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Irish Court of Criminal Appeal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Irish Court of Criminal Appeal >> D.P.P. (People) v. Keogh [2008] IECCA 86 (9 June 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECCA/2008/2008_IECCA_86.html
Cite as: [2008] IECCA 86
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Neutral Citation: [2008] IECCA 86
[Record No. 60 CJA/08]
Kearns J.
Budd J.
Hanna J.
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993
BETWEEN
THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT of the Court (ex tempore) delivered the 9th day of June, 2008 by Kearns J.
This is an application brought on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions for a review of sentence following a plea to a charge of dangerous driving causing death in the Dublin Circuit Court on 4th
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February, 2008. It relates to an incident of dangerous driving causing the death of Sabina Lynch at Brittas, County Dublin on 21st April, 2006. The respondent Andrew Keogh, who is now twenty-four years of age, was disqualified from driving for seven years and was further fined €2,500.00 and sentenced to three years imprisonment, the entirety of which was suspended on his entering into a bond to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour.
The first thing the Court wishes to say is this, that this incident was a terrible tragedy for the family of Sabina Lynch who was a young woman aged 28 years with two young children, Roisin and Alan, who have been left motherless as a result of Mr. Keogh's speedy driving on the occasion of this accident.
What occurred on the occasion in question was that on a relatively straight stretch of roadway with a fairly rural appearance Mr. Keogh, who was fully taxed and insured and who had no drink taken and who was not engaging in any form of horseplay, either with the other occupants of his car or racing with any other car, was nonetheless travelling at an excessive speed on this roadway having regard to its width. He was travelling, and there was no dispute about this, at about seventy-five miles per hour on a roadway where the relevant speed limit was the equivalent of thirty-six miles per hour, in other words 60 kph. He came over what appears to be a hill or a rise in the road and as he did so a car
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driven by Ms. Lynch's partner was preparing to come out of a side road which was to Mr. Keogh's right about 120 to 130 yards in front of him. Because he was travelling so fast and because he anticipated this car was going to come fully out onto the road he stood on the brakes and left a 75 metre brake mark, but in doing so his car moved to the right and moved into a position where it collided forcefully with the car in which Ms. Lynch was sitting as a front seat passenger. Tragically she suffered injuries as a result of which she died.
She was a devoted mother and was working as a care worker in a nursing home and her life was tragically cut short in this moment of madness on the part of the driver of the motor car.
That said, Mr. Keogh came before the sentencing court as a young man of absolutely impeccable character. He remained at the scene of the accident. There was no question of any defects in the car. There was no question of alcohol or drugs being involved. He has no prior convictions. He has a very good work history and was the subject of numerous character and work references from both employers, people who knew him in his locality and other responsible sources. It is against this factual background that the application for a review must be considered.
There is no doubt that in certain cases a custodial sentence is appropriate for the offence of dangerous driving causing death, particularly where aggravating circumstances exist. Usually there are
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multiple aggravating circumstances. In such cases the degree of blameworthiness on the part of the offender and considerations of general public deterrence may require the imposition of a custodial sentence. I have in mind the kind of escapade which involves stealing a car, racing that car, perhaps in conjunction with another car, trying to elude the attentions of the police. Often enough the drivers and occupants of these vehicles may have taken drugs or alcohol and such people often drive with total disregard for other road users, driving without insurance, without tax or without any regard whatsoever to the basic rules of the road or rules of conduct in relation to other road users.
While the Court can and does sympathise fully with the family of Ms. Lynch, I am sure they would agree that this is not such a case and that on the evening in question it was the solitary fact of speed and nothing else which led to the accident and it is not a case where there is evidence of grossly negligent driving at speed or of breaking traffic rules or lights or signs over a long period of time. But over this 125 or 130 yard stretch the respondent was going at a pace which did not enable him to take appropriate evasive action to avoid the collision which occurred.
The issues arising in this case do to some extent reflect the considerations which arose in The People v. James O'Reilly, in which this Court gave judgment on 11th December, 2007 and where in lieu of a
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suspended sentence the court imposed a sentence of 240 hours community service.
It is very important to explain why the court in that case adopted that approach. There was clear evidence in that case, and I cannot stress this sufficiently, that the offender was most unlikely ever to re-offend. That was hardly surprising because in that case the young man who had been driving the car in which one of his closest friends was a passenger, and which through his negligent driving was in collision and as a result of which his friend died, developed very severe psychiatric problems afterwards. His life was absolutely destroyed, as indeed was his passenger's life, but there was no question whatsoever of him re-offending and the Court took the view that in such circumstances imposing a suspended sentence does not serve the same purpose as it does in the case of a repeat offender or a person with prior convictions who is very much at risk of re-offending.
The Court feels that precisely the same circumstances apply in the instant case, so that the imposition of a suspended sentence in such a case is in reality no sentence at all. On the other hand if the Court decides to impose a community service sentence, which the Court, has been informed Mr. Keogh is willing to undergo, there is then a tangible and visible method whereby a person may, in plain view of the local
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community where the offence occurred, endeavour to make the good to some small degree the harm that he or she has caused.
In the circumstances, the Court in this case, proposes to take the same view as was taken by the court in the O'Reilly case, namely to identify the imposition of a suspended sentence, while it may be appropriate to other cases, as inappropriate having regard to the evidence and the facts of this particular case because there is no suggestion of any possibility of Mr. Keogh re-offending. What it proposes to do, in the circumstances, is to uphold the disqualification from driving for seven years, to uphold the fine of €2,500.00, but instead of the suspended sentence to impose a requirement that he undergo 120 hours of community service in the location where the family of the deceased reside.
The case will have to be adjourned to obtain a report from the Probation Service to set out the feasibility of such a scheme being formulated. The Court will ask the Registrar to write immediately to the Probation Service so that this matter can be mentioned as soon as possible with a view to implementing the' community service order in an appropriate manner. The respondent will remain bound by the terms of his suspended sentence in the interim.
In the light of events in court following the delivery of the Court's decision, the Court will not require that the performance of any
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community service take place in the area where the deceased resided and will await the views and recommendations of the Probation Service as to where such service should be performed.