H394
Judgment
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Neutral Citation [2015] IEHC 394 THE HIGH COURT COMMERCIAL [2015 No. 155 COS] IN THE MATTER OF TAZBELL SERVICES GROUP AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ACTS 1963 TO 2013 BETWEEN PATRICK GLEESON PETITIONER AND
TAZBELL SERVICES GROUP RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr Justice CREGAN delivered ex tempore the 18th day of May 2015 Introduction 2. The grounds of the petition are that the company allegedly owes Mr Gleeson the sum of €125,000 approx; that there has been a demand, that the demand has not been met and that therefore the company is insolvent and cannot pay its debts. Jurisdiction 4. However, in accordance with well- settled principles of law, it is well established that this is a discretionary ground. Discretion (i) Background to the debt 7. It is also clear from uncontroverted affidavit evidence that Mr Gleeson has had fines imposed on him by the Courts (and orders for costs) of approximately €2950. 8. These fines arise following convictions for various offences including non- display of tax, insurance or NCT, or failure to provide the ODCE a report in the prescribed form in his capacity as liquidator of the insolvent company. These fines remain due and owing. 9. In respect of these fines, the petitioner has sent invoices to the company. These invoices relate to:
2. €4000 for the cost of writing letters to Tazbell 3. €10000 for alleged unauthorised use of his name which he alleges is the subject of a trade mark and is contained in a so called “private trust”. 11. Mr Gleeson admitted that each €10000 was for trespass or for infringement of his trade mark or alleged trade mark in his name. Insofar as it is a tort, Mr Gleeson’s proper remedy is to sue for damages for infringement of his trade mark. He cannot simply pluck a figure out of thin air as he has done in this case. 12. I am satisfied therefore:
2. That the demand is not a bona fide demand Standing Insolvency of the company Damage No evidence of a trade mark Conclusion
(2) The debt is fully contested; (3) There is no evidence of a trade mark, let alone evidence of a trade mark infringement; (4) The petition is entirely baseless; (5) And I would concur with the description in the director’s affidavit of Tazbell that the actions of the petitioner are nothing short of a cynical abuse of Court process designed to inflict maximum embarrassment on the company without a shred of justification whatsoever. |