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Judgment Title: Jones -v- Residential Institutions Review Committee Neutral Citation: [2014] IEHC 220 High Court Record Number: 2013 407 JR Date of Delivery: 02/05/2014 Court: High Court Composition of Court: Judgment by: O'Neill J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation: [2014] IEHC 220 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2013 No. 407 J.R.] BETWEEN ELIZABETH JONES APPLICANT AND
THE RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of O’Neill J. delivered on the 2nd day of May 2014 1. The applicant seeks an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent Review Committee dated 7th March 2013, to the effect, that the applicant was not a resident in an institution within the meaning of s. 7 1(b) and (c) of the Residential Institutions Redress Act 2002, and was, therefore, not entitled to redress under the Act. A further order is sought remitting the matter to the respondent Review Committee to be “dealt with in accordance with law”. Statutory Provisions 3. Section 7 of the Act provides:
(a) proof of his or her identity, (b) that he or she was resident in an institution during his or her childhood, and (c) that he or she was injured while so resident and that injury is consistent with any abuse that is alleged to have occurred while so resident the Board shall make an award to that person in accordance with section 13(1).” Background 5. The applicant alleges that she witnessed abuse of patients of the institution and that persons who committed some breach of a rule would have their hair shaved off and be made to wear a sign around their neck which detailed their supposed wrongdoing. The applicant alleges that during the time she spent in the institution, she was subjected to sexual abuse by older male patients in the hospital, and that when she reported it to the Sisters, they failed to do anything about it and told her to carry on with her chores. She also recounted an incident where a priest from the institution allegedly sexually assaulted her. At the hearings before the Redress Board and respondent Review Committee, the applicant described the lasting effects her time in the institution and the abuse she suffered has had on her, and psychiatric reports were submitted in this regard. 6. The applicant gave evidence that a sum of approximately £6 per month was apparently paid to her mother in return for her services. There was no evidence of this payment having been made, apart from what the applicant was told by her mother. The applicant gave evidence that she herself “didn’t receive any money whatsoever”. 7. The applicant made a claim to the Residential Institutions Redress Board in 2010, and was granted an extension of time for making such an application under s. 8(2) of the Act. A hearing took place on 7th April 2011, and the Board issued its decision on 19th June 2012. The Board held that the applicant’s claim did “not fall within the terms of the statue for the following reason - it has not been established to the satisfaction of the Board that the applicant was injured while resident in an institution covered by the said Act or Orders as required by section 7(1)(c) of the said Act.” The applicant applied to have the matter reconsidered by the respondent Review Committee on 27th June 2012, and a hearing before the respondent took place on 17th January 2013. The respondent issued its decision on 7th March 2013. I will now turn to consider this decision in greater detail. Decision of the Respondent Committee 9. After considering all of the evidence, the Committee stated that it was “difficult to accept the argument that the Applicant was not in employment in Coole. She gave detailed evidence of the work she did there, was in receipt of board and lodging, and payment for her services appears to have been made to her mother. If she felt that she was not free to leave it seems likely that it was because it was her mother, rather than the authorities in Coole, who would have prevented her from leaving”. It was found that “in the ordinary sense of the word the Applicant was ‘resident’ in Coole for the period in question” but the issue for the committee to decide was whether or not she was ‘resident’ within the meaning of the Act. Having found that the term ‘resident’ where it appears in s. 7(1) of the Act is “obscure or ambiguous” the Committee applied the provisions of s.5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 which states:
11. The committee ultimately concluded the following:
12. Counsel for the applicant contends that after finding that the applicant was a ‘resident’ of the institution in the ordinary sense of the word, the committee erred by going on to state that the word ‘resident’ was “obscure or ambiguous” and by applying the provisions of s. 5 of the Interpretation Act. In the respondent’s statement of opposition, it is stated that this was a reasonable and rational approach for the committee to adopt. The applicant contends that the relevant test is not one of reasonableness or rationality, but one of statutory interpretation. In AG v. Residential Institutions Redress Board [2012] IEHC 492, Hogan J. held:
The words in s. 29 are very clear. The term ‘appeal’ is not obscure. It has a plain meaning in relation to procedures. The concept of an appeal is a full hearing on the merits with the jurisdiction to make a determination on the issues raised. An appeal goes beyond a review of a decision making process. As the words of s. 29 are clear, with a plain meaning, they should be so construed. The literal meaning is clear, unambiguous and not absurd. There is no necessity, indeed it would be wrong, to use other canons of construction to interpret sections of a statute which are clear. The Oireachtas has legislated in a clear fashion and that is the statutory law.”
15. Counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent committee found as a fact that the applicant received board and lodging at the institution and that her mother appears to have received a monthly payment for her services. It is accepted that the applicant received no schooling at the institution and was not there for the purposes of receiving medical treatment. The respondent found it “difficult” in those circumstances to accept the argument that the applicant was not in employment at the institution. 16. It is submitted that the respondent was correct to apply the provisions of s. 5 of the Interpretation Act, and provides clear reasons for doing so. In Monahan v Legal Aid Board [2009] I.R. 458, Edwards J. held:
‘While the court is not, in the absence of a constitutional challenge, entitled to do violence to the plain language of an enactment in order to avoid an unjust or anomalous consequence, that does not preclude the court from departing from the literal construction of an enactment and adopting in its place a teleological or purposive approach, if that would more faithfully reflect the true legislative intention gathered from the Act as a whole’. As such, s. 5 largely reflects the approach adopted by the courts prior to its enactment in any event. The main departure from the common law position occasioned by s. 5 is the creation of an exception to the general rule where a literal interpretation would defeat the intention of the Oireachtas. This exception to the literal rule of interpretation now applies, together with the traditional common law ambiguity and absurdity exceptions.” Decision 19. Here, the challenge is confined to a narrow issue of statutory interpretation, and this court must determine whether the interpretation settled upon by the respondent was correct in law and not whether it was reasonable or can be upheld within an acceptable margin of appreciation. Having concluded that the circumstances of the applicant came within the term “resident” when that term was given its natural and ordinary meaning, the fundamental question which arises here is whether they were not obliged to have concluded the matter on that basis, or were they entitled or obliged to reject the application of the literal meaning of the term and to go further by invoking s. 5 of the Interpretation Act 2005, to depart from the literal rule of construction and to adopt what they saw as a purposive interpretation of term “resident” 20. The only basis on which the respondent could lawfully have rejected the literal meaning of “resident” would have been if it was of the view that the literal meaning, as applied in this case to the applicant’s circumstances, would have had the effect of defeating the intention of the Oireachtas in enacting this legislation. The decision of the respondent, whilst undoubtedly expressing dissatisfaction with the outcome of the literal interpretation, does not go near positioning itself on the basis that the intention of the Oireachtas would be defeated. Its decision, as expressed, seems to have been concerned with achieving the most correct interpretation of the term “resident”, nor is there any surprise here. A conclusion that the inclusion of the circumstances of this applicant would defeat or subvert the intention of the Oireachtas in enacting this legislation would indeed be strange. 21. I am quite satisfied that the respondent was bound to apply the literal meaning of the term “resident” when it was apparent that there was no difficulty, ambiguity or absurdity with the term itself, or with including the circumstances of this applicant within the term, given its natural and ordinary meaning. 22. The respondent therefore erred in law, by applying s.5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 and embarking on a purposive interpretation of the 2002 Act. 23. Having made this finding, it is not necessary to embark on any further consideration of the applicant’s status in the institution. However, if I am wrong in concluding that s. 5 should not have been applied, and that a purposive construction of the term ‘resident’ adopted, the respondent erred in law in its conclusion that the applicant’s status in the institution was that of a person who was there by virtue of a lawful contract of employment, and therefore fell outside the scope of what was intended by the Oireachtas. Apart from the fact that the terms of her“employment” prevented her attending school are in direct contravention of the provisions of the School Attendance Act 1926, the arrangement whereby she was in this institution lacked any of the recognisable elements of a lawful contract of employment and were more akin to that which would be easily recognisable as a form of slavery i.e involuntary labour provided with no remuneration given to the person providing the labour, accompanied by extraordinary long hours of work with little or no time off as of right. Even adopting a purposive approach, I am quite satisfied the circumstances governing the applicant’s presence in this institution could not have precluded her from redress under the Act. 24. For those reasons, I will grant the relief sought and remit the matter to the respondent Review Committee.
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