 

“If a party wishes to submit written representations for consideration at a hearing (other than a Case Management Discussion) he shall present them to the Office of the Tribunals not less than seven days before the hearing and shall at the same time send a copy to all the other parties.

 

(6)      The tribunal or Chairman may, if it or he considers it appropriate, consider representations in writing which had been submitted otherwise than in accordance with Paragraph (5).”

 

          Under Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure, it is provided:-

 

                    “ ...

 

(5)      If a party fails to attend or to be represented (for the purposes of conducting the party’s case at the hearing under Rule 26) at the time and place fixed for such a hearing, the tribunal may dismiss or dispose of the proceedings in the absence of that party or may adjourn the hearing to a later date.

 

(6)      If the tribunal wishes to dismiss or dispose of proceedings in the circumstances described in Paragraph (5), it shall first consider any information in its possession which has been made available to it by the parties.

 

(7)      At a hearing under Rule 26 a tribunal may exercise any powers which may be exercised by a Chairman under these Rules.”

 

Although, strictly, Rule 27 applies to a substantive hearing under Rule 26 of the Rules of Procedure, there would be seem to be no reason in principle why the same approach, as set out therein, should not apply to other types of hearing, including a pre-hearing review under Rule 18. 

 

In any event, I was satisfied that the claimant had received the Notice of Hearing, dated 7 November 2014, for the hearing of a pre-hearing review, pursuant to Rule 18 of the Rules of Procedure, to determine the following issues:-

 

“(1)     Whether the claimant’s claim has been presented within the three month statutory time-limit.

 

 (2)     If not, whether it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to have presented his claim within the three month time-limit.

 

 (3)     If so, whether the claimant presented his claim within a reasonable time thereafter.”

 

Further, the claimant sent to the tribunal and the respondent’s representative a letter, which was received by the tribunal on 1 December 2014, to which further reference shall be made later in this decision.  The respondent’s representative did not dispute that this letter and the claimant’s claim form required to be taken into consideration by the tribunal before determining this matter.  By e-mail dated 13 November 2014, the respondent’s representative wrote to the claimant stating, inter alia:-

 

“I am a solicitor acting for the respondent in your claim against the Belfast Health & Social Care Trust.  I trust that you have been informed by the tribunal that it has listed a pre-hearing review for hearing on 4^th of December.  At that hearing it will determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear your case.  It is the respondent’s contention that your claim has not been presented to the tribunal within the required statutory three month period.  Its reasons are set out in more detail in its response. ... .”

 

By a further e-mail dated 2 December 2014, the respondent’s representative wrote to the claimant stating, inter alia:-

 

“I refer to the above matter in which a pre-hearing review will be heard on Thursday 4^th of December.  As set out in my e-mail to you of 13^th of November 2014, the tribunal will determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear that case, in view of the contention that it has been presented outside of the statutory time-limit.  It will be for you to show that it was not reasonably practicable for you to have presented the claim within the statutory three months and that, if not, you presented it within a reasonable time thereafter.  The tribunal prefer us to produce an agreed bundle of documents to enable it to consider this point.  I have prepared the attached index and enclose the documents referred to in that index.  I believe that you will already have copies of all these documents.  If you wish to add any further documents to this bundle, please notify me and send me copies of those documents so that I can include them.”

 

The respondent’s representative informed me that she had not received any further correspondence from the claimant following her e-mail of 2 December 2014, enclosing the said bundle of documents.  In the circumstances, I was satisfied that the claimant was fully aware not only of the dates for hearing but also the issues to be determined at this hearing.  I decided, pursuant to Rule 14 and 27 of the Rules of Procedure, referred to above, to proceed with the hearing and to determine the issues, the subject-matter of the Notice of Hearing, in the absence of the claimant.  Before determining the issues in this matter, I considered not only the claim form of the claimant and the response form of the respondent but also the claimant’s letter received by the tribunal on 1 December 2014, the documents contained in the bundle of documents prepared by the respondent’s representative and the evidence called by the respondent’s representative, as set out below, together with the oral submissions of the respondent’s representative.

 

2.1     The relevant time period to bring a claim for the right not to suffer unauthorised deduction of wages is set out in Article 55(4) of the 1996 Order, where it is stated:-

 

“Where the industrial tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this Article to be presented before the end of the relevant period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.”

 

In relation to a claim of breach of contract, under the 1994 Order, Article 7 of the said Order provides that the time within which proceedings may be brought is as follows:-

 

“An industrial tribunal shall not entertain a complaint in respect of an employee’s contract claim unless it is presented –

 

(a)      within the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination of the contract giving rise to the claim; or

 

(b)      where there is no effective date of termination within the period of three months beginning with the last day upon which the employee worked in the employment which is terminated; or

 

(c)      where the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within whichever those periods is applicable, within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.”

 

In essence, the said provisions apply the same test and the relevant three month time period, as set out in the said provisions, for the presentation of the claimant’s claim was within three months beginning 4 February 2014, when the claimant’s employment with the respondent terminated. 

 

2.2     The claimant’s claim, having been presented to the tribunal on 19 September 2014, the claim was outside the relevant three month period, as set out previously, and therefore was out of time; and it was necessary for him to apply for an extension of time, pursuant to Article 55 of the 1996 Order and/or Article 7 of the 1994 Order, as set out above. 

 

          This statutory test under the 1996 Order and/or the 1994 Order, involves two distinct questions:-

 

                    “(a)     Was it reasonably practicable to present the complaint in time?

 

(b)     If it was not, did the claimant bring the complaint within a further reasonable period?”

 

It has long been established it is for the claimant to prove that it was not reasonably practicable to bring the claim in time and it is a question of fact for the tribunal to decide.  In this context, it always has to be remembered that the test for an extension of time, which applies under the discrimination legislation, potentially affords a tribunal a far wider discretion than in the test set out in the provisions under the 1996 Order and 1994 Order, set out above.  (See further Hutchison  v  Westward Television Ltd [1977] IRLR 69 and British Coal  v  Keeble [1997] IRLR 336.)  Under discrimination legislation the test of ‘just and equitable’ applies. 

 

In Palmer & Saunders  v  Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119, May LJ stated, at Paragraph 125:-

 

“To construe the words ‘reasonably practicable’ as the equivalent as ‘reasonable’ is to take a view too favourable to the employee.  On the other hand ‘reasonably practicable’ means more than what is reasonably capable physically of being done ... in the context in which the words are used in the 1978 Consolidation Act however inaptly as we think, they mean something between the two.  Perhaps to read the terms ‘practicable’ as the equivalent of ‘feasible’ ... and to ask colloquially and untrammelled by too much legal logic – ‘was it reasonably feasible to present the complaint to the industrial tribunal within the relevant three months?’ – is the best approach to the correct application of the relevant sub-section.”

 

May LJ, in the course of his judgment, set out a number of relevant factors but emphasised they could not be exhaustive, but stated they should form a useful starting point and therefore the tribunal should consider, amongst other things:-

 

“(a)     the manner in which, and the reason for which, the employee was dismissed, including any internal ‘conciliatory appeal procedure’;

 

 (b)     the substantial cause of the employee’s failure to comply with the statutory time-limit;

 

 (c)     whether he knew he had the right to complain that he had been unfairly dismissed;

 

 (d)     whether there had been any ‘misrepresentation’ about any relevant matter by the employer to the employee;

 

 (e)     whether the employee was advised at any material time and, if so, by whom the extent of the adviser’s knowledge and facts of the case advise given to the employee.”

 

In Wall’s Meat Company Ltd  v  Khan [1979] ICR 52, Brandon LJ gave the following guidance:-

 

“The performance of an act, in this case the presentation of a complaint, is not reasonably practicable if there is some impediment which reasonably prevents, or interferes with, or inhibits such a performance.  The impediment may be physical, for instance, the onus of the complainant or a postal strike; or the impediment may be mental, namely the state of mind of the complainant in the form of ignorance of, or mistaken belief, with regard to essential matters.  Such states of mind can, however, only be regarded as impediments making it not reasonably practicable to present the complaint within the period of three months, if the ignorance on the one hand or the mistaken belief on the other, is itself reasonable.  Either state of mind will, further, not be reasonable if it arises from the fault of his solicitors or other professional advisers in not giving him such information as they should reasonably in all the circumstances have given him.”

 

Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, Volume 3, Section P1, has emphasised:-

 

“(207)     So, whilst a claimant’s state of mind has to be taken into account, it is clear that his mere assertion of ignorance either as to the right to claim, the time-limit or the procedure for making the claim is not to be treated as conclusive ... moreover, as the courts pointed out, the widespread public knowledge of unfair dismissal rights, it is all the time becoming more difficult to an employee to plea such ignorance successfully ...

 

 (208)     if an employee is reasonably ignorant of the right to claim, it would inevitably follow that he will be unaware either of the correct mode of making a claim or the time within which it should be made.  But if he knows in general about the availability of the remedy, he may still be ignorant of how and when to pursue it.  In these circumstances, as Brandon LJ noted in the Walls Meat case, it may be difficult to for him to satisfy a tribunal that he had behaved reasonably in not making suitable enquiries about these matters.  Shaw LJ, in the same case, commented that ‘mere ignorance’ of the time-limit will not of itself amount to reasonably impracticability, save perhaps where the employee does not discovery the existence of his right until a short time before the expiry of the time-limit.  Waller LJ took a similar view in Riley  v  Tesco Stores [1980’ ICR 233 at 335.”

 

2.3     It has long been established, when applying the above test in relation to a claim of unfair dismissal, which would seem to have similar application to the present proceedings, unless there are exceptional circumstances shown, the mere fact of invoking an internal appeal procedure was not generally regarded as sufficient to justify a finding that it was not reasonably practicable to present a claim in time (in Palmer & Saunders  v  Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] IRLR 119, where the Court of Appeal expressly approved the following guidance of Browne - Wilkinson J, when he stated in Bodha  v  Hampshire Area Health Authority [1982] ICR 200:-

 

“There may be cases where the special facts (additional to the bare facts that there is an internal appeal pending) may persuade an Employment Tribunal, as a question of fact, that it was not reasonably practicable to complain to the ... within the time-limit.  But we do not think that the mere fact of a pending internal appeal, by itself, is sufficient to justify a findings of fact that it was ‘reasonably practicable’ to present a complaint to the ... in tribunal.”

 

In Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, Volume 3, Section P1, it is stated:-

 

“(253.01)      As the mere fact of impending internal will not of itself enable the claimant to claim that it was not reasonably practicable to present a claim in time, the question of the claimant’s state of knowledge of his or her rights and of the time-limit will nevertheless be relevant to consideration of whether he or she is entitled to the benefit of the escape clause.  Thus, in Marks & Spencer PLc  v  Williams-Ryan[2005] IRLR 562, the claimant’s belief that she had to conclude her internal appeal before starting tribunal proceedings, allied to a reasonable ignorance that the time-limit for bringing an unfair dismissal claim, enabled her to claim successfully that it was not reasonably practicable for her to make her claim in time.”

 

In John Lewis Partnership  v  Charman [UKEAT/0079/11], the claimant’s ignorance of the time-limit for claiming unfair dismissal was considered by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, where he had pursued an internal appeal at the expense of presenting an unfair dismissal claim in time.  The central issue to be determined was whether, given that he did not know of the time-limit, – “he ought reasonably to have made enquiries about how to bring an Employment Tribunal claim”.  If he had done so, it would have been inevitable, in the judgment of the Employment Tribunal that he would have been put on notice of the time-limits immediately following his dismissal.  On the facts of the case, the EAT held it was not reasonable to have expected him to do so.  Underhill J, as he then was, accepted that the claimant and/or his father knew in general terms there was a right to bring a claim for unfair dismissal to an industrial tribunal but he was ‘unquestionably’ unaware of the time-limits. 

 

Underhill J in the course of his judgment after reviewing the authorities stated:-

 

“The starting point is that if an employee is reasonably ignorant of the relevant time-limits it cannot be said to be reasonably practicable for him to comply with them.  Brandon LJ said this in terms in Walls Meat Company Ltd  v  Khan [1979] ICR 52 at Page 61 and the passage in question was explicitly endorsed by Lord Philips in Williams  v  Ryan ... in the present case the claimant was unquestionably ignorant of the time-limits, whether one considers his own knowledge or that of himself and his father.  The question is whether that ignorance was reasonable.  I would accept it would not be reasonable to have made enquiries about how to bring an Employment Tribunal claim, which would inevitably have put him on notice of the time-limits.  The question thus comes down to whether the claimant should have made such enquiries immediately following his dismissal ... .”

 

In Marks & Spencer, Lord Philips said, in terms, that the proper position that “the existence of an internal right of appeal is in no relevance to the question of whether it is reasonably practicable to make a timely complaint to the Employment Tribunal” is not a principle of law but merely “a conclusion which will ultimately be drawn when considering ... the vital question of fact, namely whether the employee could reasonably be expected to be aware of the fact there was a time-limit for making a complaint to the Employment Tribunal ...”.

 

Having concluded that he could not see, on the facts, that it was unreasonable to defer investigating the position about a possible Employment Tribunal claim until the claimant knew the outcome of the appeal, Underhill J in Charman distinguished Bodha and Palmer insofar as they might suggest a contrary conclusion, on the ground the claimants on those cases were represented by trade union officials who knew or must be taken to have known the time-limits and they had taken a deliberate decision to delay making a claim until the internal appeal process had been concluded, which decision bound the claimants and prevented them from saying it was reasonably practicable to have presented their claims in time.  In Dillon & Another  v  Todd & Another [2011] UKEAT, Underhill J following his judgment in Charman, stated:-

 

“It is well established in the context of the cognate provision of Section 111(2) of the 1996 Act (Article 145 of the 1996 Order) that reasonable ignorance of time-limits (by a person who is not represented by solicitors or other skilled advisers) will render it not reasonably practicable for him to comply with those time-limits.”

 

2.4     In light of the foregoing, I therefore concluded it was necessary to determine the preliminary issues, the subject of these proceedings, on the basis of the dicta in Bodha by Browne-Wilkinson J, and approved in Palmer & Saunders; but also as more recently interpreted in Marks & Spencer PLc  v  Williams-Ryan and, in particular, in Charman and Dillon by Underhill J.  Thus, each case must be decided on its own facts, applying the said dicta.  This task was made more difficult for the tribunal, given that the onus remains with the claimant, who was not present to give any evidence on his own behalf. 

 

2.5     Where a claimant satisfies the tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable to present a claim in time, the tribunal must then proceed to consider whether it was presented within a reasonable time thereafter.  As seen in Marley (UK) Ltd & Another  v  Anderson (1994) IRLR152, if a tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint to be presented before the end of the statutory three month period, there are no time limits on what can be regarded as a further reasonable period for presenting the complaint.  However, as set out in Biggs –v- Somerset County Council (1996) IRLR203, although the tribunal has a wide discretion in deciding what is a reasonable further period, the tribunal has to take into account all the circumstances in order to achieve a fair balance.  It is not concerned only with difficulties faced by the claimant.  Therefore an extended further period may be unreasonable if the employer were to face difficulties of substance in answering the claim.  In Northumberland County Council  v  Thompson (UK EAT/0209/07), it was held that when considering the reasonableness of a delay, proper consideration of all the relevant circumstances includes continuing need by the tribunal to investigate, throughout the period of the delay, the actual knowledge that the claimant had as to his rights and “what knowledge he should have had if he had acted reasonably in all the circumstances”.  In Cullinane  v  Balfour Beatty Engineering Services (UK EAT/053/10), Underhill J emphasised that the question of whether a further period is reasonable is not the same as asking whether the claimant acted reasonably (still less is it equivalent to the question whether it would be just and equitable to extend time); instead  requires “an objective consideration of the factors causing the delay and what period should reasonably be allowed in those circumstances for proceedings to be instituted”, having regard to the “strong public interest” in claims being brought promptly, and against a background where the primary time limit is three months.  Indeed Underhill J stated, obiter, that if the delay between the expiry of the primary time limit and the eventual presentation of the claim is objectively unreasonable on the above basis, the fact that it was caused by the fault of the claimant’s advisors, rather than by the claimant himself, will not make any difference to that conclusion.

 

3.1     In the letter received by the tribunal from the claimant on 1 December 2014, the claimant stated:-

 

“With regards to issues raised by the Belfast Trust (my ex employer) regarding my claim that I had made the claim after three months of leaving the employment, hear is my response. 

 

The only reason that I have waited for this time before making the claim is because I have raised the issue formally with Belfast Trust in November 2013, had a formal grievance hearing with Belfast Trust in February 2014.  Please note that even the grievance hearing [was] held after I had left the job with Belfast Trust which took almost one year to give me their final answer in September 2014.

 

Please find attached a copy of the letter that Belfast Trust sent me in September 2014 about their decision of the grievance hearing. 

 

I believe that I had no reason to raise the issue with an external agency when I’m waiting for the result of the internal hearing and was the only reason for me waiting until September 2014 before making the claim.

 

I have made my case very clear in the earlier claim, but if you need any further information please don’t hesitate to contact me.”

                    (Tribunal’s emphasis)

 

It is therefore apparent from the said letter, that the claimant decided to wait for the result of his internal grievance hearing before commencing his claim to the tribunal.  There was no evidence he took this decision on advice or that he sought any advice before deciding to await the result of the grievance before commencing his claim.  The claimant received notification from the respondent that his grievance had not been upheld by letter dated 4 September 2014 and he then waited until 19 September 2014 before commencing his tribunal proceedings.  On the same date, he also launched an appeal from the decision not to uphold his grievance.

 

3.2     Shortly after the commencement of his employment with the respondent on 7 August 2013, the claimant continuously raised issues with the respondent, in relation to whether he had been paid the correct remuneration by the respondent.  It is not necessary, for the purposes of determining these preliminary issues on time, to consider the validity of this dispute between the parties in any detail; but, in essence, it would appear that central to this dispute is the difference of approach between employers in the Health Service in Northern Ireland and England, where the claimant was previously employed, in relation to the application of relevant pay scales to the claimant’s employment with the respondent in a fixed term post.  In Northern Ireland, when employed in such a post, as the claimant was, he received less remuneration than he would receive in England.  In a bundle of documents prepared by the respondent’s representative, referred to above, I was referred to a series of e-mails between the claimant and the respondent during the course of his employment where this difference of approach was explained to him with relevant guidance notes/pay scales etc and how, in the circumstances, the respondent was satisfied it was unable to pay him the monies which he maintained he was owed.  In particular, in an e-mail dated 20 November 2013, the claimant stated, inter alia – “I’m sure I’ve a case but I don’t want to get involved in solicitors or courts ....”.  The claimant was also given a detailed explanation by his line manager why the respondent was satisfied that he had been paid the correct remuneration throughout the period of his employment.  However, despite this detailed explanation, on 29 November 2013, he raised a formal grievance with the respondent.  A hearing was subsequently held in February 2014 and he was informed that his grievance had not been upheld on 4 September 2014.  The tribunal had no evidence of what attempts, if any, the claimant made to obtain any advice about these matters and in particular about bringing a claim to the tribunal in relation to his claim for arrears of pay.  Ms J. Turner, a senior human resources officer with the respondent, gave oral evidence to the tribunal and she informed me that she was in frequent contact, on the telephone, with the claimant, following various e-mails where the respondent’s position on these pay issues had been stated.  On at least one occasion, she pointed out to him that the British Medical Association had previously had to consider this issue and, in particular, the differences in pay between the position of such employees in the National Health Service England and Northern Ireland.  It is not known if the claimant did contact the British Medical Association – but, in fairness, it is stated on his claim form that he was not a trade union member and may therefore not have been a member of the British Medical Association.  However, I have no doubt that, if he had made enquiries of the BMA or indeed a solicitor or other relevant bodies, like the Law Centre or Citizen’s Advice Bureau, he would have been told of the ability to make a claim in the industrial tribunals about such issues, the relevant time period for doing so and the relevant procedure to enable him to bring such a claim.  Further, the claimant did not give evidence and there was no evidence about the claimant’s knowledge or lack of knowledge about any of these matters.  Indeed, it is of some significance, for the purposes of this decision, that in the letter received by the tribunal on 1 December 2014, the claimant made no mention of any such lack of knowledge as a reason for not brining his claim in time.  His sole ground for not making the claim was because he was waiting for the result of the internal grievance. 

 

4.       The tribunal can only determine this matter on the basis of the evidence before it.  There was no evidence of any physical impediment preventing the claimant bringing his claim in time.  There was no evidence about the claimant’s state of mind in relation to his right to complain and/or the relevant time period or the procedure to be followed in order to bring such a claim in the industrial tribunals.  There was no evidence the respondent had misled the claimant in to thinking he could await the result of the grievance before commencing his claim in the industrial tribunal.  Even if the tribunal was to assume the claimant was ignorant about the right to claim, the time limit and/or the procedure, there was no evidence he had made relevant inquiries at any time about such matters.  Indeed, the evidence of the e-mail dated 20 November 2013, suggests the claimant was fully aware, at that time, that he had a claim but he took a conscious decision not to seek advice about it.  Again, it would appear, on the evidence before this tribunal, the claimant assumed, without making relevant enquiries/seeking advice, that he could await the result of the grievance before he commenced his claim.  This failure to make any such inquiries and/or seek advice was not, in my judgement, reasonable.  If he had done so, he would have had the relevant knowledge and would have been in a position to bring his claim in time.

 

5.       In the circumstances, I was satisfied that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to present his complaint in time.  Therefore, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider and determine the claimant’s claim.  It is not for this tribunal to consider whether the claimant may be able to bring his claim in another jurisdiction and/or is in time to do so.  Even if I am wrong and it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to bring his claim before he obtained the result of his grievance hearing on 4 September 2014, I am not satisfied, on the evidence before me, he has shown that he brought his claim within a reasonable period thereafter.  Again, there is no evidence from the claimant what action, if any, he took during the period between 4 September 2014 and 19 September 2014.  If, as set out in his correspondence received by the tribunal on 1 December 2014, he was waiting for the outcome of the grievance hearing, there was no evidence to show why he could not have immediately brought his claim within a shorter period.  In essence, he waited some 14 days before doing so, for which there has been no explanation by him.

 

6.       As the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s claim it must be dismissed.

 

 

 

Employment Judge

 

 

Date and place of hearing:   4 December 2014, Belfast

 

 

Date decision recorded in register and issued to parties: